Manila
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 208089. September 28, 2016 ]
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., STEALTH MARITIME CORPORATION AND CARLOS SALINAS, PETITIONERS, VS. CASIANO F. SALADAS, JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:**
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,1 filed by petitioners Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTCI), Stealth Maritime Corporation (SMC) and Carlos Salinas, as President/General Manager of PTCI, to reverse and set aside the January 28, 2013 decision2 and the July 1, 2013 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120532.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Pursuant to a nine-month POEA standard employment contract dated July 9, 2008, the petitioners hired Casiano F. Saladas, Jr. (Saladas) as Chief Cook on board M/V Gas Defiance. He joined the vessel crew on July 29, 2008, after having been declared fit to work with restriction by the PTC Health Metrics, Inc.4
Sometime in March 2009, while doing his chores, Saladas allegedly lost his balance and fell when the vessel changed speed. His chest hit a trash can, but he ignored the pain. Another on-board incident occurred when Saladas slipped from a ladder with his hip hitting the deck. After two (2) days, he felt numbness and weakness in his right leg, thighs, chest, and neck areas. He claimed that he requested from the Captain a medical checkup.
The petitioners claim that, while on board the vessel, Saladas did not experience any illness or injury which hampered his functions as Chief Cook. He also did not report any unusual incident concerning his health which could have indicated any illness or injury.
On April 6, 2009, Saladas disembarked at Brisbane, Australia because his contract had already ended. While he was in Brisbane, Australia, Saladas underwent a medical check-up with Dr. David Bartholomeusz (Dr. Bartholomeusz). The foreign doctor diagnosed that Saladas' pain from the accident has been symptomatic for two (2) weeks; found that his blood pressure was high but became normal after two (2) hours; made him go through an electrocardiogram test (ECG); and prescribed him maintenance drugs.
Saladas alleged that he asked Dr. Bartholomeusz for a copy of his findings, with assessment and diagnosis. Dr. Bartholomeusz, in turn, advised him that the results would be given through SMC's agent.1aшphi1 However, Saladas never received his medical results before he left for the Philippines.
When Saladas arrived in the Philippines, he immediately reported to PTCI and informed them of the accidents he suffered on board the vessel. Despite repeated requests for compensation, PTCI denied these because there was no endorsement from SMC regarding this matter.
On November 12, 2009, Saladas consulted Dr. Efren Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo), an internist-cardiologist at the Philippine Heart Center, who diagnosed him with diabetes mellitus, essential hypertension, rib fracture with impediment Grade VII (41.80%). Dr. Vicaldo, nonetheless, declared him unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity.
On October 16, 2009, Saladas filed a complaint for disability benefits, illness allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, and damages against the petitioners.
THE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION DECISIONS
In his June 16, 2010 decision, Labor Arbiter Felipe P. Pati (LA Pati) ruled in favor of Saladas and awarded permanent and/or total disability benefits in the amount of $60,000.00. Saladas was found to have proven the following evidentiary facts, which LA Pati deemed as uncontroverted: (1) that he went through an ECG test and was prescribed antihypertensive medications but did not receive his medical results from Dr. Bartholomeusz; (2) that PTCI denied his disability claims right after he arrived in the Philippines; (3) that he had no choice but to seek consultation and treatment on his own from Dr. Vicaldo; and (4) after having been thoroughly examined and diagnosed, he was given an unfit-to-work assessment.
LA Pati said that the petitioners only gave unsubstantiated arguments and failed to prove with substantial evidence that they were not liable for the disability claims. Their arguments were considered "bare denials," which appear bereft of any concrete evidence to thwart the claims against the petitioners.
On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the petitioners' appeal and affirmed LA Pati's decision in its January 6, 2011 resolution, and denied their subsequent motion for reconsideration in its May 17, 2011 resolution.
The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming LA Pati's award of disability benefits based on Saladas' self-serving allegation that he suffered an injury on board the vessel, and that he complied with the three-day reporting requirement under the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions. They also insisted that his illnesses were not work-related. At any rate, they argued that Saladas disembarked from the vessel not for medical reasons but due to finished contract.
THE ASSAILED DECISION
In its January 28, 2013 decision, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. The CA mainly held, among others, that Saladas is entitled to permanent/total disability benefits because his injury was work-related that existed during the effectivity of his employment contract. The CA appreciated Saladas' claim that he met an accident on board the M/V Gas Defiance because it was supported by the medical report of Dr. Bartholomeusz on April 6, 2008. In addition, the pre-employment medical examination Saladas underwent before boarding the vessel showed that he was not suffering from rib fracture. Thus, after he was medically repatriated on April 8, 2008, Saladas was unable to work for more than one hundred twenty (120) days and could no longer pursue his usual work as a seaman.
On July 1, 2013, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration; hence, they filed the present petition.
OUR RULING
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
In reviewing the CA decision in a labor case made under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we examine the CA decision in the context that it determined the presence or the absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision, on the merits of the case, committed errors of law. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the challenged NLRC decision.
Under this approach, the question that we ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?5
Underlying this jurisdictional limitation of our Rule 45 approach in labor cases is the general jurisdictional limitation of a Rule 45 petition that restricts the Court's inquiry to questions of law - where the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts. We do not review questions of facts (where the doubt or controversy concerns the truth or falsehood of facts) unless necessary to determine the correctness of the allegation that the NLRC (in the decision the CA reviewed) committed grave abuse of discretion.1aшphi1
In resolving the present petition, therefore, we are bound by (1) the general factual-bar-rule under the Rule 45 petition directly before us, and (2) the intrinsic limitations of a certiorari proceeding (in the CA's review of the NLRC's decision) as an extraordinary remedy aimed solely at correcting errors of jurisdiction.
The issue before us involves mixed questions of fact and law, with the real issue being one of fact - whether Saladas met an accident on board the vessel and/or his heart condition worsened during his employment. As a question of fact, we generally cannot address this issue.
By way of exception, we can address factual issues and, in the process review the factual findings of the labor tribunals and the evidence, to determine whether, as essentially ruled by the CA, the NLRC indeed grossly misread the facts and misappreciated the evidence - situations that we consider as marks of grave abuse of discretion.
In the present case, we find that the CA committed a reversible error and that the labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion because they totally disregarded the governing contract between the parties. They likewise grossly misappreciated the facts and even completely disregarded vital pieces of evidence in resolving the case.
First, the CA erroneously relied on the 120-day period because Saladas failed to prove that his medical condition is work-related. The continuing reliance on the number of days that a seafarer is unable to work has attracted much doubt as regards it fairness and relevance. We have reminded that this period cannot be used as a panacea for all maritime compensation cases as labor tribunals should always take into account the contractual duties between the parties.6
The frequent reliance on the 120-day period diverts the attention of labor tribunals from other equally important doctrines in granting a disability claim. Such diversion creates the risk of giving due course to otherwise premature claims; or worse, it may lead to an award of benefits to claims that are entirely without merit based on the degree of proof required.
In this respect, one important doctrine that should be considered in this case is the element of work relatedness between an illness or disability and the seafarer's duties — a relation that is explicitly required under the POEA-SEC. The focus on the length of time during which the seafarer is unable to work may diminish the importance of establishing this connection. In effect, it undermines an essential principle in labor cases, which is the need to prove allegations and claims with substantial evidence.
We must always remember that whether a seaman is entitled to disability benefits or not is a matter governed not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. Deemed incorporated in every Filipino seafarer's contract of employment is a set of standard provisions established and implemented by the POEA, which contain the minimum requirements prescribed by the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers. Under these standards, we held that two (2) elements must concur for an injury or illness to be compensable: (a) the condition must be work-related, and (b) it must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.7
In this case, Saladas failed to submit proof that his illness was work-related. In other words, the evidence on record misses essential facts on how he contracted or developed his illness, and how and why his working conditions aggravated this illness. In the absence of substantial evidence, we cannot just presume that Saladas' job caused his injury or aggravated any preexisting condition he might have had.8
While Saladas alleged that he met two (2) accidents on board the vessel, these allegations remain unsubstantiated by sufficient evidence. He failed to show that these incidents happened because he did not present any kind of evidence to prove that the accidents occurred at all. There was no record of any medical complaint lodged by Saladas during his employment on board the vessel. He even claimed that his fellow crew members noticed him limping, yet the records do not show any testimony, affidavit, or document that they, indeed, had witnessed such fact.
The only documents on record about this alleged accident on March 2009 were post-medical reports of Saladas' rib fracture9 and Dr. Bartholomeusz's initial report when Saladas came to him for a medical checkup in Brisbane, Australia.10 These documents, however, prove no more than the fact that Saladas told Dr. Bartholomeusz that his ribs have been hurting for two (2) weeks before he visited him, and that he has an existing rib fracture when he underwent medical examinations in the Philippines. These two facts, taken together, are not enough to prove that Saladas met an accident on board his vessel.
As for his heart condition, Saladas did not present evidence that the condition worsened during his employment. Again, what he presented were post-medical reports about the tests he underwent, the heart medications he was prescribed, and diagnosis of diabetes and hypertension.11 These reports, however, were issued; long after Saladas had disembarked the vessel. Although he alleged that it was the working conditions he had to undergo - i.e., stressful work on-board the ship, harsh sea weather conditions, and constant exposure to harmful chemicals and varying changes in temperature - that aggravated his heart condition, Saladas failed to adduce any kind of evidence proving that he was indeed subject to these working conditions.
While the POEA-SEC considers a heart disease as occupational, Saladas failed to satisfy by substantial evidence the condition laid down in the contract that if the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain brought about by the nature of his work.12
Second, the CA failed to consider the fact that Saladas was NOT repatriated for medical reasons. His nine-month contract with the petitioners started on July 9, 2008, which would have ended sometime in April 2009. True enough, and as admitted by Saladas, he disembarked the vessel because his employment had already ceased. In other words, it is logical to conclude that Saladas was repatriated to the Philippines due to the completion of his employment contract and not on account of his alleged accident and heart condition.
We have frequently recognized the fact of a "finished contract" as the reason for a seafarer's repatriation.13 In fact, we have used such circumstance as an indication that the injury or illness is not work-related.14
Third, the CA, as well as the labor tribunals, prematurely considered the medical assessment of Saladas' own doctors without taking into account that Saladas did not undergo the mandatory post-medical examination. A seafarer must submit himself within three (3) days after repatriation due to disability for the post-employment examination and treatment by the company-designated physician.15 Failure to report within such time will result in the forfeiture of benefits.16
In the present case, Saladas alleged that he reported to PTCI upon his arrival in the Philippines, informed them of the accidents he suffered on board the vessel, and asked for compensation. Despite his repeated requests, PTCI denied the claim because there was no endorsement from SMC. To our mind, PTCI's refusal was to be expected because there was no accident on board the vessel involving Saladas and, even if the accident did occur, there was no single record of the accident.
All told, we declare that Saladas' rib fracture and heart condition, if they exist at all, are not work-related, and are therefore not compensable. We stress that Saladas failed to prove, by substantial evidence, the work-relatedness of his claims and his compliance with the parameters that the POEA-SEC provides for disability benefit claims. Therefore, the NLRC, under the present circumstances, committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding disability benefits despite the absence of the element of work relatedness. Accordingly, in affirming the NLRC's decision, the CA committed a reversible error in not finding that the NLRC committed an error of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioners. Accordingly, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the January 28, 2013 decision and the July 1, 2013 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120532.
The complaint filed by Casiano F. Saladas, Jr. is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Carpio, (Chairperson), J., on official leave.
Footnotes
** Designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2374 dated September 14, 2016.
1 Rollo, pp. 31-50.
2 Id. at 14-26; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon, and concurred in by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz and Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez.
3 Id. at 28-29.
4 Id. at 130; Saladas' PEME shows that he has been hypertensive since 2005.
5 Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 334, 342-343.
6 See Splash Philippines, Inc. v. Ruizo, G.R. No. 193628, March 19, 2014, 719 SCRA 496-498.
7 InterOrient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Creer III, G.R. No. 181921, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 267, 284, citing Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag, G.R. No. 191491, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 670, 677.
8 See Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, G.R. No. 200566, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 494-495.
9 Rollo, pp. 133-134, 148.
10 Id. at 132.
11 Id. at 133-147.
12 See Villanueva v. Baliwag Navigation, Inc., G.R. No. 206505, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 311, 315.
13 See Splash Philippines, Inc. v. Ruizo,supra note 6 at 507; InterOrient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Creer III, supra note 7, at 282; Villanueva v. Baliwag Navigation, Inc., ibid.; Manota v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 179607, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 61, 71; Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. v. Nazal, G.R. No. 177103, June 3, 2013, 697 SCRA 51, 60-61.
14 Villanueva v. Baliwag Navigation, Inc.; Manota v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, ibid.
15 POEA Standard Employment Contract, Section 20(B)(3).
16 Status Maritime Corporation v. Spouses Delalamon, G.R. No. 198097, July 30, 2014, sc.judiciary.gov.ph; InterOrient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Creer III, supra note 7, at 282-283; Loadstar International Shipping, Inc. v. Heirs of Calawigan, G.R. No. 187337, December 5, 2012, sc.judiciary.gov.ph; Wallen Maritime Services v. Tanawan, G.R. No. 160444, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 268; Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. Nazam, G.R. 190804, October 11, 2010 sc.judiciary.gov.ph.
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