Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16490 January 30, 1964
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and CECILIO GATDULA, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
REYES, J.B.L. J.:
Petitioner, Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc. has filed, through counsel, a motion praying for reconsideration of the decision of this Court, promulgated on June 29, 1963, affirming that of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. We ordered the case set for rehearing on October 23, 1963. The parties have chosen to submit memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
The motion to reconsider is based on two grounds:
(1) That the claimant Gatdula's illness was neither caused nor aggravated by the nature of his employment; and
(2) That his claim was barred for failure to submit it to his employer within the two (2) months period prescribed by section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The first ground is without merit. The findings of fact of the Commission, that the condition of Gatdula's work an driver and loader of the company's buses exposed him to tubercular infection, as well as the presumption of compensability established by statute, have not been adequately destroyed by the evidence invoked by the petitioner. The testimony of Dr. Gaerlan that respondent was contaminated by his deceased wife is pure supposition, and the fact that the wife died ahead, of tuberculosis, does not warrant the inference that she contracted the disease earlier than her husband. We find this assumption of the doctor much too flimsy, it being undeniable that the earlier demise could be due to other factors, such as the weaker constitution of the wife. Mere possibilities are not enough to enervate the statutory presumption.
After mature consideration, the Court reached the conclusion that the second ground is meritorious, and furnishes adequate basis for setting aside the previous decision. "Here it is not disputed", says the Workmen's Compensation Commission in its decree appealed from, "that the notice of injury or sickness and claim for compensation was filed by the claimant only on September 2, 1957 or more than two (2) years from January 23, 1955 the day he stopped working for the respondent. Nevertheless the Commission concluded that the claim was still not barred because the employer (petitioner) "was notified of the ailment of respondent Cecilio Gatdula", since it had actual knowledge thereof, and, in fact, ordered him to stop working. The Commission was of the opinion that this knowledge sufficed to excuse the absence of timely claim under section 27 of the Compensation Act, to the effect that —
SEC. 27. Sufficient notice. — Any notice given in accordance with the provisions of section twenty-five of this Act shall not be considered as invalid or sufficient by reason any incorrectness in the statement of time, place, nature or cause of the injury or of anything else, unless it be shown that the employer has been actually misinformed respecting the injury. Failure to or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to the proceeding herein provided for, if it is shown that the employer, his agent or representative had knowledge of the accident or that the employer did not suffer by such delay or failure. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner points out, with reason, that said section 27 refers clearly to the notice of injury, but not to the claim for compensation; that section 24 of the Act clearly requires the claimant to perform two different acts: (a) notify the employer of the injury or sickness suffered by the claimant worker; and (b) file with the employer a claim for compensation within two months. This is plainly shown by the text of section 24:
SEC. 24. Notice of the injury and claim for compensation. — No compensation proceeding ng under this Act shall prosper unless the employer has been given notice of the injury or sickness as soon as possible after the same was received or contracted, and unless a claim for compensation was made not later than two months after the date of the injury or sickness, or in case of death, not later than three months after death, regardless of whether or not compensation was claimed by the employee himself. Such notice may be given and such claim made by any person considering himself entitled to the compensation or by any other person in his behalf. In case medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies have been furnished voluntarily by the employer, notice of the injury or sickness within the time limit above mentioned shall not be necessary, and if the employer has voluntarily made the compensation payments, the claim for compensation to be made within the time limits above established shall no longer be necessary. (Emphasis supplied)
The statute distinguishes clearly the notice of injury from the claim of compensation, to the extent of prescribing different periods for the filing of each. As to the notice of injury or sickness, the same is to be given "as soon as possible" without any fixed period. The law evidently realizes that, while the time of giving notice can not be predetermined, it is important that the employer be afforded the earliest opportunity to determine the circumstances surrounding the injuring mishap, and obtain the testimony of witnesses while the same is fresh in their memory; for, as pointed out by the eminent criminologist, Dr. Edmond Locard, in his manuals of criminal investigation, the hours immediately following the event to be investigated "are priceless, and in these matters, the time that passes is truth in flight".
