Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1651 February 17, 1948
AGAPITO B. ANDAL, petitioner,
vs.
BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of First Instance of Rizal, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, CONSUELO ROXAS and SALVADOR GOMEZ, respondents.
V.H. Endaya for petitioner.
Ramirez and Ramirez for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal relative to the execution of a final judgment entered in an action for unlawful detainer of a city lot situated in Rizal City (Pasay). One of the orders, dated August 14, 1947 and issued by Judge Eulalio Garcia, allowed the petitioner herein and defendant in the
above-mentioned case, a grace of "not exceeding six months, counted from the date of the filing of the petition for suspension, July 8, 1947, on condition that the defendant deposits with this court, in advance, all the rents due during the period of suspension, at the rate of P160 a month, plus the costs in the amount of P52.24 adjudged in favor of the plaintiffs and the further amount of P200 to answer for damages." The other order was issued by Judge Bienvenido A. Tan on August 23, 1947, denying the execution debtor's motion for reconsideration of Judge Garcia's order and enjoining, besides, "bajo pena de desacato, el estricto cumplimiento de la orden de fecha 14 de agosto de 1947." Judge Tan added: "Apareciendo igualmente en el record que la fianza prestada por el demandado no es suficiente para cubrir los alquileres vencidos, el Juzgado ordena a dicho demandado que deposite o pagar directamente al demandante, la cantidad correspondiente a los alquileres vencidos hasta la fecha dentro del plazo de 10 dias, a contar desde la fecha en que reciba copia de esta orden."
The judgment was rendered as early as November 20, 1946, a judgment appeal from which buy the defendant, petitioner herein, was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for having been filed out of time. The suspension of execution for six months was granted, "in the interest of justice and equity", upon the defendant's own motion, although, at best, the case did not clearly fall within the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as the defendant's house on the lot in question was partly rented out and partly used fro commercial purposes.
The objection of the defendant was directed solely against that part of each of the two orders concerning the deposit and the manner of payment of rents during the period of suspension. The prayer was to amend these orders "so as to eliminate therefrom the requirement for the defendant to deposit the sum of P200 for damages, and so as to merely require said defendant to pay the plaintiffs the rents corresponding to the period of the suspension within the first ten (10) days of the months to which they respectively correspond."
As the respondents' counsel anticipated in their memorandum filed on November 10, 1947, this case had then, for all practical purposes, become moot. Now it is absolutely so. The time consumed for the case to reach its turn on the calendar of hearings and for deliberation has already exceeded six months, thus enabling the petitioner to escape compliance with the conditions imposed by the respondent judge and his predecessor and assailed by the petitioner. The period of six months commenced on July 8, 1947, and ended on January 8, 1948.
There would seem, therefore, no necessity of deciding the questions raised in the petition. However, lest our failure to dispose of these questions might serve as a new ground for a motion for reconsideration and be the cause of further delay in the execution, now long overdue, of the judgment, we shall express our opinion n the matter: We do not construe the orders as an abuse of discretion. They are in substantial, almost in literal accord with the applicable provisions. Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, empowers the court to suspend execution of an order or judgment "on the condition that the requirements laid down for said suspension shall be complied with;" and section 6 of Act No. 689 expressly provides that "The order of suspension shall be granted and will continue in force only on condition that the person against whom judgment has been rendered deposits the total amounts of rent due during the period of suspension or such portions of said amount as the Court may order from time to time, at the same rate of rental that he was charged for the month immediately preceding the expiration of the lease. This deposit shall include, in addition, the costs and all rents due and not paid before the suspension and a reasonable amount to answer for damages."
The petitioner in his memorandum touches on the merits of the case, going to the extreme of contending that the decision should be modified so as to reduce the monthly rent to P96. This contention is out of order. The judgment is no longer open to attack and is not put in issue by the petition.
The petition is denied and dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
Paras, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
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