THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 222857. November 10, 2021 ]
KIMRIC CASAYURAN TAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MAKATI CITY, THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
ZALAMEDA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking, to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated 17 August 2015 and Resolution2 dated 04 February 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 97217. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of Branch 198, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, which denied petitioner Kimric Casayuran Tan's (Kimric's) petition for change of name.
Antecedents
According to Kimric, he is a former natural-born Filipino, who is now a British citizen.4 He claimed that although the surname indicated in his birth certificate is Tan, he has never used it. Instead, he has been known by the name "Kimric Florendo Casayuran." The name of his father as indicated in his birth certificate is Carlos Tan, whom he never met since the latter abandoned him and his mother when he was only an infant. The middle name "FLORENDO" is his mother's maiden name while "CASAYURAN" is her surname. When he got married, he used the name "KIMRIC FLORENDO CASAYURAN."5
Kimric only learned that the surname in his birth certificate was "TAN" in 2009, while processing the papers of his wife and daughter at a certain embassy. He averred that it was his mother who enrolled him in elementary and high school, and he assumed that his mother submitted a copy of his birth certificate. It was likewise his mother who told him to write the name Kimric Casayuran, not Kimric Tan.6
When he renewed his driver's license in 2010, he already knew his name is Kimric Casayuran Tan, but he was informed by the Land Transportation Office that he should first secure the necessary documents to change his name.7
Hence, he filed the Petition for Change of Name before the RTC of Las Piñas City, where he had been residing at least three years prior to the said filing.8 To support his contention, Kimric presented his Student's permanent record from Woodridge College in Bacoor, Cavite and the Department of Education-Regional IV-A's Special Order (A) No. 0828, s. 1995 dated 20 September 1995 confirming his graduation from said school. Both documents state his name as Kimric F. Casayuran. He also attached a copy of his marriage certificate where his name is stated as Kimric Casayuran. Likewise, given in evidence by Kimric was a copy of his Philippine driver's license in the name of Kimric Florendo Casayuran.9
The RTC found the petition sufficient in form and substance. Consequently, it issued an Order,10 giving notice that the petition was to be heard on 05 April 2010, and all interested parties were directed to show cause why the petition should not be granted. The RTC also directed the publication of the Order as required by the Rules.11
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision dated 18 February 2011, the RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that Kimric failed to prove that he has been using Kimric Casayuran for most of his life, or that he is well known in the community by that name.12
The RTC noted that based on the evidence presented by Kimric, the earliest time it can be determined that he used Kimric Casayuran is in 1992, when he was already 15 years old and in first year high school. All other documents he presented - his British passport, driver's license, and marriage contract - were issued subsequent to that time.13
Further the RTC held that Kimric "failed to substantiate his allegation that confusion and embarrassment would arise if he were to use his true name." Neither was he able to establish that the use of the surname "TAN" would prejudice him and his family.14
Kimric moved for reconsideration. He attached an Affidavit15 executed by his mother, June Estherine Florendo Casayuran (June), who attested that the inconsistencies in the details found in Kimric's birth certificate and his British passport were due to inadvertence by the person who prepared his son's documents for his British passport application. Specifically, the place of birth stated in his passport is Surigao del Norte, which was carried over to his subsequent passports.16 He also submitted a letter from Coopers Lane Primary School in London, confirming that a student named Kimric Casayuran attended the institution from 04 January 1989 to end of July 1989.17
Subsequently, Kimric also filed an Addendum to Motion for Reconsideration, to which a letter was attached from the Depford Park Primary School in England. The letter stated that Kimric Casayuran attended the school starting in February 1988, but there are no records from when he left the school.18
The RTC denied Kimric's motion, reiterating that there was no convincing or compelling reason to allow the change of name. It held that the discrepancies in the various documents presented raised doubts as to its credibility.19
Thus, Kimric assailed the Decision before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated 17 August 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.20 It held:
The documents he adduced during trial cannot standing alone, discount the fact that as shown in his birth certificate duly issued by the Civil Registrar of Makati City, he is entitled to bear the last name of his father as clearly reflected in his birth certificate. While it is lamentable that he has not known his biological father since birth, such is not a valid reason for him to change his surname and use another in lieu thereof. The fact that he was deprived of the opportunity to know or even catch a glimpse of his alleged father, he cannot, by whim, choose whatever last name he wants to use other than what is appearing in his birth certificate. By using his mother's maiden name, grave legal consequences arose as it brought confusion as to his legitimate parentage. Instead of making the records straight, all the more that confusion will arise should he be permitted to continuously use the last name of his mother's maiden name considering that it has legal implications on his status in relation to his father.21
The CA also found strange Kimric's claim that he only found out his real name when he was processing the visa application of his wife and daughter when he has been processing documents with government agencies requiring the submission of a birth certificate. Thus, the CA concluded that Kimric had known that "Kimric Casayuran" was not his real name but found that he continued using the same because it was convenient.22
On the other hand, the CA rejected the Office of the Solicitor General's (OSG) argument that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Kimric's petition. It noted that the name sought to be adopted was clearly stated in the RTC's Order, even as it did not state the ground for the petition. Nonetheless, the CA noted that the State's interests were amply represented by the public prosecutor. Moreover, the public prosecutor never once questioned the RTC's jurisdiction during the proceedings.23
Issue
The main issue for the Court's determination is whether Kimric is entitled to the change of name he prays for.
Kimric asserts that he has been using the name "Kimric Florendo Casayuran" since childhood, such that all his school, official, and work records bear that name. It is even the name indicated in his marriage certificate and his daughter's birth certificate. Using "Tan" would only cause confusion because that is not the name by which he is known in the community, and by his friends and relatives. The use of Tan would also cause him and his family mental anguish and embarrassment. He does not want to bear the name of the man who abandoned him and his mother. His wife and daughter will also bear the humiliation of having to explain why they now bear the surname of the father he never met.24
In its Comment, the OSG maintained its contention before the CA that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to defective publication.25 The OSG posits that the published Order was defective because it failed to specify the cause or reason for the petition for change of name. Further, the OSG maintains that it is not estopped from questioning such jurisdiction even though it participated in the proceedings through the public prosecutor.26
Ruling of the Court
Initially, We resolve the argument of the OSG against the trial court's jurisdiction.
"A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving [their] relation with others, that is, [their] legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem and, as such, strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover."27
We agree with the CA that the OSG should not be permitted to impugn the RTC's jurisdiction when it actively participated in the proceedings, including cross examining the witnesses.28 The OSG's argument that the State is not estopped from impugning jurisdiction because objections on ground of lack of jurisdiction can be raised anytime is misplaced. Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corp. (Bantigue),29 the case cited by the OSG as basis for its objection, is not applicable.
In Bantigue, the land registration case was first filed before the RTC, where the State participated by filing an opposition. Eventually, however, the case was transferred to the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) because the assessed value was found to be less than Php100,000.00. Thereafter, the MTC issued a general order of default, and the State had no opportunity to assail the lack of that court's jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it raised the issue of jurisdiction on appeal at the first opportunity when it appealed. Thus, the Court therein held:
Here, petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still with the RTC. At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief. Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.30
In this case, unlike in Bantigue, the State actively participated in all the stages of trial, including cross examination of the witnesses, and could have raised the ground of lack of jurisdiction at any time while trial was on going, It did not do so. Thus, the State is considered to have "fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court."31 To allow the OSG's point would be to lay to waste the proceedings before the RTC and, in the words of the CA, "make a mockery of the judicial process."
Be that as it may, the State's interests were fully protected given the active participation of the public prosecutor during trial. The adversarial nature of the proceedings was not affected by the alleged defect in publication. In Republic v. Capote,32 the Court had occasion to explain the adversarial nature of a petition for change of name:
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.33
In this case, the RTC's Order was published as required by the Rules. The State was properly represented at trial. At no point did the OSG voice its objection to the court's jurisdiction when it had every opportunity to do so. It cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective.34
The Court has explained the reason for requiring the publication in this wise:
The reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted by and the other names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition or in the caption of the published order is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding. Only if the caption or the title strikes [them do they] proceed to read the contents of the order. And the probability is great that [they do] not at all notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. The non-inclusion of all the names or aliases of the applicant in the caption of the order or in the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the required publication.35
An examination of the RTC's Order shows that the same has the name used and the new name sought. Thus, the objective is met.
It is likewise not lost on this Court that the OSG assails only the jurisdiction of the trial court and did not touch upon the merits of the case. With the procedural issue settled, We proceed to rule on the substantive issues in this case.
Kimric Florendo Casayuran is the name he has been using for most of his life and the change to this name will avoid confusion
A name is "a word or combination of words by which a person is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing [them], or in speaking of or dealing with [them]. It is both of personal and public interest for every person to have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish [them] from other individuals. The surname or family name identifies the family to which [they] belong and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law."36
Given the State's interest in the names of individuals and entities, it is a privilege to be granted only upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor. A change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. The court must make a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.37
The Court, in Republic v. Hernandez,38 recognized the following grounds as sufficient to warrant a change of name: "(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest."39
Kimric asserts that he has been using the name Kimric Florendo Casayuran since childhood, such that all his school, official, and work records bear that name both here in the Philippines and in the United Kingdom, of which he is now a citizen. It is even the name indicated in his marriage certificate and the birth certificate of his daughter.40 Using Tan would only cause confusion because that is not the name by which he is known by his friends and relatives, and in the community.
We find that Kimric has sufficiently established proper and reasonable ground to grant the petition. The records support Kimric's claim of using the name for most of his life.
His passport issued on 06 October 1989 by the Philippine Embassy in London, England,41 bears the name Kimric F. Casayuran. In the same passport, there is an annotation that a previous passport - presumably in the same name - had been issued on 02 November 1986 by the DFA.42 He would have been eight years old at that time.
Kimric submitted letters proving that he used the name Kimric Casayuran while studying at Depford Park Primary School in London, where he attended starting February 1988,43 and Coopers Lane Primary School,44 where he was a student from 04 January 1989 to end of July 1989. On the other hand, his permanent record from Woodridge College,45 shows that he enrolled there under the name Kimric F. Casayuran in 1992. Department of Education-Regional IV-A's Special Order (A) No. 0828, s. 199546 further confirms that he used the name Kimric F. Casayuran until he graduated from Woodridge College in 1995.
During trial, Kimric's wife, Edelyn Abarintos (Edelyn), testified that she had known him as Kimric Casayuran since 1993, being classmates in high school. Upon getting married, she used the name Edelyn Abarintos Casayuran.47
As for official documents issued when Kimric became an adult, he presented a copy of his Philippine government-issued non-professional driver's license bearing the name Kimric Florendo Casayuran.48 His passport issued by the government of the United Kingdom49 also states the name Kimric Casayuran. The same name appears in his certificate of marriage to Edelyn.50 On the other hand, the birth certificate of his daughter Chloe states the father's name as Kimric Florendo Casayuran.51
The RTC, however, took the discrepancy in Kimric's place of birth in his birth certificate (Makati) and his passports (Surigao del Norte) to cast doubt on the credibility of Kimric's claim.
We note that while Kimric's birth certificate indeed states that he was born in Makati, all his other official documents state his place of birth as Surigao del Norte. His mother, June, explained the error in Kimric's first passport, which were eventually carried over to subsequent documents.
Whether it was deliberate or mere oversight, the error can be attributed to June, not Kimric, considering that he was only a child when the first official documents were issued. That he carried on claiming his place of birth as Surigao del Norte in subsequent documents, even as an adult, is simply the product of what he was told by his mother. The same information being on his passport presumably gave him no reason to doubt his mother's word. In fact, it lends credence to his claim that he did not see a copy of his birth certificate until he was already an adult.
Nonetheless, all of these do not detract from the fact that Kimric has been using the name Kimric Florendo Casayuran since at least 1988, or when he was only 10 years old. He is now 43. This means that he has been using the name for at least 33 years, or over ¾ of his life. To refuse his plea for change of name would mean forcing him to use a name that, according to him, he has never used in his life, or at least not since he was a young child. The chances of a new name causing confusion is not only high but inevitable.
In Chua v. Republic,52 this Court granted the petition for change of name based on similar documents. In that case, the petitioner had been known as "Eric Chua" his whole life, rather than "Eric Kiat," as evidenced by scholastic records, employment records, licenses, and other identity documents. We found it obvious that changing the name written on his birth certificate would avoid confusion:
The same circumstances are attendant in the case at bar. As Eric has established, he is known in his community as "Eric Chua," rather than "Eric Kiat." Moreover, all of his credentials exhibited before the Court, other than his Certificate of Live Birth, bear the name "Eric Chua." Guilty of reiteration, Eric's Certificate of Baptism, Voter Certification, Police Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation Clearance, Passport, and High School Diploma all reflect his surname to be "Chua." Thus, to compel him to use the name "Eric Kiat" at this point would inevitably lead to confusion. It would result in an alteration of all of his official documents, save for his Certificate of Live Birth. His children, too, will correspondingly be compelled to have their records changed. For even their own Certificates of Live Birth state that their father's surname is "Chua." To deny this petition would then have ramifications not only to Eric's identity in his community, but also to that of his children.53
Likewise, the State has not shown that the petition was filed based on any other reason other than to avoid confusion. There was no allegation, even before the trial court, that Kimric filed the petition based on caprice or fraudulent intent. Indeed, when petitioner found out in 2009, he sought to change his driver's license name, but was told that he would have to follow a procedure for changing the name, prompting him to file the petition for change of name — a badge of good faith. There is here no malice or ill will to undermine the system.
Denial of the petition will cause confusion and even greater prejudice to Kimric and his family
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is clear that denying the petition will cause greater prejudice not only to Kimric, but to his wife and daughter. The chaos and confusion of having Kimric use a name other than what he has been using will affect not only his identity in the community and among his relatives and friends, but also to that of his wife and children.
To compel Kimric to use the name "Kimric Tan" at this point would inevitably lead to confusion. It will result in alteration of all his official documents, save for his certificate of live birth. Moreover, petitioner's wife and daughter, too, will correspondingly be compelled to have their records changed. As noted above, Edelyn testified that she had known him as Kimric Casayuran since 1993, being classmates in high school and upon getting married, she used the name Edelyn Abarintos Casayuran.54 The name Kimric Casayuran also appears in petitioner's certificate of marriage to Edelyn.55 The birth certificate of Kimric's daughter, Chloe, also states her father's name as Kimric Florendo Casayuran.56 Additionally, taking the surname Tan would give Kimric and his family the additional burden of changing or correcting all their legal documents in the Philippines and United Kingdom — a cumbersome and costly endeavor.
Further, from a practical standpoint, while the Republic has an interest in a person's name, the same interest will not be injured by the grant of Kimric's petition. It must be emphasized that petitioner's official documents, issued by the Philippine and United Kingdom governments, are already in the name of Kimric Florendo Casayuran or Kimric Casayuran. Thus, there will be no need to change or update his documents to reflect a new name. We may even go so far as to say that denying the petition will result in greater prejudice to the State given that all Kimric's documents, as well as that of his wife and daughter who similarly use the surname Casayuran, will have to be corrected — an additional burden to the bureaucracy that can well be avoided.
The change of name will not affect Kimric's parentage or status as a legitimate child
The RTC also denied Kimric's petition on the ground that "a change of name which might lead to a misunderstanding as to one's paternity or status of legitimacy should not be encouraged." The trial court's reasoning is misplaced.
Our pronouncement in Alanis III v. Court of Appeals57 is on point:
This Court fails to see how the change of name would create more confusion. Whether people inquire deeper into petitioner's parentage or paternity because of a name is inconsequential here, and seems to be more a matter of intrigue and gossip than an issue for courts to consider. Regardless of which name petitioner uses, his father's identity still appears in his birth certificate, where it will always be written, and which can be referred to in cases where paternity is relevant.58
In Kimric's birth certificate,59 Carlos Tan is not only named as the father, but he also signed the same as informant. Thus, even his name is changed, his father's identity still appears in his birth certificate, where it will always be written, and which can be referred to in cases where paternity is relevant. That should lay to rest any question as to his parentage and legitimacy. Moreover, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,60 We said that "[a] change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status[,] or citizenship: What is altered is only the name."
Aside from being unduly restrictive and highly speculative, RTC's reasoning is also contrary to the spirit and mandate of the Constitution,61 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to which Philippines is a party,62 and Republic Act No. 7192 or Women in Development and Nation Building Act,63 which all require the State to take the appropriate measures to ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law.64
As similarly noted by this Court in Alanis III v. Court of Appeals,65 the RTC's reasoning here further encoded patriarchy into our system. There, We said that "[i]f a surname is significant for identifying a person's ancestry, interpreting the laws to mean that a marital child's surname must identify only the paternal line renders the mother and her family invisible. This, in turn, entrenches the patriarchy and with it, antiquated gender roles: the father, as dominant, in public; and the mother, as a supporter, in private."66
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 17 August 2015 and Resolution 04 February 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97217 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Change of Name filed by petitioner Kimric Casayuran Tan is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Makati City is DIRECTED to make the corresponding corrections to petitioner's name, from KIMRIC CASAYURAN TAN to KIMRIC FLORENDO CASAYURAN.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, (Chairperson), Caguioa,* Carandang, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Rosario, J., took no part due to his prior action in the Court of Appeals; Caguioa, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated 13 October 2021.
1 Rollo, pp. 21-28; penned by Justice Edwin D. Sorongon and concurred in by Justices Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of this Court) and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. of the Sixteenth (16th) Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
2 Id. at 30-31.
3 Id. at 67-71; penned by Judge Erlinda Nicolas-Alvaro.
4 Id. at 9.
5 Id. at 68.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 22.
8 Id. at 32.
9 Id. at 34.
10 Id. at 67
11 Id. at 56, 58.
12 Id. at 69-70.
13 Id. at 69.
14 Id. at 70.
15 Id. at 84.
16 Id. at 91.
17 Id. at 83.
18 Id. at 90.
19 Id. at 92.
20 Id. at 28.
21 Id. at 26.
22 Id. at 27.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 36-37.
25 Id. at 154.
26 Id. at 161.
27 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 284-A Phil. 643, 653 (1992) [Per J. Regalado]; citations omitted.
28 Rollo, p. 27.
29 684 Phil. 192 (2012) [Per J. Sereno].
30 Id. at 200.
31 See Republic v. Bolante, 528 Phil. 328, 338 (2006) [Per J. Garcia].
32 543 Phil. 72 (2007) [Per J. Corona].
33 Id. at 81; citations omitted.
34 See Republic v. Mecadera, 652 Phil. 195 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza].
35 Republic v. Zosa, 247-A Phil. 384, 388-389 (1988) [Per J. Bidin].
36 Republic v. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606, 635-636 (1996) [Per J. Regalado].
37 Supra note 27 at 658.
38 Supra note 36 at 637-638.
39 Id. at 637-638; emphasis supplied.
40 Rollo, p. 35.
41 Id. at 86.
42 Id. at 85.
43 Id. at 90.
44 Id. at 83.
45 Id. at 61.
46 Id. at 62.
47 Id. at 68.
48 Id. at 64.
49 Id. at 59.
50 Id. at 63.
51 Id. at 65.
52 820 Phil. 1257 (2017) [Per J. Velasco].
53 Id. at 1263; See Alanis III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 216425, 11 November 2020 [Per J. Leonen].
54 Rollo, p. 68.
55 Id. at 63.
56 Id. at 65.
57 Alanis III v. Court of Appeals, supra note 53.
58 Id.
59 Rollo, p. 41.
60 Supra note 27 at 663.
61 Article II, Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
62 Article 2
[...]
(f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
[... ]
Article 5
[...]
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women[.]
63 SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal to that of men.
To attain the foregoing policy:
(1) A substantial portion of official development assistance funds received from foreign governments and multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set aside and utilized by the agencies concerned to support programs and activities for women;
(2) All government departments shall ensure that women benefit equally and participate directly in the development programs and projects of said department, specifically those funded under official foreign development assistance, to ensure the full participation and involvement of women in the development process; and
(3) All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures to remove gender bias therein.
64 Alanis III v. Court of Appeals, supra note 53.1a⍵⍴h!1
65 Id.
66 Id.
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