Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-1970-72 October 2, 1948
KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA FILIPINAS (CLO), petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents.
Laurel, Sabido, Almario and Laurel and Lazatin and Caballero for petitioner.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for respondents Dy Pac and Co. and Central Saw Mill, Inc.
Arsenio I. Martinez for Court of Industrial Relations.
TUASON, J.:
In case No. 73-V and 73-V (1) of the Court of Industrial Relations, that Court in order dated October 17, 1947, authorized and sanctioned the temporary closing by Dy Pac & Pac., Inc., of its saw mill on Juan Luna Street, Manila, and lying off of its laborers, as of June 30, 1947. The order imposed this condition, to wit: "que la compania, cuando reabra su negocio de tableria o cuando reanude la operacion de la misma, repondra o permitira que sus empleados y obreros que han quedado sin trabajo o suspendidos con motivo del cierro del negocio continuente en el servicio." The saw mill, a different corporation, under a contract of lease with Dy Pac & Company. Central Saw Mill brought its own personnel and took in some of Dy Pac's former employees. Those of Dy Pac's former laborers who were left out filed a motion for contempt, amended on November 29, against both Dy Pac & Co. and Central Saw Mill, motion which was docketed as a separate case was simulated, designed "to avoid the decision of this Honorable Court being carried out", and that the respondents "had violated and defined the authority of this Honorable Court."
It was from an adverse decision of the Court of Industrial Relations on the motion for contempt that the present appeal by certiorari was brought. The part of the order which is pertinent for the purpose of this proceeding is as follows:
From the documentary evidence, presented in the hearing of this motion, it is clear that the Central Saw Mill, Inc., with which Dy Pac & Company, Inc., has a contract of lease, is a distinct and separate entity from the Dy Pac & Company. The fact that some members of the Board of Directors of the Dy Pac & Company and the Central Saw Mill, Inc., are the same, or, members of just one family, would not alter the fact that the two companies are two companies are two independent entities, more so, when it is considered that the Central Saw Mill, Inc., has been in operation since 1939. There is no affirmative allegation either that the contract of lease was a nullity nor could it be claimed that the contract of lease should include a clause to accept the laid-off laborers and employees, as this contingency was not contemplated in the decision of October 14, 1947, nor could the failure to include it as a provision thereof render the contract of lease void or ineffective. The position of the Court becomes more clear when it has to be remembered that there was no evidence that Dy Pac & Company has reopened its lumber mill or reestablished its business to make the case squarely fall under the terms of the decision of the Court of October 14, 1947. Undoubtedly, to make the Central Saw Mill, Inc., a party to the case and more, to hold it in contempt of Court just because it refused to re-employ all the former employees and laborers of the Dy Pac & Company, Inc., when no mention about it has been made in the contract of lease between the two lumber companies nor was it an original party to the case, would be to set at naught the independent and legal personality of the Central Saw Mill, Inc. Surely, the social justice policy of the state should not be interpreted to mean the shielding of one and the oppression of the other. If Dy Pac & Company has sought to lease its property believing that it would redound its benefit, it has perfectly that right considering the fact that there is n evidence that it had been resorted to negate the decision of the Court.
The respondents ask for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that only questions of fact are involved.
It is apparent from the nature of the charges and from the above-quoted order, that the question raised and the question decide by the court was a question of fact. Specifically, the question raised and the question decided was whether the two respondent companies were identical, or whether the lease by Dy Pac of its establishment to Central Saw Mill was fictitious, as the petitioners allege, executed for the main or sole purpose of circumventing the court's order. The very argument in petitioners' memorandum with which they press their accusation is replete with assertions and phrases that are characteristically factual, such as, to mention only some, "collusion"; "bad faith"; "fictitiously alienating the management"; "a fictitious and fraudulent contract, simulated by the parties therein, . . . to defeat the effectiveness of the decisions"; "suspicious circumstances"; "obstruction and degradation of the administration of justice"; — all of which rest on evidentiary facts of their determination.
Only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth, may be raised in an appeal by certiorari from an award, order or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. (Section 2, Rule 44, of Court.) In consonance with this rule we have steadfastly refused to interfere with the findings of fact of that court, limiting our attention to questions of law. (Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Court of Industrial Relations. 1 No. 46843, 40 Off Gaz., 3d Supp., 319; Manila Labor Union, 40 Off. Gaz., 9 Supp., 132; Mindanao Bus Co. vs. MBC Employees. 2 Nos. 47544 & 47611, 40 Off Gaz., 10th Supp., 114; Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. BLT Employee Labor Union. 3 No. 47661, 40 Off Gaz., 13th Supp., 88; Leyba vs. Meralco, 40 Off. Gaz., 4th Supp., 73 Elks Club vs. Rovira. 4 No. 48411, promulgated February 24, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz., 3829.).
Upon the foregoing considerations, the petition is dismissed with costs.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are reviewable by the Supreme Court. This legal theory is based on the very provisions of the law creating said court, as we have already explained in our opinion in other cases. No new reasons have been offered to us why we have to abandon said legal theory. We recoil from the idea of making the Court of Industrial Relations infallible on matters of fact.
The findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations in this case are not supported by the evidence. We agree with the findings made in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Briones.
We therefore vote to grant the petition.
BRIONES, M., disidente:
La mayoria sobresee al presente recurso por el fundamento de que el mismo plantea solamente cuestiones de hecho y "en consonancia" con esta regla (art. 2, regla 44, de los Tribunales) hemos rehusado firmemente entrometernos en las apreciaciones de hecho de esa corte (la industrial), limitando nuestra atencion a las cuestiones de derecho.
Este pronunciamiento incondicional es, a mi juicio, erroneo. La negativa de esta Corte Suprema a revisar las apreciaciones de hecho de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales se ha hecho siempre con una cualificacion, a saber: que la corte industrial no haya abusado de su discrecion en la apreciacion de los hechos que sirven de base a su sentencia. Esta regla se ha establecido invariablemente en una serie de decisiones, siendo la ultima la dictada recientemente en el asunto de Pesicola Inc. contra National Labor Union, 1 No. L-1500, en la que, a su vez, se citan con aprobacion los siguientes asuntos: Mindanao Bus Co. vs. Mindanao Bus Co. Employees Associacion, 2 Nos. 47544 y 47611, 40 Off. Gaz., 10th Supp., 114; Manila Electric Co. vs. National Labor Union Inc., 3 R. G. No. 47279, November 25, 1940; Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Court of Industrial Relations 4 No. 46843, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supp., 319.
En el asunto de Central Azucarera de Tarlac, recurrente, vs. Court of Industrial Relations, and Philippine Labor Union, recurridos, supra, se declaro lo siguiente:
Considering the facts found by the Court of Industrial Relations to have been proven, which we are not at liberty to alter and must have to accept, unless in arriving at them it has committed a grave abuse of discretion; and considering the principle of commutative justice that the salary must answer in an adequate manner to the work performed and be sufficient in order that a family in ordinary circumstances may be able to subsist, we find that the respondent court has not committed a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to authorize the reduction of the number of laborers of the petitioner to one-half, with a minimum wage of P1, and in compelling it to retain the same number of laborers whom it usually employs during the off-seasons. (40 Off. Gaz., [December 15, 1939] Supp. 7, p. 319.)lawphil.net
En el asunto de Mindanao Bus Company, recurrente, vs. Mindanao Bus Company employees Association, recurrida, ut supra, hicimos tambien una declaracion semejante, a saber:
. . . The findings of the Court of Industrial Relations are conclusive and will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing that it has abused its discretion. (40 Off. Gaz., [December 19, 1940] Supp. 14, p. 115.)
Bajo la regla de que se trata es indudable que tenemos facultad para revisar la sentencia del tribunal industrial en el asunto que nos ocupa. Tenemos aqui un caso en que evidentemente la corte industrial abuso de su discrecion al apreciar los hechos. Ciertas circunstancias y hechos no negados en autos inclinan fuertemente el animo judicial a creer que aqui hubo una colusion entre dos corporaciones hermanas para burlar los derechos del obrero y hacer ineficaz una orden de la corte industrial encaminada a proteger tales derechos. A raiz de cierta disputa entre Dy Pac & Co. Inc., y sus obreros, la corte industrial autorizo el cierre temporal del negocio de tableria de aquella desde el 13 de Junio de 1947, "con la condicion de que la compañia, cuando reabra su negocio de tableria o cuando reanude la operacion de la misma, repondra o permitira que sus empleados y obreros que han quedado sin trabajo o suspendidos con motivo del cierre del negocio, continuen en el servicio." Que ocurre, sin embargo, despues? Dy Pac & Co., en vez de reabrir por si misma su negocio, dio en arrendamiento todas sus maquinarias, equipos y pertenencias a una corporacion hermana llamada Central Saw Mill Inc. Que se trata de dos corporaciones hermanas, es cosa que no admite duda. Es hecho establecido en autos que Daniel Dy Pac, el individuo que represento a Dy Pac & Co. Inc. ante la corte industrial, es presidente y gerente auxiliar de dicha compañia, pero es, al propio tiempo, administrador general de la Central Saw Mill Inc. Pues bien, este Daniel Dy Pac es quien firma el contrato de arrendamiento en nombre de Dy Pac & Co. Inc. con el nombre de Dy Lip Kum. (Se puede tomar conocimiento judicial de que en Filipinas es corriente y ordinario el hecho muchas veces desorientador de que los chinos usan dos nombres: uno chinico, y otro cristiano, si lo tienen.) ¿Que mas? Existe otra prueba positiva, contundente, de la hermandad entre las dos compañias y es el siguiente hecho: el viejo Dy Pac, que es el jefe de la familia y es practicamente el animador y principal capitalista de ambas corporaciones, es el gerente general de Dy Pac & Co. Inc., pero es al propio tiempo el presidente de la compañia arrendataria Central Saw Mill Inc., como que es quien firma el contrato de arrendamiento en nombre de esta ultima compañia. Es hecho tambien establecido que los accionistas de ambas empresas son casi los mismos, es decir, miembros de la familia Dy Pac. Puede, pues, afirmarse, sin temor a equivocacion, que ambas compañias estan capitalizadas y dominadas por una sola familia.
De estas pruebas circunstanciales, establecidas en autos sin disputa, la colusion resulta evidente. Si el arrendamiento no fuese un simulacro para evitar el reempleo de los obreros y empleados afectados ¿por que no se inserto en el contrato una clausula que pusiera a salvo el derecho de los mismos a reocuparse imponiendo a la arrendataria la obligacion de reemplearlos? Notese que la orden de la corte industrial dice que ". . . (Dy Pac & Co.) repondra o permitira que sus empleados y obreros que han quedado sin trabajo o suspendidos con motivo del cierre del negocio, continuen en el servicio." En virtud de este mandato Dy Pac & Co. quedaba obligada a hacerse cargo del reempleo de sus obreros y empleados afectados, sin que pudiera alegar que no estaba reabriendo su negocio sino que lo estaba arrendando tan solo a la Central Saw Mill Inc. Trantandose de dos compañias, la arrendadora y la arrendataria, capitalizadas por unos mismos accionistas y controladas por casi los mismos oficiales, sostengo que el negocio de la una es tambien practicamente negocio de la otra, por lo menos para los efectos de la orden en cuestion. Por tanto, el arrendamiento tiene que considerarse necesariamente como simulado para evitar el reempleo de los obreros afectados y consiguientemente no puede alegarse como excusa para evadir la orden de la corte industrial. Si esto se permitiera, los derechos del obrero seria completamente ilusorios. En los casos de venta o traspaso en fraude de acreedores por falta de consideracion, el parentesco se considera como indicio vehemente de fraude. Pues bien; creo que en el presente caso existen las mismas razones para conceptuar el parentesco como prueba de colusion.
Voto, por tanto, en favor del recurso.
Pablo, M., concurs.
Footnotes
TUASON, J.:
1 69 Phil., 289.
2 71 Phil., 168.
3 71 Phil., 291.
4 80 Phil., 272.
BRIONES, M., disidente:
1 Supra, p. 348;
2 71 Phil., 168;
3 70 Phil., 617;
4 69 Phil., 289.
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