G.R. No. L-14591




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-14591 September 26, 1962 PINDAñGAN AGRICULTURAL COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE P. DANS, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Lands, PLACIDO L. MAPA, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, PEDRO U. ASENSI, in his capacity as District Land Officer at Dagupan City, EMITERIO DE LOS SANTOS, MARCELO DE LOS SANTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Primicias and Del Castillo for plaintiff-appellee. Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants government officials. Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for defendants-appellants non-government officials. LABRADOR, J.: Counsel for plaintiff-appellee has filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision claiming that as Republic Act No. 2613 increased the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to P200,000, on August 1, 1959, this Court has lost jurisdiction to decide the case on appeal, and should have remanded the same to the Court of Appeals for final decision in accordance with the ruling of this Court in similar or parallel cases. Following this contention it is argued that if this Court has jurisdiction to try the case and decide the appeal, it may do so only on questions of law and should take as a basis for it decision the findings of fact of the court below. As further ground for the motion for reconsideration the plaintiff-appellee has submitted the affidavits of some 80 heads of families alleged to compose the plaintiff corporation, to support its theory that the Lands Bureau and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have abused their discretion in denying the petition of plaintiff corporation for the lease or sale of the lands subject of the action to itself. Defendants-appellants non-officials, replying to the first ground of the motion for reconsideration, argue that the lands subject of the action contain 491.99 hectares and are located in the rich and fertile rice regions of Pangasinan; that said lands are already well developed and were productive as early as 1935; that the assessed value of P51,127.23 is based on the values of properties in the vicinity long before 1933; and that the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the lands subject of the action could be worth no less than P5,000 per hectare, of which fact this Court can and should take judicial notice; that since this Court had acquired jurisdiction of this case, that jurisdiction continues despite approval of the law. Replying to the second ground the motion for reconsideration, it is argued that the plaintiff corporation cannot possibly represent the 93 heads of families, original tenants on the lands, because of the 273 shares of stock, 160 shares now stand in the name of Cipriano P. Primicias, 30 in the name of Nieves Primicias and 30 in the name of Javier Primicias, and the claim that the corporation represents 93 heads of families is not true. After the presentation of the opposition the plaintiff-appellee filed a reply insisting on its claim that the decisions of this court in previous cases support the rule that upon the approval of Republic Act No. 2613 the case should have been forwarded to the Court of Appeals for decision, and that consequently this Court cannot review the questions of fact but must rely in making the decision on the findings of fact of the court below. It is further claimed in reply that the 178 actual occupants of the lands consist of the 93 heads of families, original tenants, and their heirs and successors in interest. It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus: . . . that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latter's jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: . . . . Furthermore, considering that Pangasinan is a rice-producing province and reputed to be the rice granary of the Philippines, and the further fact that the land subject of the action has been cultivated since before 1940 we can take judicial notice of the fact that the value of land certainly cannot be less than P500 per hectare, considering that in many rice-producing provinces the value of similar lands ranges now from P2,000 to P5,000 per hectare. With this finding of fact, the first ground for the reconsideration of the decision must be denied. The claim of the plaintiff-appellee that this Court should review questions of law only and rely for questions of fact on the decision of the trial court is, therefore, also denied. As to the second ground of the motion for reconsideration, the supposed error incurred by Us in our findings of fact is in supposedly overlooking the fact that the 9 heads of families represented by the plaintiff corporation had been in actual occupation of the land in question. While the record shows that 93 families used to occupy the land as tenants of the original owners and many of them continued to stay thereon, we find that said possession and cultivation by said original tenants cannot be availed of as a ground for the plaintiff corporation's claim. The 93 heads of families were not presented as witness in the trial of this case, and even if they were in actual possession of the land, the fact alone does not entitle the plaintiff corporation to base its right to preference thereon. The record shows that the plaintiff relies in its action upon the fact that the original occupants had supposedly transferred their rights, titles, interests, actions and participations to the plaintiff corporation. (See paragraph 2 of the amended complaint, page 55 of the record appeal.) But such assignment is unavailing under the law, firstly because it was not shown that the said occupants had presented or filed applications for homestead or sale of the lands occupied by them, and secondly because even if they did so, it does not further appear that approvalof the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had been secured thereto. Assignments of homestead rights may be made only with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.1awphîl.nèt The land subject of the present litigation was acquired by the Government from a private owner, who had failed to repurchase the same after its confiscation by the defunct Agricultural Bank. Consequently the Public Land Act governs its disposition, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Act No. 3038, as follows: SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is hereby authorized to sell or lease land of the private domain of the Government of the Philippine Islands, or any part thereof, to such persons, corporations or associations as are, under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-Eight Hundred and Seventy-four, known as the Public Land Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease of agricultural public land. SEC. 2. The sale or lease of the land referred to in the preceding section shall, if such land is agricultural, be made in the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed in chapters five and six, respectively, of said Public Land Act, and if it be classified differently, in conformity with the provisions of chapter nine of said Act: Provided, however, That the land necessary for the public service shall be exempt from the provisions of this Act. Assuming that the original 93 heads of families, the original tenants of the former owners, had continued occupying their holdings and had acquired rights thereto by such occupation, the transfer, assignment and conveyance by them of the lands so occupied, or of all their rights or interest thereto could not be made without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, in accordance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Public Land Act. (Commonwealth Act No. 141.) By reason of the illegality of any supposed transfer, it is evident that the plaintiff-appellee may not claim preference to lease or purchase the land in question. Furthermore, if the supposed original occupants and tenants occupying the lands had any interest in the lands adverse to the ruling or findings of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, they should have been the ones to file the protest and subsequent action in their own names under the principle that actions should be filed in the names of the real parties in interest. But, as alleged by the plaintiff-appellee in its complaint, these original 93 heads of families had assigned their rights, titles, actions and participations, so, they no longer have such rights, actions and interest. Neither has the corporation any such right, title and interest to the property because it may not acquire these without the approvalof the corresponding authority. The import of the decision rendered in this case must be borne in mind. It sustains the findings and conclusion of both the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that the land subject of the action must be awarded to the actual occupants and not to the plaintiff corporation. Findings of fact of the said officials cannot be reviewed by the courts. (Coloso vs. Board of Accountancy, G.R. No. L-5750, April 20, 1953; Alfafara vs. Mapa, et al., G. R. No. L-7042, May 28, 1954; Francisco vs. Rodriguez, et al., G. R. No. L-8263, May 21, 1956; Pajo, et. al. vs. Ago, et al., G. R. No. L-15414, June 30, 1960). We find that the resolution awarding the lands the occupants has not been shown to constitute an abuse of their discretion; hence, the motion for reconsideration must be denied. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista, Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur. Makalintal, Padilla and Regala, JJ., took no part. 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