G.R. No. L-1891




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-1891 March 31, 1949 CO CHIONG, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE MAYOR OF MANILA, THE CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, THE MEMBER OF THE MARKET COMMITTEE OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE MARKET MASTERS OF DIVISORIA, ARANQUE, QUINTA, OBRERO, BAMBANG, SAMPALOC, PACO and other MARKETS OF MANILA, respondents. Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing & Salazar for petitioners. City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondents. PERFECTO, J.: Petitioners allege that they are lessees of public market stall in the city of Manila by virtue of contracts of lease expressly understood to be of continuous duration until the city Mayor, for reasonable or just cause or any violation of the provision of the market code or any ordinance, or any rules relating to the administration of public markets, revokes the same; that on October 1, 1946, Republic Act No. 37 was promulgated and to carry into effect its purposes, the Secretary of Finance issued Department Order No. 32 on November 29, 1946; that petitioners filed with the Court of First Instances of Manila a petition challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 37 and Department of Finance Order No. 32 and praying for injunction to restrain their ejection from the leased public market stall; that on April 19, 1947, the trial court rendered judgment annulling section 2 of Department of Finance Order No. 32 and commanding respondents to desist from enforcing the provisions thereof, from which decision respondents appealed to the Supreme Court; that on June 26, 1947, Ordinance No. 3051, amending Ordinance No. 2995, was promulgated providing for the termination of the occupancy of public market stalls by the Chinese petitioners; that petitioners are entitled to a writ of injunction to command respondents to desist from enforcing said Ordinance No. 3051 because it was returned by the mayor with a qualified approval which, therefore, operated as a veto and avoided the promulgation of a valid ordinance as the mayor has no right to qualify his approval and thereby amend the ordinances adopted by the municipality board; that while Ordinance No. 3051 provided for the termination on June 30, 1947 of any existing permission granted for the occupancy of public market stalls, the mayor approved the same subject to his interpretation that licenses paid up to December 331, 1947 would not terminate until the latter date; that Ordinance No. 3051 is null and void, being inconsistent with the public policy of the state as declared in Republic Act No. 37; that said ordinance is unconstitutional in that it impairs the obligation of contracts, it nullifies the substantial protection of due process, it denies petitioner and aliens the equal protection of the law, is unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, partial, and discriminatory, and is in conflict with common right, it prohibits trade by Chinese stall holders, is violative of the generally accepted principles of international law and of the treaty obligation of the Philippines with respect to commercial activities by Chinese and other aliens and of the basic principles laid down in the United Nations Organization Charter; that said ordinance cannot be enforced while the question of the constitutional of Republic Act No. 37 is pending before the court; and that the ordnance is obviously an attempt by an inferior legislative body to evade the decision rendered by the trial court in civil case No. 1436. Petitioners pray for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction which was denied on January 8, 1948. Petitioners filed an urgent petition for preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration of said resolution of January 8, but they were also denied by resolution issued on January 21, 1948. Respondent deny petitioners' allegation with respect to the condition of the contracts of lease, conceding arguendo that petitioners were lessees for the occupancy of the public market stall in question, and allege that the fees of stall holders were collected either daily, weekly or monthly and, therefore, the contracts of lease which had no definite period had expired on December 31, 1947; that petitioners' claim, that said leases are of continuous and indefinite duration, is contrary to law and would the purpose of Republic Act No. 37, as well as ordinance No. 3051 independently intended to put into effect the provision of said acts; that Ordinance No. 3051 does not impair the obligation of contracts because the licenses granted to petitioners to occupy public market stall were not contracts but lease privileges which may be withdrawal at will; that the establishment, maintenance and operation of markets, admittedly governmental in nature, are non-separable from the regulation as regards the leasing thereof, and the occupants have no such interest in the stall which a lessee of a store or dwelling has, and that the municipal corporation may provide for the revocation of the permit or licenses; that petitioners are mere licensees and their licenses are not contracts which would create in their favor vested rights protected against future and subsequent enactments; that Ordinance No. 3051 does not deprive petitioner of the equal protection of law, which does not limit the police power of the state to legislate for the promotion of the general welfare and prosperity, and the nationalization of retail trade; that the ordinance is not unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, partial and discriminatory and it is not made the subject of civil case No. 1436 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and, by its nature, may be forced independently of Republic Act No. 37; and that no generally accepted principle in international law is violated by its enactment, while, on the other hand, the right of a state to self-determination is respected by the Charter of the United Nations. There is no question that the establishment, maintenance and operation of public market are government in nature, being among the public functions of the state and therefore, the opportunity of occupying stall in public markets is a privilege that can be granted or withdrawn without impairing any one of the guarantees embodies in the Bill of Right of the Constitution. In the case of Co Chiong vs. Cuaderno, Sr., m 83 Phil., 242, we have already declared: Public market are public service or utilities as much as the public supply and sale of gas, gasoline, electricity, water and public transportation are. Under the Constitution, the operation of all public services are reserved to Filipino citizen and to corporations or associations sixty per centum of the capital of which belongs to Filipino citizens. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporation or other entities organized under the law of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires. Foodstuffs sold in public markets demand at least, as much official control and supervision as the commodities sold and distributed in other public utilities. They affect the life and health of the people, the safeguarding of which is one of the basic obligations of a constituted government. Official control and supervision can be exercised more effectively if public market stalls are occupied by citizens rather than by aliens. In impugning the validity of Republic Act No. 37, appellees invoke general guarantees in the Bill of Rights, such as the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. Even if their position could be supported under said general guarantees, a hypothesis the validity of which we consider unnecessary to decide, said guarantees have to give way to the specific provision above quoted which reserves to Filipino citizens the operation of public services of utilities. Furthermore, the establishment, maintenance, and operation of public markets as much as public works are part of the functions of government. The privilege of participating in said functions, such as that of occupying market stalls, is not as that among the fundamental right or even among the general civil rights protested by the guarantees of the Bill of Right. The exercise or enjoyment of public functions are reserved to class of person possessing the specific qualifications required by law. Such is the case of the privilege to vote, to occupy a government position, or to participate in public works. They are reserved exclusively to citizens. Public function are power of national sovereignty and it is elementary that such sovereignty be exercised exclusively by nationals. Although foreigners are entitled to all the right and privileges of friendly guests, they can not claim the right to enjoy privileges which by their nature belong exclusively to the host. With the above pronouncements the whole controversy is disposed of against petitioners. Ordinance No. 3051 offends neither the constitutional clause guaranteeing the obligation of contracts nor the guarantees of due process of law and equal protection of the law. Neither does it violation any principle of international law nor any of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nation Organization. It does not impair any treaty commitment, as the treaties mentioned by petitioners have no binding effect upon the Republic of the Philippines is bound only by treaties concluded and ratified in accordance with our Constitution. Ordinance No. 3051 of the City of Manila is valid. Moran, C.J., Pablo, Briones and Tuason, JJ., concur. Paras and Feria, JJ., concur in the result. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation