Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18615 December 24, 1963
AMANDO M. DIZON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DEMETRIO ENCARNACION, defendant-appellee.
A.M. Dizon and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
A.J. Fransisco and A.J. Fransisco for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Plaintiff Amando M. Dizon seeks the review of an order of the Court of FirstInstance of Pampanga dismissing the complaint herein, without costs, upon the ground that venue had been improperly laid..
In a complaint filed with said court, plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, seeks to recover from defendant Demetrio B. Encarnacion the aggregate sum of P50,000.00, by way of damages allegedly suffered by the former in consequenceof the filing by the latter, in Special Proceeding No. 2025 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, entitled "Inestate Estate of the Deceased AgustinN. Medina," of a pleading captioned "Manifestation and Refutation," containingstatements which are said to be libelous and deragatory to dignity, integrity,reputation and standing of the former, as well as irrelevant to the issues in said special proceeding..
In due course, the defendant moved to dismiss the case upon the theory that, pursuant to Art. 360 of the revised Penal Code, as ammended by Republic ActNo. 1289, plaintiff's action should be instituted in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, in which said "Manifestation and Refutation", had been filed. The motion was granted by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,which accordingly dismissed the present case, without prejudice to its renewalin the "proper court." A reconsideration of the order to this effect havingbeen denied, plaintiff has brought the case to us by record on appeal..
The appeal hinges on said provision of the Revised Penal Code, as ammended by Republic Act. No. 1289, the pertinent part of which reads: ... The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamation as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of First instance of the province or city where any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where the libel is published, circulated, displayed, or exhibited in a province or a citywherein neither the offender or nor the offended the party resides the civil and criminal actions may be brought in the court of first Instance thereof:Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts; And provided, finally, That this ammendmentshall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminalactions to have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of hislaw..
which, as contendent by the defendant, was constuend by the lower court to mean: .
... that when any of the accused or any of the offended of the parties resides in a province or city where a written defamation is published,circulated, displayed or exhibited, the action, civil or criminal, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of said province or but when the offender or any of the offenders or the offended party or any of the offended parties does not reside in a province or city, where the publication, circulation, display or exhibition were made, such action must be interposed therein..
We find ourselves unable to concur in this view. The language of the above quoted provision is, to our mind, plain and clear. It establishes a general rule and an exception thereto. Civil actions for damages in cases of written defamation "shall" be filed with the court of first instance of the province or city in which "any of the accused or "any of the offended paries resides."In other words, the plaintiff is limited in his choice of venue to the court of first instance of his residence or to that of any of the accused. Plaintiffmay not file the action elsewhere, unless the libel is published, circulated,displayed, or exhibited in a province or city wherein neither the offender northe offended party resides, in which case "the civil criminal actions may be brought in the court of first instance thereof." The verb "may" is permissive.Hence, it does not necessarily imply a complete abrogation of the general rule laid down in the preceeding sentence, except in sofar as it broadens thetwo (2) alternatives therein set forth, by giving the plaintiff a third choiceof venue. .lawphil.net
Although the term "may" should be taken as "must" or "shall" when the intention of the law maker to give thereto a mandatory or compolsary meaningis patent or manifest, no such intent appears insofar as the above provisionis concerned. On the contrary, the use of the word "may" in the first, clearlysuggest that Congress meant the second sentence to be merely permissive, notmandatory. Indeed, when the libelous imputation has not been published or circulated in the locality wherein either of the parties resides, the offendedparty may not wish to initiate the action therein, for the same would have the the effect of giving the additional publicity to the derogatory, and of increasing the harm already caused to the complainant. As a consequence, he "may" prefer to file suit where the libel had actually been published or circulated. Hence, the provision of this effect has been established, in our opinion, for his benefit, which he may waive..
Otherwise, if the complainant were a resident of Jolo and the defendant,residing in Cebu, had defamed him in Batanes, it would be necessary to bringthe action in the latter province, thereby imposing upon the average memberof the community a serious hindrance to the vindication of his most preciouspossession - his good name and reputation. In fact, if the theory advanced by the appellee were upheld, the defendants could purposely choose to publish and circulate their defamatory imputations in a place far away from where they and the offended parties resides in order to make it convenient, if not well-nigh impossible for the letter to sue the former for redress of the wrongcommitted them. Neither the language of the law nor the adduced by herein appellee warrant the belief that Congress intended to create such obstacles to the prosecution of those guilty of the crime of libel..
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside and the case hereby remanded to the lower court further proceedings, with the costs of this instance against the appellee. It is so ordered..
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Barrera, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur..
Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, took no part..
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