 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The Commissioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in the Resolution39 dated December 16, 2014. Hence, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed before this Court a Petition for Review. Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue raises the sole issue of whether the Final Assessment Notice issued against respondent Fitness by Design, Inc. is a valid assessment under Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revenue Regulations No. 12-99.40 Petitioner argues that the Final Assessment Notice issued to respondent is valid since it complies with Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revenue Regulations No. 12-99.41 The law states that the taxpayer shall be informed in writing of the facts, jurisprudence, and law on which the assessment is based.42 Nothing in the law provides that due date for payment is a substantive requirement for the validity of a final assessment notice.43 Petitioner further claims that a perusal of the Final Assessment Notice shows that April 15, 2004 is the due date for payment.44 The pertinent portion of the assessment reads:
This Court, through the Resolution46 dated July 22, 2015, required respondent to comment on the Petition for Review. In its Comment,47 respondent argues that the Final Assessment Notice issued was merely a request and not a demand for payment of tax liabilities.48 The Final Assessment Notice cannot be considered as a final deficiency assessment because it deprived respondent of due process when it failed to reflect its fixed tax liabilities.49 Moreover, it also gave respondent an indefinite period to pay its tax liabilities.50 Respondent points out that an assessment should strictly comply with the law for its validity.51 Jurisprudence provides that "not all documents coming from the [Bureau of Internal Revenue] containing a computation of the tax liability can be deemed assessments[,] which can attain finality."52 Therefore, the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy cannot be enforced since it is based on an invalid assessment.53 Respondent likewise claims that since the Final Assessment Notice was allegedly based on fraud, it must show the details of the fraudulent acts imputed to it as part of due process.54 I The Petition has no merit. An assessment "refers to the determination of amounts due from a person obligated to make payments."55 "In the context of national internal revenue collection, it refers to the determination of the taxes due from a taxpayer under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997."56 The assessment process starts with the filing of tax return and payment of tax by the taxpayer.57 The initial assessment evidenced by the tax return is a self-assessment of the taxpayer.58 The tax is primarily computed and voluntarily paid by the taxpayer without need of any demand from government.59 If tax obligations are properly paid, the Bureau of Internal Revenue may dispense with its own assessment.60 After filing a return, the Commissioner or his or her representative may allow the examination of any taxpayer for assessment of proper tax liability.61 The failure of a taxpayer to file his or her return will not hinder the Commissioner from permitting the taxpayer's examination.62 The Commissioner can examine records or other data relevant to his or her inquiry in order to verify the correctness of any return, or to make a return in case of noncompliance, as well as to determine and collect tax liability.63 The indispensability of affording taxpayers sufficient written notice of his or her tax liability is a clear definite requirement.64 Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revenue Regulations No. 12-99, as amended, transparently outline the procedure in tax assessment.65 Section 3 of Revenue Regulations No. 12-99,66 the then prevailing regulation regarding the due process requirement in the issuance of a deficiency tax assessment, requires a notice for informal conference.67 The revenue officer who audited the taxpayer's records shall state in his or her report whether the taxpayer concurs with his or her findings of liability for deficiency taxes.68 If the taxpayer does not agree, based on the revenue officer's report, the taxpayer shall be informed in writing69 of the discrepancies in his or her payment of internal revenue taxes for "Informal Conference."70 The informal conference gives the taxpayer an opportunity to present his or her side of the case.71 The taxpayer is given 15 days from receipt of the notice of informal conference to respond.72 If the taxpayer fails to respond, he or she will be considered in default.73 The revenue officer74 endorses the case with the least possible delay to the Assessment Division of the Revenue Regional Office or the Commissioner or his or her authorized representative.75 The Assessment Division of the Revenue Regional Office or the Commissioner or his or her authorized representative is responsible for the "appropriate review and issuance of a deficiency tax assessment, if warranted."76 If, after the review conducted, there exists sufficient basis to assess the taxpayer with deficiency taxes, the officer 'shall issue a preliminary assessment notice showing in detail the facts, jurisprudence, and law on which the assessment is based.77 The taxpayer is given 15 days from receipt of the pre-assessment notice to respond.78 If the taxpayer fails to respond, he or she will be considered in default, and a formal letter of demand and assessment notice will be issued.79 The formal letter of demand and assessment notice shall state the facts, jurisprudence, and law on which the assessment was based; otherwise, these shall be void.80 The taxpayer or the authorized representative may administratively protest the formal letter of demand and assessment notice within 30 days from receipt of the notice.81 II The word "shall" in Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revenue Regulations No. 12-99 means the act of informing the taxpayer of both the legal and factual bases of the assessment is mandatory.82 The law requires that the bases be reflected in the formal letter of demand and assessment notice.83 This cannot be presumed.84 Otherwise, the express mandate of Section 228 and Revenue Regulations No. 12-99 would be nugatory.85 The requirement enables the taxpayer to make an effective protest or appeal of the assessment or decision.86 The rationale behind the requirement that taxpayers should be informed of the facts and the law on which the assessments are based conforms with the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of his or her property without due process of law.87 Between the power of the State to tax and an individual's right to due process, the scale favors the right of the taxpayer to due process.88 The purpose of the written notice requirement is to aid the taxpayer in making a reasonable protest, if necessary.89 Merely notifying the taxpayer of his or her tax liabilities without details or particulars is not enough.90 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. United Salvage and Towage (Phils.), Inc.91 held that a final assessment notice that only contained a table of taxes with no other details was insufficient:
Any deficiency to the mandated content of the assessment or its process will not be tolerated.93 In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Enron,94 an advice of tax deficiency from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to an employee of Enron, including the preliminary five (5)-day letter, were not considered valid substitutes for the mandatory written notice of the legal and factual basis of the assessment.95 The required issuance of deficiency tax assessment notice to the taxpayer is different from the required contents of the notice.96 Thus: The alleged "factual bases" in the advice, preliminary letter and "audit working papers" did not suffice. There was no going around the mandate of the law that the legal and factual bases of the assessment be stated in writing in the formal letter of demand accompanying the assessment notice.97 (Emphasis supplied) However, the mandate of giving the taxpayer a notice of the facts and laws on which the assessments are based should not be mechanically applied.98 To emphasize, the purpose of this requirement is to sufficiently inform the taxpayer of the bases for the assessment to enable him or her to make an intelligent protest.99 In Samar-I Electric Cooperative v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,100 substantial compliance with Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code is allowed, provided that the taxpayer would be later apprised in writing of the factual and legal bases of the assessment to enable him or her to prepare for an effective protest.101 Thus:
A final assessment notice provides for the amount of tax due with a demand for payment.103 This is to determine the amount of tax due to a taxpayer.104 However, due process requires that taxpayers be informed in writing of the facts and law on which the assessment is based in order to aid the taxpayer in making a reasonable protest.105 To immediately ensue with tax collection without initially substantiating a valid assessment contravenes the principle in administrative investigations "that taxpayers should be able to present their case and adduce supporting evidence."106 Respondent filed its income tax return in 1995.107 Almost eight (8) years passed before the disputed final assessment notice was issued. Respondent pleaded prescription as its defense when it filed a protest to the Final Assessment Notice. Petitioner claimed fraud assessment to justify the belated assessment made on respondent.108 If fraud was indeed present, the period of assessment should be within 10 years.109 It is incumbent upon petitioner to clearly state the allegations of fraud committed by respondent to serve the purpose of an assessment notice to aid respondent in filing an effective protest. III The prescriptive period in making an assessment depends upon whether a tax return was filed or whether the tax return filed was either false or fraudulent.1âwphi1 When a tax return that is neither false nor fraudulent has been filed, the Bureau of Internal Revenue may assess within three (3) years, reckoned from the date of actual filing or from the last day prescribed by law for filing.110 However, in case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, Section 222(a) provides:
In Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals,111 this Court interpreted Section 332112 (now Section 222[a] of the National Internal Revenue Code) by dividing it in three (3) different cases: first, in case of false return; second, in case of a fraudulent return with intent to evade; and third, in case of failure to file a return.113 Thus:
This Court held that there is a difference between "false return" and a "fraudulent return."115 A false return simply involves a "deviation from the truth, whether intentional or not" while a fraudulent return "implies intentional or deceitful entry with intent to evade the taxes due."116 Fraud is a question of fact that should be alleged and duly proven.117 "The willful neglect to file the required tax return or the fraudulent intent to evade the payment of taxes, considering that the same is accompanied by legal consequences, cannot be presumed."118 Fraud entails corresponding sanctions under the tax law. Therefore, it is indispensable for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to include the basis for its allegations of fraud in the assessment notice. During the proceedings in the Court of Tax Appeals First Division, respondent presented its President, Domingo C. Juan Jr. (Juan, Jr.), as witness.119 Juan, Jr. testified that respondent was, in its pre-operating stage in 1995.120 During that period, respondent "imported equipment and distributed them for market testing in the Philippines without earning any profit."121 He also confirmed that the Final Assessment Notice and its attachments failed to substantiate the Commissioner's allegations of fraud against respondent, thus:
Petitioner did not refute respondent's allegations. For its defense, it presented Socrates Regala (Regala), the Group Supervisor of the team, who examined respondent's tax liabilities.123 Regala confirmed that the investigation was prompted by a tip from an informant who provided them with respondent's list of sales.124 He admitted125 that the gathered information did not show that respondent deliberately failed to reflect its true income in 1995.126 IV The issuance of a valid formal assessment is a substantive prerequisite for collection of taxes.127 Neither the National Internal Revenue Code nor the revenue regulations provide for a "specific definition or form of an assessment." However, the National Internal Revenue Code defines its explicit functions and effects."128 An assessment does not only include a computation of tax liabilities; it also includes a demand for payment within a period prescribed.129 Its main purpose is to determine the amount that a taxpayer is liable to pay.130 A pre-assessment notice "do[es] not bear the gravity of a formal assessment notice."131 A pre-assessment notice merely gives a tip regarding the Bureau of Internal Revenue's findings against a taxpayer for an informal conference or a clarificatory meeting.132 A final assessment is a notice "to the effect that the amount therein stated is due as tax and a demand for payment thereof."133 This demand for payment signals the time "when penalties and interests begin to accrue against the taxpayer and enabling the latter to determine his remedies[.]"134 Thus, it must be "sent to and received by the taxpayer, and must demand payment of the taxes described therein within a specific period."135 The disputed Final Assessment Notice is not a valid assessment. First, it lacks the definite amount of tax liability for which respondent is accountable. It does not purport to be a demand for payment of tax due, which a final assessment notice should supposedly be. An assessment, in the context of the National Internal Revenue Code, is a "written notice and demand made by the [Bureau of Internal Revenue] on the taxpayer for the settlement of a due tax liability that is there: definitely set and fixed."136 Although the disputed notice provides for the computations of respondent's tax liability, the amount remains indefinite. It only provides that the tax due is still subject to modification, depending on the date of payment. Thus:
Second, there are no due dates in the Final Assessment Notice. This negates petitioner's demand for payment.138 Petitioner's contention that April 15, 2004 should be regarded as the actual due date cannot be accepted. The last paragraph of the Final Assessment Notice states that the due dates for payment were supposedly reflected in the attached assessment:
However, based on the findings of the Court of Tax Appeals First Division, the enclosed assessment pertained to remained unaccomplished.140 Contrary to petitioner's view, April 15, 2004 was the reckoning date of accrual of penalties and surcharges and not the due date for payment of tax liabilities.1avvphi1 The total amount depended upon when respondent decides to pay. The notice, therefore, did not contain a definite and actual demand to pay. Compliance with Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code is a substantative requirement.141 It is not a mere formality.142 Providing the taxpayer with the factual and legal bases for the assessment is crucial before proceeding with tax collection. Tax collection should be premised on a valid assessment, which would allow the taxpayer to present his or her case and produce evidence for substantiation.143 The Court of Tax Appeals did not err in cancelling the Final Assessment Notice as well as the Audit Result/Assessment Notice issued by petitioner to respondent for the year 1995 covering the "alleged deficiency income tax, value-added tax and documentary stamp tax amounting to ₱10,647,529.69, inclusive of surcharges and interest"144 for lack of due process. Thus, the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy is void since an invalid assessment bears no valid effect.145 Taxes are the lifeblood of government and should be collected without hindrance.146 However, the collection of taxes should be exercised "reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure."147 The essential nature of taxes for the existence of the State grants government with vast remedies to ensure its collection. However, taxpayers are guaranteed their fundamental right to due process of law, as articulated in various ways in the process of tax assessment. After all, the State's purpose is to ensure the well-being of its citizens, not simply to deprive them of their fundamental rights. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc dated July 14, 2014 and Resolution dated December 16, 2014 in CTA EB Case No. 970 (CTA Case No. 7160) are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO
On official leave A T T E S T A T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Footnotes * On official leave. 1 The Petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 2 Rollo, pp. 32-49. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Juanito Castafieda, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Roman G. Del Rosario, Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino, Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas, and Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban. 3 Id. at 53-57. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Juanito Castaneda, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Roman G. Del Rosario, Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino, Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas, and Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban. 4 Id. at 48, Court of Tax Appeals En Banc Decision. 5 Id. at 33. 6 Id. 7 Id. at 34. 8 Id. at 36. 9 Id. at 34. 10 Id. at 12-13, Petition for Review. The Annex referred to in the Final Assessment Notice was not attached to the records of the case. However, based on the testimony of Fitness' President, Domingo C. Juan, "[t]he attached details of discrepancy containing the assessment for income tax (IT), value-added tax (VAT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) as well as, the Audit Result/ Assessment Notices do not impute fraud on the part of petitioner" (Id. at 37, Court of Tax Appeals En Banc Decision). 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 TAX CODE, sec. 222(a) provides:
17 Rollo, p. 35, Court of Tax Appeals En Banc Decision. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. at 39. 24 Id. at 35. 25 Id. at 38. 26 Id. at 39. 27 Id. 28 Id. at 67, Petition for Review of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue before the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. 29 Id. at 40, Court of Tax Appeals En Banc Decision. 30 TAX CODE, sec. 228 provides:
31 Rollo, pp. 32-33, Court of Tax Appeals En Banc Decision. 32 Id. at 40. 33 Id. 34 Id. at 41. 35 Id. 36 Id. 37 Id. 38 Id. at 48. 39 Id. at 53-57. 40 Implementing the Provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 Governing the Rules on Assessment of National Internal Revenue Taxes, Civil Penalties and Interest and the Extra-Judicial Settlement of a Taxpayer's Criminal Violation of the Code Through Payment of a Suggested Compromise Penalty (1999).
41 Rollo, p. 16, Petition for Review. 42 Id. at 18. 43 Id. 44 Id. at 20. 45 Id. at 13. 46 Id. at 87. 47 Id. at 90-101. 48 Id. at 91. 49 Id. 50 Id. 51 Id. 52 Id. 53 Id. at 92. 54 Id. at 97. 55 SMI-ED Phil. Technology, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 175410, November 12, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary. gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/november2014/175410.pdf> 5 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] . 56 Id. 57 TAX CODE, sec. 56(A) provides:
58 SMI-ED Phil. Technology, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 175410, November 12, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/november2014/175410.pdt> 8 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] 59 Id. 60 Id. 61 TAX CODE, sec. 6(A). 62 TAX CODE, sec. 6(A). 63 TAX CODE, sec. 5(A). 64 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Liquigaz Philippines Corp., G.R. Nos. 215534 & 215557, April 18, 2016 <sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/april2016/215534.pdt> 7 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]. 65 Id. 66 On November 28, 2013, Revenue Regulations No. 18-2013 was enacted amending Certain Sections of Revenue Regulations No. 12-99 relative to the Due Process Requirement in the Issuance of a Deficiency Tax Assessment. The scope of the law provides that under the provisions of Section 244, in relation to Section 245 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, these Regulations are promulgated to amend provisions of Revenue Regulations No. 12-99.
67 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.1. 68 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.1. 69 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.1 provides that either the Revenue District Office or the Special Investigation Division, as the case may be (in the case of Revenue Regional Offices) or the Chief of Division concerned (in the case of the BIR National Office) may inform the taxpayer of his or her discrepancies. 70 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.1. 71 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.1. 72 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.l. 73 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.l. 74 Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.1 provides that in case of default, the "Revenue District Officer or the Chief of the Special Investigation Division of the Revenue Regional Office, or the Chief of Division in the National Office" shall endorse the case to the Assessment Division. 75 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.1. 76 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.l. 77 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.2. 78 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.1. 79 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.1. 80 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.4. 81 BIR Revenue Reg. No. 12-99, sec. 3.1.4. 82 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Liquigaz Philippines Corp., G.R. Nos. 215534 & 215557, April 18, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.htrnl?file=/jurisprudence/2016/april2016/215534.pdf> [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Enron Subic Power Corp., 596 Phil. 229 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. United Salvage and Towage (Phils), Inc., 738 Phil. 335 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]. 83 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Enron Subic Power Corp., 596 Phil. 229, 235 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division]. 84 Id. 85 Id. 86 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Liquigaz Philippines Corp., G.R. Nos. 215534 & 215557, April 18, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/april2016/215534.pdf> 14 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]. 87 Id. 88 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Metro Star Superama, Inc., 652 Phil. 172,187 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]. 89 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Liquigaz Philippines Corp., G.R. Nos. 215534 & 215557, April 18, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/april2016/215534.pdf> 12 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]. 90 Id., citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, 516 Phil. 176, 186-190 (2006) [Per C.J. Panganiban, First Division]. 91 738 Phil. 335 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division] 92 Id. at 349-350. 93 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Liquigaz Philippines Corp., G.R. Nos. 215534 & 215557, April 18, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/april2016/215534.pdt> [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division], citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. United Salvage and Towage (Phils), Inc., 738 Phil. 335 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], in turn citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Enron Subic Power Corp., 596 Phil. 229 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division]. 94 596 Phil. 229 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division]. 95 Id. at 235-236. 96 Id. at 236. 97 Id. 98 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Liquigaz Philippines Corp., G.R. Nos. 215534 & 215557, April 18, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/april2016/215534.pdt> 14-15 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]. 99 Id. 100 G.R. No. 193100, December 10, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l4/december2014/193100.pdf> [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division]. 101 Id. at 12. 102 Id. 103 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Menguito, 587 Phil. 234, 256 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]. 104 Tupaz v. Ulep, 374 Phil. 474, 484 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division]. 105 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Liquigaz Philippines Corp., G.R. Nos. 215534 & 215557, April 18, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/april2016/215534.pdf> 15 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division], 106 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, 516 Phil. 176, 190 (2006) [Per C.J. Panganiban, First Division] 107 Rollo, p. 33. 108 Id. at 34. 109 TAX CODE, sec. 222(a). 110 TAX CODE, sec. 203 provides:
111 157 Phil. 510 (1974) [Per J. Esguerra, First Division]. 112 TAX CODE, sec. 222(a) provides:
113 Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals, 157 Phil. 510 (1974) [Per J. Esguerra, First Division]. 114 Id. at 523. 115 Id. at 523. 116 Id. 117 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ayala Securities Corp., 162 Phil. 287, 296 (1976) [Per J. Esguerra, First Division]. 118 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Air India, 241 Phil. 689, 698 (1988) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division]. 119 Rollo, p. 37, Court of Tax Appeals En Banc Decision. 120 Id. 121 Id. 122 Id. 123 Id. at 38. 124 Id. at 39. 125 Id. Regala admitted that "[i]n their memorandum report, they recommended the filing of a civil case for the collection of petitioner's tax liabilities and a criminal case, for its failure to declare in its ITR for the year 1995 the income derived from its cited sales. Thus, the BIR's filing of a criminal case against petitioner with the Department of Justice (DOJ). The witness confirmed that the gathered information did not indicate that petitioner's failure to state in its ITR its income and sales for the year 1995 was deliberate. The instant case was precipitated by the issuance of the Letter of Authority on May 13, 2002." (Emphasis supplied) 126 Id. 127 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Menguito, 587 Phil. 234, 256 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]. 128 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Pascor Realty and Development Corporation, 368 Phil. 714, 722 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. 129 Tupaz v. Ulep, 374 Phil. 474, 484 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Menguito, 587 Phil. 234, 256 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]. 130 Tupaz v. Ulep, 374 Phil. 474, 484 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division]. 131 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Menguito, 587 Phil. 234, 256 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]. 132 Id. 133 Id. 134 Id. 135 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Pascor Realty and Development Corporation, 368 Phil. 714, 722 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. 136 Adamson v. Court of Appeals, 606 Phil. 27, 44 (2009) [Per C.J. Puno, First Division]. 137 Rollo, p. 13, Petition for Review. 138 Id. at 45, Court of Tax Appeals En Banc Decision. 139 Id. 140 Id. at 46. 141 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. BASF Coating+ Inks Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 198677, November 26, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/november2014/198677.pdf> 9 [Per Justice Peralta, Third Division] 142 Id. 143 Id. 144 Rollo, p. 47, Court of Tax Appeals En Banc Decision. 145 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. BASF Coating+ Inks Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 198677, November 26, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/november2014/198677.pdf> 9 [Per Justice Peralta, Third Division] 146 Id. at 9-10, Petition for Review, citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue, Inc. 241 Phil. 829 (1988) [Per J. Cruz, First Division]. 147 Id. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation 
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
