Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-336 January 25, 1947
FORTUNATO F. HALILI, solicitante,
vs.
ICE AND COLD STORAGE INDUSTRIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., recurrida.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-343 Enero 25, 1947
ICE AND COLD STORAGE INDUSTRIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., solicitante,
vs.
FORTUNATO F. HALILI, recurrido.
D. Manuel O. Chan y D. Vicente Ampil en representaciondel solicitante (No. L-336) y recurrido (No. L-343).
D. B. Francisco, D. Arnaldo J. Guzman y D. Carlos Kahn en representacion de la recurrida (No. L-336) y solicitante (No. L-343).
BRIONES, J.:
I
Estas dos apelaciones se refieren a una sola sentencia — ladictada por la Comision de Servicios Publicos en el expediente No. 401 de dicha Comision que versa sobre la solicitud presentada por Fortunato F. Halili pidiendo la concesionde un certificado de conveniencia publica para lainstalacion, mantenimiento y operacion de una fabrica dehielo en la Ciudad de Quezon.
Se han opuesto a la solicitud la razon social Ice and ColdStorage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., que mas adelantese designara con el nombre abreviado de Ice Cold, y Esteban Espiritu, en virtud de los siguientes fundamentos: (a) que la aprobacion de la solicitud redundaria en detrimentode sus derechos e intereses como fabricantes de hielo previamente autorizados en el territorio donde el solicitante proyecta establecer su planta; (b) que por ley sus derechosen inversiones como tales operadores previamente autorizados merecen el amparo de la Comision de Servicios Publicos mediante la denegacion de la referida solicitud; (c) y, por ultimo, que la comodidad o conveniencia publica norequiere ni justifica el establecimiento y operacion de lafabrica proyectada por el solicitante. Tanto el solicitante como la opositora Ice Code articularon sus pruebas en apoyode sus respectivas alegaciones. El opositor Esteban Espirituno adujo ninguna prueba, descansando mas bien enlas presentadas por su co-opositora, la Ice Cold.
La Comision dicto despues su sentencia concediendo alsolicitante un certificado de conveniencia publica para instalar, mantener y hacer funcionar una fabrica de hielocon capacidad para producir veinte (20) toneladas al dia, y para vender su produccion solamente dentro de los limitesde la Ciudad de Quezon. Tambien se imponen y acostumbradasen esta clase de operaciones —, pero la principal y laque considera al solicitante como la mas onerosa es la quelimita la duracion del certificado a solo tres (3) anos, estoes, hasta el 31 de Diciembre de 1948.
Tanto el solicitante como la opositora Ice Cold han apeladode la decision. Ambas apelaciones son las que tenemosque considerar y resolver en esta decision conjunta.El otro opositor, Esteban Espiritu, no ha apelado.
Hallanse tan estrechamente enlazados entre si las cuestionesdebatidas, los puntos contencionsos de una y otraapelacion, que todo lo que digamos en favor de las pretensionesde una parte es necesaria y a automaticamente aplicableen contra de la otra parte y viceversa. Asi que, enobsequio de la brevedad y concision, optamos por discutiry resolver las cuestiones suscitadas conjuntamente, en globo, sin establecer ninguna prelacion o prioridad.
II
Resulta de autos que orginariamente el certificado de laIce Cold abarcaba toda Filipinas. Despues se reformopara cubrir solamente toda la Ciudad de Manila, la Ciudadde Quezon y parte de las provincias de Rizal, Bulacan y Cavite. El 30 de Septiembre de 1941 su capacidad maximade produccion llegaba a 245 toneladas diariamente. En talfecha la Comision de Servicios Publicos autorizo un aumentode 100 por ciento, o sea, una produccion diaria de 490 toneladas. Bajo esta autorizacion, sin embargo, la Ice Cold solo pudo montar la maquinaria suficiente para 45 toneladas, ascendiendo, por tanto, su produccion total diariaa 290 toneladas. La maquinaria restante ya no sepudo instalar por haber sobrevenido la guerra del Pacificoel 8 de Diciembre de 1941.
En los primeros dias de la ocupacion japonesa la Ice Coldcontinuo produciendo y distribuyendo hielo de conformidadcon los terminos de su certificado hasta que el ejercito japonestomo y asumio la operacion de todas sus plantas. En la batalla por la liberacion de Manila la mayor parte dela fabrica quedo destruida, suspendiendose consiguientementesu produccion. Reconquistada Manila el ejercitoamericano tomo la planta rehabilitandola parcialmente. Desu produccion — unas 100 toneladas al dia, segun la sentenciade la Comision que lleva la fecha de 15 de Enero, 1946 — lamayor parte la consumia el ejercito americano, y solo unapequena parte se ponia a disposicion del publico. Parecesin embargo, que bajo los terminos del contrato con el Ejercito la produccion total se entregaria a la Ice Cold afines de Junio de este ano para su distribucion y venta al publico. Pero es hecho establecido que al terminarse lavista de este expediente y al dictarse la sentencia de la Comision la Ice Cold no distribuia ni vendia hielo en laCiudad de Quezon ni estaba en condiciones de hacerlo porla insuficiencia de su produccion. Tambien resulta de autosque la Comision, antes de avenirse a conceder la solicitud siquiera parcialmente, o sea, para un periodo de 3 anos,impuso la condicion de que el solicitante tuviese la maquinariay los implementos necesarios para poder instalarinmediatamente su planta, a fin de asegurar la pronta yexpedita prestacion del servicio, y tambien para evitar quese especulase con el certificado.
III
Lo primero que tenemos que determinar y resolver es silas pruebas obrantes en autos justifican y sostienen lassiguientes conclusiones de la Comision: (a) que la convenienciae interes publicos demandan el establecimiento yoperacion de la fabrica de hielo proyectada en la Ciudadde Quezon; (b) que el solicitante tiene listos y preparados,para su inmediata instalacion, las maquinarias e implementosnecesarios descritos en la solicitud; (c) y que elsolicitante esta economicamente capacitado para mantenery prestar el servicio publico de que se trata. Estamos perfectamente satisfechos de que estas conclusiones sehallan bien fundadas. Nada hay en autos que justifique elque usemos de nuestra facultad de revision (Ley Num. 146 del Commonwealth tal como ha sido reformada por la Ley Num. 454 tambien del Commonwealth) para abrogar dichas conclusiones. Estamos sustancialmente de acuerdo con lassiguientes apreciaciones de la Comision:
In the light of the above facts, we cannot agree with oppositors' contention that public convenience does not require the operation of the proposed ice plant. Applicant's evidence shows that Quezon City if subdivided into nineteen large districts most of which are well populated and that at the present time no authorized operator is rendering ice service to the inhabitants thereof. It is true that we have recently authorized the operation of two ice plants in Quezon City (see decision dated December 5, 1943 in Cases Nos. 309,417 and four others) but aside from the fact that said two plants will only produce seven tons of ice daily, this production will be sold not only in Quezon City but also in Manila. The evidence of record, which we have carefully examined, clearly shows that the public need and demand for ice in Quezon City require the operation of the plant herein proposed together with the other two plants already authorized in said place in view of the emergency and considering that the Ice and Cold Storage Industries which produced 290 tons of ice daily before the war is not rendering service at present. (Decision, Public Service Commission.)
De lo dicho, se sigue que el recurso interpuesto por la IceCold para que revoquemos la decision de la Comision en laparte favorable al solicitante, no puede prosperar. Solamentepodriamos hacer esto si en autos no hubiera pruebasque razonablemente sostengan dicha parte de la decision, ola misma fuese palmariamente contraria a la ley, o la Comisioncareciera de jurisdiccion y competencia para actuary decidir el caso. Ninguno de estos requisitos se da en elasunto que nos ocupa.
IV
Pasaremos ahora a considerar y resolver el pedimento derevision interpuesto por el solicitante. Este se excepcionacontra la decision en cuanto esta limita el plazo del certificadoa 3 años y pide que se le de el plazo acostumbrado enesta clase de servicio — el de 15 años.
El solicitante arguye que la Ciudad de Quezon es unaurbe importante no solo por sus actuales proporciones enpoblacion y en territorio, sino tambien por las enormes posibilidades de expansion y crecimiento de que le hacesusceptible su contiguidad con Manila y con provinciaslimitrofes densamente pobladas. Segun pruebas no seriamente impugnadas del solicitante, la ciudad tiene ahora 120,000 habitantes y un territorio 3 veces mas grande queel de Manila; que entre tiendas, hoteles, restoranes, cafesy otros lugares de entretenimiento hay en ella unos 250centros donde se consume o puede consumirse bastante cantidad de hielo; que, ademas, estan situadas en ella importantes instituciones privadas como el Quezon Institute,Good Shepherd Convent, St. Joseph College, y Jesus ChristSeminary; y que en ella no hay ninguna fabrica de hielo,puesto que las planas de la Ice Cold todas estan situadasen Manila. El solicitante arguye que la demanda de hieloy de sus derivados en la ciudad de Quezon no es temporalo de emergencia, sino que es permanente, continua, impuestapor las necesidades cotidianas de la poblacion. Portanto, la razon de emergencia que invoca la Comision ensu sentencia para limitar el plazo del certificado a 3 años, no tiene razon de ser.
Estimamos acertado este razonamiento del solicitante. Lo que en todo caso es accidental, contingente, es la capacidadde la Ice Code para reanudar su servicio en la Ciudadde Quezon, distribuyendo y vendiendo hielo alli como antesde la guerra; en otras palabras, que si la Ice Cold no puedeprestar ahpra dicho servicio debido a la destruccion de susplantas si culpa de su parte, podra, sin embargo, hacerlosi se le da un tiempo razonable para rehabilitar su produccion. Pero si la Comision no ha estimado esta perspectiva, esta posibilidad de rehabilitacion como razon bastante paraprivar a los habitantes de Quezon de un servicio publicoa que tienen perfecto y actual derecho, posponiendo la satisfaccionde sus necesidades frigorificas para tiempos mejores — y por este motivo se ha concedido la solicitud para queel solicitante instale inmediatamente su fabrica, y produzcay venda hielo en dicha ciudad —, juzgamos que tampoco elloes motivo suficiente, por las razones que mas adelante vamosa exponer, para limitar el plazo del certificado a 3 años, envez del plazo de 15 anos que se ha concedido siempre.
Se alega, sin seria impugnacion, que entre terrenos yedificios, maquinarias y accesorios el solicitantes tiene invertidoen la fabrica de que se trata un capital montante aP265,000. A esto hay que anadir el costo calculado de laoperacion que suma unos P27,000 mensualmente. Resulta patente que 3 años es un plazo demasiado corto para posibilitarel recobro de la inversion mediante razonables rendimientos. Se debe considerar que una utilidad o servicio publico no es como un negocio cualquiera, de esos en queuna amplia libertad economica permite posibilidades espectaculares, hasta estupendas de lucro, al socaire de favorables circunstancias o del ingenio y habilidad de susadministradores. El servicio publico, no. Sus posibilidadesde lucro estan limitadas y reglamentadas, sujetas entodo tiempo a tarifas y aranceles que se fijan y determinanal tenor del interes y conveniencia publica. A las empresasde servicio publico se les requiere que presten un serviciolo mas eficiente y economico posible; que esten constantemente alerta hacia las exigencias de ese gran amo que sellama publico — amo casi siempre quejoso e insaciable. Asique, a cambio de esto, tienen derecho "a una justa compensaciony una ganancia liberal" (Ynchausti Steamship Co.contra Comisionado de Utilidad Publica y Junta de Apelacion,42 Jur. Fil., 654); y no solo esto sino que tienen derechotambien a que el Estado les provea de cierto grado deestabilidad y seguridad; en una palabra, a que se les dotede un clima economico vital en que razonablemente puedanprosperar y desarrollarse. Por eso no es extrano que enun memorandum sometido el 26 de Julio de 1939 el Secretario de Justicia, y aprobado por este, en relacion con lasdisposiciones de la citada Ley Num. 454 del Common wealthque, enmendando el articulo 15 de la Ley Num. 146 del mismoCommonwealth, faculta a la Comision de Servicios Publicosa fijar el periodo de tiempo durante el cual seran validoslos certificados de conveniencia publica, el ComisionadoHon. Vicente de Vera recomendase un periodo de quince(15) anos para los certificados sobre fabricas de hielo yalmacenes de refrigeracion. "El equipo de estos servicios — diceel Comisionado Vera — cuesta bastante y su desarrollo requiere tiempo, considerando que la demanda de hielo no esuniforme todo el ano, y por esto es recomienda que lavalidez de los certificados para estos servicios sea de quince(15) años." (Memorandum del Comisionado Hon. Vicentede Vera al Secretario de Justicia Hon. Jose Abad Santos, de 26 de Julio de 1939, obrante en autos a folio 46, Exhibit H.).
Efectivamente, en consonancia con este memorandumdebidamente aprobado por el Secretario de Justicia comoqueda dicho, la Comision de Servicios Publicos adopto invariablementecomo norma en sus decisiones antes de laguerra el fijar un periodo de 15 anos en los certificados deconveniencia publica para fabricas de hielo y almacenes derefrigeracion.
V
Pero no es solo el interes del solicitante, como empresariode servicio publico, el que aconseja la concesion de un plazorazonablemente largo para la duracion de su certificado:tambien lo aconseja, y acaso con mayor fuerza, el mismointeres publico, la misma publica conveniencia en la ciudadde Quezon. Se puede afirmar, sin temor a valida contradiccion, que siempre sera mas conveniente y economico parael vecindario de la ciudad de Quezon el servicio de unaempresa que produzca y distribuya hielo alli mismo, dentrode su territorio, maxime si es exclusivo como el del solicitante, que el servicio de otra empresa que tiene sus plantasfuera como es el caso de la Ice Cold que las tiene en Manila, a varios kilometros de la ciudad de Quezon, y mantienetan solo en esta un servicio de distribucion mediante autocamionesy el expendio en puestos frigorificos (ice boxes) manejados por distribuidores particulares e independientes.Y la razon es harto sencilla: en la distribucion y venta dehielo el factor distancia es muy importante por la facilidadcon que se derrite el producto. Esto sin contar que siemprees mas comodo, conveniente y economico un servicio que setiene a la mano, a facil alcance.
Asi que es doctrina firmemente establecida en esta jurisdiccionque, salbo cuando hay de por medio una competenciaruinosa y antieconomica, una fabrica que producehielo alli donde lo distribuye es preferible a otra que loproduzca fuera. En otras palabras, en igualidad de circunstancias, y cuando la competencia no destruye a los competidoressino que todavia les deja un margen razonblede supervivencia y, ademas, les estimula a una saludableemulacion en la prestacion de mejor servicio, la opcion, debeser en favor del productor local. Esta doctrina se sentoen una serie de decisiones de esta Corte promulgadas antesde la guerra, de las cuales una de las mas tipicas y representativases la dictada en el asunto de Limjoco contra SanMiguel Brewery (71 Phil., 189).
Limjoco solicito de la Comision de Servicios Publicosla concesion de un certificado de conveniencia publica parala instalacion de una fabrica de hielo en San Juan del Monte (21,000 habitantes), provincia de Rizal, con capacidad para producir 5 toneladas diarias, y con autorizacionpara vender sus productos en el citado municipio yen el contiguo de Mandaluyong (18,000 habitantes). Objetarona la solicitud San Miguel Brewery, antecesora dela Ice Cold, y otros opositores de menor cuantia, aduciendoen su oposicion sustancialmente casi las mismas razonesalegadas por la Ice Cold en el presente expediente. La Comision denego la solicitud por las siguientes razones: que la demanda de hielo y de almacenes de refrigeracionen los municipios de San Juan y Mandaluyong ere pequenay limitada; que esta necesidad estaba adecuada y suficientementeservida por la opositora San Miguel Brewery; y por ultimo, que el solicitante no habia podido demostrarsatisfactoriamente que la necesidad y conveniencia publicas requerian el servicio propuesto por el. Elevado el expedienteen grado de apelacion a esta Corte, revocose ladecision apelada, concediendose el certificado solicitado porLimjuco. Esta Corte dijo entonces lo siguiente, sentandonormas inequivocas en este genere de asuntos:
Although as a general rule this Court will not disturb the decision of the Public Service Commission if reasonably supported by the evidence according to several decisions rendered (Manila Electric Co. vs. Balagtas, 58 Phil., 429; Ampil vs. Public Service Commission, 59 Phil., 556; Calabia vs. Orlanes & Banaag Transp. Co., 55 Phil., 659; Aleosan Transp. Co. vs. Public Service Commission, G. R. No. 44523; Mindanao Bus Co. vs. Maria Cristina Transp. Co., G. R. No. 43628; Espiritu vs. San Miguel Brewery, G. R. No. 45161; Gilles vs. Halili, 38 Off. Gaz., 1988; Manila Electric Co. vs. M. R. Mateo, 38 Off. Gaz., 1839; Bulacan Bus Co. vs. Enriquez, G. R. Nos. 46085-86), this is a case where we think the petition for review should be granted and the decision of the Public Service Commission reversed. It is admitted that San Juan del Monte has no ice plant or refrigeration establishment; neither does Mandaluyong. San Juan del Monte has a population of around 31,000 inhabitants, whereas Mandaluyong has more than 18,000. The oppositors, Mariquina Ice Plant and the Pasig Ice Plant of Jose Flores, do not now sell or distribute ice in San Juan del Monte and Mandaluyong, although authorized to do so in their certificates of public convenience and necessity, and the ice service in these two localities is furnished solely by the oppositor San Miguel Brewery whose plant is located in Manila, several kilometers away, and which merely maintains in the said localities a delivery truck service and ice boxes handled by independent dealers. We are of the opinion that the public demand for ice can be better met by the establishment of an ice plant in the same municipality where it is to be distributed. In San Miguel Brewery vs. Espiritu, 60 Phil., 745, 751, we said:
It being of general knowledge, and therefore, of judicial knowledge, no evidence is necessary to show that an ice plant in the locality is much more advantageous to the general public as to facility in acquiring said article of commodity, not to say of domestic necessity, without loss in weight, than a plant some kilometers from said locality, which distributes ice to its customers by means of delivery trucks at certain hours of the day. Even in the case where an outside manufacturer has an ice depository in the locality, this Court has found and held that it is always more advantageous to have an ice plant in the same locality (San Miguel Brewery vs. Calumpit Ice Plant, G.R. No. 31550, promulgated Jan. 14, 1930, not reported; Cruz and Lapid vs. San Miguel Brewery [1933], 57 Phil., 1017; San Miguel Brewery vs. Lapid 53 Phil., 539).
The mere fact that the San Miguel Brewery and the other oppositors have authority to sell ice in San Juan del Monte and Mandaluyong is not ground for denying the application of the appellant. This Court once observed that:
. . . The mere fact that a holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity is authorized to supply ice in a locality does not prevent the authorization of another holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to supply and sell ice in the same locality when the latter is in a better position to do so than the former, and when his service proves to be better and more beneficial to the inhabitants of said locality, taking into consideration the distance between the municipality where the plant is established and that in which the ice manufactured in said plant is to be sold. This is not a case of a land transportation company with a timetable, whose service may be increase or decreased according to the needs of the public but that of a company supplying ice manufactured by it, whose efficiency to satisfy the needs of the buying public depends upon its promptness and economy in so doing. (Limjoco vs. Public Service Commission and Cabrera, G. R. No. 32831, cited in San Miguel Brewery vs. Espiritu, supra.) The rule thus enunciated should apply with more force in the present case where the applicant proposes not only to sell and distribute ice in the localities covered by his application but to establish an ice plant in one of them. Due to the great importance of ice as a prime necessity of life, the better policy is to facilitate the establishment of ice plants, unless such establishment is not justified or will lead to ruinous or wasteful competition. (Decision, Limjoco contra San Miguel Brewery, supra, Exhibit I, a folios 51, 52 y 53.).
La "gran importancia del hielo como primordial necesidadde la vida," conforme se dice en la precedente cita, jamas se podra exagerar en un pais tropical como el nuestrodonde los extenuadores efectos del clima torrido en lamayor parte del ano tienen que ser mitigados con diversasformas de refrigeracion, la mas tipica y eficas de las cualesson el hielo manufacturado y sus derivados. Esto sincontar las vastas y crecientes aplicaciones industriales ymercantiles del hielo, v. gr., en la preservacion de carne,de pescados, de vegetales, de drogas, etc., etc. Y el hielono es ya un articulo de lujo, reservado tan solo para usoy solaz de las clases acomodadas; en realidad, estas gozande formas de refrigencion mas costosas, mas refinadas ymas avanzadas como la "atmosfera acondicionada," y lasrefrigeradoras. Son las masas obreras, las mas expuestasa la inclemencia de nuestro sol, y las clases menosafortunadas las que principalmente se sirven del hielo manufacturado, yendo a satisfacer su sed en la tienda de laesquina, o comprandolo en pequenos pedazos. Asi que,reiterando sustancialmente la doctrina sentada en el asuntocitado de Limjoco, la mejor politica no es el imposibilitaro dificultar el establecimiento de plantas de hielo, "a menosque tal establecimiento no estuviere justificado o determinareuna ruinosa competencia o un despilfarro insensato."
VI
Demostrada la justificacion del certificado otorgado alsolicitante, lo que nos queda por ver es si la concesion deun plazo mayor — 15 años en vez de 3 — determinara unacompetencia ruinosa o un despilfarro insensato de capitalesy energias. Las pruebas obrantes en autos no lodemuestran. Lo que, por el contrario, ha quedado establecido de una manera decisiva, es que la opositora Ice Cold cubre un territorio bastante extenso — toda Manila,toda la ciudad de Quezon, y parte de las provincias de Rizal, Bulacan y Cavite; que mientras a la opositora no sele priva de su derecho de vender hielo en la ciudad deQuezon, el solicitante tendra que venderlo exclusivamenteen dicha ciudad, es decir, que no podra invadir Manila y elresto territorial de la opositora; que aun antes de la guerrala opositora aun no habia logrado instalar las maquinariasque se necesitaban para poder producir su maximum autorizado de 490 toneladas diarias, alcanzando solamentesu mayor produccion a 290 toneladas; que con la destruccionde la mayor parte de sus maquinarias y las presentesdificultades para importar materiales o implementos, resultanaturalmente menos hacedero alcanzar el limite maximoautorizado por la Comision; que por motivos de variolinaje, unos economicos, otros sociales, la poblacion de Maniladurante la guerra y despues de ella ha crecido enproporciones tremendas, casi fantasticas, y tiende a crecermas dada la probabilidad de que Manila se conviertaen emporio comercial en el Extremo Oriente, que, porrazones obvias y naturales, el estupendo crecimiento deManila esta repercutiendo, con el impacto y la fuerza deuna poderosa marea, en las areas de su periferia, particularmenteen la ciudad de Quezon; que otras empresasproductoras de hielo en Manila antes de la guerra ya nofuncionan ahora por la destruccion de sus plantas, dejando practicamente sola en el campo a la Ice Cold; que naturalmentetodas estas causas y concausas convergen en hacerque haya negocio mas que suficiente, sobrado, no solopara una empresa de grande capitalizacion como la Ice Cold, sino tambien para empresas pequenas como la delsolicitante, cuya produccion autorizada de 20 toneladasdiarias es nada mas que una pequena fraccion del volumenautorizado a la opositora.
VIII
Arguye la opositora que "es regla bien establecida enesta jurisdiccion que mientras un operador actual ejecutey observe los terminos y condiciones de su licencia, cumplalos reglamentos de la Comision y llene las razonables demandas del publico, el mismo tiene mas o menos un derechoadquirido y preferente sobre una persona que intenteinvadir su territorio;" y luego anade que "tambiense ha establecido en esta jurisdiccion que antes de expedirseun nuevo certificado de conveniencia public, si hubierealgun antiguo operador con propio certificado, a este ultimose le debe dar antes una oportunidad para corregiry mejorar su servicio si fuere deficiente o inadecuado."En apoyo de esta asercion se invoca y cita lo resuelto enuna serie de asuntos sobre transporte terrestre motorizado,entre ellos el de Batangas Transportation Co. contraOrlanes (52 Jur. Fil., 469), y el de Bohol Land TransportationCo., contra Jureidini (53 Jur. Fil., 597). Ya hemosvisto, sin embargo, que en relacion con las fabricas dehielo y almacenes de refrigeracion la regla ha sido alguntanto diferente por las razones especiales de que se ha hechomerito y que ya no es preciso repetir. (Limjoco contra San Miguel Brewery y otros asuntos citados, ut supra.)Acaso bastara solo anadir que mientras en el servicio deautomoviles y autocamiones hay una porcion de razonesque aconsejan la adopcion de normas algun tanto rigidasde restriccion y control para prevenir la ruinosa competenciay el despilfarro, entre ellas, v. gr., la relativa facilidadcon que se puede adquirir el equipo y el no exigirsecalificaciones especiales para el negocio (cualquiera podriacomenzar inmediatamente con un automovil o un autocamion, y asi ha habido muchos individuos y familias quese han arruinado tontamente en la insensata aventura), no asi en el establecimiento de fabricas de hielo y almacenesde refrigeracion donde en costo mas o menos considerablede la inversion inicial, las calificaciones especialesy tecnicas que se requieren — eso que graficamente se llamaahora "know how" — el lento desarollo del negocio, yotras circunstancias no se prestan a crear un medio ambientepropicio para la impremeditacion y la aventura, amenos que sea fines de especulacion, y contra estaultima ya la Comision tiene adoptadas ciertas medidasprudentes de precaucion.
La opositora Ice Cold admite que de momento no tieneella todas las instalaciones necesarias para producir suvolumen autorizado de 490 toneladas diarias, pero diceque si se le da un tiempo razonable para ello puede hacerlo,y que al no concedersele esa opotunidad antes deque se otorgue un nuevo certificado a otro operador comoel solicitante, no parece sino que se le quiere castigar poruna incapacidad de que no es responsable y que estabafuera de sus manos el poder impedirlo. Creemos que estaqueja carece de fundamento. Si en esta clase de serviciopublico no hay razon para excederse en el amparo a unaoperacion ya existente, salvo razones de competencia ruinosa,despilfarro, o servicio ineficiente y antieconomico, menos la hay para una operacion futura, eventual, contingente. No se ha probado que la concesion de un periodode 15 anos al solicitante le va a causar un dano irreparablea la opositora. Lo que en todo caso esta tiene que haceres reajustar sus planes de rehabilitacion a la nueva situacionque se crea con el certificado del solicitante. Nose dira que 20 toneladas de negocio para el solicitante vaa tener el efecto de dislocar esos planes.
VIII
Es posible que la planta del solicitante afecte alguntanto a los ingresos y ganancias de la opositora en la ciudadde Quezon en el sentido de disminuirlos; pero este simplehecho, suponiendolo probado ?constituye lo que se llamacompetencia ruinosa? Indudablamente que no. La competenciadebe ser tal que prive al operador de razonablesganancias en proporcion al capital invertido, y de esto nohay prueba fehaciente en autos. Es doctrina bien establecidaque la mera posibilidad de reduccion en los ingresosde un negocio no es bastante para probar una alegacionde competencia ruinosa. Se debe demostrar que el negociono obtendria suficientes ganancias para pagar un dividendoo interes razonable sobre el capital invertido (Manila Electric Co. contra Pasay Transportation Co., 66 Phil.,36.) Esta demostracion no se ha hecho en el caso que nos ocupa.
IX
Se insinua la incuestionable condicion o capacidad financierade la opositora para reanudar su servicio y la ejecuciondel vasto programa de mejoras trazado y proyectadopor ella antes de la guerra. Parece que sobre esto nopuede haber realmente discusion: la opositora representauna capitalizacion amplia y bien consolidada. Pero, porotro lado, cabe afirmar que la pequena industria tambientiene perfecto derecho a reclamar su sitio bajo el sol enlos contornos y dintornos de un sistema economico bienequilibrado, que aspire al logro de una autentica y generalprosperidad. No se necesita ser hostil a las grandes concentracionesde capital o riqueza para pensar y decir quecuando la pequena industria puede ofrecer las mismas garantiasde un servicio eficiente, economico y barato, tiene,por lo menos, tanto derecho como la grande para que sele dote de un clima vital el mas propicio posible. Estapolitica es progresiva y conservadora al propio tiempo. Multiplicara las oportunidades de trabajo y empleo lucrativo;canalizara los capitales y los ahorros por los caucesdel mayor numero posible de inversiones creadoras y productivas;determinara consiguientemente un reparto masequitativo y mas general de las ganancias; y asegurarafinalmente a las bases de nuestra democracia politica yeconomica el mayor grado de solidez y estabilidad.
Una industria pequena prospera y triunfante acaso seauno de los mejores antidotos a ciertos ismos y utopias queagitan y preocupan a los hombres y a los pueblos en todaspartes.
En meritos de lo expuesto, se confirma la sentencia dela Comision de Servicios Publicos en todos los respectoscon la sola modificacion de que, en vez de tres (3) anos,se concede al solicitante Fortunato F. Halili un periodo dequince (15) años para la operacion de su fabrica, siendovalido en certificado correspondiente de conveniencia publicaque se le otorga hasta el 31 de Diciembnre de 1960.Sin pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas. Asi se ordena.
Moran, Pres., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado y Bengzon, MM., estan conformes.
Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I concur in the dismissal of the petition for review by Ice Cold and Storage Industries. On the same grounds on which this dismissal is made, and while I cherish high regard and admiration for the able and well-written decision of the majority, I am constrained to disagree with the reversal of the Public Service Commission's decision refusing to grant Fortunato Halili a certificate of public convenience for a period longer than four years, i. e., beyond 1948.
At the risk of making this opinion commonplace and tedious, I will cite what I believe are the law and rules governing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in public utility cases.
Section 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, is the law. It clearly marks the bounds of our power therein, leaving nothing to inference. It confines our jurisdiction to set aside any ruling, order or decision of the Public Service Commission to where it clearly appears (1) that there is no evidence before the Commission reasonably to support such ruling, order or decision; (2) that the same is contrary to law; or (3) that it was without the jurisdiction of the Commission.
The power of review thus conferred is purely judicial in character as distinguished from legislative or executive. In some states, under constitutional or statutory provisions the court's jurisdiction is legislative and executive as well as judicial. It is a matter of the utmost consequence that this distinction should constantly be kept in mind, for upon the nature of the court's jurisdiction depends the scope and extent thereof. Corpus Juris, Vol. 51, p. 83, explains the difference. It says that where the proceeding is legislative the court has jurisdiction to review the legislative discretion of the Commission and to enter an order which it deems ought to be made, and in so doing it must exercise its own judgment as to both law and the facts. In other words, the court might or must do what it would do if the question were originally before it. This is roughly the function of the appellate court in ordinary criminal and civil cases.
But where, as in the instant case, the court proceeding is purely judicial, the jurisdiction of the court is, or should, be limited to setting aside or suspending the order complained of, if the court finds that the Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdict in, or in violation of law, or that there is no evidence reasonably to sustain it. If the conclusion arrived at by the Commission finds justification in the evidence and is not unlawful, the court may not review the facts and it may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. The court may in such case consider the facts, circumstances and conditions shown to exist, but merely for the purpose of inquiring into the method by which the Commission reached its conclusion. (51 C.J., 83.) The rule is thus aptly stated in Corpus Juris: "The review by the Court, on appeal, of an order of a public utility commission, is limited to the questions whether the commission has regularly pursued its authority, whether the order is supported by evidence, and whether any constitutional right of a party is infringed thereby. The question is not whether the court, if the question were originally before it, would make the same order as was made by the commission, but only whether the commission has acted reasonably and legally or has exceeded or abused its powers, and the court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the commission on administrative matters." (51 C.J., 75.)
This Court has followed this rule. In a long line of decisions in public utility cases, it has said it would not unduly interfere with the Commission or substitute its judgment for that of the Commission except when there is before it no evidence reasonably supporting the order, or when the order was issued without hearing or receipt of any evidence, or when the Commission acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction. (Aleosan Transportation Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 63 Phil., 523; Ampil vs. Public Service Commission, 59 Phil., 556; Gilles vs. Halili and Public Service Commission, 65 Phil., 738; Bulacan Bus Company vs. Enriquez, 66 Phil., 454; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. Bisaya Land Transportation Co., 66 Phil., 63.
The Commission's decision now in question is not contrary to law; it is not without the jurisdiction of the Commission; and the evidence of record and facts of general knowledge of which the court may take judicial notice, reasonably warrant the same. Under these circumstances, this Court, I submit, goes beyond the orbit of its legitimate power when it sets aside or modifies the decision of the Commission under review. It exercises legislative and administrative power in a case in which its function is purely judicial and its freedom of action is restricted. It adopts its own independent conception of what is good for the public welfare and interest in an administrative and legislative case wherein the shaping of economic and social policy is entrusted to an administrative body by the legislative department of the government.
The decision of the majority relies upon Limjoco vs. Public Service Commission and Cabrera (G. R. No. 32831), and San Miguel Brewery vs. Espiritu (60 Phil., 745, 751). I will not concern myself with the propriety or impropriety, legality of illegality, of the position assumed by this Court in the decisions cited. Frankly, I have serious doubts. But however it may be, the majority, I am constrained to believe, cannot derive comfort from them. There are wide differences in the circumstances between those cases and the case at bar, and these differences furnish precisely the best argument in favor of this dissent.
I note that in the above cases, the ice plants were intended to manufacture and distribute ice in San Juan, Mandaluyong and Caloocan, Province of Rizal. Unlike Quezon City, these were compact communities, small in territories but dense in population. These characteristics gave decisive weight, in the opinion of the Court, to the conclusion that "the public demand for ice can be better met by the establishment of an ice plant in the same municipality where it is to be distributed,' and "that an ice plant in the locality is much more advantageous to the general public as to facility in acquiring said article of commodity, not to say of domestic necessity, without loss in weight, than a plant some kilometers from said locality, which distributes ice to its customers by means of delivery-truck sat certain hours of the day." Quezon City by its population, size and facilities of communication with the City of Manila bears no similarity in the above respects to the municipalities of San Juan, Caloocan and Mandaluyong of the province of Rizal. The advantages which this Court envisioned in the installation of ice factories in those towns do no exist in the case of Halili's projected ice plant in Quezon City.
The population of Quezon City, according to the acting mayor of that city, is 123,000. This is an estimate not based on any official census or statistics. The figure may be, and I believe, is exaggerated. While the Quezon City pre-war population was only 40,500 (Census of 1940), many strong houses in that city have been destroyed and there have been no new constructions to speak of during the occupation or after the liberation. But the population is not very relevant, if at all, to this case. What is important is its size. According to the decision of the majority, quoting the testimony of the same witness, Quezon City is three times as large as Manila. The mayor's calculation also is greatly in excess of the true area, although the exaggeration would favor my position. The true area of that city is 73.78 square kilometers as compared with Manila's 37.04 square kilometers. Yet as it is, Quezon City comprises a vast territory sprawled southward from Balintawak to Wack-Wack and beyond, and eastward as far as Marikina. Save for San Juan and Mandaluyong in between, Quezon City borders on about two-thirds of Manila's north, east and south boundaries. All its main roads which constitute its main arteries of communication run from widely separated parts of this city and converge in the downtown sections of Manila either directly or through intermediate streets.
Halili's ice plant was to be located in Balintawak. Balintawak is in the northwest corner of Quezon City. It is at one point of what we may roughly describe as a three-quarter moon with Manila filing the space to make the circle. The belief that the inhabitants of Quezon City can go to Halili's ice plant or ice store as the inhabitants of San Juan, Mandaluyong and Caloocan can go to the ice stores in their respective towns, is, in the face of such extensive territory, quite illusory. The reason given in the decisions cited in the majority opinion in favor of the establishment of ice plants in Mandaluyong, San Juan and Caloocan, namely, that the purchase of ice at the plant without loss in weight due to long trips is more advantageous to the inhabitants of those towns, does not hold here. Except the people of Balintawak — perhaps — there are no sections of Quezon City which could derive from the operation of Halili's ice factory an advantage greater than, or as much as, they can get from the plants in Manila. The institutions which according to the majority will be greatly benefited by the operation of Halili's ice plant, and the more fashionable districts of Quezon City, such as New Manila, Santa Mesa Heights, Diliman, Wack-Wack, Cubao, etc., are much nearer to, and have better, more numerous, and, quicker facilities of communication and transportation with, the commercial districts of Manila than with Balintawak. Unless one has his private means of transportation he has to pass through those districts of Manila to reach Balintawak from any of the Quezon City districts above-named. So unless Halili organizes a home delivery service, he cannot hope to distribute ice to people of Quezon City, with the exception probably of those who live in the vicinity of his factory. And even if he adopts a home delivery service, he cannot distribute ice as economically and efficiently as ice-makers having their plants in Manila. Even if the only direct route, the Circumferential Road, from Balintawak to other parts of Quezon City be used by Halili's trucks, still Santa Mesa Heights, Camp Murphy, Cubao, Galas, Diliman, Wack-Wack. New Manila, to mention only some, would be much closer to San Miguel in Manila than to Balintawak.
Except, therefore, during the period of emergency, Halili's certificate of public convenience will not promote public interest and welfare. If there is jurisdiction for granting certificates to all applicants who can supply the public need for ice now, it is because of the acute shortage of this commodity during the first few years after liberation. After 1948 or before the end of that year, Ice Cold and Storage Industries will have completed the installation of its machinery and equipment to double its pre-war production capacity. This concern had been granted in September, 1941, authority to increase its production of ice from 245 tons to 490 tons, an amount more than the sufficient supply of ice required by the residents of its allocated territory. The failure to carry out this projected increase was only caused by the outbreak of war. The additional machinery and equipment needed had been ordered and were ready for shipment when the war came. But in the hearing of October 17, 1945, the representative of Ice Cold and Storage Industries testified that soon after liberation his firm had cabled for the prompt shipment of the said machinery and equipment, but that other cargoes had been given priority in transportation. However, the witness declared that the authorized increase could be carried out by the end of 1946. Financially and by experience and proven ability, Ice Cold and Storage Industries can be depended upon to be able to put into effect this plan before the end of 1947, at the latest.
It is said that small business deserves a place in a well-balance deconomic system. No one will querrel with this theory — as an abstract proposition. As applied to ice industries in Manila and surrounding places, however, others might not be willing to subscribe to the idea. Evidently, the Commission, for one, holds a different view. Many factors, legal and economic, enter into the scene. As a matter of law, it is the duty of the Commission to prevent the invasion by a utility of a territory occupied by another utility who furnishes adequate service at reasonable rates. Even when the service is inadequate, an existing utility should first be accorded opportunity to furnish necessary additional and extended service before a certificate is issued to a competitor. For another thing, the Commission has to consider whether the proposed service is reasonably necessary or would be wasteful and a useless burden to the community. To prevent ruinous competition is one of the aims of the creation of the Public Service Commission. (Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Jureidini, 53 Phil., 560; Raymundo Transportation Co. vs. Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co., and Orlanes Transportation Co., 55 Phil., 404; 51 C.J., 52.) The contention that Halili's business could not do much harm to Ice Cold and Storage Industries presents only one side of the picture. It overlook the possibility, which it is the Commission's duty to take into account, that Halili and not precisely Ice Cold and Storage Industries might be the loser in a competition on a venture in which he has no previous experience, within a territory which in normal times is adequately and efficiently served by competent operators, if not overcrowded. Moreover, who is to determine, in the scheme of things, the extent of competition that may become destructive or unprofitable?.
But this is beside the point and should not interest us. What matters is that there were alternatives to choose from, and that the Commission has made a choice in the regular exercise of its sound discretion in the light of the evidence of record, of the results of its observations and investigation, and of its peculiar and detailed knowledge of existing conditions. If the court can not agree with the Commission's decision, it is not free to correct the supposed mistake. Inevitably, I have to repeat the rule, that the court may not impose its judgment upon a question of policy, economic or social, as to which there is room for a difference of intelligent opinion; it may not set aside an order of the Commission merely upon its conception as to the wisdom or expediency of the order. (43 Am. Juris., 721.) That power falls within the province of the policy-making departments of the government of which the Public Service Commission is an instrumentality. I need not stress the fact that the Public Service Commission is an administrative body exercising administrative and legislative powers delegated to it by the legislature. The function of the court is to see that these powers are performed within and according to law and the constitution and in a reasonably manner, it can go no farther. Incidentally, the fact that this Court's jurisdiction under the law can be invoked, not by way of appeal but by original process, is in itself significant as a sign-post of the reduced length and width of our path.
Halili would have no cause for complaint and would not be prejudiced if he did not get a permanent certificate of convenience and public utility. He knew he was taking a chance when he bought the machinery and equipment he now owns, fully aware of the fact that he might not be granted such certificate. He had foreseen this contingency and wisely made a provision for an escape. In the event of an unfavorable decision he was going to install them on his fishing boats. That is the gist of the testimony of his nephew and manager of his commercial enterprises.
Let not this opinion be construed as hostility towards small business. If the Commission had granted permanent certificates not only to Halili but also to the other applicants, and the decision of the Commission had been elevated to us for review, I would not hesitate to vote for non-interference with such decision. Small business and small merchants naturally arouse sympathy, and they do indeed deserve all help and encouragement. But that encouragement must come from other sources. Above personal feelings and sentiment is the paramount necessity of adherence to law when, as here, it is clear, and of enforcing principles essential to the orderly operation of the system and processes of constitutional government.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing dissent.
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