G.R. No. L-5861




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-5861 January 28, 1911 ESTEBAN FABROS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUAN VILLA AGUSTIN and JUAN TABLIGA, defendants-appellees. T. L. McGirr for appellant. Mariano Escueta for appellees. ARELLANO, C.J.: The appeal in this cause merely involves an incidental petition or one of a secondary order, which was denied in the judgment appealed from, and the payment of interest directed in the judgment. The principal petition was granted by the trial court and the judgment, in so far as it is concerned, was not appealed by any of the litigants. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac, in conformity with the prayer of the complaint, decided that the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the land described in the complaint, (which redemption had been opposed by Juan Tabliga), upon payment to the defendant, Juan Tabliga, of the sum for which the latter had purchased it and, in addition, of the amount of the interest thereon, at 12 per cent per annum, up to the time when the said plaintiff offered to redeem the land, and at 6 per cent from the date of the said offer. No appeal was taken with respect to the right to redeem upon payment of the price of the sale; but the plaintiff appealed on account of the two following assignments of error: 1. Because the judgment did not allow him damages at the rate of P1,000 a year, from at least the 23d day of March, 1907; thus violating sections 93, 126, and 409 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Because it compelled him to pay the 6 per cent, in addition to the 12 per cent interest, on the sum which the defendant refused to receive as the price of redemption; thus violating article 1100 of the Civil Code and section 465 of the aforesaid Act No. 190. With regard to the first error assigned, the trial court stated in its findings from the evidence: (1) That it did not deem the estimate of P1,000 to be either just or correct as the value of the products, in one year, of so small an area of land, not even though it contained a fishery; and (2) that the only proof presented, to wit, the testimony of the plaintiff, had not satisfied the court, and that in due time it had indicated to the attorneys the necessity of presenting satisfactory proof, and that, as they had not adduced any further evidence in this matter, it concluded that it would be improper to allow damages, which were not satisfactory proved, in the amount requested. This court can not, in cases like this, arrive at a different conclusion. The existence and amount of the damages must be proved; otherwise, it is not possible to determine the obligation to pay them. By the citation of section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant apparently wishes it to be understood that, the defendant not having demurred to the complaint, nor denied in his answer the facts alleged, such facts must be accepted by the court as proved; but this theory is without foundation, in the present case, since the defendant expressly denied all the facts alleged in the complaint: "And answering the said complaint," read on page 8 of the bill of exceptions, "they deny each all of the allegations thereof . . ." (they, the defendants, Juan Tabliga and Juan Villa Agustin). The plaintiff averred that he was not contradicted by the evidence in his statement of the amount which the property ought to have produced, and he cited section 126 of the code aforementioned. What this section does say is that if there is no answer offered to the complaint, the relief granted to the plaintiff can not exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but in his suit there was an answer to the complaint and the trial was not prosecuted with the defendants in default. With regard to the second assignment of error, the law provides that the redemptioner may, within twelve months from the date of the purchase, redeem the property sold, on paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with 1 percent per month interest thereon in addition , up to the time of redemption. (Sec. 465, Code of Civil Procedure.) The judge divided this time two periods: one, in which the plaintiff offered the redemption price, and the other, that following this offer. He fixed 1 per cent per month up to the time of the offer, and 6 per cent per annum thereafter. The following conclusions of the judgment appealed from serve to illustrate this point: In 1904 a judgment was rendered by the justice of the peace court of Tarlac, against Tomas Arenas and Esteban Fabros. On April 6, 1906, the deputy sheriff of Tarlac proceeded to sell the lands of Esteban Fabros and Tomas Arenas. The land of Tomas Arenas was sold to Juan Tabliga for P120. On March 23, 1907. Esteban Fabros went to the house of Juan Tabliga and asked the latter to allow him to redeem the land of Tomas Arenas, which land was mortgaged to him, Fabros; but Tabliga replied that he would allow him to redeem his own land but that which was sold as belonging to Tomas Arenas. This petition, the judge adds, was made, as may be observed, within the period of one year, as prescribed by law. Esteban Fabros, on a subsequent date, but before the expiration of the twelve months, again went to Tabliga's house, accompanied by the provincial sheriff, Santiago de Jesus, and asked that he be allowed to redeem the land referred to, but on this occasion also the redemption was refused by Tabliga. (B. of e., pp. 10 and 11.) The legal grounds of the judgment appealed from are: (1) That, in conformity with section 464 of Act No. 190, a judgment debtor, or his successors in interest, may redeem the property sold, as may also a creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage; so that while Fabors was in possession of the land by reason of a mortgage or whatever the lien was that arose from the credit which he held against Arenas, and the latter not having exercised the right of redemption, the right pertained to Fabros as the creditor of Arenas; and, (2) that the plaintiff Fabros offered to return to the defendant the sum which the latter had paid for the purchase, together with the interest and costs; that, not knowing the amount thereof, he took with him P150 for this purpose "and offered to count out the amount in the presidencia, but the defendant Juan Tabliga refused to allow the redemption of the land which was sold as belonging to Tomas Arenas." (B. of e., pp. 12 and 13.) The trial court, in its judgment aforementioned, imposed upon the plaintiff the obligation to pay "the interest at 12 per cent per annum until the time when the said plaintiff offered to redeem the land, and interest at 6 per cent from the date of the said offer of redemption." (B. of e., p. 13.) We esteem the second assignment of error to be well founded, that is, the one relative to the plaintiff's having to pay an annual interest of 6 per cent besides the 12 per cent which he was willing to pay up to the time of the redemption. In the case of Martinez vs. Campbell (10 Phil. Rep., 626) this court ruled: When the right of redemption is exercised within the term fixed by section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an offer is made of the amount due for the repurchase of the property to which said right refers, it is neither reasonable not just that the repurchaser should pay interest on the redemption money after the time when he offered to repurchase and tendered the money therefor. Moreover, it is a provision of the Civil Code that if the creditor to whom the tender of payment has been made should refuse to accept it without reason, the debtor shall remain released from all liability by judicial deposit (consignacion) of the thing due. (Art. 1176.) And the deposit is properly made "by depositing the things due at the disposal of the judicial authority (in the procedure now in force, the sheriff is also included) before whom the tender shall be proven in a proper case and the notice of the consignation in other cases." (Art. 1178.) There is no reason for this other interest, which appears to be a penalty for delinquency, while there was no delinquency. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, in so far as it directs the payment of legal interest at 12 per cent, per annum up to the time when the plaintiff offered to make the redemption, and it is reversed, in so far as it provides that the plaintiff shall pay 6 per cent per annum from the date of the said offer of redemption. No special findings as to costs is made in this instance. So ordered. Torres, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation