EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 240873, September 03, 2019 ]
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, MILAGROS O. CALIDA, JOSEF CALIDA, MICHELLE CALIDA, AND MARK JOREL CALIDA, PETITIONERS, VS. SENATOR ANTONIO "SONNY" TRILLANES IV, THE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS (BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE), AND THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE, GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION, AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
A case becomes moot when it may no longer be the subject of judicial review, as there is no conflict of legal rights which would entail judicial resolution.
This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida (Calida), Milagros O. Calida, Josef Calida, Michelle Calida, and Mark Jorel Calida. They pray that Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes), then a sitting senator, be permanently prohibited from conducting a legislative inquiry into their alleged conflict of interest on government contracts awarded to their security services company. They also pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.2
Petitioners claim that Proposed Senate Resolution No. 7603 does not contain any intended legislation. Instead, it merely calls for an investigation on any conflict of interest regarding the award of government contracts to Vigilant Investigative and Security Agency, Inc., a company owned by petitioner Calida and his family.4 They likewise claim that respondent Trillanes acted without authority in issuing invitations to the resource persons, as the invitations were sent out without the Senate body's approval of the proposed resolution.5
Furthermore, petitioners insist that the investigation is clearly intended merely to target and humiliate them.6 Thus, they pray that respondent Trillanes, as the chair of the Senate Committee on Civil Service, Government Reorganization, and Professional Regulation (Committee on Civil Service), be prohibited from conducting a legislative inquiry against them.7
On August 16, 2018,8 this Court directed respondent Trillanes to comment on the Petition.
In his Comment/Opposition,9 respondent Trillanes denies that the scheduled hearing was without Senate authority or that he acted on his own. He points out that Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760 underwent first reading and was formally and officially referred by Senate President Vicente C. Sotto III, with the concurrence of the Senate Body, to the Committee on Civil Service as primary committee, and the Senate Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee) as secondary committee. Thus, he stresses that the invitations extended to petitioners were sent in his official capacity as Committee on Civil Service chair.10
Additionally, respondent Trillanes states that on August 7, 2018, upon Senator Miguel Zubiri's (Senator Zubiri) motion and without objection from the Senate body, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760 was referred to the Committee on Rules for study. The following day, again upon Senator Zubiri's motion and without objection, the Senate body approved the change of referral of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760 from the Committee on Rules to the Blue Ribbon Committee as primary committee, and Committee on Civil Service as secondary committee.11
Respondent Trillanes asserts that with the formal change of referral, the task of initiating the investigations for Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760 fell to the Blue Ribbon Committee. Thus, he stresses, the initial hearing conducted by the Committee on Civil Service was considered functus officio and the scheduled hearing sought to be restrained has been rendered moot by supervening events.12
In any case, respondent Trillanes emphasizes that petitioners "were never under any legal compulsion to attend"13 the committee hearing. He points out that they were issued mere invitations, not subpoenas.14
Finally, respondent Trillanes underscores that the Senate's power and authority to conduct investigations in aid of legislation are provided in the Constitution.15 He asserts that this issue is a political question, which is outside this Court's jurisdiction.16
On August 31, 2018, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition17 where they impleaded the Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Civil Service. They prayed that these committees also be enjoined from conducting joint hearings on Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760.18
In a September 4, 2018 Resolution,19 this Court directed petitioners to reply to respondent Trillanes' Comment.
In their Reply,20 petitioners reiterate that respondent Trillanes lacked the authority to issue the August 1, 2018 invitation because the Senate, as a body, had not yet approved Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760.21 They emphasize that the proposed resolution itself was unconstitutional as it lacked legislative intent.22
In an October 9, 2018 Resolution,23 this Court directed the parties to file their respective memoranda. Both parties complied.24
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not respondents, then Senator Antonio "Sonny" Trillanes IV, the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, and the Committee on Civil Service, Government Reorganization, and Professional Regulation, should be enjoined from conducting hearings in aid of legislation over Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760.
The Petition has no merit.
I
The legislative power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation is conferred by Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
While this power is not found in the present Constitution's precursors, this Court in Arnault v. Nazareno25 clarified that such power did not need textual grant as it was implied and essential to the legislative function:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which is not infrequently true—recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.26 (Citation omitted)
Nonetheless, despite the constitutional grant, the power of both the House of Representatives and the Senate to conduct investigations in aid of legislation is not absolute. Citing Watkins v. United States,27 this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee28 emphasized that "[n]o inquiry is an end itself[.]"29 It explained that an investigation in aid of legislation must comply with the rules of procedure of each House of Congress, and must not violate the individual rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.30
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,31 this Court explained further that a legislative inquiry must prove to be in aid of legislation and not for other purposes, pronouncing that "Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency."32 It declared:
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e., legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.33 (Citation omitted)
Additionally, legislative inquiry must respect the individual rights of the persons invited to or affected by the legislative inquiry or investigation. Hence, the power of legislative inquiry must be carefully balanced with the private rights of those affected. A person's right against self-incrimination34 and to due process35 cannot be swept aside in favor of the purported public need of a legislative inquiry.
It must be stressed that persons invited to appear before a legislative inquiry do so as resource persons and not as accused in a criminal proceeding. Thus, they should be accorded respect and courtesy since they were under no compulsion to accept the invitation extended before them, yet they did so anyway. Their accommodation of a request should not in any way be repaid with insinuations.
The basic rules of decorum and decency must govern any undertaking done in one's official capacity as an agent of the State, in tacit recognition of one's role as a public servant.
However, the deportment and decorum of the members of any constitutional organ, such as both Houses of Congress during a legislative inquiry, are beyond the judicial realm. All this Court can do is exercise its own power with care and wisdom, acting in a manner befitting its dignified status as public servant and never weaponizing shame under the guise of a public hearing.
II
This Court's power of judicial review is limited to an actual case and controversy.36 An actual case and controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or opposite legal claims capable of judicial resolution and a specific relief.37 The controversy must be real and substantial, and must require a specific relief that courts can grant.38
A case becomes moot when it loses its justiciability, as there is no longer a conflict of legal rights which would entail judicial review.ℒαwρhi৷ This Court is precluded from ruling on moot cases where no justiciable controversy exists.
However, exceptions do exist. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo39 enumerated the circumstances when this Court may still rule on issues that are otherwise moot:
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.40 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
None of the established exceptions exist in this case.
This Court takes judicial notice that Proposed Senate Resolution No. 76041 was filed on May 30, 2018, during the second regular session of the 17th Congress. The 17th Congress closed on June 4, 2019,42 while the 18th Congress opened on July 22, 201943 and will close in June 2022.
With the closing of the 17th Congress, the investigation into Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760 automatically ceased, rendering this case moot as "the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court cease[d] to exist."44
This Court also takes judicial notice that respondent Trillanes has reached the end of his two-year term as senator. Thus, petitioners' prayer for this Court to permanently prohibit him from conducting an investigation into their supposed conflict of interest has likewise been rendered moot.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Reyes, Jr., A., Gesmundo, Reyes, Jr., J.C., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on September 3, 2019 a Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on October 23, 2019 at 11:33 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 3-41.
2 Id. at 35.
3 Id. at 45-47. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760 urges "the Senate Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the conflict of interest of Solicitor General Jose Calida, arising from security service contracts between national government agencies and Vigilant Investigative and Security Agency, Inc."
4 Id. at 18-20.
5 Id. at 11-12.
6 Id. at 22.
7 Id. at 35.
8 Id. at 72-73.
9 Id. at 78-102.
10 Id. at 84-85.
11 Id. at 88-89.
12 Id. at 89-90.
13 Id. at 91.
14 Id. at 91-92.
15 Id. at 94-95.
16 Id. at 95-96.
17 Id. at 212-257.
18 Id. at 215-224.
19 Id. at 198-199.
20 Id. at 286-305.
21 Id. at 289-291.
22 Id. at 291.
23 Id. at 307-309.
24 Id. at 358-408, for petitioners, and 445-471, for respondent Trillanes.
25 87 Phil. 29 (1950) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
26 Id. at 45.
27 354 U.S. 178, I L. ed. 2d 1273 (1957).
28 280 Phil. 829 (1991) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
29 Id. at 848.
30 Id. at 841.
31 586 Phil. 135 (2008) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc]
32 Id. at 189.
33 Id.
34 CONST., art. III, sec. 17 provides:
SECTION 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
35 CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
36 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
37 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 753 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc] citing ISAGANI A. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 259 (2002 ed.).
38 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc., 816 Phil. 422, 445 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
39 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Guttierrez, En Banc].
40 Id. at 754.
41 Rollo, pp. 45-47.
42 S. Res. 17, 17th Cong., 3rd Session (2019), available at < https://www.senate.gov.ph/lisdata/3016526942!.pdf> (last accessed on September 2, 2019).
43 S. Res. 2, 18th Cong., 1st Session (2019), available at < http://comappt.gov.ph/images/pdfiles/LegCal_8th_1st.pdf > (last accessed on September 2, 2019).
44 Republic v. Moldex Realty, Inc., 780 Phil. 553, 560 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
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