Upon the other hand for the filing of the claim for compensation with the employer, the law allows a fixed period of two months (or three months in case of death of a workman). While not as urgent as the giving of notice of injury (which must be done "as soon as possible"), the statute still sets a very short period for filing the claim in order to enable the employer to decide quickly what precautions he must take to protect his interests. For it is evident that his defenses in case the injured workman chooses to hold the employer under Workmen's Compensation Laws will not be the same as those to be taken when the worker elects to sue the employer under the Civil Code. Under the latter, he can set up a variety of defenses (i.e., lack of fault or negligence on the part of the employer, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, last clear chance, etc.) that would not be available under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The distinction between notice of injury and claim for compensation is further emphasized by section 24, where different excuses are allowed for each case. Delay or absence of notice of injury within the time limit is not required "when medical, surgical and hospital services and supplies have been furnished voluntarily by the employer"; while delay in filing a claim for compensation need not be made within the respective time limit "if the employer has voluntarily made the compensation payments". Thus the excuse for delay are neatly distinguished.
Again, the last phrase in section 25 of the Act, that "the notice may include the claim", plainly indicates that the two are not identical, since the permissive "may" reveals that formally, "notice" (of injury) will not include the "claim" for compensation.
The same diversity appears in section 26. After specifying the persons on whom "the notice" is to be served, and the manner in which the same is to be given, the section adds that "the foregoing provisions shall be applicable to the procedure in connection with the claim". Once more, the statute plainly indicates that "notice" (of injury) is not to be identified with "claim" for compensation.
From the premises, we think it is incontestable that when the Workmen's Compensation Law, in its section 27, Speaks of "sufficient notice", and that "failure to or delay in giving "notice" shall not be a bar — if it is shown that the employed — had knowledge of the accident or did not suffer by such delay or failure", without making the least reference therein to the claim for compensation, or any assimilation of one and the other (as is done in sections 25 and 26, heretofore discussed), the provisions of section 27 must have been intended to apply exclusively to the notice of injury, and do not apply to the claim for compensation. For the courts to hold otherwise would require disregard of a clear legislative intent.
We are not called upon to decide whether the time limits set by the Compensation Act are too short or not. The fixing of these periods are essentially the matter of legislative discretion that the courts may not disregard without breaching the separation of powers.
Since it is clear that the only statutory excuse for a late claim is the making by the employer of compensation payments, in part or in full (section 24), and since no such payments were approved to have been made in this case by the employer. Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc., the award by the Compensation Commission is not warranted in law.1äwphï1.ñët
The great majority of decisions in the United States (from which we derived our own Compensation Act) is to the effect that failure to present a claim for compensation within the legal time limit is fatal, because its presentation in due time is a condition precedent to the compensation proceedings and of jurisdictional import (see 78 ALR, p. 1294). This Court has expressed the same views in Luzon Stevedoring vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-18388, June 28, 1963.
Respondent-claimant invokes our ruling in Saulog vs. Del Rosario, L-11504, May 23, 1959, that any provisions concerning the form of notice should normally be deemed applicable to claim; but the ruling that either or both of them may be written or verbal does not warrant the conclusion that one can take the place of the other, or that anything which applies to notice should also apply to the claim, when the statute plainly considers each distinct from the other, their purposes being likewise diverse.
Finally, we are not unaware that the tendency of late has been to view delay in filing a claim for compensation with the employer, or his representative, as being merely a defense that is subject to the general rules of waiver (2 Larson, Workmen's Comp. Law, 284-287; Horowitz, Workmen's Compensation Law, 254, 255), and such is the minority view in the United States (78 ALR 1306). But even if this Court were to adhere to the latter doctrine, the award in the present case would still remain untenable, since the employer from the very beginning has pleaded the delay, and consistently relied thereon throughout these proceedings without adopting any position incompatible with such defense.
WHEREFORE, the motion is granted, and our decision of June 24, 1963 is reconsidered and set aside. A new decision shall be entered whereby the award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission under appeal is reversed, and the claim for compensation ordered dismissed. No costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
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