G.R. No. 247787




EN BANC [ G.R. No. 247787, March 02, 2021 ] DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N LOPEZ, M., J.: The immutability of a final judgment and the authority to open settled account are the core issues in this Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court assailing the Commission on Audit's (COA) Decision dated April 13, 2015. ANTECEDENTS In 2006, the Board of Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) granted salary increases to its eight senior officers in the aggregate amount of P17,380,307.64 pursuant to its 1999 compensation plan.2 On June 19, 2007, the supervising auditor disallowed the amount because the DBP's compensation plan lacks prior approval from the Office of the President.3 The DBP appealed the notice of disallowance to the Commission on Audit (COA) Corporate Government Sector Cluster A - Financial.4 On June 2, 2010, the COA Cluster Director denied the appeal,5 thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the subject ND on the increase in the compensation of DBP senior officers is hereby AFFIRMED.6 (Emphasis in the original.) Aggrieved, the DBP filed a petition for review before the COA.7 The DBP invoked Memorandum dated April 22, 2010 where former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved the implementation of its compensation plan from 1999 onward.8 On February 1, 2012, the COA granted the petition and lifted the notice of disallowance,9 thus: The subsequent approval by the President of the DBP's Compensation Plan for 1999 made the principal issue of the absence of Presidential approval moot and academic. In COA Decision No. 97-689 dated November 4, 1997, this Commission ruled that: [I]n the light of the post-facto approval or ratification of the Office of the President which in effect legitimizes or legalizes the grant of the social amelioration benefit to the employees of the Sugar Regulatory Commission pursuant to the pertinent provision of Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, this Commission hereby gives due course to the instant request for reconsideration. [x x x]. This case is no different, since the only basis for the subject ND was the absence of Presidential approval pursuant to M.O. No. 20. This being the case, the approval of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has legitimized the compensation plan of DBP and the reason for the disallowance has ceased to exist. x x x x WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, CGS-A Decision No. 2010-001 dated June 2, 2010 is SET ASIDE and ND No. SOC-2006-12(06) dated June 19, 2007 on the increase of DBP's senior officers' compensation in the total amount of [P]17,380,307.64 is LIFTED.10 (Emphases supplied.) On February 6, 2012, the DBP received a copy of the COA Decision but did not file any motion for reconsideration or a petition to the Supreme Court. On March 27, 2012, Mario P. Pagaragan (Pagaragan), the Vice President/Officer-In-Charge of DBP's Program Evaluation Department, submitted confidential letters to the COA asking to reconsider its Decision dated February 1, 2012. The letters explained that Section 261(g)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits the grant of salary increase within 45 days before a regular election. As such, President Arroyo's post facto approval of DBP's compensation plan on April 22, 2010 is void because it was made within the 45-day period before the May 10, 2010 elections.11 On April 13, 2015, the COA treated Pagaragan's letters as a motion for reconsideration and exercised its power under Section 52 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445 or the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines to open and revise settled accounts. The COA found the motion meritorious and reversed its Decision dated February 1, 2012, viz.: This Commission shall treat the letters as a motion for reconsideration (MR) pursuant to Section 10, Rule X of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of COA, the same having been filed within the reglementary period required under the aforesaid rule. Likewise, this Commission shall take cognizance of the subject matter in the exercise of its jurisdictional power to motu propio review and revise an account pursuant to Section 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. x x x x As correctly pointed out by the movant the post facto approval of then President Arroyo is illegal for it violates Section 261 (g) (2), Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 x x x re: In the Matter of Enforcing the Prohibitions Against Appointment of New Employees, Creating or Filling of New Positions, Giving any Salary Increase or Transferring or Detailing any Officer or Employee in the Civil Service and Suspension of Elective Local Officials, in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. x x x. x x x x The post facto approval of then President Arroyo indicated in the aforementioned letter dated April 22, 201 0 was made 18 days before the May 10, 2010 Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections, which is clearly within the 45 days prohibition contemplated in the aforesaid law. Accordingly, since the post facto approval was not in accordance with the law, the increase of DBP senior officers' compensation in the amount of [P]17,380,307.64 has no legal basis. x x x x WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Commission on Audit Decision No. 2012-004 dated February 1, 2012 is hereby REVERSED and Notice of Disallowance No. SOC-2006-12(06) dated June 19, 2007, on the increase of the senior