G.R. No. L-2357




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-2357 September 28, 1949 BIBIANA T. VDA. DE INFANTE and FEDERICO T. INFANTE, petitioners-appellees, vs. RUPERTO JAVIER, Justice of the Peace Court of San Enrique, and DEOGRACIAS E. LERMA, representatives of Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice, respondents-appellants. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres for respondents-appellants. Rivera and Lalisan for petitioners-appellees. BENGZON, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros requiring the respondent justice of the peace of San Enrique, same province, to issue writs of execution in civil cases numbered 8and 9 of his docket. The decision also enjoins the respondent chief of the Tenancy Division of the Department of Justice to refrain from interfering in the same cases. The main issue concerns the jurisdiction to dispose of a controversy in whichthe landlord seeks to deprive his tenant of possession of the farm. Appellants claim exclusive jurisdiction for the Department of Justice, whereas the appellees main tain that the justice of the peace has jurisdiction. It appears that on April 17, 1947, Bibiana T. Vda. de Infante and Federico T. Infante (petitioners-appellees) filed complaints for ejectment in civilcases Nos. 8 and 9 of the justice of the peace court of San Enrique, Occidental Negros. After due hearing the court rendered judgment ordering the defendants therein, Lorenzo Fimeza, et al., to vacate the premises. Thesewere tenants of plaintiff who had returned to their farm after having been driven away. Defendant's attorney received copy of the decision on May 20, 1947. However, on May 8, 1947, Lorenzo Fimeza and companions filed with the TenancyLaw Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice (hereafter referred to as Tenancy Division) complaints against Bibiana T. Vda. de Infante involving the same parties and properties described in the justice of the peace cases Nos. 8 and 9. And on May 25, 1947, the petitioners and their tenants agreed to submit their dispute to the Tenancy Division in a written stipulation which reads partly as follows: 3. That the complainant tenants objected to the jurisdiction of J. P. to hear and decide the ordinary civil cases of ejectment as these cases are tenancy cases and the objection of the tenants and the J. P. overruled such objection and hence the decision. (Annex "A") 4. That the parties agree to submit their above entitled cases upon the strength of the stipulation of facts and should the Dept. rule that the proceedings had by the J. P. were irregular, to set the above entitled cases for reinvestigation. In case of the contrary the parties also agree to abide with the decision. 5. That the tenants agree to respect the bond filed by the respondent landlord or in order to secure the temporary possession and use of the land involved pending final decision of the case by Dept. with respectto these cases. In the meantime, having been duly informed by the Department of Justice ofthe provision of Act No. 461 and its circulars on the subject, the justiceof the peace of San Enrique declared in an order of August 20, 1947, thatits actuations in civil cases Nos. 8 and 9 were of no effect and value. On December 4, 1947, the Tenancy Division found after investigation, forthe tenants and issued corresponding orders in their favor. Nevertheless,on December 20, 1947, petitioners moved in the justice of the peace courtfor execution of the ouster judgment in the cases numbered 8 and 9. Denialof such motion, gave rise to the instant special civil action for mandamusand for injunction, which has been favorably acted upon by the lower court. The respondent appealed, and their main arguments turn around the proposition that conflicts between landowners and their tenants as topossession or cultivation of the farms do not fall within the jurisdictionof the justice of the peace courts, because such controversies have been placed by law under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice by Commonwealth Act No. 461, as amended, which reads partly as follows: Any agreement or provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, in allcases where land is held under any system of tenancy the tenant shallnot be dispossessed of the land cultivated by him except for any of the causes mentioned in section nineteen of Act Numbered Four thousand and fifty-four or for any just cause, and without the approval of a representative of the Department of Justice duly authorized for the purpose.The Department of Justice is, likewise, charged with the duty of enforcing all the laws, orders and regulations relating to any system of tenancyand it may issue such orders as may be necessary in pursuance thereof, . . . . (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 44.) In a decision promulgated on May 30, 1949 we concluded that in view of the statute, a justice of the peace has presently no jurisdiction to entertaincomplaints for ejectment or illegal detention by landlords against theirshare-croppers or tenants (Ojo vs. Jamito, G.R. No. L-1511). That decision, penned after this appeal had been submitted and argued, is of course conclusive on the question at issue herein. The justice of peace of San Enrique had no jurisdiction. There is truly much to be said in support of the trial judge's view and ofappellee's contention that the legislature may not deprive courts of their judicial function. But as we declared in the above-mentioned opinion "there is no doubt that Congress has power to diminish the jurisdictionof the Courts of First Instance" (and of justice of the peace courts), and"confer the jurisdiction in question upon the Department of Justice, andthe Court of Industrial Relations. Section 3, Article VIII and the Constitution empowers the Congress to define, describe and apportion thejurisdiction of the various courts, with the only limitations that it cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction . . . thereinspecified". Such congressional authority must furthermore be acknowledgedin connection with the express constitutional duty of the state "to regulate the relations between landowner and tenant and between labor andcapital in industry and in agriculture." (Article XIII, sec. 6, Constitution.) Our conclusion on the matter of jurisdiction necessarily requires a reversalof the order of mandamus which is premised on the duty of the justice of the peace to carry out its decision in an ejectment case after he has acquired jurisdiction. As we hold the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it follows that his order to vacate(even supposing it had become final) could not be enforced either by himself or by others. It also follows that injunction against the respondent Deogracias E. Lerma as representative of the Tenancy Division may not properly be issued, because he is acting or has acted within the scope of the authority ofthe Department of Justice. Judgment reversed, without costs. Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation