G.R. No. 31067




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 31067 September 14, 1929 MANILA PUBLISHING COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HONORABLE JOSE BERNABE, Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila, YAP SULAN and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the City of Manila, defendants-appellees. Cruz and Esposo for appellant. B. A. Tan for appellees. STATEMENT Plaintiff is a domestic corporation with its office in the City of Manila. The defendant, Jose Bernabe, is a Judge of the Municipal Court of that city. The defendant, Jose Casimiro, is the sheriff of the City of Manila, and the defendant, Yap Sulan, is a resident. It is alleged that the case of Yap Sulan vs. Manila Publishing Company and the sheriff of the City of Manila was tried by the defendant judge on December 5, 1927. That after the trial, he reserved his decision without fixing the date for its rendition. That he rendered his decision on December 12, 1927, ordering the plaintiff here to pay Yap Sulan, the defendant here, 460 and costs a copy of which was received by this plaintiff for the first time on December 20, 1927. That on December 29, 1927, plaintiff here gave notice of appeal from the judgment, and deposited the docketing fee and costs. That on January 10, 1928, Yap Sulan filed a motion to dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff here " on the ground that the said appeal was not presented within the time provided by law." That on February 2,1928, the municipal judges sustained the motion, and dismissed the appeal, and that Yap Sulan asked for, and the defendant judge issued, an execution on the judgment which the defendant sheriff was about to execute on the property of the plaintiff, and petitioner prays for a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants here from executing the judgment rendered against it in the municipal judge, and for an order requiring the municipal judge to certify the record of the case, after which that this court annul and vacate the order of the municipal court. To this petition the defendants filed a demurrer upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. March 31, 1928, the lower court overruled the demurrer, and on April twenty-fourth set the case for hearing on May 21, 1928, and on that date rendered judgment against the plaintiff here, and dissolved the injunction that was issued, to which the plaintiff duly excepted and moved for a new trial, and gave notice of its intention to appeal to this court for relief, and on appeal assigns the following errors: I. The court below erred in rendering the judgment dated November 14, 1928, reversing and annulling motu proprio its decision on March 31, 1928, after it has become final and irrevocable. II. And in holding the plaintiff-appellant has not perfected its appeal in case No. 66174 of the Municipal Court of Manila within the time prescribed by law. JOHNS, J.: The facts are very simple, and the question is purely legal. The case of Yap Sulan vs. Manila Publishing Company, the plaintiff here, and Sheriff of the City of Manila, was tried before the defendant, Jose Bernabe, Municipal Judge, on December 5, 1927, and at the conclusion of the trial, the judge reserved his decision without stating when he would render it. He rendered his decision on December twelfth, of which this plaintiff received a notice and a copy on December twentieth, but the decision was rendered and dated December twelfth. December 29, 1927, within nine days after it had received notice of the judgment and seventeen days after its rendition, plaintiff gave notice of its intention to appeal from the judgment of the municipal court to the Court of First Instance, and paid the P16 to cover the docketing fee and made the deposit of P25 to cover the costs. The question presented involves the construction of the following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure: At the conclusion of the trial, the justice shall render judgment for the plaintiff to recover such sum as he finds to be justly his due, with costs; or for the defendant to recover his costs, as the law and evidence may warrant. If there is a counterclaim or plea in offset the justice shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party, with costs. But he may adjourn the disposition of the case to a stated day, not exceeding one week from the time of the conclusion of the trial, for the consideration of judgment, if he require time for consideration. (Section 66, Code of Civil Procedure.) An appeal in civil causes shall be perfected by filing with the justice of the peace, within fifteen days after the entry of the judgment complained of, . . . (Section 76, Code of Civil Procedure.) Applying the facts to this law, it will be found that case was tried on December fifth, and the judgment was rendered on December twelfth, of which the plaintiff received notice on December twentieth, from which it gave notice of intention to appeal on December twenty-ninth, nine days after it received notice of decision, and seventeen days after the rendition of the judgment. The question presented was squarely met and decided by the second division in the case of Agcaoili vs. Rivera, G. R. No. 26768,¹ in which the court says: Upon appeal to this court the defendant argues that the fifteen days period, allowed for an appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace on an ordinary civil action, must be counted from the date of the notification of the judgment and not from the date of its entry. This contention cannot be sustained. The language of sections 72 and 76 of the Code of Civil Procedure is so clear as to require no special interpretation and leaves no doubt that the appeal must be perfected within fifteen days from the date of the entry of the judgment. It is admitted here that the case was tried on December fifth, and that the judgment in question was rendered on December twelfth, or within the time specified in section 66. That is to say, that the law specifically provides for the rendition of judgment within one week after the trial, and it must be assumed that official duty has been performed. Yet there is no claim or pretense that the attorneys ever gave any notice to the clerk of the court or made any effort or inquiry to find out about the rendition of the judgment, and that they received the first information from the clerk on December twentieth. But even then, they could have given notice of appeal at any time on or before the twenty-seventh, but did not give the notice until December twenty-ninth, which was seventeen days after the judgment was rendered. A vicious practice has grown up among some of the attorneys of the lower courts and of this court relying upon clerks of the court, which has resulted in the dismissal of a number of appeals. When employed by their respective clients, it is the duty of attorneys to guard, look after and protect the interest of their clients, and not to leave such matters to the clerks of the court. It is for those reasons that attorneys are employed and paid by their clients, and for which the clerks are not employed and are not paid. For example, in this case, by a simple telephone call to the clerk's office of the municipal court, the attorneys for the plaintiff could have easily found out that the judgment was rendered on December twelfth, which was within the time provided by law, and even after the receipt of notice from the clerk on the twentieth, they could have given the notice of appeal at any time on or before the twenty-seventh, which would have been within the specified time. As to this class of cases, the law in question is plain, positive and certain, and specifically provides that an appeal shall be taken "within fifteen days after the entry of the judgment complained of." The complaint is dismissed, and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered. Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Footnotes ¹ Promulgated March 25, 1927, not reported. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation