G.R. Nos. L-15214-15




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. Nos. L-15214-15 October 26, 1960 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE C. CRUZ, accused. GLOBE ASSURANCE CO., INC., bondsman-appellant. Alejo Mabanag, A. Magno and Saura for appellant. Asst. Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Solicitor Emerito M. Salvador appellee. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Felipe C. Cruz was charged with estafa in two years separate cases before the Justice of the Peace Court of Lucena, Quezon. To secure his provisional liberty, he was allowed to put up a personal bail bond in the amount of P7,000.00 which was subscribed in the two cases by the Globe Assurance Co., Inc. Thereafter, the cases were forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Quezon where the accused was formally indicted charging him with the same crime of estafa to which he pleaded not guilty. On June 25, 1955, a copy of the notice of hearing was sent to the bondsman which was served thru the sheriff of the City of Manila by leaving it. When the date of hearing came, the accused failed to appear, whereupon the court ordered the forfeiture of the bond giving the bondsman 30 days within which to produce the accused and to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of its bond. On July 21, 1955, the accused himself filed a motion for reconsideration attaching thereto an affidavit of merit. Because the bondsman failed to comply with the court's order dated July 18, 1955, the trial court rendered judgment against it for the amount of its bond, while ordering the arrest of the accused unless he files a new bail bond. Thereupon, upon receipt of said order, the accused filed on October 23, 1956 a new bond thru the Alliance Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. for the same amount of P7,000.00, which was duly approved, resulting in the abatement of the order for his arrest. On June 17, 1957, the Globe Assurance Co., Inc., the original bondsman, filed a motion praying that the accused be required to file a new bail bond in order that its own bond may be cancelled, which motion the court denied considering that said bond has already been declared forfeited in view of its failure to produce the accused on the date of hearing. The bondsman filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court also denied on the ground that the order forfeiting the bond has already become final and executory. The bondsman filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the court likewise denied, although it stated that if it could produce the accused within sixty days the court might look with its petition for relief, whereupon the bondsman interposed the present appeal. Under the rules of this Court, when the appearance of an accused is required, his sureties shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date. If the accused fails to appear as required, the bond is declared forfieted and the bondsman are given 30 days within which to produce the accused and to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond. Within the said period of 30 days the bondsmen (a) must produced the body of the accused, or give their reason for his non-production; and (b) must explain satisfactory why the accused did not appear when first required so to do. If they fail to comply with these requisites, the court shall render judgment against them on the bond (Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Court). In the instant cases, the lower court issued a notice setting their hearing on July 15, 1955, copy of which was sent to bondsmen-appellant thru the sheriff of Manila who made the corresponding return on the back thereof to the effect that he has served the same by leaving a copy with a person authorized to received it. When said date came, the accused failed to appear and so the court declared the bond forfeited and gave the bondsman 30 days within which to produce the accused and to show cause why the judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond. And since the bondsman-appellant failed to either produce the accused or give a satisfactory explanation of its failure within the period set for doing so, the lower court rendered judgment against it for the amount of the bond. The lower court, therefore, did nothing but to comply with the rules relative to the bond filed by appellant. But it is contended that three days after the confiscation of the bond was ordered by the trial court, the accused on his own accord filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the lifting of the order for the reasons stated in his affidavit of merit, which motion the court should have entertained not only because it was seasonably filed but because the reasons alleged for his failure appear to be satisfactory. While these reasons may be satisfactory with regard to the order of arrest, which, in effect were so found by the trial court when it ordered the release of the accused on condition that he files a new bail bond, they were not satisfactory insofar as the appellant is concerned, it appearing that it utterly failed to explain its failure to produce that accused as required by the court. What appellant did was to file a motion for the cancellation of its own bond, which the lower court properly denied, considering that the order forfeiting the bond had become final long ago. It is true that the bondsman now claims that it failed to respond to the order of July 18, 1955 because it never received a copy thereof which made it impossible for it to implement it, but this hard to believe considering the time that has been elapsed since its issuance to the date it filed its motion for cancellation. To this effect, we find satisfactory the following comment of the Solicitor General: . . . The facts as shown by the records however, furnish adequate to support to warrant the application of the presumption of law to the effect that said orders were duly received by appellant bondsman. No convincing explanation has been adduced to prove a conclusion to the contrary. In fact, several notices of hearing have reached bondsman-appellant. Indeed, the almost two years that had elapsed from the time the last order was issued until the motion for substitution and cancellation of bond was filed, is quite considerably long enough to have made appellant discover the status of the case as part of their business operation, especially so in the face of an assertion by appellant in its motion for reconsideration that even as early as September, 1954, the accused already moved his residence without even notifying the bondsman so that the notice sent by us as early as September 1954, returned unclaimed and since then, all notices sent to the accused returned unclaimed. However, considering the fact the three days after the forfeiture of appellant's bond accused immediately submitted to the jurisdiction of the court giving weighty reasons for his failure to appear, we agree with the Solicitor General that the amount adjudged against appellant may be reduced to a degree this court may deem reasonable, following the policy enunciated several similar cases,¹ especially that of People vs. Puyal, 98 Phil., 415; 52 Off Gaz. (16) 6886. WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated September 12, 1955 is hereby modified in the sense of reducing the amount adjudged against appellant to P2,000.00. No pronouncement as to costs. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur. Footnotes ¹ People vs. Alamada, 89 Phil., 1; People vs. Reyes, 48 Phil., 139. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation