Manila
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 220383. October 05, 2016 ]
SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION (SWOFLU) / RENATO YUDE, MARIANITO REGINO, MANUEL YUMAGUE, FRANCISCO DACUDAG, RUDY ABABAO, DOMINIC SORNITO, SERGIO CAJUYONG, ROMULO LABONETE, GENEROSO GRANADA, EMILIO AGUS, ARNOLD CAYAO, BEN GENEVE, VICTOR MAQUE, RICARDO GOMEZ, RODOLFO GAWAN, JIMMY SULLIVAN, FEDERICO SUMUGAT, JR., ROMULO AVENTURA, JR., JURRY MAGALLANES, HERNAN EPISTOLA, JR., ROBERTO BELARTE, EDMON MONTALVO, TEODORO MAGUAD, DOMINGO TABABA, MAXIMO SALE, CYRUS DIONILLO, LEONARDO JUNSAY, JR., DANILO SAMILLION, MARIANITO BOCATEJA, JUANITO GEBUSION, RICARDO MAYO, RAUL ALIMON, ARNEL ARNAIZ, REBENCY BASOY, JIMMY VICTORIO BERNALDE, RICARDO BOCOL, JR., JOB CALAMBA, WOLFRANDO CALAMBA, RODOLFO CASISID, JR., EDGARDO DELA PENA, ALLAN DIONILLO, EDMUNDO EBIDO, JOSE ELEPTICO, JR., MARCELINO FLORES, HERNANDO FUENTEBILLA, SAUL HITALIA, JOSELITO JAGODILLA, NONITO JAYME, ADJIE JUANILLO, JEROLD JUDILLA, EDILBERTO NACIONAL, SANDY NAVALES, FELIPE NICOLASORA, JOSE PAMALO-AN, ISMAEL PEREZ, JR., ERNESTO RANDO, JR., PHILIP REPULLO, VICENTE RUIZ, JR., JOHN SUMUGAT, CARLO SUSANA, ROMEO TALAPIERO, JR., FERNANDO TRIENTA, FINDY VILLACRUZ, JOEL VILLANUEVA, AND JERRY MONTELIBANO, PETITIONERS, VS. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, SUGAR DIVISION-SOUTHERN NEGROS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (SONEDCO), RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
An employer who refuses to bargain with the union and tries to restrict its bargaining power is guilty of unfair labor practice. In determining whether an employer has not bargained in good faith, the totality of all the acts of the employer at the time of negotiations must be taken into account.
This resolves a Petition1 for review assailing the Decision2 dated January 30, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated July 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union for lack of merit.4
On May 6, 2002, Universal Robina Corporation Sugar Division - Southern Negros Development Corporation (URC-SONEDCO) and Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU-TUCP), then the exclusive bargaining representative of URC-SONEDCO's rank-and-file employees, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement) effective January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2006.5 Under the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, rank-and-file employees were entitled to a wage increase of P14.00/day for 2002 and P12.00/day for the succeeding years until 2006.6
On May 17, 2002, days after the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement was signed, a certification election was conducted. SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union won and replaced PACIWU-TUCP as the exclusive bargaining representative.7
PACIWU-TUCP questioned the results of the certification election before the Department of Labor and Employment. On July 8, 2002, Med-Arbiter Romulo Sumalinog certified SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of URC-SONEDCO.8 This was affirmed by the Labor Secretary in a Resolution dated December 27, 2002, which became final on April 15, 2003.9 PACIWU-TUCP elevated the same issue to the Court of Appeals and thereafter this Court, which on July 11, 2007, resolved that the certification election was valid. SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union was declared the exclusive bargaining agent of URC-SONEDCO's rank-and-file employees.10
URC-SONEDCO consistently refused to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, despite several demands from SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, allegedly due to the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, which it signed with PACIWU-TUCP.12
Despite being the incumbent exclusive bargaining agent, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union filed before the Department of Labor and Employment a Petition13 for certification election on December 6, 2006 in view of the approaching expiration of the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement. On December 31, 2006, the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement expired with no new collective bargaining agreement being signed.14
On August 28, 2007, with no collective bargaining agreement in effect, URC-SONEDCO informed the rank-and-file employees that they would be granted the following economic benefits:
(1) Wage increase of P16.00/day effective January 1, 2007;
(2) Group life insurance of P50,000.00 coverage/year;
(3) Emergency leave in lieu of bereavement leave, up to five (5) days per year; and
(4) Cash loan in lieu of emergency loan of P5,000.00, payable in 11 months.15
URC-SONEDCO asked the employees who wished to avail themselves of these-benefits to sign an acknowledgment receipt/waiver (2007 waiver), which stated that "[i]n the event that a subsequent [collective bargaining agreement] is negotiated between Management and Union, the new [Collective Bargaining Agreement] shall only be effective January 1, 2008."16 URC-SONEDCO claimed that the 2007 waiver was designed to avoid and/or prevent double compensation.17
Several SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union members refused to sign the 2007 waiver. Hence, they did not receive the benefits given to other members of the bargaining unit who had done so.18
In 2008, another wage increase of P16.00/day effective January 1, 2008 were given to employees who signed an acknowledgment receipt/waiver (2008 waiver).19 The 2008 waiver stated that "[s]a panahon na kung saan may [collective bargaining agreement] na maisasara sa pagitan ng Management at Uniyon, ito ay magiging epektibo lamang Simula January 1, 2009."20
Again, several SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union members refused to sign the 2008 waiver. They did not receive the benefits from URC-SONEDCO.20
On August 20, 2008, a certification election was conducted.21 SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union won again and proceeded to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement, which became effective January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2013 (2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement).22
On July 2, 2009, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union and its members who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers filed a complaint for unfair labor practices against URC-SONEDCO.23 They argued that the requirement of a waiver before the release of the wage increase violated their right to self-organization, collective bargaining, and concerted action.24
The Labor Arbiter found that URC-SONEDCO did not commit unfair labor practice when it increased the wages of the rank-and-file employees for 2007 and 2008.25 He found that, the requirement of a waiver aside, it was benevolent for URC-SONEDCO to give its employees additional benefits outside the Collective Bargaining Agreement.26 However, the Labor Arbiter ordered URC-SONEDCO to pay the employees who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers of the benefits received by their fellow employees for 2007 and 2008. As a new collective bargaining agreement had already been renegotiated and did not include the years 2007 and 2008, the purpose of the waivers was already served.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission sustained27 the Labor Arbiter's Decision that the requirement of a waiver before the release of the benefits for 2007 and 2008 did not constitute unfair labor practice:
Such an act does not constitute interference, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self organization or to bargain collectively, neither is it tantamount to discrimination against union members who refused to waive wage increase in a CBA. As aptly termed by respondents, it is an "offer" during the absence of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and during the time when there was an unresolved union representation, which this Commission considers as reasonable.29
The National Labor Relations Commission likewise affirmed the decision to award the wage increase to the employees who initially refused to sign the waiver.30
Aggrieved, members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing the National Labor Relations Commission Decision. The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed decision and dismissed the Petition.31
Hence, on October 22, 2015, this Petition32 was filed.
In the Resolution33 dated January 11, 2016, this Court required respondent URC-SONEDCO to file its comment on the Petition. Respondent filed its Comment34 on March 22, 2016.
Petitioners now argue that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the totality of respondent's dealings with them.35 They allege that despite their several invitations, respondent consistently failed to bargain with them, and the wage increase was just another move to avoid negotiations.36 Petitioners claim that the benefits given by respondent was an economic incentive meant to encourage individual employees to give up agreement bargaining for 2007 and 2008.37 Moreover, petitioners maintain that the wage increase for 2007 and 2008 should be considered as a continuing benefit over what was already provided in the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement because Article XXI of the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement excluded claims pending before the courts. 38 Article XXI provides:
ARTICLE XXI
COMPLETE SETTLEMENT
The parties agree that this Agreement is full and complete settlement of all demands, requests, claims and disputes of any nature, written or verbal, that either party have or may have against the other prior to the effectivity hereof, except those subject of pending cases before the NLRC or its arbitration branch, or before the DOLE or regular courts.39
Respondent points out that petitioners merely rehashed the same matters already ruled upon by the Court of Appeals.40 It reiterates that both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found them not guilty of unfair labor practice since the waivers did not violate the employees' right to organize.41 Moreover, the employees freely signed the waivers; even petitioners did not accuse respondent of coercing employees to sign these waivers.42 Respondent claims that the benefits that it offered were higher than what the employees had previously received; there was no diminution of benefits involved.43
For resolution are the following issues:
First, whether respondent committed unfair labor practice;
Second, whether petitioners, who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers, are entitled to the wage increase and other economic benefits as a continuing employee benefit notwithstanding the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement; and
Lastly, whether respondent is liable for damages.
I
Respondent is guilty of unfair labor practice.
Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals ruled that respondent did not commit unfair labor practice since the requirement of a waiver for 2007 and 2008 did not interfere with the employees 5 exercise of their right to self-organization.44 However, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account that unfair labor practice not only involves acts that violate the right to self-organization but also covers several acts enumerated in Article 259 of the Labor Code, thus:
ARTICLE 259. 248 Unfair Labor Practices of Employers. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining agreement: Provided, That the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code 204 shall not apply to the non-members of the recognized collective bargaining agent;
(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney's fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this provision, an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice when it fails in its duty to bargain in good faith.
Although it Is well-settled that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies such as the National Labor Relations Commission are accorded great respect, this rule does admit exceptions.45 One of these exceptions is when, as in this case, the Court of Appeals errs in appreciating the facts. In Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.:46
While it is true that factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts, this general rule admits of exceptions. When there is a showing that a palpable and demonstrable mistake that needs rectification has been committed or when the factual findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, these findings may be examined by the courts.47
In ruling that respondent did not commit unfair labor practice, the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the totality of respondent's acts, which showed that it violated its duty to bargain collectively. This constitutes unfair labor practice under Article 259(g) of the Labor Code.
Article 263 of the Labor Code defines the duty to bargain collectively:
ARTICLE 263. 252 Meaning of Duty to Bargain Collectively. — The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
Respondent repeatedly refused to meet and bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, the exclusive bargaining agent of its rank-and-file employees. In its Position Paper48 before the National Labor Relations Commission, respondent cited the different instances when petitioners sent it letters trying to set meetings to discuss a new collective bargaining agreement.49 Respondent admitted that it refused to meet with petitioners in light of the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, which it signed with PACIWU-TUCP, the previous bargaining representative. It claimed that the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement remained in full force and effect without change until December 31, 2006, despite PACIWU-TUCP losing the May 17, 2002 certification election to SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union.50
Respondent's argument has no merit. Respondent's reliance on the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement as basis for not negotiating with petitioners is unjustified. The Collective Bargaining Agreement that respondent invoked had been entered into when a Petition for Certification Election was already filed.
In Associated Trade Unions v. Trajano,50 this Court ruled on the temporary nature of this type of collective bargaining agreement:
The Court will not rule on the merits and/or defects of the new CBA and shall only consider the fact that it was entered into at a time when the petition for certification election had already been filed by TUP AS and was then pending resolution. The said CBA cannot be deemed permanent, precluding the commencement of negotiations by another union with the management. In the meantime however, so as not to deprive the workers of the benefits of the said agreement, it shall be recognized and given effect on a temporary basis, subject to the results of the certification election. The agreement may be continued in force if ATU is certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers or may be rejected and replaced in the event that TUP AS emerges as the winner.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent claimed that it refused to bargain with petitioners because the issue of representation was still pending before the courts.1aшphi1 It claimed that when the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement expired on December 31, 2006, it had no bargaining agent to deal with as SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union had filed before the Department of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election on December 6, 2006, which resulted in the absence of a duly elected bargaining representative.52 Respondent claimed it was only on September 25, 2008 that SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union was certified by the Department of Labor and Employment as the exclusive bargaining agent of respondent's rank-and-file employees.53
This argument fails to persuade.
The Department of Labor and Employment, in its Order54 dated May 4, 2007 granting SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union's second Petition for Certification Election, illustrated why respondent's argument is untenable:
Let it be noted that based on the results of the certification election conducted in the establishment on 17 May 2002, Mediator-Arbiter Sumalinog, declared and certified SWOFLU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of SONEDCO. The office of the Secretary affirmed SWOFLU's certification in OS-A-6-63-01, and the decision became final and executory on 15 April 2003. As such, the suspension of the running of the one (1) year period referred in Section 3(a) Rule VIII was automatically lifted on 15 April 2003. Hence, the one (1) year bar cannot be used to deny the subject petition. Furthermore, despite PACIWU-TUCP's act of questioning the Office of the Secretary's affirmation before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari, no restraining order was issued to stay the implementation of the decision.
In other words, as far as this Office is concerned, SWOFLU is the incumbent sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of SONEDCO. As such, there was actually no necessity for SWOFLU to file the subject petition, as its representation status remains to be effective unless challenged by other legitimate labor organizations during the freedom period of the CBA that was entered into by PACIWU-TUCP and employer SONEDCO.
Incidentally, the Office of the Secretary declared in OS-A-6-63-01 that SWOFLU had the option to adopt the interim CBA or negotiate with SONEDCO a new CBA. Whether SWOFLU was able to actually administer the said CBA, or whether it attempted to negotiate with the employer for a new CBA but was rejected, the issues are already moot and academic by reason of the expiration of the effectivity of the agreement.56 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's duty to bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the incumbent bargaining agent is clear. The last paragraph of Article 268 of the Labor Code states:
ARTICLE 268 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. — In organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the labor unions receiving the two highest number of votes: Provided, that the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.
At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed.1aшphi1 (Emphasis supplied)
When petitioners held a conference on May 26, 2003, respondent refused to attend.57 Because respondent failed to appear in the conference, petitioners wrote their demands in a letter sometime in July 2003. The letter included, among others, a wage increase of P50.00/day from September 2003 to 2006.58 Instead of explaining its non-attendance to the conference or making a counter-offer, respondent replied on August 15, 2003 acknowledging the receipt and contents of the July 2003 letter but invoking the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement as an excuse not to answer petitioners' demands to negotiate.59 This is contrary to Article 261 of the Labor Code, which requires the other party to reply within 10 days from receipt of the written demand:
ARTICLE 261. [250] Procedure in Collective Bargaining. — The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice[.]
This was not respondent's only violation of Article 261. Respondent likewise failed to reply to the collective bargaining agreement proposal sent by petitioners on August 21, 2007.60 The September 22, 2007 letter, sent with the agreement proposal, also went unheeded.61
Respondent's reliance on the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement is contrary to jurisprudence. In Associated Labor Unions v. Trajano,62 this Court explicitly held that the winning union had the option to either continue the existing collective bargaining agreement or negotiate a new one:
The new CBA negotiated by petitioners whether or not submitted to the MOLE in accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code cannot be deemed permanent, precluding commencement of negotiations by another union with management, considering that it was entered into at a time when the petition for certification election had already been filed by respondent union. . . . Meantime, this interim agreement must be recognized and given effect on a temporary basis so as not to deprive the workers of the favorable terms of the agreement. . . .
If, as a result of the certification election, respondent union or a union other than petitioner union which executed the interim agreement is certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of respondent company, then, such union may adopt the interim collective bargaining agreement or negotiate with management for a new collective bargaining agreement[.]63 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
As petitioners asked for a P50.00 wage increase, as opposed to the P12.00 wage increase they had been receiving under the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, petitioners were justified in demanding a renegotiation. Respondent was remiss in its duty when it repeatedly refused negotiations with petitioners.
Respondent's refusal is even more unfounded considering that the Labor Secretary's Resolution,64 which upheld the result of the May 17, 2002 certification election and declared SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the exclusive bargaining agent, became final and executory as early as April 15, 2003.65 Even though there had been a pending petition for certiorari questioning the election results, no temporary restraining order was issued to preclude respondent from bargaining with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, the declared incumbent union.
Even if we consider respondent's refusal to bargain as merely a mistake made in good faith, its subsequent acts show an attempt to restrict petitioners' negotiating power.
First, the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement was done on May 6, 2002, only days before the May 17, 2002 certification election. When respondent and PACIWU-TUCP entered into the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, they had been aware that a certification election was going to be conducted in a few days. In pushing through with negotiations instead of waiting for the outcome of the election, respondent risked needing to renegotiate with a new union if PACIWU-TUCP loses. It cannot, thus, invoke the hastily concluded 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement as an excuse not to bargain with petitioners. If respondent had truly intended to bargain in good faith, it could have easily waited a few more days to know the result of the certification election.
Second, when the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement expired in December 2006, the Labor Secretary's Resolution declaring SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the bargaining agent of respondent's rank-and-file employees was already final and executory. Respondent's initial basis for refusal to bargain had expired, and since no temporary restraining order was issued, nothing was legally preventing respondent from negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement with petitioners. That it chose to refuse negotiations and instead entered into an agreement with its employees to essentially waive negotiations for 2007 and 2008 betrays its intention of limiting petitioners' bargaining power.
The 2007 waiver provided, in part:
In the event that a subsequent CBA is negotiated between Management and Union, the new CBA shall only be effective January 1, 2008.66
The 2008 waiver provided, in part:
Sa panahon na kung saan may CBA na maisasara sa pagitan ng Management at Unyon, ito ay magiging epektibo lamang Simula January l, 2009.67
The wording of the waivers shows a clear attempt to limit petitioners' bargaining power by making them waive the negotiations for 2007 and 2008. In stipulating that the collective bargaining agreement that would be entered into would only be effective the year following the 2008 waiver, respondent limited when the collective bargaining agreement could be deemed effective. Tn other words, respondent asked petitioners to forego any benefits they might have received under a collective bargaining agreement in exchange for the company-granted benefits.
Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals regarded the incentives as a magnanimous move because it gave the employees a P16.00 wage increase, P4.00 more than the P12.00 increase under the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement. However, respondent's claim of benevolence falls short: the wage increase proposed by petitioners in 2007 was P50.00. If a collective bargaining agreement had been concluded in 2007, employees who signed the waivers would have lost the chance to receive P34.00 wage increase for that year.
Lastly, when the 2007 waiver was circulated, respondent already had a copy of petitioners' agreement proposal. Respondent was aware that petitioners asked for a P50.00 wage increase. More importantly, the last bar preventing respondent from recognizing SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the bargaining agent has been resolved by the time it issued the waivers. The Petition for Certiorari relative to the May 17, 2002 certification election was denied with finality by this Court on July 11, 2007.68 There was no reason to doubt that SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union was the sole and exclusive bargaining representative. If respondent did indeed act in good faith, it would have undergone agreement negotiations with petitioners. However, respondent incessantly refused to meet with petitioners to discuss the agreement proposal even after petitioners sent their September 22, 2007 letter.69 Instead of negotiating the proposed P50.00 wage increase, respondent granted a P16.00 wage increase on the condition that if a collective bargaining agreement was to be signed, it would only be effective the succeeding year. In effect, respondent hindered petitioners' bargaining power when it made them waive the bargaining efforts for 2007 and 2008.
II
The National Labor Relations Commission did not err in granting the benefits for 2007 and 2008 to the employees who did not sign the waiver.
After SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union was again declared as the exclusive bargaining representative in the August 20, 2008 certification election, the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement was created to cover 2009 to 2013.70 Since the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement did not include the years 2007 and 2008, the alleged purpose of the waivers, which was to prevent double compensation, was already served.71 It would be unfair for the employees to still not receive the benefits for 2007 and 2008 simply because they refused to sign a waiver that was already moot.
However, there is no need for the continuation of the wage increase for 2007 and 2008 since the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement contains wage increase provisions for 2009 to 2013. As explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing v. National Labor Relations Commission,72 if a proposal is not printed in the collective bargaining agreement, it cannot be demanded:
The CBA is the law between the contracting parties — the collective bargaining representative and the employer-company. Compliance with a CBA is mandated by the expressed policy to give protection to labor, hi the same vein, CBA provisions should be "construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve." This is founded on the dictum that a CBA is not an ordinary contract but one impressed with public interest. It goes without saying, however, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be so interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by a contracting party does not find print in the CBA, it is not a part thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its implementation.72 (Citations omitted)
If petitioners wanted the wage increase for 2007 and 2008 to be carried on, the proper recourse would have been to demand that this be included in the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
III
Respondent is liable to pay moral and exemplary damages. In Nueva Ecija Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission:73
Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect; and disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. As the conscience of the government, it is the Courts sworn duty to ensure that none trifles with labor rights.
For this reason, we find it proper in this case to impose moral and exemplary damages on private respondent.74
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30, 2015 and the Resolution dated July 27, 2015 in CA-GR. SP No. 05950 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Universal Robina Corporation. Sugar Division - Southern Negros Development Corporation is GUILTY of unfair labor practice and is ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners the wage increase of P16.00 for the years 2007 and 2008; and to pay SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 15-59. The Petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Id. at 61-70. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 05950, was penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Francisco and concurred in by Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Pamela Ann Abella Maxino of the Eighteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
3 Id. at 73-75. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Francisco and concurred in by Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Pamela Ann Abella Maxino of the Eighteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
4 Id. at 70.
5 Id. at 63.
6 Id. at 157.
7 Id. at 62-63.
8 Id. at 144.
9 Id. at 148.
10 Id. at 176.
12 Id. at 153, Letter of SONEDCO dated August 15, 2003.
13 Id. at 177-179.
14 Id. at 64.
15 Id. at 24.
16 Id. at 25.
17 Id. at 207.
18 Id. at 64.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 25.
20 Id. at 64.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 69.
23 Id.at 64-65.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 107-124. The Decision was penned by Labor Arbiter Romulo P. Sumalinog.
26 Id. at 120.
27 Id. at 93-104. The Decision dated October 29, 2010, penned by Commissioner Aurelio D. Menzon and concurred in by Commissioners Julie C. Rendoque and Violeta Ortiz-Bantug.
29 Id. at 99.
30 Id. at 103.
31 Id. at 61-70.
32 Id. at 15-59.
33 Id. at 273.
34 Id. at 284-293.
35 Id. at 28.
36 Id. at 28-29.
37 Id. at 30.
38 Id. at 34.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 284-292, Comment.
41 Id. at 288.
42 Id. at 289.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 67-68.
45 Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., 657 Phil. 342, 361 (2011) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
46 657 Phil. 342 (2011) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
47 Id. at 361.
48 Rollo, pp. 198-236.
49 Id. at 202.
50 Id. at 203.
50 245 Phil. 293 (1988) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
51 Id. at 299.
52 Rollo, p. 205.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 256-262.
56 Id. at 260-261.
57 Id. at 150.
58 Id. at 150-152.
59 Id. at 153.
60 Rollo, p. 187.
61 Id. at 187-188.
62 254 Phil. 46 (1989) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
63 Id. at 55.
64 Rollo, pp. 144-147.
65 Id. at 148.
66 Rollo p. 186.
67 Id. at 197.
68 Id. at 176.
69 Id. at 187-188.
70 Id. at 69.
71 Id.
72 356 Phil. 480 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
72 Id. at 490-491.
73 380 Phil 44-60 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
74 Id. at 57-58.
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