Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4369 October 30, 1951
LUCIA JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Angela S. Tuason and Fidel IBAÑEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IX, respondents.
Alberto R. de Joya for petitioner.
Araneta and Araneta for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. The injunction was granted upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in the amount of P1,000.
On December 10, 1948, respondent J. Antonio Araneta, in his capacity as executor of the estate of the late Angela S. Tuason, filed an action for forcible entry against Lucia Javier in the municipal court of Manila. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to vacate the premises and to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P15 a month beginning from the month of July 1948, up to the time she vacates the same, with costs. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the latter affirmed the judgment with the addition that the defendant should remove her house and other constructions she had erected on the land in question. Defendant's petition to set aside the judgment having been denied, she took steps to appeal from the decision, but the court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed a beyond the reglementary period. Then plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. In the meantime, defendant sued out for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking the annulment of the decision, but the petition was dismissed for lack of merit. This attempt having failed, defendant filed a motion for suspension of the order of execution invoking in her favor the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 538. This motion was denied on November 6, 1950. And this is the order which the defendant now seeks to annul with the institution of the present petition for certiorari.
The only issue to be determined is whether the order of execution issued by the respondent judge in the forcible entry case should be suspended on the ground that the property in question is included in the parcel of land which the Rural Progress Administration is negotiating to purchase from the estate of Angela S. Tuason to be later divided and sold to its actual occupants.
It appears that sometime in 1948, respondent J. Antonio Araneta, in his capacity as executor of the estate of Angela S. Tuason, offered to sell to the Rural Progress Administration a portion of the estate consisting of seven (7) hectares. When the proposal was submitted to the Board of Directors of said Government agency, said Board decided to acquire the property at the price of P7 per square meter. This would bring the total purchase price to the tune of P490,000. These terms were accepted by Araneta subject to certain conditions, one of them being that all squatters and tenants who have no written contracts with the estate will be moved to the segregated portion of 7 hectares. But the negotiation did not go any further. No deed of sale was ever executed, nor has any portion of the purchase price been paid, wherefore, J. Antonio Araneta, in the same capacity aforestated, filed an action against the Rural Progress Administration for specific performance. This case is now pending appeal in this Court..
These facts are not controverted. It is not also disputed that petitioner herein is but a mere squatter, or one who is occupying a portion of the land without any lease contract with the owner, either verbally or in writing. And because she is a mere squatter, the owner filed an action for forcible entry against her to compel her to vacate the land. This case was decided adversely against her and she now resists the order of execution which would result in her ejectment from the property. What is her ground for opposing the order of execution?
The only ground she is invoking is Commonwealth Act No. 538, which provides that when the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate, any motion for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended for such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, which time shall not exceed one year (section 1). Petitioner contends that, inasmuch as the Government is seeking to acquire the land which includes the portion she is now occupying, and the negotiation has not yet been completed, there is a good reason for suspending the order of execution until the termination of the case involving the acquisition of the land which is now pending determination by the Supreme Court.
Apparently the argument sounds logical, but it loses its force when considered in the light of the express provisions of said Commonwealth Act No. 538. In the first place, the law accords the privilege of suspension of any proceedings for ejectment only when the Government seeks to acquire through purchase or expropriation proceedings the land occupied by the tenant. In this particular case, the Government seems to have desisted from its original plan of acquiring the land in question as shown by the fact that after agreeing on the terms of the purchase it did not take any further step to consummate the sale so much that the owner had to institute an action for specific performance of the terms of the agreement. And the cause of this desistance may either be lack of money or a charge of the original plan. Be it as it may, the fact is that the proposed purchase has not been carried out.
