G.R. No. 235837




SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 235837. April 01, 2019 ] BELINA AGBAYANI CONCEPCION, PETITIONER, VS. THE FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Assailed in this petition1 for review on certiorari are the Resolutions dated July 17, 20172 and November 10, 20173 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 151485 which dismissed outright the petition for review filed by petitioner Belina Agbayani Concepcion (petitioner) based on purely procedural grounds, i.e., failure to attach material portions of the record, non-representation by a lawyer, and failure to comply with the rule on proof of service, all of which are required under the Rules of Court. The Facts On February 3, 2015, respondent Field Investigation Office (FIO), Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), filed an administrative complaint4 for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Dishonesty, and Grave Misconduct against petitioner, who was then the Sales and Promotion Supervisor V of the Technology and Livelihood Information Dissemination Services (TLIDS) Group-Marketing Division and Legislative Liaison Officer (LLO) of the Technology Resource Center (TRC) and two (2) others5 in connection with the alleged anomalous utilization of Congressman Douglas RA. Cagas' (Congressman Cagas) Priority Development Assistance Fund6 (PDAF) for the year 2007.7 At the time material to this case, Congressman Cagas was the Representative of the 1st District of Davao del Sur.8 Records show that in 2007, Congressman Cagas was allocated two (2) Special Allotment Release Orders9 (SAROs) in relation to his PDAF in the total amount of P16,000,000.00 with the corresponding Notice of Cash Allocations10 (NCAs). The PDAF-drawn funds were channeled through TRC as the implementing agency (IA), with two (2) non-government organizations (NGOs) as "project partners" for implementation, namely: Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic and Development Foundation, Inc. (CARED) and Philippine Social Development Foundation, Inc. (PSDFI).11 Based on its fact-finding inquiry, as well as the findings in the Commission on Audit's (COA) Special Audits Office Report No. 2012-03 (COA Report),12 the FIO alleged in its complaint that the projects funded by Congressman Cagas' PDAF were merely a scheme used by him, other TRC officials, and Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles), in conspiracy with petitioner and her co-respondents, to siphon and embezzle the aforesaid PDAF funds. The FIO alleged that CARED and PSDFI, which were endorsed by Congressman Cagas, were dummies of Napoles and created for the purpose of funneling the PDAF through the TRC.13 As such, the PDAF-funded projects of Congressman Cagas were non-existent or "ghost projects." The FIO further alleged that the amount of P15,360,000.00 allotted for farm implements, livelihood materials, and training for the projects sponsored by Congressman Cagas were misappropriated and converted to his and Napoles' personal use and benefit in conspiracy with petitioner, her co-respondents and other TRC officials.14 Particularly with respect to petitioner, her participation in this case consisted of overseeing the processing of and recommending the PDAF release to CARED.15 In defense,16 while petitioner admitted that she drafted the internal letter/memorandum recommending the release of Congressman Cagas' PDAF for the implementation of his livelihood projects, she merely did so after finding that all the required documents were complete upon transfer to her by the Office of the Director General of TRC.17 Thereafter, she endorsed the recommendation letter together with the required documents to the Legal Department for review and approval, after which the said department forwarded the documents to the Office of the Director General. She averred that without the evaluation and approval of the Legal Department, her recommendation letter had no value.18 Further, she claimed that she did not recommend the release of Congressman Cagas' PDAF to any specific NGO as implementing agency and that she never transacted with any of them during her designation as LLO.19 Neither was she privy to the selection of CARED as an NGO in this case.20 Instead, she maintained that she was merely performing her ministerial function as the TRC's LLO when she recommended the release of Cagas's PDAF, her recommendation being still subject to the approval of her superiors.21 Finally, she asserted that she was not a member of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC).22 The Ombudsman Ruling In a Decision23 dated November 21, 2016, petitioner was found administratively liable for Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty, and accordingly, dismissed from the service along with the accessory penalties of: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from holding public office.24 The Ombudsman held that petitioner played a vital role in the release of Congressman Cagas' PDAF when she recommended its release to CARED, stressing that the funds would not have been transferred to the latter if not for petitioner's certifications, approvals, and signatures in the relevant documents. It added that despite the apparent irregularities in the documents submitted, petitioner helped expedite the release of PDAF disbursements to the dummy NGOs of Napoles.25 The Ombudsman noted that the TRC did not even bother to conduct a due diligence audit on the said NGOs, which possessed neither the accreditation to transact with the government nor any track record in project implementation.26 In conclusion, the Ombudsman held that the acts of petitioner in directly allowing the NGOs to be project implementors without complying with the pertinent laws and regulations amounted to Grave Misconduct.27 Moreover, the Ombudsman ruled that TRC's repeated illegal transfers of public funds to the said NGOs for non-existent projects amounted to distortion of the truth and thus, was tantamount to Serious Dishonesty.28 Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS),29 Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty are offenses punishable by dismissal from the service, even on the first offense.30 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,31 which was denied in an Order32 dated May 4, 2017.£A⩊phi£ Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review.33 The CA Ruling In a Resolution34 dated July 17, 2017, the CA dismissed the petition outright on the ground that petitioner: (a) failed to append material portions of the record;35 (b) attached only one (1) registry receipt as proof of service of the petition, without any indication as to whether the same pertained to the FIO or the Ombudsman, despite claiming in her Affidavit of Service36 that a copy of the petition had been sent to the FIO and the Ombudsman, in accordance with Section 5,37 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court; and (c) was not represented by counsel. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,38 attaching to her motion copies of most39 of the lacking documents. She likewise implored substantial compliance with the rule on proof of service, explaining that the registry return receipt in her Affidavit of Service pertained to the FIO. At the least, she pleaded that the CA could have directed her to furnish a copy of her petition to the Ombudsman before it dismissed her appeal outright. Finally, she maintained that considering the gravity of the penalty of dismissal imposed upon her, the CA should have traversed the merits of the case instead of dismissing it on mere technicalities. However, her motion was denied in a Resolution40 dated November 10, 2017; hence, this petition. The Issue Before the Court The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing outright petitioner's appeal on purely procedural grounds. The Court's Ruling The petition is impressed with merit. At the outset, it must be stressed that procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases so courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. They provide a system for forestalling arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in dispute settlement. Thus, they are not to be ignored to suit the interests of a party.41 However, procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons so as to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.42 In this case, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA, challenging the Ombudsman's decision finding her administratively liable and meting upon her the penalty of dismissal. Section 6, Rule 43 thereof provides: Section 6. Contents of the petition. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Underscoring supplied) In its assailed July 17, 2017 Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition for review based purely on procedural grounds, namely, failure to append material documents43 to her petition; lack of representation by counsel; and failure to show proof of service to both the Ombudsman and the FIO. With regard to petitioner's failure to append material portions of the record in her petition, the Court has already declared in Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora44 that: First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition. Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached. Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.45 (Underscoring supplied) In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appended the "Complaint with Annexes, Joint Order dated 16 March 2015, Order dated 22 January 2016, Counter-Affidavit of the Petitioner, Rejoinder, Verified Position Paper of the Petitioner, Position Paper of the Respondent, Decision dated 21 November 2016, Motion for Reconsideration of the Petitioner, and Order dated 4 May 2017"46 and likewise, averred that the rest of the documents that the CA found lacking were already incorporated as annexes in the Complaint. Jurisprudence pertaining to this matter has established that submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement that relevant or pertinent documents be submitted along with the petition, and therefore calls for the relaxation of procedural rules. This ruling is in consonance with the fact that the Rules do not specify the precise documents, pleadings or parts of the records which must be annexed to the petition, apart from the assailed judgment, final order, or resolution.47 Neither should petitioner's lack of representation by counsel be deemed fatal to her cause and lead to the dismissal of her appeal. In Polsotin, Jr. v. De Guia Enterprises, Inc.,48 the Court held: Aware that petitioners are not represented by counsel, the CA could have been more prudent by giving petitioners time to engage the services of a lawyer or at least by reminding them of the importance of retaining one. It is worthy to mention at this point that the right to counsel, being intertwined with the right to due process, is guaranteed by the Constitution to any person whether the proceeding is administrative, civil or criminal. The CA should have extended some degree of liberality so as to give the party a chance to prove their cause with a lawyer to represent or to assist them.49 Nor should her failure to show that she furnished a copy of the petition to the Ombudsman, as the agency a quo, in accordance with Section 5,50 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, be sufficient justification51 to dismiss her petition. In her motion for reconsideration, she clarified52 that the registry receipt in her Affidavit of Service indicated service of her petition to the FIO, which the Court finds to be substantial compliance with the rules. In any case, the. presence of compelling reasons53 in this case impels the Court to relax the pertinent rules of procedure to make way for a resolution of the case on the merits. In the case of Dalton-Reyes v. Court of Appeals54 (Dalton-Reyes), the Court exercised liberality and allowed the remand of the case to the CA for adjudication on the merits despite petitioner's failure to show proof of service of a copy of the petition on both the adverse party and the Ombudsman, among other procedural lapses committed by petitioner. The Court took into consideration the fact that one, petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer at that time, as in this case, and two, under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class oh the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law;55 more so in the case of one who pursues her case even without the assistance of counsel. Thus, the Court stressed that "[s]ocial justice would be a meaningless term if an element of rigidity would be affixed to the procedural precepts."56 Moreover, the petitioner therein was also a public servant57 who was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service, an extreme penalty which prompted the Court to allow a review of the decision finding her administratively liable in order to obviate any doubts on the propriety of the penalty and insure that no injustice would be done to petitioner. As in Dalton-Reyes, and due to the same compelling circumstances attendant in this case, the Court opts for a liberal application of procedural rules. Indeed, the penalty of dismissal bears injurious effects to petitioner's career and means of livelihood, and possibly even her personal life. On this score, it bears reiterating that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on procedural minutiae. It bears to stress that resolving the merits of the case would give more efficacy to the constitutional mandate on the accountability of public officers and employees58 and every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.59 Finally, courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process.60 WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated July 17, 2017 and November 10, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 151485 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits. SO ORDERED. Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Del Castillo,* and Caguioa, JJ., concur.1âшphi1 J. Reyes, Jr., J., on official leave. Footnotes * Designated Additional Member per Raffle dated March 25, 2019. 1 Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 13-42. 2 Id. at 46-51. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a member of this Court) and Pedro B. Corales, concurring. 3 Id. at 53-60. 4 Dated December 11, 2014; id. at 201-220. See also id. at 81. 5 Also charged as defendants were Zenaida Garcia Cruz-Ducut, Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer of the Energy Regulatory Commission and Marivic Villaluz Jover, Chief Accountant of the TRC. 6 The PDAF is an annual appropriation allocated to each member of the Congress of the Philippines, granted under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) to fund priority development programs and projects identified by the legislator; see rollo, p. 82. 7 Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 81-82. 8 Id. at 82. 9 SARO No. ROCS-07-00046 issued on January 10, 2007 and SARO No. ROCS-07-03351 issued on February 15, 2007; see id. at 83. 10 NCA No. 314303-3 issued on February 13, 2007 and NCA No. 336352-2 issued on February 26, 2007, both for the amount of P8,000,000.00; see id. 11 Id. at 82. 12 See id. 13 See id. at 214-216. 14 Id. at 90. 15 Id. at 91. 16 See Counter-Affidavit dated February 10, 2016, id at 153-180. 17 Id. at 155-156. 18 Id. at 155. 19 Id. at 155-156. 20 Id. at 159. 21 Id. at 156. 22 Id. at 94. See also id. at 165 23 Id. at 81-106. Issued by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III Anjuli Larla A. Tan-Eneran, reviewed by Acting Director, PIAB-F Ruth Laura A. Mella and approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales. 24 Id. at 104-105. 25 The disbursement vouchers (DVs) were accomplished, signed, and approved on the same day; see id. at 101. 26 Id. 27 Id. at 101-102. 28 Id. at 102. 29 See Rule 10, Section 46 (A) (1) and (3) of the RRACCS. 30 The Ombudsman held that the lesser offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service is subsumed in the other offenses; rollo (Vol. I), pp. 102-103. 31 Dated March 15, 2017; id. at 113-118. 32 Id. at 107-112. 33 Id. at 62-78. 34 Id. at 46-51. 35 The documents that petitioner failed to attach were: the COA Report; the SAROs; letter dated January 18, 2007 - Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) notarized on January 25, 2007; Memorandum dated March 12, 2007 - undated Disbursement Voucher (DV) No. 012007040604; Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 850421; CARED Official Receipt (OR) No. 015; letter dated March 7, 2007- MOA dated March 30, 2007; Memorandum dated March 20, 2007; undated DV No. 012007040596; LBP Check No. 850438; PSDFI OR No. 1229; Joint Order dated March 16, 2015; Ducut's Counter-Affidavit dated May 11, 2015; Jover's Counter-affidavit dated April 20, 2015; Order dated January 22 2016- Jover's Position Paper dated February 5, 2016; Ducut's Position Paper dated February 5 2016; Salaysay dated August 29, 2013 of Simonette R. Briones; Karagdagang Simmpaang Salaysay dated November 26, 2013 of Benhur K. Luy; Joint Sworn Statement dated August 5, 2013 of Benhur K. Luy, Merlina P. Sunas, Gertrudes K. Luy, and Anabelle Luy-Reario; Sworn Statement dated August 29, 2013 of Marina C. Sula; Project Activities Reports; annexes of the Complaint; and respondent's Consolidated Reply dated May 25, 2015. Likewise not attached were the Certifications issued by Former Mayor Arsenio A. Latasa and Mayor Joseph R. Perms of Digos City, Davao del Sur; City Agriculturist Roger M. Masculino of Digos City, Davao del Sur; Mayor Joel Ray L. Lopez of the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur; Municipal Agriculturist Jose A. Martorillas of the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur; Mayor Franco Magno Calida of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Davao del Sur; Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator Veronica M. Rodriguez and Municipal Agricultural Officer Felix N. Bariquit of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Davao del Sur; Mayor Edwin G. Reyes of the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur; Municipal Agriculturist Julian L. Albores of the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur; and Mayor Vicente A. Fernandez of the Municipality of Matanao, Davao del Sur; see id. at 48. 36 Id. at 79. 37 Section 5. How appeal taken. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner. Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial. (Underlining supplied) 38 Dated August 9, 2017; id. at 188-200. 39 In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner attached the "Complaint with Annexes, Joint Order dated 16 March 2015, Order dated 22 January 2016, Counter-Affidavit of the Petitioner, Rejoinder, Verified Position Paper of the Petitioner, Position Paper of the Respondent, Decision dated 21 November 2016, Motion for Reconsideration of the Petitioner, and Order dated 4 May 2017." The rest of the documents are incorporated as Annexes of the Complaint; see id. at 191. 40 Id. at 53-60. 41 See Cortal v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017, 838 SCRA 255, 265, citing Garbo v. CA, 327 Phil. 780, 784 (1996) and Sebastian v. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 605 (2003). 42 Id. at 266, citing Asian Spirit Airlines v. Spouses Bautista, 491 Phil. 476, 483 (2005) and Asia United Bank v. Good/and Company, Inc., 650 Phil. 174, 185 (2010). 43 See note 36. 44 529 Phil. 718 (2006). 45 Id. at 728. 46 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 191. 47 Spouses Henry Lanaria and the Late Belen Lanaria v. Francisco Planta, 563 Phil. 400, 411 (2007); citation omitted. 48 677 Phil. 561 (2011). 49 Id. at 567-568. 50 Sec. 5. How appeal taken. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner. x x x 51 Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit of costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. 52 See rollo, p. 192. 53 In Barnes v. Quijano Padilla, 500 Phil. 303, 311 (2005), the Court restated the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court to resist a strict adherence to procedure, enumerating the elements for an appeal to be given due course by a suspension of procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. 54 493 Phil. 631 (2005). 55 Id. at 645-642, citing Uy v. Commission on Audit, 385 Phil. 324, 339-340 (2000). 56 Id. at 642. 57 Petitioner Rosario Dalton-Reyes,was a Stenographic Reporter III of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau-(EPIB), Preliminary Investigation, Administrative Adjudication and Monitoring Office (PAMO), Office of the Ombudsman. 58 See Joseph Malixi v. Glory V. Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017. 59 Dalton-Reyes v. CA, supra note 54, citing Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 415 Phil. 538 (2001). 60 Negros Slashers, Inc. v. Alvin Teng, 682 Phil. 593, 603-604 (2012), citing Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation, 551 Phil. 768, 780 (2007), citing Barnes v. Padilla, supra note, 53 The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation