Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2098 May 30, 1949
PIO MARQUEZ, protestante-apelante,
vs.
ARSENIO PRODIGALIDAD, protestado-apelado.
D. Antonio Barredo, en representacion del apelante.
D. Vicente Perrin, en representacion del apelado.
PABLO, J.:
La undta de escrutinio del municipio de Rosario, Cavite, en las ultimas elecciones generales, proclamo concejales electos a los siguientes:
|
Eliseo Abueg ................................................................ |
1,504 votos |
|
Pedro Giongco ............................................................. |
1,298 votos |
|
P. Nones ....................................................................... |
1,185 votos |
|
A. Buhayin ................................................................... |
1,160 votos |
|
C. Enriquez ................................................................... |
1,138 votos |
|
Arsenio Prodigalidad ................................................. |
1, predecessors in,p |
El articulo 178 del Codigo Electoral Revisado dice asi:
De cualquier decision final dictada por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia sobre porotestas contra la elegibilidad o la eleccion de gobernadores provinciales, vocales de la junta provincial, concejasles de ciudad y alcaldes, la parte agraviada puede apelar ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones o el Tribunal Supremo, segun sea el caso, dentro del termino de cinco dias despues de notificada de la decision, para su revision, correccion, anulacion o confirmacion, y la apelacion se tramitara como si fuera en una causa criminal." Se pretende que, bajo esta disposicion legal, las decisiones de los Juzgados de Primera Instancia en protestas contra la elccion de concejales en los municipios regularmente organizados, no son apelables. Notese, sin embargo, que la orden apelada en el presente caso no reuelve los meritos de la protesta, sino que sobresee la mismaa por supuesta falta de juridiccion en virtud de una supuesta omision de incluir como partes a todos los candidatos electos. De modo que la orden apelada versa sobre una cuestion de jurisdiccion, o sobre una cuestion puramente de dercho. Y el articulo 2, Titulo VIII de la Constitucion dispone que: "The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations is in question. (2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue. (4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. (5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.
La Coonstitucion claramente autoriza a la Legislatura a definir, prescribir y distribuir la jurisdiccion de los tribunales; pero expresamente dispone que no puede privar al Tribunal Supremo de su jurisdiccion para revisar, rreexaminar, revocar, modificar o conocer en apelacion o mediante certiorari o recurso de casacion las diciones de juzgados inferiores que versan, entre otras cosas, sobre la constitucionalidad de alguna ley, ordenanza, tratado, u orden ejecutiva o sobre la jurisdiccion del tribunal sentenciador, o sobre otras cuestiones puramente de derecho. En otras palabras, la Constitucion ha querido establecer y conservar inalterable la jurisdiccion del Tribunal Supremo sobre cuestiones constitucionales o puramente de derecho, con el proposito evidente de convertido en arbitro supremo en la interpretacion de la Constitucion y de la Ley.
Se pretende que la prohibicion constitucional de privar al Tribunal Supremo de su jurisdiccion sobre las mencionadas cuestiones se refiere tan solo a aquellos asuntos sobre los cuales este Tribunal tenia jurisdiccion al tiempo de aprobarse la Constitucion y no aquellos que, como el presente, no caian bajo su jurisdiccion de acuerdo con las leyes entonces vigentes, pues es obvio, segun se alega, que no sepriva a un tribunal de una jurisdiccion que no tenia. Esta distincion, sin embargo, no halla fundamento en el lenguaje de la Constitucion, pues la prohibicion alli establecida es en sus terminos absoluta con un proposito claro y evidente que es el de situar en el Supremo Tribunal la autoridad suprema en la interpretacion de la Constitucion y de la ley.
Debe recordarse que antes de la aprobacion de nuestra Constitucion la jurisdiccion apelada del Tribunal Supremo no dependia, segun las leyes entonces vigentes, de la naturaleza de la cuestiones polanteadas, pues tenia esa jurisdiccion casi en todos los asuntos provenientes de los Juzgados de Primera Instancia independientemente de las cuestiones alli envueltas. De suerte que la Constitucion al hacer referencia a la jurisdiccion apelada del Tribunal Supremo sobre ciertas cuestiones de derecho, generales y especificas, no lo hace en relacion conla jurisdiccion apelada que el tribunal ya entonces tenia, sino que define una nueva jurisdiccion apelada del tribunal de la cual no quiere que este tribunal sea privado jamas.
Por lo demas, si se ha de interpretar la Constitucion en la forma que se pretende, no habria uniformidad o simetria en la interpretacion de las ley leyes del pais, pues si este tribunal no pudiese corregir los pronunciamientos legales de los tribunales inferiores en algunos asuntos, esos pronunciamientos podrian ser contradictorios y conflicto podria quedar sin solucion por algun tiempo por lo menos, y esto es lo que indudablemente ha querido evitar la Constitucion. Y pretender que en casos como el presente el Tribunal Supremo no puede ejercer jurisdiccion apelada aunque hubiese serias infracciones de la Constitucion en la decision del tribunal inferior, equivale claramente a frustrar el proposito evidente de la Constitucion.
Creemos, por tanto, que el articulo 178 del Codigo Eletoral Revisado, al disponer expresamente que son apelables las decisiones de los Juzgados de Primera Instancia "sobre protestas contra la elegibilidad o la eleccion de gobernadores provinciales, vocales de la junta provincial, concejales de ciudad y alcaldes," no ha tenido el proposito de vedar en otras protestas la apelacion al Tribunal Supremo sobre cuestiones puramente de derecho, particularmente sobre cuestiones de jurisdiccion, o de constitucionalidad de alguna ley, ordenanza, tratado u orden ejecutiva.
En cuanto a la segunda cuestion, el articulo 27 de la primera ley electoral, No. 1582 dispone que "todos los procedimientos que se sigan con arreglo a este articulo seran en virtud de una mocion especial con notificacion a todos los candidatos votados." Notese que se usa la palabra "todos", sin exceptuar al que haya recibido un solo voto. Y todos los candidatos notificados son partes, por tanto, de la protesta. La falta de notificacion a todos los candidatos votados daba lugar al sobreseimiento de la causa. (Mayo contra Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Tayabas, y Magbiray, 35 Jur. Fil., 643; Santos contra Miranda y Clemente, 35 Jur. Fil., 657; Tamondong contra Llorente y Palisoc, 35 Jur. Fil., 649). Pero, bajo tal practica, algunos candidatos votados se escondian para evitar que fueran notificados y hacer fracasar asi la protesta. Para remediar la anomala situacion, la Legislatura dicto la Ley No. 3030 que dispone: "Los procedimientos para la protesta judicial de una eleccion seran en virtud de una mocion especial con notificacion a todos los candidatos registrados votados. . . . " Depues de detallar la manera de practicar la notificacion, dispone: "En el caso de ignorarse el paradero de un candidato, por ausencia del mismo de la localidad, o de que se ocultare para evitar que se le haga el emplazmiento del juzgado, con vista de la manifestacion de estas circunstancias por declaracion jurada hecha a satisfaccion del juzgado, este dispondra se practique el emplazamiento mediante la publicacion en algun periodico de circulacion general en la localidad, o en su defecto, por edictos que se fijaran en varios sitios mas conspicuos de la localidad, de una orden que dictara fijando la fecha en que deba comparecer el ausente, el oculto o el de ignorado paradero, la cual no sera mayor de veinte dias."
La Ley No. 3387 reproduce la misma disposicion transcrita.
Aplicando estas disposiciones legales en asuntos de protesta, este Tribunal declaro que cada candidato notificado de la protesta como requiere la ley se hace inmediatamente parte de la actuacion judicial y una peticion de tal candidato para intervenir es innecesaria (Manalo contra Sevilla, 24 Jur. Fil., 631), y el hecho de que no haya presentado escrito de terceria y no haya tomado parte activa en la vista no es razon para que deje de serlo, porque como parte interesada y candidato que ha recibido votos en la eleccion y que ha sido emplazado en la protesta no tiene necesidad de presentar mocion de terceria. (Santos contra Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Cavite, 49 Jur. Fil., 416.)
El articulo 479 del Codigo Administrativo Revisado que es la recopilacion del articulo 576 de la Ley No. 2657, articulo 44 de la Ley No. 3030, articulo 25 de la Ley No. 3210, articulo 1.º de la Ley No. 3887, articulo 1.º de la Ley No. 3699, y articulo 1.º de la Ley No. 3834, dispone que "contests in all eletions for the determination of which provision has not been made otherwise shall be heard by the Court of First Instance having jruisdiction in the judicial district in which the election was held, upon motion by any candidate voted for at such election and who has duly filed his certificate of candidacy." Ya no exige la notificacion o el emplazamiento de todos los candidatos votados. Reduce, pues, el pleito entre el protestante y el protestado.
El articulo 184 del Codigo Electoral aprobado en 22 de agosto de 1938 deroga la ley electoral recopilada e incorporada en el Codigo Administrativo Revisado (articulos 392 al 483), y dispone en su articulo 170 la forma como debe ser emplazado el protestado y añade nueva disposicion que es la siguiente: "los otros candidatos votados derrotados podran, dentro del plazo fijado para protestar, intervenir en el asunto como otros protestantes y pedir remedio afirmativo a su favor, mediante protesta en terceria, la cual sera tratad como otra protesta, solo que se tramitara dentro del mismo expediente. No se autorizara su intervencion de otro modo."
El Codigo Electoral Revisado, hoy en vigor, aprobado en 21 de junio de 1947, reproduce la misma disposicion ya transcrita, y en cuanto el procedimiento que debe seguirse, el articulo 176 dice:
Procedimiento. — (a) La protesta contra la eleccion de un candidato se notificara a este mediante emplazamiento en la direccion postal consignada en su certificada de candidatura, salvo que el protestado, sin esperar el emplazamiento, se hay dado por notificado de la protesta o contestado a la misma.
(b) El protestado contestara a la protesta dentro de cinco dias de emplazdo o, de no haber habido emplazamiento, desde la fecha de su comparecencia y en todo caso antes de comenzar la vista de la protesta. La contestacion versara unicamente sobre la eleccion en los precintos que sean objeto de las alegaciones de la protesta.
(c) Si el protestado deseare impugnar los votos obtenidos por el protestante en otros precintos, debera presentar un contraprotesta dentro del mismo plazo señalado para la contestacion, sirviendo copia de la misma al misma al protestante por correo certificado o por entrega personal o por medio del sheriff.
(d) El protestante contestara a la contraportesta dentro de tres dias desde la notification.
(e) Si no se presentare contestacion a la proteta o a la contraprotesta dentro de los plazos respectivamente deñalados, se entendera presentada una negacion general.
( f ) En los procedimientos de ptrotesta electoral, el censo electoral, como fue en definitiva corregido por la junta de inspectores, sera final en lo que se refiere a quien tenia derecho de votar en dicha eleccion.
(g) Los otros candiadtos votados derrotados podran, dentro del plazo fiajado para protestar, intervenir en el asunto como otros protestantes y pedir remedio afirmativo a su favor, mediante protesta en terceria, la cual sera trada como otra protesta, solo que se tramitara dentro del mismo expediente. No se autorizara su intervencion de otro modo.
Y ya no exige como las dos primeras leyes que sean emplazados todos los candidatos vatados.
De todo esto se ve claramente como la legislatura ha cambiado gradualemente el procedimiento que debe seguirse en estos casos. En las primeras leyes electorales disponia que todos los candidatos votados, no importando el numero de votos que hubiesen recibido, fuesen notificados o emplazados de la protesta como partes en el litigo. En la ley electoral recopilada por el Codigo Administrativo Revisado, haciendo menos engorroso el procedimiento, redujo a dos a los litigantes, el protestante y el protestado. Y posteriormente en el Codigo Electoral y en el Codigo Electoral Revisado ya permitio la terceria, pero que su intervencion debera hacerse dentro del plazo concedido para presentar la protesta, y "no se autorizara su intervencion de otro modo."
Resulta, pues, claro que bajo el actual procedimiento no es necesario incluir a todos los candidatos que hayan recibido votos, ni es necesario incluir a todos los electos concejales cuando se disputa un cargo de concejal. Y ello tiene su fundamento logico. El protestante es libre de admitir o reconocer la legalidad de la eleccion de algunos de los candidatos, y el no incluirlos en la protesta es admision tacita de su debida eleccion. Erro, pues, el Juzgado a quo al concluir que era necesaria, bajo el Codigo Electoral Revisado, la inclusion como recurridos de los cinco concejales electos.
Se revoca la orden de sobreseimiento y se ordena la devolucion al Juzgado de origen de la causa para que conozca de la misma y la decida de acuerdo con las pruebas que se presenten, con costas contra el protestado-apelado.
Moran, Pres., Ozaeta, Paras, Perfecto y Briones, MM., estan conformes.
Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., dissenting:
This is an appeal by the contestant from the judgment of the Court of First Instance dismissing his protest against the election of the apeallee as municipal councilor of the municipality of Rosario, Cavite. The appellee asks for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that this Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction, because under section 178 of the Revised Election Code the order or decision of the court below is final and not appealable. But the appellant contends that said provision is unconstitutional for it violates the provisions of section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the varios courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over casesaffecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consults, nor of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm, on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in —
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations is in question.
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.
(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
(5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involvement.
The majority, after quoting section 178 of the Revised Election Code which provided that "From any final decisions rendered by the Court of First Instance in protests against the eligibility or the election of provincial governors, members of provincial boar, city councilor, and mayors, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court as the case may be," say: "It is to be observed that the order appealed from does not decide the protest on the merits, but dismisses it on the ground of assumed lack of jurisdiction because all the elected candidates were not included in the protest. So a pure question of law or jurisdiction is involved in the appeal." And then the decision quoted the provisions of section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution which, according to the majority, "intend to established or preserve intact the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases in which Constitution questions or question of law are involved with the evident purpose of making the Supreme Court a Supreme Arbiter in the interpretation of the Constitution or law". This, by the way, is ambiguous and self-contradictory, in such as if the Constitution intended to established such jurisdiction it was because it did not exist as yet, and if the intention of the framers of the Constitution were to preserve such jurisdiction it must have existed already prior to the enactment of the Constitution; but this ambiguity is clarified in one of the subsequent paragraphs where the majority say that "The Constitution, in referring to the appellate jurisdiction on certain general or specific question of law, does not refers to the appellants jurisdiction the Supreme Court already had, but defines a new appellate jurisdiction of which the Supreme Court can never be deprived."
The appellee precisely submits to this Court for decision the constitutional question whether or not section 178 of the Revised Election Code, which does not allow appeal from final decision of the Court of First Instance in protests against the election of municipal councilors, by virtue of the legal maxim inclusio unios est exclusio alterius, is violative of the provisions of section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution. But the above-quoted except from the majority decision seems to convey the erroneous idea that there is no conflict between the said provisions of the Constitution and those of said section 178 of the Revised Election Code, because the appeal in the present case is not from a decision of the Court of First Instance on the merits, which is the appeal contemplated by said section 178, but on a question purely of law or jurisdiction, and therefore the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, and not those of section 178, are applicable. This concept of the nature of the appeal provided for in the Revised Election Code is erroneous, because it is elementary that "by appeal the appellate court reviews all the findings of law and of fact of the court below (Sotto vs. Commission on Election, 76 Phil., 516), and the appeal provided for in said section 178 is not only from a decision on the merits, that is, on questions of fact and law, but also from a decision on purely questions of law as that of jurisdiction. For that reason, it says that the appeal may be taken either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court as the case may be, that is the constitutionality of a law, jurisdiction of the inferior court, or pure question of law, and to the Court of Appeals in the other cases, in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3 which organized the Court of Appeals and apportion the former appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court between both courts.
It is obvious, therefore, that although the majority do not expressly say that the question involved in this appeal hinges on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the provisions of section 178 of the Revised Election Code, and they think that this Court may decide the appeal without discussing that question, the decision of the majority decides, by necessary implication, that the provisions of said section 178 violate section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution is not conformity with the latter. Because, while the provisions of the latter either established (grant) or preserve according to the decision, the jurisdiction already of the Court of First Instance in protest against the election of municipal councilors is cases an error or question of law is involved, section 178 does not allow or permit such appeals or deprives the Supreme Court of such jurisdiction.
The question for us to determine are therefore: (1) Whether or not this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review by appeal on a question of law an order of the lower court in protests against the election of municipal councilors, and section 178 of the Revised Election Code deprives this Courtof said jurisdiction in violation of the limitation on the power of Congress provided for in the above-quoted constitutional provisions. And (2), if not, whether the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution are not a mere limitation of the power of Congress to legislate on the appellate jurisdiction which the Supreme Court had at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, (ratified by section 3, Art VIII, of the same Constitution), but a grant of a new appellate jurisdiction to this Court to review such decisions of appeal.
As to the first question, it is obvious that the Supreme Court had no such jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
An election contest is not an ordinary action which falls within the general original jurisdiction of the Court of Election Instance and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review on appeal all final judgment of the Courts of First Instance, conferred by Act No. 136 which organized during the American regime the courts of justice in the Philippines. Original jurisdiction to determine election contests and appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal the judgment of the Court of First Instance thereon, depend entirely upon, and are regulate by, and are regulated by, express statutory provision. Congress may confer it upon an administrative body or board, or upon the courts of justice as special jurisdiction of the latter, because an election contest is not a justiciable question which affects civil, personal or property rights accorded to every member of the community or nation, but political question which involves political rights that consist in the power to participate directly or indirectly, in the establishment or management of the government. This finds support in the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of Tajanla_¤_git vs. Penaranda, 37 Phil., 155, which up to date stands unreversed and is applicable to the present case. In said case this Court held following:
. . . On the 1st day of July, 1902, neither the Supreme Court nor the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands had been given jurisdiction over election contests. That being true, the Legislature, when it adopted the Election Law and provided for election contests, might have created a special tribunal for the purpose of hearing and determining the contests provided for in said Election Law. An examination of the Election Law (Act No. 1582, as amended by Act No. 2170, as found in Act No. 2657) shows that in certain election contests the Assembly itself is left to decide the same, while in others the Courts of First Instance have original jurisdiction with a right of an appeal to the Supreme Court. But with reference to appeals from election contests growing out of municipal elections the exclusive and final jurisdiction was given to the Courts of First Instance, without providing for an appeal. The jurisdiction which the Legislature gave to the courts after the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The provisions, therefore, of said Act (July 1, 1902) have not been violated. Said Act of Congress prohibited a diminution of the jurisdiction of said courts, but, at the same time, permitted the Legislature of the Philippine Islands to increase their jurisdiction. In the case of election contests growing out of elections for the office of provincial governor the Legislature increased the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance as well as that of the Supreme Court. In contests growing out of an election for municipal officers they limited the increase of jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance. Neither can it be successfully contended that the Legislature indented confer appellate jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court in cases of election contests growing out of municipal elections, for the reason that the language of the law (Section 576, Administrative Code) expressly limits said jurisdiction exclusively and finally to the Courts of First Instance. The fact that the Legislature expressly provided for an appeal to the Supreme Court in election contests involving the elections of provincial governors and expressly prohibited the appeal in contests the appeal in contests growing out of elections of municipal officers is proof positive that the Legislature neither overlooked the question of the right of an appeal in the second case, nor intended that the law should be interpreted so as to give the right of an appeal in such a case.
No law has been passed by the Legislature since then up to the present time, conferring upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the final judgments or decrees of the Courts of First Instance in contests of election of municipal councilors. Section 576 of Act No. 2656 known as the Administrative Code of 1916, referred to in the decision above quoted, provided that the decisions of the Courts of First Instance on election contests are final and not appealable, except as provided in section 577 of the same Code, which conferred upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over election contests for provincial governors only and read follows:
SEC. 577. Appeal to Supreme Court in contended election case. — An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court, within ten days, from any final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance on contests of elections for provincial governors, for the review, amendment, repeal, or confirmation of such decision, and the procedure thereon shall be the same as in a criminal case.
The above-quoted provision which granted the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over contests of elections for provincial governors only, as an exception to section 576 of the same Code, was amended, first, by section 26 of Act No. 3210 so as to extend the exception and authorize also an appeal to the Supreme Court from final decisions of said courts on contests of election for members of the provincial board. And subsequently, by section 1 of Act No. 3387, the exception was further extended so as to provide for appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgments of the First Instance on protests against the election of municipal presidents. The provisions of said section 577, as amended, were incorporated in section 480 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1934, which reads as follow:
SEC. 480. Appeal to Supreme Court in contested election case. — An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court within ten days, from any final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance on contests of elections for provincial governors, or members of the provincial board, or municipal presidents, for the review, amendment, repeal or confirmation of such decision, and the procedure thereon shall be the same as in a criminal cause.
The apparent reason of the law in not providing for an appeal to the Supreme Court from the final decisions rendered by the Court of First Instance on contests of election of municipal councilors, is undoubtedly the fact that the number of municipal councilors in the Philippines to be elected in each general elections amounts to thousands, and if an appeal were allowed this Court would be overcrowded with such appeals.
Therefore, since the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in the year 1935 to review on appeal final decisions of the Courts of First Instance in protests against the election of either city or municipal councilors, even though an error or question of law is involved, so much so that, after the adoption of the Constitution, Congress had to enact section 172 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 to confer upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over election contests for the office of city councilors only, the provision of section 178 of the Revised Election Code in question, which is a mere reproduction of section 480 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, does not infringe the Constitution or deprive the Supreme Court of any of its appellate jurisdiction ratified by section 3, Article VIII, of the Constitution.
(2) With respect to the second question, after laying down the premise that "before the enactment of the Constitution the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court did not depend, according to his laws then in force, upon the nature of the questions involved, for it had jurisdiction over all cases appealed from the Courts of First Instance, irrespective of the question involved," the majority conclude that "the Constitution defines a new appellate jurisdiction of which the Supreme Court can never be deprived."
The conclusion that the provisions of section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution are not a mere limitation on the power of Congress granted therein, but a grant of new appellate jurisdiction, is clearly erroneous for the following reasons:
First. In consonance with the provisions of section 3, Article VIII, of the Constitution that reads: "Until the Congress provides otherwise, the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution," section 2 of the same Article VIII provides that "Congress shall have power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to review on appeal . . . final judgments and decrees of the Court of First Instance . . . in all cases in which an error or question of law is on involved." From a mere cursory reading of both provisions it appears evident that the proviso of section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, "but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, etc.," is not a grant of a new appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, but a limitation on the power of Congress granted in said section 2, to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts;
Second. Section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution grants Congress the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various court, and it stands to reason, grammar and logic that, if it had been the intention of the framers of the Constitution to confer a new appellate jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court, it would have so provided not in the same paragraph of said section 2, but in a separate section or more properly in another Article of the Constitution.
Third. If the provision of the above-mentioned section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution to the effect that Congress may not deprive the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction over the cases therein described, be counted as a grant to said Court of appellate jurisdiction over said cases. the limitation or provision that Congress "may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to review etc.", would be a surplusage, because whatever jurisdiction may be granted to the Supreme Court by the Constitution can not be diminished by Congress without necessity of imposing expressly such a limitation.
Fourth. To construe the constitutional limitation under consideration as conferring upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review final judgment anddecrees of the Court of First Instance in protests against the election of municipal councilors in which a question of law is involved, would leadto an anomaly or incongruity in our legislation on courts' jurisdiction. Because, under the laws in force, such judgment and decreed of the Court of First Instance are not appealable even to the Court of Appeal when questions of fact are involved, while judgments of the Court of First Instance in lection contests for provincial governors, members of the provincial board, municipal mayors, and city councilor are appealable to the Court of Appeals in case questions fact are involved, and to the Supreme Court if the question involved is of law. (Sec. 2, Commonwealth Act No. 3 in connection with 172 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, as amended by section 178 of the Revised Election Code.)
And lastly. The majority hold that, as before the adoption of the Constitution, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court did not depend upon the nature of the questions involved, for it had jurisdiction over all cases appealed from the Court of First Instance, irrespective of the question in issue, the Constitution, in speaking of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over certain general or specific question of law, does not refer to the appellate jurisdiction the Supreme Court already had, but it grants a new appellate jurisdiction. This conclusion is based on an erroneous premise. Section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, in providing that Congress "may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts . . .," intended to safeguard only the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review the final judgments or decisions of the Court of First Instance in case the appeal involves questions of law and other questions specified in the Constitution; but it does prohibit Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to review on appeal the decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases none of the questions specified therein or only questions of fact are involved. This is the reason why Congress could create the Court of Appeals and confer upon the latter final appellate jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Courts of First Instance on questions of fact without infringing said section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.
The majority argue that "to construe the Constitution otherwise or contrary to their opinion, there would be no uniformity or symmetry in the interpretation of the laws in force in our country, because if the Supreme Court can not correct the judgments of the inferior courts in certain cases, the latter's judgments may be contradictory and the conflict could not be solved at least for some time, and this is what undoubtedly the Constitution intended to avoid."
This reason or arguments is devoid of foundation. In the first place, because the decisions of the inferior courts do not constitute a precedent and there is nothing serious in a conflict between them, which is a matter of daily occurrence, and the parties concerned are not bound to, and do not always, appeal to the courts of last resort to solve the conflict. And besides, because whatever question of law may arise in an election contest for municipal councilors, be it constitutional, or jurisdiction or what not, may also, absolutely and without exception, be raised in a protest against the Supreme Court and passed upon by the latter because the law on election protest is the same and applies to all provincial, city and municipal elective offices. This is shown by the fact that the second question raised in the present appeal has already been passed upon by this Court in the Delizo vs. Ceferino de los Santos, G. R. No. L-1945,1 involving a protest against the election of a mayor, in which it was held that, under the laws now in force, it is longer necessary in an election protest against one of the candidates to notify or include all the others.
Of course, although the Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and decrees of the Courts of First Instance in election contests for municipal councilors, if an inferior court has acted or is about to act without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as in the present case, a special civil action of certiorari (not appeal by certiorari) or prohibition as the case may be, may be filed with the Supreme Court against the respondent court or judge, and if the latter fails to perform a duty specifically enjoined by law resulting from his office mandamus would lie; because the Supreme Court has a supervisory jurisdiction expressly conferred by section 2, Rule 67, to set aside an act done, or prohibit a judge or inferior court to act, without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and to compel a court or judge to perform his duty or take cognizance of a case of which the court has jurisdiction. (Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil., 672; Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez, Tan Keh, 75 Phil., 371.)
In view of all the foregoing, the appeal is dismissed, because section 178 of the Revised Election Code which does not allow the appeal is not unconstitutional, not only for the reasons set forth in this dissenting opinion, but in by the votes of eight justices, which are the two-thirds of all the members of the Supreme Court required to declare a law unconstitutional, under section 10, Article VIII, of the Constitution. So ordered.
Bengzon, J., concurs.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
It is said that section 178 of the Revised Election Code is at war with section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, according to which the Congress may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments and decrees of inferior courts. I cannot accept this view.
I do not believe that election contests fall within the belong to the political branch of the government, and are beyond the control of the judicial power. (29 C. J. S., 355.)
The right to contest an election is not a common law right. It is not an action at law or a suit in equity, but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law. (80 Am. Jur., 361.) It does not partake of the nature of the ordinary case instituted in a court of justice under its well-defined and undoubted constitutional jurisdiction. (Augburn vs. Elmore, 123 Ga., 677; 51 S. E., 641.)
Jurisdiction to hear and determine election contests is dependent upon, and regulated by statutory provision. (80 Am. Jur., 365.) The hearing of an election contest is so political in character that in some States statutes attempting to confer this jurisdiction upon courts have been held unconstitutional. (Id.)
The right to run for a public office is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution. There is no title to an office which the courts are called upon to protect until it is acquired in the manner provided by law. Not till then does an office become property or estate in some cases. The power to create an office and to prescribed the mode of appointment or election thereto is left to the legislative department of the government. This power, in the absence of any constitutional provision controlling it, carries with it the power to prescribed the extent and scope of the proceeding settling election disputes. It may, indeed it should, as we have seen, be placed in the hands of administrative officers. It will be recalled that the determination of the legality of municipal elections was, in the early days of the American regime, entrusted to the provincial boards whose decisions were final. (Section 13 [b], Act No. 82.)
From all the foregoing, I am of the opinion the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction under the constitutional provision above cited on election protests for municipal councilor and municipal vice-mayor is limited to the cases in which the courts depart from or exceed the powers given them by the Election Law, the recourse against which is not appeal but extraordinary legal remedy.
Footnotes
1 81 Phil., 361.
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