In the second place, the law provides that "to avail himself to the benefits of the suspension, the tenant shall pay the land owner the current rents as they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted" (Sec. 1, Com. Act 538). Petitioner herein does not come with the purview of this provision. She is a mere squatter and, therefore, not a tenant within a legal meaning of this word. The word "tenant" does not include a squatter, because a squatter is "a person who settles or locates on land, inclosed or uninclosed, with no bona fide claim or color of title, and without the consent of the owner" (Baker vs. State, 71 S.E., 594; 9 Ga., App., 423; Penal Code 1910, sec. 216, subd. 4); and it does not appear that petitioner has paid to the land owner the current rents as they became due or has deposited the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted. Petitioner, therefore, can not invoke the benefits of said Commonwealth Act No. 538.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. The injunction issued is hereby dissolved.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.
R E S O L U T I O N
August 31, 1953
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On October 30, 1951, this court dismissed the petition for certiorari interposed by Lucia Javier and dissolved the preliminary injunction issued as prayed for in said petition. Before this decision has become final, a petition was filed in this court praying that the damages suffered by respondent resulting from the issuance of the writ be assessed either by the Supreme Court or by the court of origin. On November 21, 1951, acting favorably on said petition, this court directed the trial court to make a finding of the damages allegedly suffered by respondent, and on August 13, this court was furnished with a copy of the order entered by the trial court on August 12, 1953 wherein if denied the motion of respondent to assessed the damages as directed by this court and ordered that the record be forwarded to the latter court for whatever action it may deem proper take in the premises.
It appears that while the trial court was in the process of receiving evidence on the damages incident to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Lucia Javier, the defendant, died and because of this supervening event, the trial court entertained the view that the claim for the damages should be denied because that claim should be filed against the estate of the deceased. It also appears that, when respondent present for action on his motion for assessment of damages, counsel for the bounding party, Alto Surety Company, opposed said move on the ground that the action contemplated is too late because the order of the trial court denying respondent's motion for reconsideration and canceling the bound filed by the surety has already became final and unappealable; and considering that a petition for damages holding the surety liable should be filed before judgment becomes final, the court sustain the opposition and denied the motion to assess damages. The incident is now before this court for the corresponding appropriate action.
The finding of the trial court that the claim for damages of respondent should be denied because the death of the debtor, Lucia Javier, and the claim should be filed against the estate of the latter, is not well taken. This result only obtains if the claim is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance (Rule 3, section 21, Rules of Court), but not when the claim is for damages for an injury to person or property (Rule 88, section 1, Idem). In the present proceeding, the claim for damages has arisen, not while the action was pending in the Court of First Instance, but after the case had been decided by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the claim of respondent is nor merely for money or debt but for damages to said respondent. Thus, Chief Justice Moran, commenting on section 1, Rule 3, says: "The above section has now removed doubts by expressly providing that the action should be discontinued upon defendant's death if it is for the recovery of money, debt, or interest thereon, while, on the other hand, in Rule 88, section 1, it is provided that actions to recover damages for injury to person or property, real or personal, may be maintained against the executor or administrator of the deceased." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of court, Vol. 1, 1952 ed., p. 109.)
On the other hand, under Rule 3, section 17, Rules of Court, when a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order the legal representative of the deceased, of the heirs, to be substituted for him within a period of 30 days, or within such time as may be granted. Here, it appears that no step has so far been taken relative to the settlement of the estate, nor an executor or administrator of the estate has been appointed. This deficiency may be obviated by making the heirs take the place of the deceased.
The claim that the move of the respondent to have the damages assessed against Lucia Javier has come late because the order of the court denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent and cancelling the bond filed by the surety has already become final and unappealable, is not also well taken, it appearing that the motion of respondent pressing for action on the motion to assess damages was filed only five days after said order has been entered. It should be noted that the original order entered by the court on April 7, 1953, was not a denial of the claim but merely a statement of its view that no action thereon can be taken in view of the death of Lucia Javier because in its opinion the claim should be filed against her estate, and the order which ordered the cancellation of the bond was entered only on May 27, 1953.
It appearing that the trial court has refrained from assessing the damages which it was directed to assess in the resolution of this court issued on November 21, 1951, for reasons which, in the opinion of the court, are not well founded, it is the sense of this court that the record should be remanded to the trial court for it to act as directed in said resolution.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
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