Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48671 April 19, 1949
EUSEBIO BELVIZ, petitioner,
vs.
CATALINO BUENAVENTURA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Isada & Javelona Hilalo for petitioner.
No appearance for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a reconstituted case. It appears from the present record that in civil case No. 2055 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, an order was entered on April 8, 1941, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Por la presente, se sesadrueba el proyecto de particion sometido por el administrador, y en su lugar se aprueba el Contra-proyecto de particion presentado por el abogado Sr. Antonio J. Beldia de fecha 26 de diciembre de 1940 en todas sus partes, y se ordena al administrador que entreque inmediatamente a los herederos la porcion de bienes que corresponde a cada uno de los herederos segun el contra proyecto de particion, debiendo registrar en al expediente los recibos acrrreditativos sobre dicha entregadetro del plazo de cinco dias despues de haber recidido de esta orden, entendiendose que esta particion esta sujeto el resultado de los terrenos controvertidos en catastro entrre el intestado y de los herederos de Gregorio Ortiz, pendiente ante este Juzgado.
On April 14, 1941, a motion for reconsideration was filed by Atty. Jose Y.Torres which motion was denied by an order May 3, !941, reading as follows:
En conjunto a la mocion de reconsideracion de fecha abril 14, 1941, presentado por el abogado Torres, el Juzgado no la encuentra justificada para reconsiderar el auto del Juzgado aprobando el Contra proyecto de particion presentado por el abogado Sr. Antonio J. Beldia, aparte de que antes de probarse dicho contra proyecto de particion se los habia dado oportunidad a los opositores a formular sus objecciones, las cuales son sustancialmente las mismas que se alegaron por abogado Jose Ortiz Barrios quecomparecio al someterse seste mocion de reconsideracion, si bien el abogadoTorres solo se limito entonces a preeeesentar una oposicion de formula. Se deniega, por tanto, la mocion de reconsideracion del abogado Torres.
On May 26, 1941, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by the same attorney which was granted by the respondent Judge in his order of July 21, 1941, the pertinent portions of which read:
De los hechos expuestos, se ve que algunos de los lotes o partes de losmismo distribuidos en ambos proyecto de particion son objectos de reclamaciones de varias personas cuya vista habia terminado, y hoy pendiente catastral sea primero resuelto antes de que el juzgado hagaa distribucion de las propiedadas de este intestado.
Por tanto, confirmado la orden verbal del juzgado en Corte Abriente se deja sin efecto la orden de fecha 8 de abril de 1941, aprobando el contra-proyectode particion presentado por el abogado Beldia.
It is contended by the petitioner that the order of the respondent Judge of July 21, 1941, was in excess of his jurisdication on the ground that the order of April 8, 1941 had become final, the second motion for reconsideration not having suspended the period for appeal.
Although the 30-day period for filing an appeal is not interrupted by a motion for reconsideration which is a mere reiteration of a petition to set aside the judgement (federal Films, Inc. vs. Judge of First Instance of Manila 78 Phil., 472), or by a second motion containing something new, which existed and could be used or included in the first (Perez vs. Ysip, 81 Phil., 218), there is nothing in the record before us which tends to show that the Torres on May 26, 1941, is one covered by the restrictions. The presumption, therefore is that the said second motion for reconsideration was based on an allowed ground, and this presumption of regularity is confirmed by the granting of the motion by the respondent Judge. If so, the second motion for reconsideration suspended the running of the period for appeal from the date of its filing on May 26, 1941 to July 21, 1941, when the same was acted upon and granted by the respondent Judge. There can be no doubt that it was filed within the period of 30 days from April 8, 1941, after deducting the time during which the first motion for reconsideration filed on April 14, 1941, was pending, since April 8 to 14, and from May 3 to May 26, only 29 days had elapsed. (Rule of Court 37, sec 4.)
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari will be as the same is hereby dismissed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Tuazon, Briones, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
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