G.R. No. 228373




Manila THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 228373. March 12, 2018 ] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. PO1 JOHNNY K. SULLANO, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N GESMUNDO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 promulgated on June 10, 2016 and Resolution2 promulgated on November 17, 2016 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 06247-MIN. The CA affirmed the Order3 dated March 7, 2014 and Resolution4 dated April 8, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 4 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 16757 which granted the demurrer of evidence of accused PO1 Johnny K. Sullano (respondent) and dismissed the case for violation of Section 15, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165) against respondent. The Antecedents On October 16, 2012, Senior Superintendent Nerio T. Bermudo (P/SSupt Bermudo), the City Director of the Butuan City Police Office, ordered fifty (50) randomly selected police officers under the Butuan City Police Office to undergo drug testing pursuant to Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165. Among those who underwent testing was respondent, a police officer at Butuan City Police Station 5. Respondent's urine sample was received on October 17, 2012. According to the Initial Chemistry Report5 of the Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory Office 13, the test conducted on respondent's urine specimen gave a positive result for the presence of methamphetamine. The confirmatory test6 on the same specimen completed on November 5, 2012 yielded the same result. Given the result of the random drug test and confirmatory test, P/SSupt. Bermudo filed a Complaint Affidavit7 against respondent for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In lieu of a counter-affidavit, respondent filed a Manifestation,8 wherein he claimed that he voluntarily submitted to the random drug test ordered by P/SSupt. Bermudo; the urine sample he submitted gave a positive result to the presence of methamphetamine; he did not use the dangerous drug but had no means to contest the test's veracity; and he entered into a rehabilitation program with Cocoon Foundation for Substance Abuse. He concluded by pleading for the dismissal of the complaint against him. Assistant City Prosecutor Isabel Corazon Cabuga-Plaza recommended the dismissal of the complaint through a Resolution9 dated February 1, 2013.10 This was reversed by Deputy City Prosecutor Aljay O. Go in an Order11 dated April 8, 2013, finding probable cause against respondent. Consequently, an information was filed, the delictual allegations of which read: That sometime on October 17, 2012 at Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously use methamphetamine hydro chloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug and found positive for use, after a confirmatory test. CONTRARY TO LAW. (Violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended)12 Respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence.13 In his Demurrer to Evidence,14 respondent argued that the case against him should be dismissed as the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The essential elements of the crime were not proven as it was never asserted that respondent was apprehended or arrested or actually caught using any dangerous drug. RTC Ruling The RTC granted the demurrer to evidence through its order dated March 7, 2014. The RTC relied upon the wording of Sec. 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 articulating its reasoning thus: It pre-supposes that accused was arrested or apprehended committing a crime and therefore should be subjected to a drug examination, considering that this could be alleged as an aggravating circumstance in any criminal case filed against him. In this case, the accused was never arrested nor apprehended committing an offense. He was only subjected to a random drug examination per directive of the PNP Superior Officer. It is the opinion of the Court that the accused should not be charged for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165, but, should be administratively charged for being a user of prohibited drugs under the other provisions of R.A. 9165. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Demurrer to Evidence is granted. This case is dismissed, for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond in the amount of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) as evidence per Official Receipt No. 3502863, dated June 20, 2013 is ordered cancelled and released to the bondsman, Mr. Juanito A. Sullano. SO ORDERED.15 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of this RTC order. The same was denied in the resolution dated April 8, 2014, citing that there was no good reason to grant the motion for reconsideration. CA Ruling Due to the dismissal of the case, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence. In its decision dated June 10, 2016, the CA was not convinced of petitioner's arguments and denied the petition. The CA ratiocinated: As can be deduced from the foregoing, the elements to be charged under Section 15 of R.A. 9165 are as follows: 1) a person is apprehended or arrested; 2) the said person was subjected to a drug test; and 3) the person tested positive for use of any dangerous drug after a confirmatory test. In the case at bar, the first element for private respondent to be charged under Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is absent. It bears stressing that private respondent was not apprehended nor arrested. As borne by the records, private respondent was subjected to a random drug testing conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory as directed by P/S Superintendent Bermudo. Accordingly, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, there is no sufficient evidence to charge private respondent for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165. The findings of the trial court also finds support in the recent case of Dela Cruz v. People. xxx In fine, petitioner have failed to show that the trial court capriciously and whimsically exercised its discretion or grossly misapprehended the facts in granting the demurrer to evidence filed by private respondent. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Absent any showing that trial court abused its discretion, much less gravely, the instant petition must be dismissed.16 The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Order dated March 7, 2014 and Resolution dated April 8, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Butuan City, in Criminal Case No. 16757 [are] AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.17 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition, raising the sole issue of - whether the CA committed a reversible error when it held that Hon. Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., in his capacity as the Presiding judge of the Butuan City RTC, Branch 4, did not gravely abuse his discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in granting respondent's demurrer to evidence.18 Petitioner contends that the CA erred in interpreting R.A. No. 9165, instead insisting that Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not exclusively apply to circumstances where the accused was apprehended or arrested. To petitioner, once the results of the mandatory drug test showed a positive result, the person tested may be criminally prosecuted under Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In the instant case, since there was an order for respondent to undergo mandatory drug testing, and the initial and confirmatory tests gave a positive result, he was properly charged with violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to Sec. 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165. Petitioner maintains that under Section 36, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, arrest or apprehension of the accused is not required prior to the submission to drug examination. Random drug tests are allowed under certain circumstances, which include the instant case. Petitioner further insists that the case of Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines19 (Dela Cruz) does not preclude the application of Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. To petitioner, the narrow interpretation of Section 15 will result in an absurd situation where an individual, found to be positive for the use of dangerous drugs through a random mandatory drug test, may not be penalized. Petitioner further claims grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge when the latter found that respondent should only be held administratively liable for his conduct. Petitioner also points out that respondent failed to comply with Section 54, Article VIII of R.A. No. 9165, and respondent was likewise not exempt from criminal liability under Section 55, Article VIII of R.A. No. 9165 for his failure to justify his exemption. Finally, petitioner avers that respondent is not placed in double jeopardy as the instant case is an exception to the rule, there being grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial judge. On the other hand, respondent maintains that a person may only be charged of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, if he was apprehended or arrested, and later found to be positive for use of any dangerous drugs. Petitioner expands the scope of Section 15 even when the information did not relate the respondent's offense to Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165. An indictment under Section 15 is totally different from Section 36; they are not interchangeable. Petitioner's position effectively denies respondent his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him. Finally, the petition places the accused in double jeopardy as his acquittal is final and unappealable. The Court's Ruling The petition is unmeritorious.(awÞhi( At the heart of this petition is the question of whether Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehension or arrest of a person for the latter to be considered as violating the provision. Taking into consideration the text of the law itself, general criminal law principles, and previous jurisprudential interpretation, the answer is in the affirmative, given the specific facts of this case. The provision, Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, reads: Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner claims that this section should be read in conjunction with Section 36, Article III of the same law, which mandates the random drug testing for certain employees, and pertinently includes police officers like respondent. Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165 states: Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of test results. The DOH shall take steps in setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited drug testing centers to further reduce the cost of such drug test. The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of the drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. Drug test certificates issued by accredited drug testing centers shall be valid for a one-year period from the date of issue which may be used for other purposes. The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: xxx (e) Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement agencies. - Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement agencies shall undergo an annual mandatory drug test; In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act. (emphasis supplied) The constitutionality of certain portions of Section 36 has already been questioned in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency20 (SJS). As stated, several factors militate against petitioner's construction of the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" appearing in Section 15. It is likewise important to note that the allegations in the information against respondent clearly state that he is only being prosecuted for Section 15 and nowhere in the information was it stated that it should, be read in relation to Section 36. The cardinal rule in statutory construction is the plain-meaning rule. Verba legis non est recendendum - "from the words of a statute there should be no departure." When the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, the words should be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.21 Especially for penal provisions, it is not enough to say that the legislature intended to make a certain act an offense, the legislature must use words which in some way express that intent.22 An analysis of the construction of the sentence yields no other conclusion. Section 15 is unambiguous: the phrase "apprehended or arrested" immediately follows "a person," thus qualifying the subject person. It necessarily follows that only apprehended or arrested persons found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug may be prosecuted under the provision. Moreover, the elementary rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, also known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, is relevant and applicable. This rule applies where the very terms of the statute expressly limit it to certain matters; thus it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.23 In the provision in question, Congress itself confined and restricted the liability arising from use of dangerous drugs to those who were apprehended or arrested if charged with a violation of Section 15. Petitioner also advances the argument that a narrow interpretation of Section 15 will result in an absurd situation where a person found to be positive for use of dangerous drugs through Section 36 may not be penalized for not being arrested or apprehended, rendering Section 36 meaningless. The Court disagrees. The information, quoted above, against respondent is straightforward: respondent "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously use methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug and found positive for use, after a confirmatory test." The essential element, i.e. the accused was apprehended or arrested, was not specifically alleged. Moreover, nowhere in the information was Section 36 mentioned. Urging the inclusion of Section 36 in accusing the respondent of the crime will deprive the latter of the opportunity to prepare his defense and violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. An information must be complete, fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as an information is a recital of the essentials of a crime, delineating the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused.24 Convicting an accused of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded.25 This appears to be petitioner's intention here and should not be condoned. It is true that every part of a statute must be considered together with other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole law. The statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole.26 Parenthetically, the Court finds no difficulty in harmonizing Section 36 with a strict interpretation of Section 15. Section 36, last paragraph states "[I]n addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act." This may be construed to mean that rehabilitation for six (6) months in a government center, as stated in Section 15, may be imposed on those found positive of use of dangerous drugs through a random drug test. This reading of the provisions would still pursue the intent of the law to encourage not the prosecution and incarceration of those using dangerous drugs, but their rehabilitation. This reading especially finds relevance in this case as respondent voluntarily submitted himself to rehabilitation. Also, criminal law is rooted in the concept that there is no crime unless a law specifically calls for its punishment. Nullum crimen poena sine lege. Another basic criminal law precept important to remember here is in dubiis reus est absolvendus - all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Any criminal law showing ambiguity will always be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused.27 These concepts signify that courts must not bring cases within the provision of law that are not clearly embraced by it. An act must be pronounced criminal clearly by the statute prior to its commission.28 The terms of the statute must clearly encompass the act committed by an accused for the latter to be held liable under the provision. Hence, it has been held: For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment. The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.29 (emphasis supplied) Applying these age-old precepts to the case at bar, petitioner's arguments should be rejected. Petitioner wishes to expand the coverage of Section 15 to cover those under Section 36, and beyond what is specifically limited by the wording of the statue under Section 15, even when the information only alleges a violation of Section 15. Because of the strict construction of penal laws, this is not possible. Petitioner claims that the Dela Cruz case cannot be used here as the facts of the case are different. Indeed this much is true. In Dela Cruz, Jaime De La Cruz, a public officer, was arrested in an entrapment operation for the crime of extortion. After his arrest, he was required to submit his urine for drug testing. The issue tackled by the Court was whether the drug test conducted on petitioner was legal. Nevertheless, the Dela Cruz ruling is helpful as to the Court's interpretation therein of the coverage of the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested," to wit: First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others, the "importation", "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation", "manufacture" and "possession" of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"; being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort"; "maintenance of a den, dive or resort"; "illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals"; "manufacture or delivery" or "possession" of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"; "unnecessary" or "unlawful" prescription thereof; "cultivation or culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof; and "maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals." To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging land convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez as follows: xxxx Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, to wit: . . .[M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person's right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.30 (Emphasis supplied) The above ruling, in not extending the phrase "apprehended or arrested," is instructive. The Court recognized that only apprehended or arrested persons for the specified offenses fall within the provisions of the law and the Court already narrowly interpreted the terms of the statute, as it should be. Section 15 is thus already limited in scope and coverage. Furthermore, a grant of the petition would also expose respondent to double jeopardy. Truly, all the elements of double jeopardy are present in respondent's case. Under exceptional circumstances, i.e., where there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, double jeopardy will not attach.31 As stated earlier and as ruled by the CA, the dismissal of the case and grant of demurrer were not attended with grave abuse of discretion. Considering the above, the inescapable conclusion is that Section 15 cannot be expanded to include respondent, who underwent mandatory drug testing pursuant to Section 36 (e), Article III of R.A. No. 9165 where the information only alleged a violation of Section 15. The letter of the law, basic statutory construction, criminal law precepts, and jurisprudence are plainly incompatible with petitioner's line of reasoning. Thus, neither courts a quo committed any grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer or a reversible error in dismissing the case against the respondent.1a⍵⍴h!1 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 10, 2016 Decision and the November 17, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 06247-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Martires, JJ., concur. May 9, 2018 NOTICE OF JUDGMENT Sirs/Mesdames: Please take notice that on March 12, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on May 9, 2018 at 2:04 p.m. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN Division Clerk of Court Footnotes 1 Rollo, pp. 55-61; penned by Associate Justice Oscar V. Badelles with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Ronaldo B. Martin, concurring. 2 Id. at 63-66. 3 Id. at 88-89; penned by Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. 4 Id. at 90. 5 Id. at 100. 6 Id. at 101. 7 Id. at 102. 8 Id. at 103. 9 Id. at 108-109. 10 The date stated in the resolution is February 1, 2012. However, given the time line of the instant case, it appears that the year should be 2013. 11 Rollo, p. 110. 12 Id. at 111. 13 Id. at 113-117. 14 Id. 15 Id. at 88-89. 16 Id. at 58-60. 17 Id. at 60. 18 Id. at 31. 19 739 Phil. 578 (2014). 20 591 Phil. 393 (2008). 21 See Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017. 22 See United States v. Ambata, 3 Phil. 327, 329 (1904). 23 See Centeno v. Judge Villalon-Pornillos, et al., 306 Phil. 219, 228 (1994). 24 See People of the Philippines v. Cutamora and Cutamora, 396 Phil. 405, 414 (2000). 25 See People of the Philippines v. Capinpin, 398 Phil. 333, 344 (2000). 26 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, 635 Phil. 447, 454 (2010). 27 See People of the Philippines v. Geronimo, et al., 100 Phil. 90, 98 (1956). 28 See Causing v. COMELEC, et al., 742 Phil. 539, 555 (2014). 29 Centeno v. Judge Villalon-Pornillos, et al., supra note 23, at 230-231. 30 Supra note 19, at 585-589. 31 See People of the Philippines v. Tan, 639 Phil. 402, 411 (2010). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation