Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15287 September 30, 1963
VIVENCIO JORNALES, ALFREDO BARRIOS, FLORENTINO CLAVESILLAS, LIBERATO PAO, DIGNO GATI-AN, AURELIO DINOPOL, IGNACIO GOLEZ, GALO REYES and TEODORO TIMONEY, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS and COMPAÑIA CELULOSA DE FILIPINAS, defendants-appellees.
Teodorico R. Reyes, Benjamin D. Somera and Marcelo Z. Culi for plaintiffs-appellants.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental dated October 29, 1958, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The complaint was filed September 17, 1958, alleging that plaintiffs were permanent, year-round employees defendants by virtue of agreements entered into between them and that, in violation of said agreements defendants dismissed the plaintiffs from their employment. It was prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued for immediate reinstatements; and after trial, that the dismissals be declared illegal and plaintiffs awarded moral damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer defendants alleged that they had no agreement with plaintiffs with respect to the duration of employment and justified the dismissals on the ground that defendants had entered with the United Central and Cellulose Labor Association (UCCLA-PLUM), the exclusive bargaining representative designated by the C.I.R., into a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed-shop clause, with which defendants, at the instance of the UCCLA, asked plaintiffs to comply, but that plaintiffs failed to do so, whereupon defendants considered them separated from employment as of September 15, 1958.
In the order appealed from the court declared itself without jurisdiction because Plaintiffs' claim for reinstatement was closed interwoven with a question of unfair labor practice.
Plaintiffs now maintain that the lower court erred (1) in holding that it had no jurisdiction over the case; (2) in taking into consideration defendants' answer in determining jurisdiction; and (3) in dismissing the case without defendants' having filed a motion to dismiss.
Appellants designate their action as one for "specific performance with damages and preliminary mandatory injunction." This description, however, is not necessarily conclusive as to the nature of the action. In the complaint, after alleging the conditions of their employment, appellants state the manner of their dismissal, thus:
That, predicating their action on the notices to the plaintiffs, copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes A to A-8, which notices are not based on any of the causes specifically provided by law for dismissal of employees and violate their contractual obligations with the plaintiffs, the defendants have dismissed the herein plaintiffs from employment with them as shown in the letters, copies of which are hereto attached as annexes B to B-8 and made integral parts hereof. (par. 4, complaint).1awphîl.nèt
The abovementioned annexes to the complaint are deemed part thereof and should be considered together with the formal allegations therein1 in order to arrive at a correct conclusion as to the nature of the action. Annexes A to A-8 are individual letters dated August 11, 1958, sent by appellee Compañia Celulosa de Filipinas to appellants, informing them that on April 12, 1958 said company and the UCCLA entered into a collective bargaining agreement, one of the terms of which was that those employees who were not yet members of the union should be required to become members 15 days from the signing of the agreement, and should continue to be so as a condition of their continued employment; that the UCCLA had formally demanded from the company that appellants, who were not members of said union, comply with said provision within 30 days from notice; and that if appellants failed to register within said period, without the UCCLA having withdrawn its demands with respect to them, the company would be constrained to considering them separated fro the service. Annexes B to B-8 are individual letters to appellants, informing them that since they failed to affiliate themselves with the UCCLA, and the latter had demanded prompt implementation of the closed-shop agreement, they were considered dismissed as of that date.
In effect, therefore, the complaint avers that appellant were employees of appellees, and that upon their failure to become members of the UCCLA as required by appellees the latter dismissed them. This is a clear statement of an unfair labor practice committed by the employers,2 cognizance of which, there being in the petition a prayer for reinstatement, as in this case is given to the Court of Industrial Relations.3
Appellants insist that what they seek is not the prosecution of an unfair labor practice but the specific performance of their contracts of employment which had been violated by the unwarranted dismissals. Be that as it may, the alleged manner in which the employment contracts were breached, as described by appellants themselves, placed the case outside the jurisdiction of the lower court.
A contract of employment may be violated by the employer by unjustifiably dismissing the employee, in which case the general law on contracts applies, and the action to compel the employer to reinstate the employee is cognizable by the court of first instance. However, if the dismissal is discriminatory — though also a breach of a private contract ordinarily remediable by rescission or reinstatement by way of specific performance — it constitutes a violation of a public right which the law specially protects, and for the redress of which a specific procedure in a designated court, i.e., the Industrial Court, must be followed.4
Upon finding that it has no jurisdiction over the case, the lower court correctly dismissed it, even though appellees had not moved for dismissals.5
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1The copy of the lease attached to the pleadings, under the modern rules of practice, became a part of the declaration of the petition, and both are construed together in determining the sufficiency of the statement or averments of the cause of action. (Cox v. Sinclair Gulf Oil Co., 265 SW 196; Warren v. La Salle Co., 262 SW 526.).
The petition and the document annexed are construed together, and error in the petition as to interest was amended by reference to the contract of lease annexed. Vincent v. Frelich, 23 S 373.
It has been repeatedly held by this and other courts that the mere reference to a contract in a pleading does not make that contract a part of the pleading, unless a copy of it is annexed. Du Pont Automobile Distributors v. Du Pont Motors Inc., 210 NYS 577.
The Petition is loosely drawn. Had a motion to make more definite and certain been filed by defendants, it should have been sustained. Aided, however, by the bond upon which the action was based, and a copy of which was attached, marked as an exhibit and made a part of the petition, the petition is sufficient as against a general demurrer. Davis v. Board of Com'rs of Choctaw County, 158 P. 294.
2It shall be unfair, labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization, provided, that nothing it, this Act or in any other Act or statute of the Republic of the Philippines shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization the representative of the employees as provided in section 12. (Sec. 4 [a] [4], R.A. 875.).
Nonetheless, those already in the employ of the company when the collective bargaining agreement was entered into, are not under obligation to join the Union to keep their jobs, Sumcad v. CIR, L-18716, April 29, 1963; United States Lines Co. v. Associated Watchmen and Security Union, et al., L-15508, June 29, 1963.
3The Court (of Industrial Relations) shall have jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practices and is empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. (See. 5 [a], R.A. 875). Barranta v. International Harvester Co., L-18198, April 22, 1963; Araullo v. Monte de Piedad Savings Bank, et al., L-17840, April 23, 1963.
4The reason for the distinction between an unfair labor practice case and a mere violation of an employer of its contractual obligations towards an employee, is, as we have stated above, thus: That unfair labor practice cases involve violations of a public right or policy, to be prosecuted like criminal offenses; whereas a breach of an obligation of the employer to his employee is only a contractual breach to be redressed like an ordinary, contract or obligation. National Labor Union v. Insular Yebana Tobacco Corporation. L-15363, July 31, 1961; Baguio Gold Mining v. Tabisola, L-15265, April 27, 1962.
5It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over, the subject matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of PI. & Pr., Vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu (Wakefield v. Goudy, 4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman v. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496) U.S. v. Jayme, 24 Phil. 90.
Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the action. Sec. 10, Rule 9, Rules of Court,.
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