Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18038 May 31, 1965
ROSA GUSTILO, petitioner,
vs.
AUGUSTO GUSTILO, JOSE GUSTILO, CARLOS GUSTILO, FE GUSTILO, TINA POBLADOR, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOILO, REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION, now DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lopez, Vito Law Offices for petitioner.
Doroila and Sorongon for respondents.
BENGZON, C.J.:
When Calixto Gustilo died in May 1952, he was survived by his wife Martina Poblador and their four legitimate children Augusto, Josefa, Carlos and Fe.
It appears that in August 1945, the spouses executed a deed of sale (Exh. "H") to their said children, of almost all of their real properties; and so, in November 1952, Rosa Gustilo, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Calixto Gustilo, filed this action to annul the sale, and to get the part allegedly corresponding to her, as acknowledged natural daughter, in the estate of Calixto Gustilo. Defendants are his widow and four legitimate children plus two banks, and who had become mortgagees of some realties conveyed under Exhibit H.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment declaring that Rosa had been acknowledged as natural daughter by Calixto, and that Exhibit H was fictitious and void. It issued other orders, which, as we see in the litigation, become immaterial. Previous to the judgment, the court had decreed the dismissal of the complaint against the two banking institutions; and no appeal seems to have been taken therefrom.1äwphï1.ñët
Refusing to admit Rosa's claim, the widow and the legitimate children brought the matter to the Court of Appeals; and that court, after due deliberation, reversed the judgment, expressing the opinion that Rosa Gustilo had no interest to protect, nor right to sue, because she was not a duly acknowledged natural child. 1
This is now Rosa's petition for review, which was given due course to resolve the legal issues.
The pertinent facts of the case were accurately described in the decision of Mr. Justice Castro of the Court of Appeals:
At the trial, she (Rosa) was allowed, over the objection of the defendants, to introduce evidence tending to show that she was begotten in 1898, out of wedlock by Calixto Gustilo and Teodora Soqueno (both deceased) who, at the time of her conception, could marry each other without legal impediment; that from her birth until the age of 7, she was under the custody of her mother who was supported by Calixto Gustilo; that in 1902 Calixto Gustilo married Martina Poblador; and that at the age of seven she was taken into the custody of the said spouses with whom she lived for almost fifteen years. The evidence for the plaintiff further shows that in the year 1902, she studied at the Zarraga public school while she was staying with the mother of Martina at the poblacion of Zarraga; that she later enrolled at the Colegio de San Jose and at the Colegio de Santa Ana together with her sister Josefa, and all her expenses were born by Calixto; that all along she was considered as a member of the family and addressed by her father as "Inday" and at times "Rosa", and was introduced in public gatherings by Calixto as his daugther; and that she received the same treatment from her brothers and sisters and her foster mother Niartina Poblador. ... .
The items of documentary evidence introduced by the plaintiff are the following:
(1) Exh. A — a marriage certificate which states that on the 8th day of October, 1922, Juan Sumagaysay, 26 years of age, the son of Rufino Sumagaysay and Gregoria Sebusa, resident of Leganes, Iloilo, was married to Rosa Gustilo, 23 years of age, the daughter of Calixto Gustilo and Teodora Soqueno.
(2) Exh. B — a letter of Calixto Gustilo addressed to Rosa, and dated February 12, 1917, pertinent part of which reads: "Seniorita Rosa Gustilo y su hermana Josefa, Queridas hijas: ... Conservamas buenas que es siempre el desee de tu padre (Fdo.) CALIXTO GUSTILO."
(3) Exh. C — a letter of Augusto Gustilo to Rosa Gustilo dated September 5, 1918 which in part says: "Senorita Rosa Gustilo, Colegio Santa Ana, Molo, Iloilo, Islas Filipinas, Mis muy queridas Hermanas: ... Vuestro hermano que es quiere (Fdo.) AUGUSTO GUSTILO."
