Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4724 March 5, 1920
KENRYU AZUMA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS and THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents-appellees.
H. V. Bamberger for appellant.
Assistant Attorney-General Lacson for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 22d day of October, 1918, the Insular Collector of Customs issued a warrant of arrest, No. 193, directing the Chief of the Customs Secret Service, or any other officer of the Philippine Customs Service authorized to make arrests, to arrest one Rui Daimon and to bring her before a board of special inquiry sitting at the port of Manila, P. I., for a hearing to enable her to show cause, if any there be, why she should not be deported from the Philippine Islands in accordance with the terms of the Act of Congress of February 5, 1917. Said warrant of arrest was as follows:
Whereas, it has been made to appear to the undersigned and the undersigned is satisfied that Rui Daimon is an alien woman and that since the entrance of the said Rui Daimon into the Philippine Islands she has been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and practicing prostitution within the Philippine Islands in violation of the Act of Congress, approved February 5, 1917;
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of the Act of Congress, approved February 5, 1917, entitled: "An Act regulating immigration of aliens to, and residence of aliens in, the United States," you are commanded to forthwith apprehend the said Rui Daimon, take her into custody, and bring her before a Board of Special Inquiry sitting at the port of Manila, P. I., for a hearing to enable her to show cause, if any there be, why she should not be deported from the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the terms of the said Act of Congress, approved February 5, 1917.
Given under my hand and seal of Office this 22d day of October, 1918.
(Sgd.) V. ALDANESE,
Insular Collector of Customs.
Said warrant of arrest was duly executed; but before the hearing before the board of special inquiry took place the said Kenryu Azuma, on the 22d day of October, 1918, presented a petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the court of first instance, alleging that the said Rui Daimon was being detained and deprived of her liberty illegally; that said detention and deprivation of liberty was not by virtue of any warrant of arrest, order of commitment, or legal process whatsoever, nor was said detention and deprivation of liberty in pursuance of any order emanating from the Governor-General in the exercise of his powers as set forth in Act No. 2757 of the Philippine Legislature; that said illegal detention was for the purpose of deporting the said Rui Daimon from the Philippine Islands.
The Attorney-General, representing the respondents, answered the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, and admitted that Rui Daimon was being detained for the purpose stated in said warrant of arrest, to be deported, if said statements were found to be true, in accordance with an Act of Congress regulating immigration of aliens to, and residence of aliens in, the United States.
The cause, apparently, was submitted to the lower court for decision upon the petition of the appellant and the answer of the Attorney-General, to which was attached the warrant of arrest No. 193. Apparently the only question presented to the lower court was whether or not, under said Act of Congress of February 5, 1917, Rui Daimon could be deported from the Philippine Islands. The allegation that Rui Daimon had been found an inmate of a house of a prostitution and practicing prostitution within the Philippine Islands, is not denied.
Upon the foregoing facts the Honorable James A. Ostrand denied the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. From that decision the petitioner appealed to this court.
The appellant alleges that the Insular Collector of Customs has no authority to cause the arrest of the detained for the causes set forth in the warrant of arrest, as she had been in the Philippine Islands for a period of more than five years.
In support of the contention of the appellant it is argued that aliens who are found as inmates of houses of prostitution or practicing prostitution within the Philippine Islands, cannot be deported under the provisions of the Act of Congress of February 5, 1917, after they have resided within the Philippine Islands for a period of five years.
Section 19 of the Act of Congress of February 5, 1917, provides for the deportation of aliens under twelve different conditions, as follows:
(1) Any alien who at the time of entry was a member of one or more of the classes excluded by law, shall be deported at any time within five years after entry;
(2) Any alien who shall have entered or who shall be found in the United States in violation of this Act, or in violation of any other law of the United States, shall be deported;
(3) Any alien who at any time after entry shall be found advocating or teaching the unlawful destruction of property, or advocating or teaching anarchy, or the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all forms of law or the assassination of public officials, shall be deported;
(4) Any alien who within five years after entry becomes a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to landing, shall be deported;
(5) Any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States, or who is hereafter sentenced more than once to such a term of imprisonment because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed at any time after entry, shall be deported;
(6) Any alien who shall be found an inmate of or connected with the management of a house of prostitution or practicing prostitution after such alien shall be entered the United States, or who shall receive, share in, or derive benefit from any part of the earnings of any prostitute, shall be deported;
(7) Any alien who manages or is employed by, in, or in connection with any house of prostitution or music or dance hall or other place of amusement or resort habitually frequented by prostitutes, or where prostitutes gather, or who in any way assists any prostitute or protects or promises to protect from arrest any prostitute, shall be deported;
(8) Any alien who shall import or attempt to import any person for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose, shall be deported;
(9) Any alien who, after being excluded and deported or arrested and deported as a prostitute, or as a procurer, or as having been connected with the business of prostitution or importation for prostitution or other immoral purposes in any of the ways hereinbefore specified, shall return to and enter the United States, shall be deported;
(10) Any alien convicted and imprisoned for a violation of section four hereof (which relates to persons who import prostitutes), shall be deported;
(11) Any alien who was convicted, or who admits the commission, prior to entry, of a felony or other crime of misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, shall be deported;
(12) Any alien who shall have entered the United States by water at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officials, or by land at any place other than one designated as a port of entry for aliens by the Commissioner General of Immigration, or at any time not designated by immigration officials, who enters without inspection, shall be deported at any time within three years after entry.
Said Act further provides "that the provisions of this section, with the exceptions hereinbefore noted, shall be applicable to the classes of aliens therein mentioned irrespective of the time of their entry into the United States."
It will be noted that paragraphs (1) and (12) of said section 19, above set forth, mention specifically the time within which the classes of aliens therein described may be deported: those described in paragraph (1) may be deported within the period of five years after entry, while those described in paragraph (12) may be deported within the period of three years after entry. Said section 19 sin ply provides that the classes of aliens mentioned in paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11) may be deported for the reasons therein given, without especifying the time within which they may be deported. In view of the fact that no time is specified within which they may be deported, in connection with the proviso above quoted, it seems to us to be clear that said classes of aliens may be deported at any time, "irrespective of the time of their entry into the United States," when the fact is established that they belong to the particular classes.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that Rui Daimon may be deported by an order of the Insular Collector of Customs, without reference to the time she has resided in the Philippine Islands, when it is once established that she is an alien of the class described in said warrant of arrest.
The Act of Congress of February 5, 1917, is not the first Act providing for the deportation of alien prostitutes. Under the Act of Congress of February 20, 1907, an alien prostitute could be deported only within the period of three years from the date of her entry into the United States. (34 U. S. Stat. at Large, 899; Loce Shee vs. North, 170 Fed., 566.) Under the Act of Congress of March 26, 1910, an alien prostitute was subject to deportation without reference to the length of the time she resided in the United States. (36 U. S. Stat. at Large, 264; Bugajewitz vs. Adams, 228 U. S., 585; U. S. vs. Czeslicki, 209 Feb., 496.)
The Act of Congress of February 5, 1917, continued in force the provisions of the Act of March 26, 1910, so far as the former related to the deportation of aliens.
Said Act of Congress of February 5, 1917, is made expressly applicable to the Philippine Islands, and the Collector of Customs, through a board of special inquiry, has full and complete authority to enforce its provisions. (Chieng Ah Sui vs. McCoy, 239 U. S., 139; 22 Phil., 361; U. S. vs. Williams, 185 Fed., 598; U. S. vs. Kimi Yamamoto, 240 Fed., 390; U. S. vs. Sui Joy, 240 Feb., 392.)
Therefore, and for all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court below denying the writ of habeas corpus, is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
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