Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1613 May 24, 1948
JUSTA G. VDA. DE GUIDO, petitioner,
vs.
OSCAR CASTELO, Judge of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan Branch, ANTONIO ROSCA, TO TEE, and DY CHONG, respondents.
Araneta and Araneta for petitioner.
Rosendo J. Tansinsin and Jose P. Villareal for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
In a case appealed from the justice of the peace court of Caloocan to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the defendants (the herein respondents other than the respondent judge), after the plaintiff (the herein petitioner), had closed her case, made a verbal motion for dismissal, with a reservation of their right to present evidence in case of its denial. In his order of July 9, 1947, the respondent judge denied the motion and directed that the trial be continued as soon as practicable. Taking the position that said respondents waived their right to present evidence by filing a motion to dismiss after the submission of petitioner's evidence, the latter filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the respondent judge render judgment in accordance with the proof and adduced by the petitioner, which motion was denied in order of August 12, 1947. The present original action for certiorari and mandamus was instituted by the petitioner for the purpose of securing an order compelling the respondent judge to desist from allowing the other respondents to present any evidence and forthwith render judgment upon the evidence already submitted by the petitioner.
Of course, we have already held in Arroyo vs. Azur,1 April 13, 1946, 43 Off. Gaz., 54, that "cuando el demando interpone lo que se llama demurrer a la suficiencia de las pruebas del demandante presentado una mocion de sobreseimiento por la razon de que tales pruebas son insuficientes o ineficaces para substanciar la demanda, no tiene derecho a reservarse la presentacion de sus pruebas sino que debe atenerse a las resultancias de dicho demurrer tanto para lo favorable como para lo adverso. Si la mocion prospera y la decision fuere sostenida en apelacion, el asunto termina definitivamente; pero tambien termina del mismo modo si la decision fuere revocada y el Tribunal de alzada hallare que hay pruebas y motivos suficientes para dictar una sentencia en el fondo a favor del demandante. Naturalmente el efecto de todo esto as eliminar en estos casos la llamada reserva de pruebas, obligando a a las partes a que liquiden todas sus controversias en una sola vista." The scope of these pronouncements is obviously not unlimited. That decision involved a motion for dismissal which was granted, resulting in effect in a final termination of the case on the merits; and the fundamental objective of this Court was merely to avoid possible delays due to relays of cases between the lower and appellate courts should the dismissal be found untenable on appeal. The following are typical passages demonstrative of the line of reasoning not only in the case above cited but in the earlier decisions in Moody, Aronson & Co. vs. Hotel Bilbao, 50 Phil., 198, and Gonzales Castro vs. Azaola, 63 Phil., 841.
Esta docrina admite mas que una inferencia o interpretacion y es que en adelante ya no se permitiria ninguna reserva, pero que si por error se permitiese, la mis ya no podria invocarse como motivo legal para que el asunto se devolviera al tribunal inferior para los efectos de la articulacion de las pruebas reservadas. Si la doctrina no se interpretase de esta manera, jamas se aplicaria la misma con todo rigor, porque si un Juzgado de Primera Instancia se equivocase de nuevo permitiendo igual reserva y llegaramos a la conclusion, como en el presenta caso, de tener que revocar la decision de dicho Juzgado, cabria invocar siempre la equidad para la devolucion del asunto, y asi sucesivamente, sin ninguna limitacion de caracter final.
x x x x x x x x x
. . . Por tantos, los demandados al presentar su mocion de sobreseimiento con el aditamento de la reserva de articular sus pruebas eventualmente, lo hicieron allanandos al riesgo de que se rechazase dicha reserva en apelacion como hoy lo hacemos. La intencion de la Corte era clara, terminante y deciseva: evitar la multiplicacion y la prolongacion de lo pleitos, cosa siempre odiosa no solo por la perturbacion y la anomalia que ocasionan en la vida y en los negocios del individuo, sino tambien por lo que cuestan en dinero y en energias tanto al ciudadano como al Estado. (Arroyo contra Azur, y otros. 1 CA-No. 9320 Abril 13, 1946, 43 off. Gaz., No. 1, pp. 54, 60.)
. . . The defendant who, after the plaintiff has submitted his evidence, makes a motion to dismiss which the trial court in the decision grants, and who, on appeal of the plaintiff, has the judgment reserved, cannot then be permitted to produce evidence in defense. The defendant in offering a motion to dismiss in effect elects to stand on the insufficiency of the plaintiff's case. Otherwise, the result will be to invite unnecessary litigations. (Moody, Aronson and Co. vs. Hotel Bilbao, 50 Phil., 198, 200.)
The records shows that immediately after the attorney for the defendant had presented his oral motion to dismiss, he signified his intention to call his client as a witness in the event that his motion to dismiss should be denied. The court, in such situation, should not have rendered its decision, but in order to avoid any possible delay of the case and enable it to render its decision with all the disputed questions in view, it should have required the defendant to present his evidence. (Gonzalez Castro vs. Azaola, 63 Phil., 841, 842.)
The delay thus sought to be eliminated certainly can not happen where the motion to dismiss is denied and the movant (defendant) required to proceed with the submission of his evidence in the lower court which, it is needless to state, still has full jurisdiction and control of the case. The procedure followed by the respondent by the respondent judge in the case at bar is virtually in consonance with the suggestion contained in Gonzalez Castro vs. Azaola, supra, to the effect that "the court, in such situation, should not have rendered its decision, but in order to avoid any possible delay of the case and enable it to render its decision with all the disputed question in view, it should have required the defendant to present his evidence.
The petition is, therefore, hereby denied with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 76 Phil., 493.
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