Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 15692 September 5, 1919
LEON BRIONES, plaintiff,
vs.
JUAN GARCIA, ET AL., defendants.
Vicente Singson Pablo for plaintiff.
The respondent Judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for the other defendants.
TORRES, J.:
On July 3rd, 1919, the counsel for Leon Briones petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus directed to the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac requiring said judge to allow and certify verbatim a bill of exceptions presented in case No. 989 without (by the order of April 24 of the present year) excluding the stated words on the ground that the motion for new trial, which was denied by the lower court, was presented within the period of thirty days required by law. He alleged that said judicial decision was due to an erroneous opinion that said motion for new trial was not presented within the period of thirty days, that is, that the sending of the motion and affidavit did not take place on the 27th of January but on the 28th, or 29th of the same month of 1919; that, in deciding, the true presentation should be counted from the date on which same was received by the clerk of the court and not from the day the same was registered and deposited in the post-office of Vigan, the residence of the counsel for the appellant; that against the order of the trial court denying the motion for new trial was presented a motion for reconsideration, which also was denied on the ground that, according to the postmaster of Vigan, his motion for a new trial was registered and deposited in the post office on 27th of January 1919; and that, if he was notified of the judgment on December 28, 1918, and if the period of thirty days expired on the day following the 27th of January when his motion was deposited in the post-office, the said period fixed by section 27 of Act No. 2347 has not yet expired; but that in spite of what has already been said, and the given distance between the residence of his counsel and the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, the judge persisted in his erroneous opinion and refused to certify the bill of exceptions as long as the following words are not stricken out:
. . . together with the oral and documentary evidence submitted by both parties and the transcription of the stenographic notes taken during the trial of the present case in consequence of the corresponding revision. And requiring, furthermore, that the order denying the motion in this case No. 989 should be made a part of the same Bill of Exceptions.
In his answer, the judge of first instance set forth that notification of the judgment rendered in the case No. 989 was given to the plaintiff on December 28, 1918; that on January 9, 1919, was received in the office of the clerk of court of Tarlac the plaintiff's notice dated the 2nd of the same month, excepting to the said judgment; that on January 31, 1919, was likewise received in the office of the clerk of the said Court of First Instance a motion for new trial from the said plaintiff, Leon Briones, dated the 27th of the same month; that to this motion as well as to the reconsideration of the motion for new trial the counsel for the defendants objected; that on March 16, 1919, the counsel for said plaintiff excepted to the order denying the motion for new trial, to which the counsel for the defendants objected on the ground of having been presented out of time, and that an order of execution of the judgment was prayed for. On the 22d of the said month of March the plaintiff presented his bill of exceptions; the counsel for the defendants on April 10 following objected to approval of same. On the 24th of the same month of April the trial court issued an order requiring, among other things, that in case the bill of exceptions be sent to the Supreme Court, the clerk of court should also send with it a certification of the date on which the motion for new trial had been received and of the fact that the trial court could not approve nor forward said bill of exceptions as presented unless amended, striking out the words previously inserted.
Against this last order is interposed the present complaint or petition for a writ of mandamus, based on the provision of section 499 of Act No. 190. The respondent judge is of the opinion that a writing is considered as presented to the court only from the moment that in fact it is given to the court, not from the moment it is deposited in the post-office — and believes that same is also the opinion of this Tribunal — for, in accordance with article 13 of the Rules of Court, the periods referred to begin to run from the day following that when notice is served, so consequently the motion for new trial ought to have been filed with the Court of First Instance within the period which began to run the day following the day of notification of the judgment in the case; that it is the doctrine laid down by this court that the duty of the clerk of court is to receive bills of exceptions and to note down the dates same are filed, just as in the case of briefs, pleadings and all other writings which are connected with a pending judgment; that the annotation of presentation has positive legal effect, by provision of law, on the order of use in exercising the rights of the party and use of the means or remedies fixed by law. The motion for a new trial not having been presented within the period fixed by said Act No. 2347, the petitioner has no right to expect that the Supreme Court will review the evidence whereby the words, above mentioned, are stricken out, and, holding as never presented the motion for a new trial in the aforesaid suit, this tribunal respectfully submits the consideration set forth in support of the decision of the respondent judge.
It is unquestionable that the motion for new trial sought by the counsel for Leon Briones in the said case No. 989 was presented without the period of 30 days fixed by section 27 of the Organic Law No. 2347, which section amending section 145 of Act No. 190 was incorporated under paragraph 1 of the latter in the following terms:
Sec. 145. New Trial. — Within thirty days after notice of a decision rendered by a Court of First Instance, the judge thereof may at the petition of the party aggrieved, and after due notice to the adverse party, set aside the judgment and grant a new trial, provided the petition is based on any of the following causes materially affecting the legitimate rights of the petitioner, etc.
Counsel for Leon Briones having been notified of the judgment rendered in said case on December 28, 1918, the period of thirty days began to run on the 29th of said month and ended of January 27, 1919, and as the motion for new trial of the plaintiff, Leon Briones, of the 27th of January was received in the office of the clerk of court of Tarlac only on the 31st of the same month, it is evident that the said motion for new trial was presented without the period, taking into consideration the fact that briefs or bills of exceptions and other writings which party litigants have the obligation to prove as having been presented within the required time should be filed with the clerk of court where the action is instituted within the period fixed by law with regard thereto. The mere fact that briefs, bills of exceptions and other writings which the interested party is obliged to file with the clerk of court have been deposited in the post office, though registered, is not enough to justify compliance with the law since such a procedure is not authorized by law. It is indispensable that said pleadings, documents or other prestations which the interested party is obliged to presented should be presented without any excuse to the clerk of court where such case is pending. (Section 384, Act No. 190.)
The doctrine has been constantly upheld by the Supreme Court that when a party, which considers itself aggrieved by a judgment rendered in a case, has not filed with the trial court a motion for new trial based upon the provisions of section 145 of Act No. 190 as amended by section 27 of Act No. 2347 upon appeal, this court will not review the evidence adduced by the parties according to the provisions of section 497 of the said Act No. 190 as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1596.
Having failed to present the motion for new trial within the period fixed by Act No. 2347, the petitioner has no right to expect this court to review the evidence adduced in the trial and therefore, if the petitioner, Leon Briones, has the right to maintain his appeal by means of a bill of exceptions, the decision of this court will be limited to the determination of the questions of law submitted. Wherefore the petitioner had no right to insist that together with his bill of exceptions should be included the evidence adduced at the trial, which in no way can be reviewed as the law does not so authorize. For this reason the trial judge had a right to order that the words in question, those insertion the petitioner seeks, should be stricken from bill of exceptions.
By these considerations the remedy claimed by the plaintiff Leon Briones has been set forth to be improper and therefore:
The petition of Leon Briones for a writ of mandamus is hereby denied, with the costs against the same. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 The case of Garcia vs. Galindez, R.G. No. 15691, based on the same facts and principles, we decided at the same time and with the same result.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