(4) Exh. D — a letter of Augusto Gustilo to Rosa dated February 1, 1920, which in part says: "Señorita Rosa Gustilo, Zarraga, Iloilo, Islas Filipinas, Mi querida hermana: ... Tu hermano que te quiere. (Fdo.) AUGUSTO GUSTILO."
(5) Exh. E — a motion f iled by Augusto Gustilo with the Court in behalf of Rosa dated December 10, 1945, which in part reads: "Rosa Gustilo, my sister, is the registered owner of Lot 9500 of the Cadastral Survey of Santa Barbara, now Zarraga. ... (Fdo.) AUGUSTO GUSTILO."
(6) Exh. F — a deed of donation executed by Calixto Gustilo himself in favor of Rosa in a public document, duly accepted by the latter in the same document, which states in substance that in consideration of the donation the donee will renounce her participation in his estate after his death.
Under the facts set out in the first paragraph above quoted, Rosa Gustilo could conceivably have filed an action for compulsory recognition under Art. 283 of the New Civil Code 2 alleging continuous possession of the status of a natural child of Calixto Gustilo by direct acts of the latter or of his family; but as she did not file such action before his death, she is now precluded from bringing it, inasmuch as she was already mature [54] when Calixto died; and as she did not claim (nor prove) to have discovered after his death some document actually recognizing her. 3
Therefore, this action may not be entertained as an action to compel recognition. It must be regarded as an action by a recognized natural child to enforce her rights as such. As the Court of Appeals has stated, the only provision of law upon which Rosa may now rest her claim is Art. 278 of the New Civil Code, 4 which reads as follows:
ART. 278. — Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. (131a)
Admittedly, plaintiff has not been recognized in a record of birth, nor in a will; but she rests her claim to filiation on the strength of either a statement, before a court of record or statements in an authentic writing. It must be obvious that such statement, to be effective, must be one made by Calixto himself; and that the writing must be the writing of Calixto.
Let us now examine the documents presented.
Exh. A — the certificate of marriage of Rosa Gustilo with Juan Sumagaysay, stating she was the daughter of Calixto Gustilo and Teodora Soqueño.
As it does not appear that this has been signed by Calixto 5 — it is enough. 6
On this same ground, the other papers, Exhs. C, D and E all signed by Augusto Gustilo must be discarded.
Exh. B — is a letter signed by Calixto addressed to "Rosa Gustilo y su hermana Josefa." It says: "Queridas hijas: ... Conservamas buenas que el siempre el desee de tu padre."
The Court of Appeals deemed this letter to be insufficient for it contends no unequivocal avowal that Rosa was Calixto's child. Indeed, it was addressed also to Josefa who was admittedly his own child. It should specially be noted that the letter spoke of "tu madre" referring to his wife Martina who was the mother of Josefa — not of Rosa. At any rate there is much sense in Justice Castro's observation that "it is not uncommon in many Filipino homes that a child who is a perfect stranger to the family but who was taken under similar circumstances, is regarded as a member of the family and called 'hija' or 'hijo' by the head thereof." This view follows and coincides with the line of thought expressed by Manresa in that portion of his commentaries, quoted with approval in Joaquin v. Joaquin, 60 Phil. 3997 wherein adverting to written acknowledgments of paternity of a natural child, he explained:
En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento ... el excrito, aunque contenga otros particulates, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por objeto el reconocimiento deliberado y expreso del hijo natural. No llena, pues, ese objeto la manifestacion que incidentalmente haga el padre de ser hijo natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho mas el dar a una persona el titulo y tratamiento de hijo en certas familiares. (Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo Civil, Tomo 1, pag. 580, 3a. ed.) [Emphasis Ours]
Needless to add, Manresa's above opinion was written as a comment to Art. 131 of the Spanish Civil Code which is exactly the same as Art. 278 of the New Civil Code, except that "in some other public document" has been substituted with "in any authentic writing."
This letter — to recall our previous indications — could probably be material evidence in a suit to compel recognition. However, it is not by itself a voluntary act of recognition, such as is contemplated in Art. 278, which act must be precise and express 8 (Pareja v. Pareja, 6823, May 31, 1954). For as Gitt v. Gitt 9 exemplifies, there may be direct acts of the father which though not constituting voluntary acknowledgment of a natural child, may be used to "compel" recognition as such.
We may now consider the deed of donation, Exh. "F", executed by Calixto in favor of Rosa wherein it is stated, in substance, that in consideration of the donation, the donee renounced her rights to Calixto's inheritance.
This document, petitioner argues, is a clear admission by Calixto that she was his natural daughter; because what rights could she renounce except those of a recognized natural daughter?
The Court of Appeals explained that the document might imply recognition of possible hereditary rights of Rosa, but it does not amount to unequivocal avowal of relationship required by law. 10 We believe this to be a correct evaluation. And answering Rosa's question, it is possible that Calixto paid for renunciation of her rights as illegitimate child, not as a natural child. Who knows?" 11
And then, he might have previously used her own money or her mother's in acquiring some of his properties. 12 Or he might have realized that his acts of kindness might induce a suit to compel recognition; and as he did not want to be so compelled, he donated. 13 It is thus clear, he did not wish to recognize. Wherefore, it would be against his wishes now to hold that, by Exh. "F", Calixto voluntarily recognized Rosa as his natural child.
To emphasize, we have here an alleged voluntary recognition by Calixto. But what could be more involuntary than his act of paying Rosa a certain amount so that she will never claim to be his natural daughter, supposing that as Rosa herself contends, such is the document's meaning? Calixto did not want Rosa to join his estate proceedings as his natural daughter; so he gave her money. At most, the document might imply a tacit admission that Rosa had some right to the inheritance; but certainly it is not a voluntary acknowledgment of a natural child.
In this connection, the matter of equity should not be overlooked. The donation document Exh. "F" was a contract. It was accepted by Rosa. In exchange for the donation (plus recognition according to her)she promised to waive all rights to Calixto's estate. 14 Now that she welshedon her promise by insisting to be his heir, it is equitable to acquire Calixtoto abide his part of the bargain (the recognition)? Is it the law that even after repudiating the document, Rosa may still enforce it (as an act of recognition)? It is apparent to render judgement for her on the strenght of the donation would amount to sanctioning a situation which may look like entrapment, or deception at least. For the reasons herein set forth, the conclusions of the Court of Appeals must be sustained; so its decision dismissing Rosa's action is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1A natural child has no right to inherit, unless acknowledged.
2and also Art. 135 of the Spanish Civil Code.
3The complaint made no such allegation. The Court of Appeals said nothing of a post mortem discovery. The brief now makes a general allegation, without citing pages nor documents. And the Exhibits presented, specially Exhs. B and F should have been known to Rosa during the lifetime of her father.
4Applicable even though she was born before the New Civil Code (Art. 2260).
5It is not usually signed by parent's of the newlyweds.
6Malonda v. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149; Cf. Dayrit v. Piccio, 49 Off. Gaz. 949; Adriano v, De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350.
7Signing "as father" the school report card of child held insufficient recognition. See also Montilla v. Montilla, L-14462, June 30, 1961.
8Must be express, not merely tacit. — Reyes, J.B.I,, Civil Law, Vol. 1, p. 264.
968 Phil. 385.
10See footnote 8.
11 and 12Now that he is dead, the doubt should be resolved in his favor.
13See footnotes 11 and 12.
14Supposing it is valid. — Cf. Art. 816, Spanish Civil Code and Art. 905, New Civil Code. — Having presented Exh. F, Rosa cannot or does not raise the issue; anyway, she may avoid it only after establishing her status — whichis the question. On the other hand, for the heirs to raise it would mean admission of Rosa's status.
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