Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11015 January 14, 1916
PERPETUO FLORES TAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellee.
Beaumont and Tenney for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
The plaintiff arrived at the port of Manila from China, on the steamship Chenan, on the 12th day of March, 1915, and requested permission to enter the Philippine Islands, claiming that he was a native of the Philippine and the natural son of Juana Flores and Tan Kee. Some question arose as to his right to enter the Philippine Islands. That question was referred to a board of special inquiry, which board, according to the record, after hearing all of the proof which the respective parties desired to present, reached the conclusion that he was not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands. An appeal was taken to the Collector of Customs from the decision of the board of special inquiry and affirmed by said Collector. The board of special inquiry refused the plaintiff the right to enter the Philippine Islands for the reason that it did not believe him to be the person he claimed to be. The board found that the plaintiff was a Chinese laborer, without the right to enter the said Islands.
Later a rehearsing was granted to the plaintiff, and additional witnesses were heard, and again the board of special inquiry denied the plaintiff the right to enter. Another appeal was taken to the Collector of Customs from the second decision of the board of special inquiry, and again affirmed. The Insular Collector of Customs, after a second review of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, and the arguments presented in his behalf, sustained the decision of the board of special inquiry and again ordered the plaintiff returned to his port of embarkation on the next sailing of the vessel that brought him to the Philippine Islands or some other vessel of the same line.
Later the plaintiff presented a petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. The Collector of Customs was ordered to show cause why said writ should not be issued. Due return was made, in which the above facts were set forth.
Upon the petition and return of the Collector of Customs, the cause was submitted to the court. Upon a consideration of said facts, the Honorable J.A. Ostrand, judge, denied the petition prayed for, and remanded the plaintiff to the custody of the Insular Collector of Customs for deportation. In addition to the prayer for the writ of prohibition, the plaintiff prayed that the Insular Collector of Customs be ordered to certify to the Court of First Instance for review, a full and complete transaction of all the proceedings had in the Bureau of Customs, relating to the right of the plaintiff to enter the Philippine Islands. In the course of his opinion and in answer to the prayer of the petition of the plaintiff, judge Ostrand said:
It is well established that in the absence of an abuse of authority or special error of law, the decision of the administrative authorities is final, in cases of this nature, and the courts have no power to interfere. There is no evidence now before the court showing abuse of authority, and such errors of law as may have been incurred do not appear to have been substantial. It may be true that the Collector of Customs in his decision, has taken into consideration facts appearing from the records of his office, and which did not originally appear in the records of this case, but the petitioner does not allege that he is prepared to refute or disprove the facts so found.
In addition to the writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner also asks for a writ of certiorari, by does not allege facts showing that respondent has exceeded his jurisdiction, nor does it appear that the petitioner does not have another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Under these facts the writ of certiorari will not issue.
From that decision of the lower court, the plaintiff appealed to this court and here makes several assignments of error. Practically every one of said assignments of error has been discussed by this court in former decisions. This court has repeatedly and constantly held the contrary to the contention of the appellant. The appellant argues that the lower court committed an error in refusing to order the record of the proceedings before the immigration authorities certified to the Court of First Instance. In answer to that argument, it may be said that the burden is upon the plaintiff, in cases like the present, to show that the department of customs had abused its authority, power, or discretion. In order to show that, the proceedings before the Collector of Customs must be examined. The courts have no right or authority to take proof upon the right of a Chinese alien to enter territory of the United States, after his right to enter has been denied by the department of customs, until it is clearly shown that said department has abused its power, authority, or discretion. That fact can only be shown by the records. Inasmuch, therefore, as the burden is upon the petitioner, it becomes the duty of said petitioner to furnish proof showing such abuse of discretion.
There is still another reason justifying the denial of the court of order the Collector of Customs to send up a copy of the record made before him, and that is the fact that a copy in the present case had already been furnished the representative of the plaintiff.
Without a further discussion of the assignments of error, we are to the opinion and so hold that the judgment of the Court of First Instance, denying the writ of habeas corpus and ordering the plaintiff returned to the Collector of Customs for deportation, should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
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