officers' compensation in the total amount of [P]17,380,307.64, is hereby SUSTAINED. Moreover, the Director, Fraud Audit Office, Special Services Sector, is directed to investigate the letter complaint dated September 12, 2010 of concerned DBP officers and employees against some DBP officials.12 (Emphasis and italics in the original; citations omitted.) On July 29, 2015, the DBP sought reconsideration on the ground that the COA Decision dated February 1, 2012 has become final and executory. Moreover, Pagaragan is not a party to the case and is not entitled to any remedy.13 On June 14, 2019, the COA partly granted the motion. The COA sustained the disallowance and held that it has the power to re-examine cases on account of new and material evidence. However, the COA exempted the approving officers and the passive recipients from liability based on the presumption of good faith,14 to wit: This Commission treated the confidential letters of Mr. Pagaragan as an MR of COA Decision No. 2012-004 under Section 10, Rule X of the 2009 RRPC, in arriving at COA Decision No. 2015-224. The significance of these confidential letters necessitated this Commission to re-evaluate and reconsider its earlier decision promulgated in COA Decision No. 2012-004 that resulted in the latter's reversal in COA Decision No. 2015-224. This is in line with the power of the Commission to re-examine cases on account of new and material evidence discovered, x x x. x x x x Upon circumspect re-evaluation, this Commission finds the MR of DBP partly meritorious. x x x x However, the approving officers and the passive recipients are exempt from the obligation to refund the disallowance. They are presumed to have acted in good faith when they relied on the post facto approval of then President Arroyo. This is in deference to the recent Supreme Court decisions appreciating good faith in favor of the approving officers who relied on the approval of a higher competent authority. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No. SOC-2006-12(06) dated June 19, 2007, on the increase of DBP senior officers' compensation, in the total amount of P17,380,307.64, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that both the approving officers and the passive recipients are exempt from the obligation to refund the disallowance, in view of their reliance on the post facto approval of then President Arroyo.15 (Emphasis and italics in the original; citations omitted.) Hence, this recourse ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the COA. The DBP argues that the COA's Decision dated February 1, 2012 is already final and executory without a motion for reconsideration or appeal filed within 30 days from notice or on February 6, 2012 until March 7, 2012. Also, Section 52 of PD No. 1445 cannot justify the opening of DBP's account absent fraud, collusion, or error of calculation, or the discovery of new and material evidence. At any rate, Pagaragan is a stranger to the case and has no legal personality to move for a reconsideration. Likewise, the DBP claims violation of its rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases. The COA did not give DBP the opportunity to comment on Pagaragan's letters. The DBP became aware of these letters only upon receipt of the COA Decision dated April 13, 2015. Further, it took COA four years to resolve DBP's motion for reconsideration. Lastly, former President Arroyo's approval of the DBP's compensation plan on April 22, 2010 merely confirmed the salary increases that has been given to its senior officers and did not constitute a grant of new privileges. On the other hand, the COA maintains that Pagaragan is a real party-in-interest because he is concerned with the proper implementation of the DBP's compensation plan and in ensuring that its funds are properly managed. In any case, Pagaragan's legal personality is irrelevant because Section 52 of PD No. 1445 authorizes the COA to initiate, motu propio, the reopening/revision of an account within three years from settlement. Moreover, there is no violation of DBP's right to a speedy disposition of case given that delay is inevitable and not capricious or oppressive. The COA is the sole agency that examines, audits, and settles all accounts pertaining to the entire bureaucracy including private entities that receive public funds. The COA also has a steady influx of petitions for money claim and requests for relief from accountability. As regards the substantive issue, the COA insists that former President Arroyo's post-facto approval of the salary increases is contrary to the Omnibus Election Code because it was made on April 22, 2010 or 18 days before the May 10, 2010 national elections. RULING Pagaragan is not a real party in interest or an aggrieved party who is entitled to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. Judicial review is not just a power but also a duty.16 Yet, it does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity."17 Specifically, judicial review may be exercised only when the person challenging the act has the requisite legal standing, which refers to a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.18 The party's interest must also be material as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. It must be personal and not based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.19 In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in the Rules of Civil Procedure.20 The question as to real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. It is important to note that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law. The plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. Hence, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief.21 The question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22 This Court has previously ruled that for suits filed by taxpayers, legislators, or concerned citizens, they must still claim some kind of injury-in-fact and allege that the continuing act has denied them some right or privilege to which they are entitled.23 These parties have no legal standing unless they sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the complained act.24 In this case, Pagaragan questions the validity of former President Arroyo's approval of the DBP's compensation plan but failed to establish that he has the requisite personal and substantial interest. Pagaragan did not sustain any direct injury or is in danger of suffering any damages from the assailed salary increases. To be sure, the allowance or disallowance of the salary increases will not affect Pagaragan. If the notice of disallowance is lifted, Pagaragan will not be prejudiced as the money given to the senior officers did not come from his personal funds but from DBP. Conversely, if the disallowance is sustained, the senior officers will bear the consequence of returning the remunerations. More importantly, Pagaragan is not an aggrieved party who may appeal the COA Decision or Resolution. Under Rule VII, Section 1 of the COA Rules, it is "[t]he party aggrieved by a decision of the Director or the ASB [who] may appeal to the Commission Proper." An aggrieved party is the ''person adversely affected by any decision, order or ruling of the Commission or any of its duly authorized representatives."25 The term "aggrieved party" presupposes that the movant or appellant is a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the assailed decision, order, or ruling. Verily, Pagaragan was not a party to the original proceedings and merely came into the picture when the COA lifted the notice of disallowance. COA is guilty of unjustified delay in acting on Pagaragan's Letters and resolving DBP's motion for reconsideration. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[a]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." Any party regardless of the nature of the case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. Yet, the right to a speedy disposition of a case is deemed violated only when vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays attended the proceedings; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Several factors including the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right, and the prejudice caused by the delay must be considered.26 Here, the COA is guilty of unjustified delay. On March 27, 2012, Pagaragan submitted confidential letters to the COA asking to reconsider its Decision dated February 1, 2012 which lifted the notice of disallowance. However, it took COA more than three years or until April 13, 2015 to act on the letters and reversed the Decision dated February 1, 2012. The COA did not provide any justification for the delay. On July 29, 2015, the DBP filed a motion for reconsideration. This time, COA took almost four years or until June 14, 2019 to resolve the motion. Again, the COA did not explain the length of time to decide the pending incident.27 The issues in this case are not complex to justify the delay that attended the proceedings. The subject matter is one of those run-of-the-mill disallowance cases that COA encounters in the normal discharge of its quasi-judicial functions. The influx of cases is not a sufficient excuse. There must be special or peculiar circumstances to rationalize the protracted delay. Furthermore, the DBP asserted the right to speedy disposition of its case. The records show that the DBP filed four motions for early resolution during the pendency of its motion for reconsideration.28 The delay likewise prejudiced the rights of DBP as an institution and that of the senior officers whose salary increases are suspended and the possibility of being required to reimburse the amount has been hanging over their head like a sword of Damocles. Notably, the speedy disposition of cases is paramount in the administration of justice. It is a truism that justice delayed is justice denied.29 The COA's Decision dated February 1, 2012 is already final and executory absent a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal. On August 17, 2011, the COA En Banc issued Resolution No. 2011-006 that modified Rule X, Sections 9 and 10 of its 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure.30 The purpose is to harmonize the COA Rules and the Rules of Court as to the effect of filing of an appeal to the Supreme Court on the finality of the COA's Decision or Resolution, thus: Section 9. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. — A decision or resolution of the Commission upon any matter within its jurisdiction shall become final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from notice of the decision or resolution. The filing of a petition for certiorari shall not stay the execution of the judgment or the final order sought to be reviewed, unless the Supreme Court shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. Section 10. Motion for Reconsideration. — A motion for reconsideration may be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the decision or resolution, on grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision; or that the said decision of the Commission is contrary to law. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Commission shall be entertained. (Emphasis supplied.) The COA Rules of Procedure is explicit that the Commission's Decision or Resolution shall become final and executory after 30 days from notice unless a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Supreme Court is filed. This is consistent with Section 22.1 of Circular No. 2009-06 or the 2009 Rules and Regulations on the Settlement of Accounts which states that "[a] decision of the Commission Proper, ASB, Director or Auditor upon any matter within their respective jurisdiction; if not appealed as herein provided, shall become final and executory." A similar provision is found in Section 51 of PD No. 1445 that "[a] decision of the Commission or of any auditor upon any matter within its or his jurisdiction, if not appealed as herein provided, shall be final and executory." In this case, the COA lifted the notice of disallowance on February 1, 2012. The DBP received a copy of the COA's Decision dated February 1, 2012 on February 6, 2012 and it has 30 days or until March 7, 2012 to move for a reconsideration or file a petition to the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Pagaragan's letters which the COA treated as a motion for reconsideration was filed only on March 27, 2012 or beyond the 30-day reglementary period. Hence, the COA has no more jurisdiction to entertain Pagaragan's letters given that the Decision dated February 1, 2012 has become final and executory absent a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal. It is settled that all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final.31 No other action can be taken on the Decision32 except to order its execution.33 The courts cannot modify the judgment to correct perceived errors of law or fact.34 Public policy and sound practice dictate that every litigation must come to an end at the risk of occasional errors.35 This is the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment. The rule, however, is subject to well-known exceptions, namely, the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments, and supervening events.36 Not one of these exceptions is present in this case. In reviewing the DBP's account, the COA relied on Section 52 of PD No. 1445 or the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines which refers to opening and revision of settled accounts, to wit: Section 52. Opening and revision of settled accounts. 1. At any time before the expiration of three years after the settlement of any account by an auditor, the Commission may motu propio review and revise the account or settlement and certify a new balance. For the purpose, it may require any account, vouchers, or other papers connected with the matter to be forwarded to it. 2. When any settled account appears to be tainted with fraud, collusion, or error of calculation, or when new and material evidence is discovered, the Commission may, within three years after the original settlement, open the account, and after a reasonable time for reply or appearance of the party concerned, may certify thereon a new balance. An auditor may exercise the same power with respect to settled accounts pertaining to the agencies under his audit jurisdiction. 3. Accounts once finally settled shall in no case be opened or reviewed except as herein provided. (Emphasis supplied.) The settlement of account is the process of determining the status or balance of the account of an accountable officer after audit and examination.37 In Cruz, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,38 we clarified that it is the allowance in audit or the issuance of a notice of disallowance that becomes final and executory absent any motion for reconsideration or appeal. In case the notice of disallowance is appealed, it is the decision on appeal that becomes final and executory that would settle the account. Here, the DBP's account was settled or completed when the COA lifted the notice of disallowance on February 1, 2012. The OSG admitted this fact.39 As discussed earlier, the DBP did not move for reconsideration or appeal within the 30-day reglementary period from the time it received the Decision on February 6, 2012. Consequently, the Decision dated February 1, 2012 became final and executory on March 7, 2012. However, the COA held that it can motu proprio review or revise an account before the expiration of three years after the settlement because new and material evidence was discovered. On this point we find grave abuse discretion. Contrary to the COA's theory, the three-year period had already lapsed. The DBP's account was settled on February 1, 2012 but it took COA until April 13, 2015 or more than three years to act on Pagaragan's letters. Worse, the COA did not give DBP the opportunity to comment on the letters. The DBP became aware of the letters only upon receipt of the COA Decision dated April 13, 2015. Thus, the COA can no longer invoke Section 52 paragraphs 1 and 2 of PD No. 1445. In any event, the allegation in Pagaragan's letters is not a new evidence. This is because the COA already knew or ought to have known the date that former President Arroyo approved the DBP's compensation plan before it rendered the Decision dated February 1, 2012 which lifted the notice of disallowance. Suffice it to say that the Omnibus Election Code is a law that is subject to mandatory judicial notice.40 Similarly, the 2010 National Elections is an event of general notoriety which the COA is expected to have known. Differently stated, evidence of these facts are already available at the time the Decision dated February 1, 2012 was rendered. Taken together, the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing a final and executory judgment and reopening a settled account beyond the legal period. Nothing is more settled that a definitive final judgment is no longer subject to change or revision, thus: A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred.41 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Commission on Audit's Decision dated April 13, 2015 is SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 1, 2012 lifting the notice of disallowance is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Delos Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur. NOTICE OF JUDGMENT Sirs/Mesdames: Please take notice that on March 2, 2021 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 12, 2021 at 1:30 p.m. Very truly yours, EDGAR O. ARICHETA Clerk of Court By: (Sgd.) ANNA-LI R. PAPA-GOMBIO Deputy Clerk of Court En Banc Footnotes 1 Rollo, pp. 3-53. 2 The senior officers and their salary increases are as follow: Reynaldo G . David (P419,449.98); Edgardo F. Garcia (P3,981,301.71): Rolando S. Geronimo (P2,881,919.50); Jesus S. Guevarra (P2,270,828.91); Ma. Theresa L. Quirino (P2,189,719.82); Armando O. Samia (P2,895,746.01); Elizabeth P. Ong (P534,448.02); and Benilda Tejada (P2,206.893.69); id. a t 84. 3 Id. at 69-84; 121-124; and 131-146. 4 Id. at 148-174. 5 Id. at 112-120. CGS-A Decision No. 2010-001. 6 Id. at 120. 7 Id. at 88-111. 8 Id. at 86-87. 9 Id. at 64-68. COA Decision No. 2012-004. 10 Id. at 66-67. 11 Id. at 180-181. 12 Id. at 55-58. COA Decision No. 2015-224. 13 Id. at 267-288. 14 ] Id. at 59-63. COA Decision No. 2019-262. 15 Id. at 60-62. 16 Judicial power refers to the duty and power "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." (CONSTITUTION, ART. VIII, SEC. 1). 17 The Court has no self-starting capacity and must await the action of some litigant so aggrieved as to have a justiciable case. (Shapiro and Tresolini. American Constitutional Law, Sixth Edition, 1983, p. 79). 18 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 Ed., p. 259; Board of Optometry v. Hon. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187, 1205 (1996); Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 242-243 (1993); Santos III v. Northwestern Airlines, 285 Phil. 734, 742-743 (1992); National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 253 Phil. 643, 649 (1989); see also Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936). 19 Hon. Aguinaldo v. Pres. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, 801 Phil. 492, 522 (2016). 20 It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff's standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. (Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 125, 131). 21 Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 756 (2006). 22 Agan, Jr. v. Phil. International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 450 Phil. 744, 802 (2003); See JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. CA, 198 Phil. 955, 970 (2000). 23 Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019, citing Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003). 24 Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448, November 6, 2018, 884 SCRA 350, 391-392. 25 The 2009 RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS: Circular No. 2009-06, SEC. 4.6. 26 Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, 417 Phil. 39. 49-50 (2001). 27 The 2009 REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Rule X, Section 4 provides that "[a]ny case brought to the Commission Proper shall he decided within sixty (60) days from the date it is submitted for decision or resolution, in accordance with Section 4, Rule III hereof." 28 The DBP filed the following: (a) Motion for Early Resolution dated February 16, 2016; (b) Manifestation and Second Motion for Early Resolution dated November 18, 2016; (c) Manifestation and Third Motion for Early Resolution dated April 5, 2018; and (d) Manifestation and Fourth Motion for Early Resolution dated January 8, 2019. 29 Central Cement Corp. (now Union Cement Corp.) v. Mines Adjudication Board, 566 Phil. 275, 288 (2008). 30 Resolution Modifying Sections 9 and 10, Rule X of the 2009 REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT. 31 Ang v. Dr. Grageda, 523 Phil. 830, 847 (2006). 32 Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Judge Rivera, 509 Phil. 178, 186 (2005). 33 Times Transit Credit Coop., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 363 Phil. 386, 392 (1999), citing Yu v. National Labor Relations Commission, 315 Phil. 107, 120 (1995). 34 Alba Patio de Makati v. National Labor Relations Commission, 278 Phil. 370, 376 (1991). 35 Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Judge Japzon, 286 Phil. 1048, 1056 (1992). 36 FGU Insurance Corp. v. RTC of Makati City, Branch 66, 659 Phil. 117, 123 (2011). See also Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, 566 Phil. 397, 408 (2008), citing Sacdalan v. CA, 472 Phil. 652, 670-671 (2004). 37 The 2009 RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS: Circular No. 2009-06, SEC. 4.25. See also Cruz, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, 788 Phil. 435, 445 (2016). 38 788 Phil. 435 (2016). 39 Rollo, p. 382. 40 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129 (What Need Not Be Proved). SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. 41 Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez, 582 Phil. 357, 366-367 (2008). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation