G.R. No. L-12581




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-12581 March 13, 1917 JOSE LINO LUNA, petitioner, vs. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, respondent. Ramon Diokno & Agapito Ygnacio for petitioner. Sumulong & Estrada for respondent. MORELAND, J.: This is an action based upon the alleged usurpation of a public office, that of governor of the Province of Rizal, in which a demurrer was filed to the complaint. The question before us arises on the issues framed by the demurrer. After setting out the election of the defendant, the complaint alleges that: "The plaintiff duly began a contest in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against the said election, and, while the said contest was pending decision, the defendant took possession of the office to which he was elected on the 16th of October, 1916, by virtud of a certificate of election issued to him by the board of provincial canvassers, which certificate of election was the subject of controversy in the election contest." The complaint further alleges that: "The protest was decided by the Court of First Instance on the 14th day of January, 1917, and the plaintiff was declared to have received 4018 votes while the defendant was found to have received only 3,317 votes, that is to say, that the plaintiff was the one who received a plurality of the legal votes cast at the said election; and the court ordered, in consequence, that the provincial board, as the provincial board of canvassers, correct its canvass in accordance with the decision of the court." The complaint avers that: "In view of the decision referred to, the plaintiff notified the defendant that he was ready to qualify and to assume possession of the office and demanded that he quit the office and deliver it to the plaintiff; but that the defendant refused to do so." Upon these facts plaintiff asserts in his complaint that: "The defendant is retaining and usurping the office in question to the great injury of the plaintiff and to the detriment of the public interest;" and maintains that: "the plaintiff has the right, by virtue of the decision of the Court of First Instance above mentioned, to take possession of and exercise the duties of the office, and the defendant, by virtue of said decisions, has lost his right to occupy it, and is at the present time in possession thereof without right." A demurrer was filed to the complaint on the ground that: "The allegations of the complaint fail to show that the plaintiff is entitled to occupy the office and discharge the duties of the office now held by the defendant;" and that: "The facts set out in the complaint are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action as they do not show that the defendant is usurping or illegally retaining possession of the office in question." We are of the opinion that the demurrer must be sustained. The complaint does not show that the plaintiff was entitled to the office or that the defendant is illegally in possession thereof. Section 197 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that: "A civil action may be brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands: (1) Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public civil office;" and that such action may be commenced by any "person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another." Section 202 declared that: "When the action is against a person for usurping an office, the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, with an averment of his right to the same; and that the defendant is unlawfully in possession of the same; and judgment may be rendered upon the right of the defendant, and also upon the right of the person so averred to be entitled, or only upon the right of the defendant, as justice requires." Section 207 determines the form and nature of the judgment to be rendered in this class of action. It provides that: "When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, . . . judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the relator or plaintiff, as the case may be, recover his costs." This court has held on several occasions, in applying that portion of the Election Law referring to the election of provincial governors, that a person is not entitled to occupy the office of provincial governor until his election has been duly proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers and a certificate of election has been issued to him in pursuance of that proclamation (Manalo vs. Sevilla, 24 Phil. Rep., 609). The certificate of election is the credential which proves his right to exercise the functions of the office and admits him into possession thereof. Section 1999 of the Administrative Code provides in effect that a person holding a public office shall continue to possess and exercise the functions of the same until his successor is elected and qualifies. By virtue of this statute on who occupies a public office is required to maintain possession thereof until his successor is elected and qualifies. If he turns the office over to a person who was not duly elected and who has not qualified he is acting in violation of law and will be responsible for the loss of money or property occasioned by such transfer. While section 209 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff in an action of quo warranto may be declared entitled to the office in question before he has taken the oath of office or executed the official bond required by law, that fact is not in conflict with our opinion that the plaintiff in the present action must go so far as to allege in his complaint and prove on the trial that he was duly elected to the office in dispute. The complaint rests the plaintiff's right to the office exclusively upon the decision of the Court of First Instance in the election contest. That right is not based on a proclamation of the provincial board of canvassers or on a certificate of election issued in pursuance thereof. There is no allegation in the complaint that the provincial board of canvassers corrected its canvass in accordance with the decision of the Court of First Instance, or that, after such correction, that body duly proclaimed the plaintiff elected to the office in question. Neither is there an allegation that a certificate of election was duly issued to the plaintiff in pursuance of such proclamation. Plaintiff's right to the office, according to his own allegations, rests exclusively on the judgment of the Court of First Instance referred to. This court has held on several occasions (Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. Rep., 238; Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. Rep., 632) that a Court of First Instance in an election contest has no authority to declare any one elected to the office to which the contest relates. Its sole duty is to order the provincial board of canvassers to correct its return. Its judgment, therefore, is not proof of plaintiff's election. Moreover, it is subject to appeal. In fact, the judgment of the court in this case was appealed and that appeal is now pending in this court. It is our opinion, therefore, that the complaint does not show either that the plaintiff is entitled to the office or that the defendant is usurping the same. Although it is not mentioned as ground of demurrer and has not been presented or discussed, it is a grave question, even conceding that this action is maintainable under any theory, whether the complaint is not demurrable on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. An election contest determines finally the right of the contestant as well as of each of the respondents to the office contested. While the contest does not determine the eligibility of the candidate for office, it determines who was elected to the office contested. It will be observed that the complaint in this action is not based on the ineligibility of the defendant but seeks to determine who was elected to the office of provincial governor of the Province of Rizal in the last election. That question will be finally and conclusively determined in the election contest; and an action of quo warranto to determine the same question would seem to be unnecessary and burdensome. It is clear to us that, although the question has not been raised or discussed, this action is not maintainable under any theory. Section 27 of Act 1582 provides a method for the determination of election contests which is exclusive of every other remedy; and to the extent that it is applicable has modified the Code of Civil procedure dealing with actions founded upon the usurpation of public office. The case of Navarro vs. Gimenez (10 Phil. Rep., 226) is similar to the case before us. There the election was contested under section 27 of Act No. 1582. Immediately after the decision of the court had been rendered in that contest an action of usurpation was begun under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to which we have referred. The Supreme Court in that case decided the very question to which we have adverted. It said: It is very evident that the Legislature intended to provide a summary and exclusive way for determining the facts in relation to certain elections held under the law. It is expressly provided by section 27 that the decision of the Court of First Instance shall be final and conclusive. No appeal is allowed from that decision. In the present case there was such a proceeding. The present plaintiff was a party thereto. He had an opportunity to try and have decided the very questions which he now asks to have decided by this court in this proceeding. Those questions were, in fact, tried and decided in the court below and if this action can be maintained it would amount to an allowance of an appeal from the judgment of the court below in the election proceeding, the very thing which section 27 prohibits. It cannot be believed that the Legislature, after providing a special and exclusive manner for determining the facts in an election case, and after declaring that determination should be final, intended that the defeated party should have a right to try the same questions over again by virtue of the provisions of section 201, above quoted. That the provisions of section 201 have been modified to some extent by the Election Law is very clear. Whether or not it still remains in force and may be availed of by a defeated candidate, who claims that the possessor of an office is not entitled thereto for some reason not connected with the method of casting and counting the votes, we do not decide. We do decide, however, that it has been so far modified that no person claiming a right to a public office can now maintain an action by virtue of this section when the grounds alleged by him in his complaint relate to the facts which the Court of First Instance in proceedings under said section 27 had acquired a right to and did determine. This decision would seem to be conclusive of right to maintain the present action. In closing we call attention to the fact that unless the special remedies mentioned in Chapter IX of the Code of Civil Procedure are directed against the court of Firs Instance itself, the Supreme Court will usually require the proceeding to be brought in the Court of First Instance instead of the Supreme Court. The Court of First Instance is better adapted to the trial of these special remedies than is the Supreme Court; and we regard it as the better practice to begin the proceedings to obtain such remedies in the trial court in the first instance. This is especially true where the determination of the questions presented would require the taking of evidence. The demurrer is sustained and unless the complaint is amended within five days the action will be finally dismissed with costs. So ordered. Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur. Trent, J., concurs in the result. Separate Opinions CARSON, J., concurring: I concur, under the doctrine announced in Navarro vs. Gimenez (10 Phil. Rep., 226). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation