G.R. No. 216914 - Concurring Opinion




EN BANC [ G.R. No. 216914. December 06, 2016 ] SUBIDO PAGENTE CERTEZA MENDOZA AND BINAY LAW OFFICES, PETITIONER, V. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS MEMBERS, HON. AMANDO M. TETANGCO, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, HON. TERESITA J. HERBOSA, CHAIRPERSON OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AND HON. EMMANUEL F. DOOC, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF THE INSURANCE COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS. CONCURRING OPINION LEONEN, J.: I concur in the result. It is my honor to do so considering that the majority opinion is the final ponencia for this Court En Banc of our esteemed colleague Justice Jose P. Perez. I join the unanimous declaration that, based on the challenges posed by the present petitions and only within its ambient facts, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160 or the Anti-Money Laundering Act is not unconstitutional. Further, that we are unanimous in declaring that the depositor has no right to demand that it be notified of any application or issuance of an order to inquire into his or her bank deposit. The procedure in the Court of Appeals is ex parte but requires proof of probable cause of the occurrence of the predicate crime as well as the potential liability of the owner of the deposit. After the inquiry of the bank deposits and related accounts within the limitations contained in the court order, it is still the option of the law enforcers or the Anti-Money Laundering Council, to proceed to request for a Freeze Order in accordance with Section 10 of the same law. The depositor is, thus, entitled to be informed only after the freeze order has been issued. In questioning the freeze order, the depositor may then raise defenses relating to the existence of sufficient evidence to lead the court to believe that there is probable cause that a covered crime has occurred, that the depositor is a participant in the crime, and that the stay of all transactions with respect to the bank account is essential in order to preserve evidence or to keep the proceeds of the crime intact for and on behalf of the victims. I differ with the premises used to arrive at the same conclusion. I The numbers on a bank's ledger corresponding to the amounts of money that a depositor has and its various transactions, especially when digitized, are definitely not physical. Yet, just because they are not physical does not necessarily mean that they do not partake of the kinds of "life, liberty, or property"1 protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. Neither should it mean that the numerical equivalent of the bank's debt to a depositor or the record of its various transactions have nothing to do with the "persons . . . papers, and effects"2 constitutionally protected against "unreasonable searches and seizures."3 The majority opinion's statement that the "inquiry by the [Anti-Money Laundering Council] into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage"4 may have been inadvertent. It does, however, neglect that the penumbra of rights protected by the due process clause and the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures also pertains to protecting the intangibles essential to human life. Definitely, every liberal democratic constitutional order has outgrown the archaic concept that life is only that which can be tangible. The due process clause is crafted as a proscription. Thus, it states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law[.]"5 This means that there is a sphere of individual existence or a penumbra of individual autonomy that exists prior to every regulation that should primordially be left untouched. In other words, the existence of what Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren once called "the right to be let alone"6 is now broadly, though at times awkwardly referred to roughly as the right to privacy, presumed. Every regulation therefore that limits this aspect of individuality may be the subject of inquiry that it does not "deprive" one of their "life, liberty or property" without "due process of law". Thus, in the often cited writings of Warren and Brandeis as early as 1890 on the right to privacy: That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society. Thus, in very early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical interference with life and property, for trespasses vi et armis. Then the "right to life" served only to protect the subject from battery in its various forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; and the right to property secured to the individual his lands and his cattle. Later, there came a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,— the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term "property" has grown to comprise every form of possession — intangible, as well as tangible. Thus, with the recognition of the legal value of sensations, the protection against actual bodily injury was extended to prohibit mere attempts to do such injury; that is, the putting another in fear of such injury. From the action of battery grew that of assault. Much later there came a qualified protection of the individual against offensive noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and excessive vibration. The law of nuisance was developed. So regard for human emotions soon extended the scope of personal immunity beyond the body of the individual. His reputation, the standing among his fellow-men, was considered, and the law