FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 247583. October 06, 2021 ]
ROMMEL M. ESPIRITU, PETITIONER, VS. SHIRLEY* ANN BOAC-ESPIRITU, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated April 26, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 110892 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) – Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, denying the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of petitioner Rommel Espiritu with respondent Shirley Ann Boac-Espiritu.
Antecedents
On July 28, 2010, Rommel Espiritu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Shirley Ann Boac-Espiritu based on Article 363 of the Family Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SD (10) - 786 and raffled to the RTC - Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.4
He essentially averred:
In August 1998, a common friend introduced them to each other.5 He courted respondent for a month and eventually became lovers. On July 18, 2000, they got married in Municipal Hall, Talavera, Nueva Ecija officiated by then Mayor Manolito Fausto. They were blessed with three (3) children.6 They resided in the house owned by respondent's parents in Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija.7
After a while, he noticed that respondent started showing signs of alleged "psychological incapacity" in performing her marital obligations. She refused to have sex with him for no reason. She told him to look for another woman to satisfy his sexual urges.8 Also, she did not want to sleep on the same bed with him and demanded to be alone.9
As a police officer, he got assigned to different places so he could only go home once a week. Whenever he was home, however, respondent had the habit of picking fights with him on trivial matters instead of being happy with his company. She was hot-tempered and a constant nagger. When they quarreled, she cursed at him and harshly called him a worthless husband.10 Since the house where they lived were owned by her parents, she would easily order him to leave. Despite this, he chose to understand her for the sake of their family.
Respondent, too, did not trust him. Each time he arrived from work, she smelled his clothes for a woman's scent. She regularly checked his cellphone to verify if he had extramarital affairs. She also looked into his wallet and ATM card to verify his withdrawals as she suspected he was spending money for different women.11 She believed that he resembled her father, a soldier, who abandoned them for another family. She also thought that just like her father, he (petitioner), too, was a womanizer supporting another family.12 Further, she got jealous whenever he talked to other women, among them, his co-workers' wives.13 Whenever she got furious, she would drive him away, telling him to meet up with his so-called mistresses.14 He tried his best to disprove her accusations but it was all in vain. She never believed him. She had no room for compromise and never admitted her mistakes.15
On numerous occasions, she prioritized her friends more than their family. She would go out with them for days leaving their minor children starving.16 There were times when he was out for work, respondent's aunt17 would be the one looking after their kids while she spent hours or days with friends.
She eventually banished him from their home, blurting "lumayas ka na dito hindi na kita kailangan, doon ka na lang sa mga babae mo!"18 That forced him to move out and live in his friend's house.19 They separated in 2008.20
Meantime, he consulted a clinical psychologist, Dr. Pacita Tudla (Dr. Tudla) who opined that their marriage should be nullified on ground of respondent's psychological incapacity. Dr. Tudla interviewed him, their driver Rolando David (David), and their neighbor Ricardo Maligaya (Maligaya). Both David and Maligaya confirmed the chaotic relationship between him and his wife especially her curses and expletives directed against her husband, mostly spewed within their neighbors' hearing distance, her outbursts on his unworthiness as a husband and several times she drove him away from their home.21
Dr. Tudla invited respondent for an interview but the latter ignored the invitation.22
Based on her assessment, Dr. Tudla diagnosed respondent with "Histrionic Personality Disorder and Paranoid Personality Disorder"23 characterized by the following personality traits:
For Histrionic Personality Disorder:
1. Pervasive pattern of excessive emotionality;
2. Attention-seeker;
3. Selfish;
4. Unreliable;
5. Wants immediate gratification;
6. Overreacts to minor provocations;
7. Suggestible; and
8. Lacks analytic ability.
For Paranoid Personality Disorder:
1. Pervasive pattern of suspiciousness and distrust on others;
2. Seeks to confirm expectation that others will take advantage of her;
3. Falsely accuses others;
4. Unreasonable jealousies; and
5. Resentful and moody.
Dr. Tudla concluded that respondent's incapacity was rooted in her problematic childhood. When she was in elementary, her father abandoned them for another family.24 Her father never sent them any financial support. Her family's financial struggles forced her mother to work abroad as a domestic helper. She became detached from both of her parents.25 She had poor upbringing because though she was left in the custody of her grandparents, the latter were lenient in her actions and tolerant of her wants. She never learned how to keep their dwelling tidy. Her grandparents always allowed her to go out with friends with whom she learned to live a carefree life.26 The marital woes of her parents, the infidelity of her father, the lack of parental support, and a detached family life affected her personality and behavioral pattern. As a wife, she was uncaring, suspicious, and unsupportive. She falsely accused her husband, petitioner, as a womanizer for simply being a police officer. For no reason, she refused to have sex with him, and even suggested to satisfy his sexual urges with another woman. She was a constant nagger. She was incapable of understanding, let alone, compromise. She was also unreasonably jealous and distrustful of him. Each time he arrived from work, she smelled his clothes for any woman's scent. She also regularly checked his cellphone, wallet and ATM card to confirm if he was indeed engaged in extramarital affairs. She, too, was neglectful and irresponsible due to frequent escapades with her friends, leaving their minor children unattended.
Due to her personality traits,27 she never found meaning in her marriage with petitioner. Thus, she could never commit herself into sharing mutual trust, respect, loyalty, support, and love with petitioner.28
Despite notice and summons, respondent failed to respond to the petition.29 Per Investigation Report dated April 5, 2011, the public prosecutor delegated by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) attested that no collusion existed between the parties.30
The Ruling of the RTC
By Decision31 dated June 30, 2017, the trial court denied the petition, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines is hereby DENIED.
Let a copy of this judgment be served upon the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija, Local Civil Registrar or Talavera, Nueva Ecija, and the Office of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office/Philippine Statistics Office (sic), Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.32
The trial court held that the totality of evidence failed to prove respondent's psychological incapacity.33 Dr. Tudla based her conclusions only from the information offered by petitioner and his collateral witnesses who knew nothing about her childhood or what she was going through as they were simply the family's neighbor and petitioner's driver.34 Their testimonies were unreliable and even self-serving, hence, devoid of any evidentiary weight.35
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a motion for new trial. He claimed that he chanced upon Marissa Pineda-De Fiesta (Pineda-De Fiesta), respondent's childhood friend. Pineda-De Fiesta signified her willingness to testify on respondent's family background.36 Under Resolution dated July 26, 2017, the motion for new trial was denied.37
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioner faulted the trial court for denying the petition for nullity of marriage. He argued in the main that the totality of evidence proved respondent's psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations.38 Respondent's personality disorders embedded in her psyche made her unable to discharge the obligation to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and support which caused their marriage to fall apart.39
In its assailed Decision40 in dated April 26, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It did not give credence to the findings of the clinical psychologist, Dr. Tudla, pertaining to the alleged dysfunctional personality traits of respondent. It noted that since Dr. Tudla relied solely on the information gathered from petitioner, their driver, and neighbor, her findings were actually one-sided and incompetent, therefore, on both grounds unreliable.41 She had not personally examined respondent and petitioner was unable to present independent witnesses to testify on respondent's alleged incapacity.42
The Present Petition
Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He erroneously faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding the expert findings of Dr. Tudla just because she did not get to personally examine and interview respondent43 – erroneously because this was not the Court of Appeals' only ground to reject the expert's findings.
For its part, the OSG maintains that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof to establish respondent's psychological incapacity.44
Ruling
We deny the petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, recognizes psychological incapacity as a ground to declare the nullity of marriage, viz.:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As expressed in Article 6845 of the Family Code, the marital covenants include the mutual obligations of husband and wife to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and to help and support each other.
In Tan-Andal v. Andal,46 the Court En Banc revisited the concept of psychological incapacity and how through the years, it was invariably interpreted and applied as a mere medical condition which hinged on mental incapacity or personality disorder. The Court, voting as one, ultimately agreed on a reconfigured concept of psychological incapacity:
x x x Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There may now be proof of the durable aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more importantly, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations.
Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, there judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations.
In this way, the Code Committees intent to limit the incapacity to "psychic causes'' is fulfilled. Furthermore, there will be no need to label a person as having a mental disorder just to obtain a decree of nullity. x x x
Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a nullity case is still required to prove juridical antecedence because it is an explicit requirement of the law. x x x
x x x x
Furthermore, not being an illness in a medical sense, psychological incapacity is not something to be cured. And even if it were a mental disorder, it cannot be described in terms of being curable or incurable.
x x x x
Reading together the deliberations of the Code Committee and our rulings in Santos and Molina, we hold that the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. This means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. "An undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."
With respect to gravity, the requirement is retained, not in the sense that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be a serious or dangerous illness, but that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" are excluded. x x
x x x x
To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion is not required.
As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been in existence at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. x x x To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
x x x x
Notably, Tan-Andal correctly stated the threshold of evidence in psychological incapacity cases i e, the spouse alleging psychological incapacity is required to prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is the quantum of proof that requires more than preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.47
In the case of marriage, the presumption strongly upholds its validity. Trial courts hearing psychological incapacity cases that are uncontested must invariably bear in mind this legal requirement – a petitioner bears the heavy burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the legal requisites of psychological incapacity in order to rebut the presumptive validity of marriage and obtain the relief that they seek, even if neither the State nor the respondent presents any evidence in chief and depends only on the cross-examination of petitioner's witnesses and objections to the latter's other evidence. To stress –
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.48
To repeat, every case to nullify a marriage positions the petitioner as invariably standing against this presumption. Thus, the petitioner must successfully discharge their49 burden of proving the contrary by clear and convincing evidence the essence of psychological incapacity in order to overcome the presumed validity of one's marriage.
To stress, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations.50 But every case involving the alleged psychological incapacity of a spouse should be resolved based on its particular set of facts and Article 36 of the Family Code, applied on a case-to-case basis. Tan-Andal was not meant to strait-jacket lower courts, forcing them to apply the guidelines in nullity cases of all shapes and sizes.51
As ordained in Tan-Andal, psychological incapacity is not only a mental incapacity nor only a personality disorder that must be proven through an expert opinion. "There may now be proof of the durable aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for this spouse to understand and, more importantly, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations.''
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,52 the Court already decreed that there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by an expert, be it a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist. What is important is the presence of totality of evidence that adequately establishes the party's psychological incapacity. Tan-Andal, too, cited Marcos. albeit it clarified that Marcos failed to categorically mention that expect opinion is no longer required in proving psychological incapacity, viz.:
It took time before this Court, in Marcos v. Marcos, declared that "a medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." Instead, as this Court said, "the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity." This pronouncement seemed to do away with the requirement of expert opinion on the root cause of the psychological incapacity, but this Court was not categorical with this. It even said in Marcos that the "root cause may be 'medically or clinically identified," — implying that although medical opinion may be done away with, a clinical identification, which is still expert opinion, must nevertheless be presented. (Emphasis supplied)
Keen attention to expert opinion nonetheless, would not be harmful if only to enable the Court to reach an "intelligent and judicious" ruling.53 Accordingly, though the Court in Tan-Andal maintained that expert opinion is no longer required, it still gave credence to the testimony and findings of Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia who declared therein petitioner's husband as psychologically incapacitated. The Court pronounced that the Court of Appeals erred in discrediting Dr. Garcia's expert opinion just because no prior personal examination and interview of therein respondent was done, viz.:
x x x Dr. Garcia recounted how Mario developed traits exhibiting chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse, lack of empathy and sense of entitlement, behaviors manifesting his inherent psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.
x x x x
It is true that Dr. Garcia gave the expert opinion — which, we reiterate, is no longer required but is considered here x x x the Court of Appeals erred in discounting wholesale Dr. Garcia's expert opinion because her methodology was allegedly "unscientific and unreliable"
x x x x
On the principles and methodology Dr. Garcia applied in evaluating Rosanna and Mario, she conducted a psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination of Rosanna. She likewise interviewed Ma. Samantha and Jocelyn Genevieve Rosanna's sister. The psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination remain to be the principal techniques in diagnosing psychiatric disorder. x x x
x x x x
At any rate, this Court said in Marcos that personal examination of the allegedly psychologically incapacitated spouse is not [required] for a declaration of [nullity of marriage due to] psychological incapacity." So long as the totality of evidence, as in this case, sufficiently proves the psychological incapacity of one or both of the spouses, a decree of nullity of marriage may be issued.
x x x x
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in not giving credence to Dr. Garcia's expert opinion just because Mario did not appear for psychiatric evaluation. (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, Tan-Andal democratized the forms of evidence proving psychological incapacity. The Court allowed lay persons to prove psychological incapacity through evidence of a personality structure or psychic causes that manifest itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the family.
Indeed, lay persons can testify about dysfunctional acts that undermine the family. The types of evidence that a lay person may adduce for this purpose are: (i) the reputation of the incapacitated spouse being psychologically incapacitated – that is the viewpoint of reasonable members of the spouses' relevant communities, (ii) the character of the incapacitated spouse relevant to or indicative of such incapacity, (iii) the everyday behavior, acts or conduct of the incapacitated spouse, and (iv) the offended spouse's own experience of neglect, abandonment, unrequited love, and infliction of mental distress, among others.
These types of evidence may establish circumstances probative of the dysfunctional acts inimical to the family. The relevant circumstances to be proven would include (i) instances of violence against women and their children as defined in Republic Act. 926254, (ii) zero probability of reconciliation between the spouses and (iii) failure of the spouse or the spouses to perform his, her, or marital duties and obligations in a manner clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Notably, the third category circumstances refers to the characterization, i.e., clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, that was once used to describe the personality disorder that gave rise to psychological incapacity.55
Since Tan-Andal has abandoned the focus on personality disorders and expert opinions, this characterization may now be appropriated to capture the essence of the problematic personality structure or psychic causes that spawn psychological incapacity. Embraced in this inclusive circumstance are such facts as: (i) forms of addiction demonstrative of such insensitivity or inability, (ii) abandonment by one spouse of the other, or (iii) instances of actual loss of trust, love, and respect for each other. This is notwithstanding the reality of meaningless marriages which force either or both spouses into chronically unproductive and detached lives, thus, physically and psychologically endangering themselves in the process.
Applying Tan-Andal here, we find that petitioner was NOT ABLE to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, indeed, respondent is afflicted with psychological incapacity which hinders her from performing her marital duties to petitioner.
First. To be clear, we are not rejecting the factual premises of petitioner's testimony. Here, he testified that respondent had the habit of picking fights with him on trivial matters. She was hot-tempered and a constant nagger. She got jealous whenever he talked to other women, among them, the wives of his co-workers. Each time he arrived from work, she smelled his clothes for a woman's scent whatever that stereotypical and discriminatory characterization actually meant. She regularly checked his cellphone to verify whether he had extramarital affairs. She also looked into his wallet and bank account as she suspected he was spending money on different women. Whenever she got furious, she would drive him away, telling him to meet up with his so-called mistresses.
Meanwhile, their driver, David, and their neighbor Maligaya confirmed the chaotic relationship between him and his wife especially her outbursts on his husband and the several times she drove him away from their home.
Even if we believe these testimonies as gospel truth, however, petitioner still failed to provide a complete picture of respondent's supposed psychological incapacity. The Court is faced with more questions than answers on why respondent was acting the way she did: 1) what are those "trivial matters" that made her furious?; 2) why would she regularly sniff his clothes, check his cellphone and ATM card?; 3) what made her believe that he had extramarital affairs?; 4) why would she get jealous over his co-worker's wive?; 5) why did she ask him to move out from their home?; 6) did their driver and neighbor actually understand the root cause of their so called "chaotic relationship"? Clearly petitioner only offered general statements of respondent's supposed manifestations of psychological incapacity. This assumed knowledge pertaining to respondent's acts, even if true, is incomplete to establish petitioner's cause.
Thus, believing the testimonies of petitioner and his witnesses does not yield the conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. As uniformly held in the courts below, the totality of the factual circumstances as testified by petitioner and his witnesses, failed to sufficiently establish that respondent is psychologically incapacitated in assuming her marital obligations. Respondents constant nagging, suspicion, jealousy, and anger do not equate to being truly incognitive in performing her basic marital duties. Indeed, respondent may be a difficult spouse to deal with56 as petitioner claimed her to be. But mere difficulty is not the incapacity contemplated by law.57 The Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may be easily entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when stressful, difficult, or inconvenient.58
Further, while respondent checked his clothes for scents and ATM card for withdrawals, had occasional outbursts, and wanted him out of their house, she, too, may have been already fed up with petitioner's philandering. For it is also probable that petitioner was the one giving reasons for respondent to react the way she did. Respondent's reaction was not of a psychologically incapacitated spouse but of a wife who subjectively or in her own experiences and mind has had enough of her husband's unfaithful ways.
Otherwise stated, petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent's actions rose to the level of psychological incapacity which could have nullified their marriage. On the contrary, respondent simply reacted normally to the situation she found herself in each time.
Second. Tan-Andal stressed that "psychological incapacity is not a personality disorder; it is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence expert opinion is not required."
While Dr. Tudla opined that respondent had Histrionic Personality Disorder and Paranoid Personality Disorder, her findings failed to specifically show how respondent's personality traits characterized by excessive emotionality, constant nagging, jealousy, distrust, and resentment, among others, are indeed clear acts of dysfunctionality making it impossible for her to understand and comply with her essential marital obligations.59 To be sure, Article 36 of of the Family Code is not the antidote for failed expectations, habitual suspicious, constant fights, and persistent doubts. The institution of marriage transcends these.60
Third. For the same reason given above assailing the probative value of petitioner's evidence, there is as well no clear and convincing evidence for the requisite juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of respondent's personality structure.
As to juridical antecedence, neither petitioner nor his driver and neighbor grew up with respondent. Admittedly, petitioner met respondent only in August 1998. They are therefore incompetent to prove this requisite.
As to gravity, this requisite is established if the personality structure is the proximate cause of the failure of the spouses to perform their mutual obligations of love, care, loyalty and fidelity and the manner of non-performance must be "clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."
The proximate cause of the non-performance, may either be respondent's personality structure itself or what jurisprudence referred to as a spouse's or both spouses' deliberate refusal or unwillingness or even negligence to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The behavioral manifestation of an atypical or wild conduct may not at all be connected to a personality structure but no mere difficulty, neglect, refusal or ill will to perform marital obligations. It would appear then that in every claim of psychological incapacity, there is the counterpart cause for the odd and obnoxious behavioral manifestations, which is either mere difficulty, neglect, refusal or ill will to discharge marital or parental obligations. To visualize this logic, the alternatives are either:
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Or:
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Hence, to prove gravity, it must be asked whether there is evidence of conduct, on respondents part, clearly and convincingly that the non-performance is not due to mere difficulty, neglect, refusal or ill will to perform marital obligations, but due to her personality structure.
Here, there is no clear and convincing evidence of the requisite gravity. For one, the more likely inference is that respondent was already fed up with her distrust of petitioner. More, there is no clear and convincing evidence of the nature and make-up of respondent's personality structure and its causative effect upon her non-performance of the obligations of her part of the marriage. Petitioner's declarations that respondents "never believed him," "had no room for compromise" and "never admitted her mistakes"61 are insufficient to establish a true and serious incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.62 For being skeptical and uncompromising one one's situation and on one's spouse, though unfortunate, are not signs of a genuinely serious psychic cause; more so, neither can falling out of love be so labeled.63
With the failure of petitioner prove clearly and convincingly juridical antecedence and gravity, it would no longer matter if the expert concluded respondents personality structure to be incurable. While technically, this requisite of incurability is heavily dependent on expertise about cures and therapies, it would still not be probable to concede proof of this requisite given the lack of proof of respondent's true personality structure.
We understand that the spouses Espiritu have long been separated – thirteen (13) years to be exact. However, we also, have to weigh the consequences of petitioner's claims. It is not fair to call respondent psychologically incapacitated and deficient in her role as a spouse and mother when probably, as the more or at least equally like inference shows, she may also have been a victim of this loveless and stressful marriage.
Depending on who the survivor is, and who holds economic power, the power imbalance that could arise from the nullification of the marriage could weigh heavily and adversely upon respondent. She was the one left with the children's upbringing, and more likely than not, had to sacrifice at least a portion of her own independent career for so many years for her children and the family.
This fact weighs heavily upon us in locking with favor to petitioner's prayers despite the long separation between him and respondent. We are not disposed to label respondents psychologically incapacitated and incapable spouse and mother, based on petitioner's allegations, and grant freedom to petitioner when there is a power imbalance against respondents that may probably ensue. These circumstances plus the paucity of evidence to establish clear and convincing evidence compel us to deny the instant petition. We are aware of gender inequalities that have plagued Philippine marital situations for a long time and we are not about to add to that history of plight and inequality.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 110892 and the Decision dated June 30, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court – Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. SD (10) - 786 are AFFIRMED. The marriage between Rommel M. Espiritu and Shirley Ann Boac-Espiritu remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.1âшphi1
Footnotes
* Also spelled "Shierly'' in the Regional Trial Court Decision and Court of Appeals Decision.
1 Rollo, pp. 9-19.
2 Id. at 92-102.
3 Article 36, Family Code provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
4 CA rollo, p. 163.
5 Rollo, p. 10.
6 Id. at 11.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Record, pp. 72-73.
12 Id. at 18.
13 Id. at 79.
14 TSN dated September 6, 2011, p. 22.
15 Record, p. 73.
16 Rollo, p. 11.
17 TSN dated August 2, 2011, p. 18.
18 TSN dated September 6, 2011, p. 22
19 Id. at 11.
20 TSN dated August 2, 2011, p. 16; TSN dated December 6, 2011, p. 28.
21 Record, p. 108; p. 112.
22 TSN dated September 4, 2012, p. 39.
23 Record, pp. 78-79.
24 Id. at 74.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 80.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Rollo, p. 12.
30 Record, p. 164.
31 Id. at 163-172.
32 Id. at 171-172.
33 Id. at 170.
34 Id. at 170-171.
35 Id. at 171.
36 Id. at 76.
37 Id. at 76-77.
38 CA rollo, p. 18.
39 Id. at 19.
40 Rollo, p. 92-102.
41 Id. at 100-101.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 17.
44 Id. at 140.
45 Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
46 G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021.
47 Id.
48 Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192, 208 (2007).
49 "Their" is issued to indicate gender neutrality, non-affiliation or indeterminacy.
50 Supra note 46.
51 See Ngo Te v. Yu Te, 598 Phil. 666, 696 (2009).
52 397 Phil. 840, 842 (2000), as cited in Republic v. Galang, 665 Phil. 658, 675 (2011).
53 See Kalaw v. Fernandez, 750 Phil. 482, 500 (2015).
54 An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore and for Other Purposes, signed on March 8, 2004.
55 See e.g. Republic v. Deang, G.R. No. 236279, March 25, 2019.
56 Record, p. 73.
57 Baccay v. Baccay, 651 Phil. 68, 86 (2010).
58 Bayani-Magay v. Magay, G.R. No. 227279 (Notice), September 22, 2020.
59 Supra note 46.
60 See Lim v. Lim, G R. No 241273 (Notice), June 19, 2019.
61 Record, p. 73.
62 See Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador, 652 Phil. 49, 65 (2010)
63 See Alcazar v. Alcazar, 618 Phil. 616, 631 (2009)
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