G.R. No. L-14573




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-14573 May 18, 1962 CONCEPCION FELICIANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents. Vicente R. Macasaet for petitioner. Nora G. Nostratis for respondent Court of Agrarian Relations. Meliton C. Parducho for respondent Amado Afable. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Concepcion Feliciano filed a petition before the Court of Agrarian Relations asking for authority to dispossess her tenant Amado Afable of his holding situated in barrio Libtong, Meycauayan, Bulacan, on the ground that (1) she desires to cultivate it personally under Section 50 (a), Republic Act No. 1199, and (2) said tenant failed to pay in full the agreed annual rental for the agricultural years 1951 to 1955. The tenant, thru counsel, after admitting his tenancy relationship with petitioner, disclaimed knowledge of the truth of the allegations contained in the petition. After both parties had presented their evidence, the court, on September 8, 1958, rendered judgment denying the petition. Petitioner was required to maintain her tenancy relationship with respondent and to respect his peaceful possession of his landholding in accordance with law. Petitioner interposed the present petition for review. The issues posed by petitioner are: (a) Whether a cultivation with aid of, or through, a son and son-in-law, complies with Section 50 (a), Republic Act No. 1199, as ground for dispossession of the tenant. (b) Whether the petitioner has evidence to support her claim of non-payment of the rentals for the years 1951 to 1954. (c) Whether the finding that petitioner 'did not show that the "agreed" rental is legal and proper', is supported by the evidence. With regard to the first issue, it was proven that petitioner gave notice to her tenant that she intended to work the land with the aid of her son Marcelino Feliciano and son-in-law Pastor Bervoso. She notified her tenant of such intention on July 12, 1956. In another letter, dated February 26, 1957, she advised him of her intention to get back the land for the reason that he was not complying with his obligation to pay the rental agreed upon. And on March 18, 1957, she notified the court of her intention to personally cultivate the land. The agrarian court found that petitioner complied with the law relative to the notice requirement prior to the grant of authority to cultivate the land on the part of the owner, but reached the conclusion that petitioner cannot avail of the right granted by law to get back the land for that purpose because, according to the evidence, she will not be the one to personally cultivate the holding but will deliver it to her son and son-in-law considering that she is already aged and sickly and is incapable to do manual work. In the opinion of the agrarian court, to warrant authority to eject a tenant from his landholding on the ground of personal cultivation it is indispensable that petitioner be capable of farming the land but will only do so with the aid of her son or son-in-law, the same is contrary to the spirit and purpose of a law. We disagree with this view. While the law provides that the bona fide intention of the land holder to cultivate the land personally, or thru the employment of farm machinery of implements, is a sufficient cause for dispossession of a tenant from his holding, this provision should not be taken literally. A landholder who owns a small parcel of land which is farmed by a tenant and desires to get it back because he has a son who can do the farming for him comes within the spirit of this provision, provided that he does not have any other property and the one to do the cultivation is a member of his family. The idea is to give the landholder an opportunity to attend to the cultivation of his farm to improve his financial condition. To hold otherwise would be to advance the fortune of an outsider to the detriment of the member of his own family. Moreover, considering the cohesion existing among the members of a Filipino family because of the intimate spiritual ties that bind them one can hardly dispute that the work of one is the work of the rest. This is the same philosophy we expressed in a case involving the desire of a wife-landholder to work the land thru her husband even if she herself was not in a position to do the farming. We said, in upholding the right of the wife to get back the landholding, that by the contract of marriage, a man and a woman enter a joint life, acting, living and working as one. Upon marriage, the husband and the wife become one single, moral, spiritual, and social being, not only for purposes of procreation, but also for purposes of mutual help and protection. There is between them a full and complete community of existence.¹ The same community of life and of interest exist between the members of the same family. We can even say that the spiritual tie is greater when it comes to the relation of a mother and a son. If a wife is given the privilege of working a farmland thru her husband, no valid reason is seen why a mother cannot be given the same privilege.1äwphï1.ñët Moreover, the law allows a tenant to cultivate a piece of agricultural land held under a contract of tenancy either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household (Republic Act No. 1199, Section 4, paragraph 3, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263). Note that he is not even required to have said cultivation undertaken by immediate members of his family, but only by his immediate farm household, who may or may not belong to the family. Surely, no reason exists why the same right should be denied to the landowner himself. If the purpose of the law is to establish the tenancy relation between landlord and tenant upon the principle of social justice, and to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenant and landholder (Section 2, Republic Act No. 1199), the protective arm of the law must be extended equally to the tenant as well as to the landlord. Having reached the above conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by petitioner. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Petitioner is hereby granted authority to dispossess respondent in order that she may cultivate her landholding under Section 50 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199. No costs. Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur. Footnotes ¹Saclolo, et al. v. Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-13274, January 30, 1960. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation