Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46330 April 22, 1939
IRENEO ABAD SANTOS and JOSE V. ABAD SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF TARLAC, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and DIEGO LOCSIN, Judge of First Instance of Tarlac, respondents.
M. H. de Joya for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta for respondents.
MORAN, J.:
A petition for certiorari.
In an action instituted by the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain parcels of land for the construction of the Capas-Murcia diversion road, a compromise was entered into between said province and the petitioners herein for the payment to the latter of the agreed value of their lands. The respondent judge approved the compromise in a partial decision rendered by him on September 27, 1937, and ordered the parties to comply with the conditions therein set forth. On October 2, 1937, the provincial fiscal, in behalf of the Province of Tarlac, moved for the reconsideration of the decision on the ground that in giving his assent to the compromise, he acted under the mistaken belief that the prices fixed therein had been approved by the appraisal committee of the provincial government, composed of the provincial treasurer, district engineer and provincial auditor, and that the Province of Tarlac, at the time of the compromise, had no longer any authority to expropriate the lands, because in virtue of Executive Order No. 71, the Capas-Murcia Diversion road was declared a national highway under the authority of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The respondent judge acceded to his motion and, setting aside it decision, ordered the reopening of the case and authorized the substitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the Province of Tarlac as party plaintiff, in accordance with the petition of the Solicitor-General to that effect. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the respondent judge was without power to set aside his partial decision which was founded upon a compromise duly approved by him. It is not claimed that the judgment in question has become final. In fact, it cannot be so claimed because the fiscal's motion for reconsideration thereof was presented five days after its rendition. Not having become final, the lower court has plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and justice require. (Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson, 18 Phil., 257; De Fiesta vs. Llorente and Manila Railroad Co., 25 Phil., 554, 561.) And the fact that the decision was rendered upon a compromise, gives it no greater validity than if it had been rendered after a trial. It stands on the same footing as that of an ordinary judgment which may be opened or vacated on adequate grounds, such as fraud , mistake or absence of real consent. (15 R. C. L., 645, 646; sec. 113, Act No. 190; Yboleon vs. Sison, 59 Phil., 281.)
Whether or not the grounds alleged by the provincial fiscal in his motion for reconsideration seeking relief from the effect of the compromise and the from the judgment rendered thereon are or are not sufficient, is not a question of jurisdiction but one of judgment which we do not decide here. No abuse of discretion is shown by the petitioners, and by abuse of discretion we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Petition is denied, with costs against the petitioners.
Avanceņa, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
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