G.R. No. L-22088




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-22088 July 30, 1964 CELESTINO C. ROSCA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. FEDERICO C. ALIKPALA, ET AL., respondents. R E S O L U T I O N^* BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Respondents seek to clarify our decision rendered on June 30, 1964 declaring unnecessary the mandatory directive against respondent officials of Caloocan City prayed for herein for the reasons expressed in said decision. On August 5, 1963, respondent judge issued an order the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, upon filing a bond in the sum of P10,000, subject to the approval of the Court, the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service is hereby enjoined, during the dependency of this action and until further orders from this Court, from continuing the "re-examination" of petitioners' status, rank and salary, and enforcing his directive requiring the petitioners to take entrance and qualifying-examinations as well as the deduction and reimbursements of salaries effected by said "re-examination" and/or termination of employment while the respondents Abelardo Subido, in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, Macario B. Asistio, in his capacity as Mayor, Dominador M. Danan, in his capacity as Acting Chief of Police, the City Treasurer and City Auditor, all of Caloocan City, are further directed to restore petitioners to the service, in their respective positions and to pay them all their salaries as if there had been no interruption in the payment thereof. In the instant petition, petitioners state in paragraph 4 that on August 9, 1963 respondent judge, motu proprio, modified his previous order of August 5, 1963 by eliminating the portion of its dispositive part pertaining to the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent Caloocan City officials. This statement implies that the respondent judge left intact his mandatory directive against respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to restore petitioners to their respective positions and to pay them all their salaries as if there had been no interruption in the payment thereof. It is for this reason that this Court declared that the relief sought for in the petition is unnecessary because its purpose could be accomplished by enforcing merely the directive issued against said Commissioner of Civil Service. It, however, appears that in issuing the amendatory order of August 9, 1963 premised on the ground that he has no authority to issue a directive which has to be effected outside of his territorial jurisdiction, respondent judge did not merely eliminate the mandatory directive against respondent Caloocan City officials but likewise that issued against respondent Commissioner of Civil Service contrary to the main purpose behind amendment of his order of August 5, 1963. We believe, however, that the elimination of the mandatory directive against respondent Commissioner of Civil Service from the dispositive part of the amendatory order of August 9, 1963 is merely due to an oversight considering the main purpose that prompted him to amend his order of August 5, 1963 as may be seen from the following portion of his amendatory order of August 9, 1963: In the dispositive part of the order dated August 5, 1963, this Court directed the respondents Mayor, Acting Chief of Police, Treasurer and Auditor, all of Caloocan City, to restore the petitioners to the service in their respective positions and to pay them all their salaries as if there had been no interruption in the payment thereof. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët The above-named respondents are officials of Caloocan City and the acts they were directed to perform would be effected outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In the case, however, of Acosta versus Alvendia, et al., G.R. L-14598, promulgated on October 31, 1960, the Supreme Court held in effect that the authority of Courts of First Instance to control or restrain acts by means of the writ of preliminary injunction is limited to acts which are being committed within the territorial boundaries of the respective provinces and districts. Accordingly, the portion of the dispositive part of the order dated August 5, 1963 pertaining to the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the officials of Caloocan City is not in order and should, therefore, be eliminated. It thus appears that the main purpose of the amendatory order is merely to eliminate the mandatory directive against respondent Caloocan City officials because, as the same order states, "the portion of the dispositive part of the order dated August 5, 1963 pertaining to the issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction against the officials of Caloocan City is not in order and should, therefore, be eliminated." However, in the dispositive portion of said order there appears eliminated not only the mandatory directive against the Caloocan City officials but also that against respondent Commissioner of Civil Service. Hence, as already stated, the elimination of the directive against the latter official is merely due to an oversight. This flaw should be here corrected. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted as regards the portion of respondent judge's order of August 9, 1963 which eliminates the mandatory directive against respondent Commissioner of Civil Service in the sense that such mandatory directive as it appears in the order of August 5, 1963 is hereby deemed restored. The petition is dismissed with regard to the prayer for relief against the Caloocan City officials. No costs. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Footnotes ^*Editor's note: See main decision on p. 494, ante. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation