G.R. No. L-1254




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-1254 May 21, 1948 Testate Estate of ALEJANDRO GONZALEZ y TOLENTINO, deceased. MANUELA GONZALES, movant-appellee, vs. MANUELA VDA. DE GONZALES, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. Mariano A. Albert for appellants. Vicente J. Francisco for appellee. PERFECTO, J.: On July 18, 1932, the will of Alejandro Gonzalez, who died the previous day, was filed with the lower court for probate. On August 27, the will was regalized and Alejandro Gonzalez, Jr., was appointed administrator, replaced by Manuel Gonzalez in March, 1936. On November 9, 1943, after more than ten years of protracted proceedings were many incidents occured, some of them unsettled or partially settled, the parties filed an amicable agreement, reproduced in pages 58-63 of the record on appeal, dated November 5, with the purpose of terminating the proceedings, and where the parties pray "that this stipulation be approved, this case ordered closed and terminated, and the shares of the heirs and legatees delivered to them, without pronouncement as to costs." On December 2, 1943, the agreement was approved by the lower court, which ordered full compliance of all stipulations contained therein. On September 21, 1946, after several further incidents extending for more years, the lower court issued an order wherein, besides providing for compliance with several provisions of the agreement which remained uncomplied with, it considered and set aside the order issued on December 9, 1943, the one providing that, in case the administrator should fail to pay all claims on or before December 31, 1943, the agreement which was approved on December 2, 1943, will become automatically disapproved. Appeal has been perfected against the order of September 21, 1946, and in the notice of appeal of October 9, 1946, appellant's stated: "Esta apelacion se funda en que la referida orden de 21 de Septiembre de 1946 reconsiderando la orden de fecha 9 de Diciembre de 1943 y ordena que se atenga a lo dispuesto en la orden de fecha 2 de Diciembre de 1943, aprobando el convenio es contraria a los hechos establacidos y a la ley." (Page 67, Records on Appeal.) Appellants assign as first error of the lower court the fact that, in setting aside the order of December 9, 1943, it did not follow the provisions of section 3 of Rule 38. Appellee answered that the question has never been raised by the appelant by the court below and, therefore, it cannot properly raised for the first time on appeal, and, as a matter of fact, appelle's motion for reconsideration, dated May 20, 1946, which gave occasion for the lower court to issue the order of Semtember 21, 1946, setting aside the order of December 9, 1943, is not a petition for relief under Rule 38. Appelles alleges that no pretension of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence as contemplated by Rule 38, was made by appellee, but was he raised was purely a question of law, involving the order of May 10, 1946, although in assailing the legality of it, the validity and enforcement of the orders of December 2 and December 9, 1943, were necessarily dragged into the issue. The amicable agreement dated November 5, 1943, approved by the order of December 2, 1943, is a compromise intended to terminate the judicial controversies involved in the testate of Alejandro Gonzalez, as defined by article 1809 of the Civil Code, which provides: Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or retaining something avoids the provocation of a suit or terminates one which has already been instituted. The agreement, therefore, partaking of the nature of a contract, is subject to the same legal provisions providing for the validity, enforcement, rescission or annulment of ordinary contracts. In entering in said compromise, the parties were free to make any stipulation not contrary to law, public interest, or principles of morality, as much as in other contract. The fact that the agreement, upon the parties' petition, was approved by the order of December 2, 1943, does not change the essential contractual nature of the agreement. The court's approval has beecome an indespensable formality in view of the fact that the properties which were the object of the contractual stipulation were in custodia legis in the testate proceedings. Naturally, any disposition regarding said properties, while the proceedings remain to be finally closed, has to be made under supervision, control and authority of the court. Provided that there is no serious objection to the agreement, such as when it contains contractual stipulations which cannot validly be included in an ordinary contract — and the parties did not point out any objectionable provision in the agreement in question — the court cannot deny its approval. Appelee's urges us to declare that the order od December 9, 1943, providing that the administration should pay the claims on or before December 31, 1943, the agreement shall be automatically disapproved, is a nullity, as the automatical disapproval provided therein could not have the legal effect of annulling the agreement. He reminds that the grounds for annulling a compromise, according to article 1817 of the Civil Code are error, deceit, violence and forgery of docment, and none of them are asserted by any party nor stated in the order of December 9, 1943, and, at any rate, under article 1817 of the Civil Code, the provisions of article 1263 of the same Code should be followed. There is no need of acceding to appelle's invitation, although there is no fairness in making the automatic disapproval of the agreement depend on the unilateral course of conduct of administration who, without the intervention of all the remaining interested parties, may have chosen to fulfill or not the condition of payment of claims before the deadline set in the order of December 9, 1943. It is enough to consider that said order is interlocutory in nature and, as such, the lower court had the power to set it aside as it did in its order of September 21, 1946, the order complained of. It is not pretended that any justice has been committed in the last order or that, in issuing it, the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion. Appellants impugn the action of the lower court in enforcing the order of December 2, 1943, and in ordering the payment of Manuel Gonzalez of the amount of P11,000 and to Alejandro Gonzalez, the amount of P4,000. Having arrived at the conclusion that the agreement of November 5, 1943, is a valid contract entered into by the parties, which the lower court was bound to approved, as it did approve it on December 2, 1943, the stipulations of agreement has become the law between the parties and the lower court isbound to enforce it. The payments of the above-mentioned amounts to Manuel Gonzalez and Alejandro Gonzalez, respectively, are among the provisions stipulated in the agreement. The fourt and fifth assignment of error made by appellants appear to be not well taken. It is only fair that the widow, the heirs, and legatees should contribute proportionately for the payment of obligations of the testate and that the administrators should take prossession of the products of the haciendas of the testate in order to be able to pay the obligations of the same. At any rate, these question were not in appellant's mind when they filed their notice of appeal on October 9, 1946, wherein they stated that the purpose of their appeal was to show that the order of September 21, 1946, in setting aside the order of December 9, 1943, and ordering the enforcement of the order of December 2, 1943, was contrary to the facts and to the law. The appealed order, dated September 21, 1946, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. Considering that the testate proceedings of Alejandro Gonzalez had been instituted sixteen years ago, the parties and the lower court are instructed to take steps for its prompt termination. Feria, Bengzon and Tuazon, JJ., concur. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation