Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12170 April 18, 1960
PEOPLE'S SURETY & INSURANCE Co., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PAZ PUEY VDA. DE LIMCACO, HON. FERNANDO C. VILLAROSA, as Judge of Municipal Court Pasay City, and the SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA respondents-appellees.
Enrique Jimenez for appellees.
Altavas, Liboro & Daza for appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an Appeal from an order of the court of First Instance of Rizal, denying the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the People's Surety & Insurance Compania v, Inc, hereafter referred to as the Company, for the purpose of nullifying certain orders issued and a decision rendered in Civil Case No. 1362 of the Municipal Court of the City of Pasay, entitled "Paz Puey Vda. de Limcaco, plaintiff, vs. Peoples Surety and Insurance Company, Inc., defendant."
Said case No. 1362 was instituted by Mrs. Limcaco, on December 9, 1954, for the recovery of a sum of money. Although duly summoned, the company did not answer or appear before said Municipal Court on December 21, 1954, the date set for bearing of the case. Inasmuch as the sheriff' return of the service of summons had not, a yet, been attached to the record, the hearing was postponed to December 24, 1954. On this date, the Company again failed to appear, it having been given no notice of said postponement. The Company was there declared in default, on motion of Mrs. Limcaeo, and the latter presented her evidence. However judgment was rendered, on January 8, 1955, dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence to sustain the averments thereof. On motion of Mrs. Limcaco, the court granted ex parte, on January 21, 1955, a new trial, which was held on February 6, 1955, without notice to the Company. Upon consideration of the evidence then introduced by Mrs. Limcaco, the court rendered, on February 11, 1955, another decision reversing its former decision dated January 8, 1955, and sentencing the Company to pay the sum claimed in the complaint. Copy of this second decision was not served upon the Company.
On August 18, 1955 — or soon after the lapse of the period of six (6) months within which relief may be sought under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court — Mrs. Limcaco Med a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which motion was granted forthwith. Upon receipt, of copy of said writ from the Sheriff of Manila, or on, August 29, 1955, the Company moved to set aside and for a reconsideration of the decision of February 11, 1955, upon the ground of nullity of all the proceedings leading thereto, for lack of the requisite notice. This motion was denied on September 28, 1955, whereupon, or on October 8; 1955, the Company instituted the case at bar, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against Mrs. Limcaco, the Municipal Judge of the City of Pasay and the Sheriff of Manila, for the annulment, by a writ of certiorari, of the aforementioned orders of December 24, 1954, January 21 and August 18, 1955, and of the decision of February 11, 1955, in said case No. 1362. The Company prayed, also, in its, complaint, for a writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, said Sheriff of Manila had garnished a deposit of the Company with the People's Bank and Trust Company. After the filing of the answer of respondents herein, or on October 29, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued, on motion of the Company, a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining said Sheriff from proceeding with the execution of the aforementioned decision, except with respect to the amount already garnished, as above stated. Upon submission of the case for decision, the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued the appealed order, dated January 19, 1957, denying the petition for certiorari, "for lack of merits". Hence, this appeal.
Respondents seek to justify the above-mentioned absence of notice to the Company, upon the ground that, having been declared in default, it was not entitled to said notice. The Company maintains, however, that the order of December 24, 1954, declaring the same in default is null and void, it having been given no notice of the hearing to be held on that date. Upon the other hand, respondents contend, in effect, that the Company was in default prior thereto, and was, consequently, not entitled to any notice, it having been in default since it failed to answer the complaint and appear in court on December 21, 1954. Section 13 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that:
If the defendant does not appear at the time and place designated in the summons, he may be declared in default, and the court shall thereupon proceed to hear the testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses, and shall render judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the facts alleged and proved. (Emphasis ours.)
This provision merely authorizes the court to declare the defendant in default for failure to appear at the time and place designated in the summons. Unlike section 6 of Rule 35 of the Rules of Court (regulating the procedure in courts of first instance), which provides that "if the defendant fails to answer within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff, order judgment against the defendant by default," it does not make such declaration of default mandatory upon the inferior court, which, may, therefore, refrain from making it, if, in its sound judgment, the. interest of justice will best be served thereby, in the light of the attending circumstances.
In the case at bar, the Company had not been declared in default prior to December 24, 1954, and, hence, was entitled to notice of the hearing scheduled on that date. Consequently, the hearing then held and the order then issued, declaring it in default, for non-appearance at such hearing, were null and void, and so were the subsequent proceedings held without such notice, predicated upon said invalid declaration of default.
Moreover, the complaint of Mrs. Limcaeo was dismiss by respondent Judge in his decision of January 8, 1955, upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence presented by her on December 24, 1954. However, a new trial was granted ex parte, on motion of Mrs. Limaco, and the Company was not notified, either of the date of the new trial, or of the decision rendered on February 11, 1955, revising that of January 8, 1955, and sentencing the Company to pay the amount claimed by Mrs. Limcaco. Consequently, the Company had no knowledge of this second decision or of the proceedings leading to its promulgation, until sometime late in August, 1955, when it received copy of the writ of execution, issued on August 18, 1955, upon ex parte petition of Mrs. Limcaco, filed on the same date, shortly after the expiration of the period of six (6) months within which the relief provided ill Rule 38 of the Rules of Court could have been availed of.
It is thus clear that petitioner herein has been denied the process of law, and that, accordingly, the order of December 24, 1954, declaring him in default, as well as the decision, rendered on February 11, 1955, and the writ of execution, issued on August 18, 1955, are null and void.
Wherefore, the writ prayed for is hereby granted, with costs against respondent, Mrs. Limcaco. It is so ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L. Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