of slander and libel arose. Man's family relations became a part of the legal conception of his life, and the alienation of a wife's affections was held remediable. Occasionally the law halted,—as in its refusal to recognize the intrusion by seduction upon the honor of the family. But even here the demands of society were met. A mean fiction, the action per quod servitium amisit, was resorted to, and by allowing damages for injury to the parents' feelings, an adequate remedy was ordinarily afforded. Similar to the expansion of the right to life was the growth of the legal conception of property. From corporeal property arose the incorporeal rights issuing out of it; and then there opened the wide realm of intangible property, in the products and processes of the mind, as works of literature and art, goodwill, trade secrets, and trademarks. This development of the law was inevitable.1aшphi17 (Citations omitted) Nothing in the structure of the due process clause limits the protected sphere of individual existence or autonomy only to the physical or corporeal aspects of life. After all, as we have long held, life is not limited only to physical existence.8 Property can be incorporeal.9 Liberty denotes something more than just freedom from physical restraint. More fundamentally, the reservation of a very broad sphere of individual privacy or individual autonomy is implied in the very concept of society governed under a constitutional and democratic order.ℒαwρhi৷ The aspects of our humanity and the parts of our liberty surrendered to the government, in order to assure a functioning society, should only be as much as necessary for a just society and no more. While the extent of necessary surrender cannot be determined with precision, our existing doctrine is that any state interference should neither be arbitrary nor unfair. In many cases, we have held that due process of law simply means that regulation should both be reasonable and fair. Reasonability and fairness is tentatively captured in the twin legal concepts of substantive and procedural due process respectively. Substantive due process is usually, though not in all cases, a nuanced means-to-end test. Basically, this means that the regulation which impinges on individual autonomy is necessary to meet a legitimate state interest to be protected through means that can logically relate to achieving that end.10 Procedural due process is succinctly and most descriptively captured in the idea that in the kinds of deprivation of rights where it would be relevant, there should be an opportunity to be heard.11 In the due process clause, there is the requirement of "deprivation" of one's right to "life, liberty or property." In my view, this means more than the occasional and temporary discomforts we suffer, which is consistent with the natural workings of groups of human beings living within a society. De minimis discomfort is a part of group life, independent of the workings of the State. The deprivation that may trigger a judicial inquiry should be more than momentary. It must be fundamentally disruptive of a value that we protect because it is constitutive of our concept of individual autonomy. For instance, a person who chooses to walk down a public street cannot complain that a police officer glances or even stares at him or her. The discomfort of being the subject of the observation by others, under those circumstances, may be too fleeting and trivial that it should not cause any constitutional query. That we look at each other in public spaces is inherently a part of existing within a society. After all, one of the worst human indignities may be that we are rendered invisible to everyone for all time within public spaces. On the other hand, the uninvited and unwelcome peering eyes of the State's agents as we reside in our most private spaces presumptively violates our right to life, liberty, and even our property. In such cases, even the most fleeting act of voyeurism can cause substantial disruption of our collective values. Certainly, there is reason to trigger judicial inquiry. If the intrusion is unreasonable, it violates the constitutional protection of the due process clause. Examining the petitioner's bank accounts is analogous to the situation involving the uninvited and unwelcome glance. For some, their financial worth contained in the bank's ledgers may not be physical, but it is constitutive of that part of their identity, which for their own reasons, they may not want to disclose. Peering into one's bank accounts and related transactions is sufficiently disruptive as to be considered a "deprivation" within the meaning of the due process clause. It may be short of the physical seizure of property but it should, in an actual controversy such as this case at bar, be subject of judicial review.1aшphi1 I disagree with the majority's opinion that bank accounts do not have any "legitimate expectation of privacy[.]"12 I believe that such opinion may be too broad a reading of Republic v. Hon. Judge Eugenio, Jr., et al.13 It is true that no bank account or investment can be made without the cooperation of those who work with financial intermediaries. The possibility that there are those, who may come across personal financial information, should not be the measure of what may be "legitimate expectation" in a constitutional sense. We should start to distinguish between knowledge of the content of these accounts, storage of these information, exchange of data, and making public disclosures. What we deal with when the Court of Appeals allows inquiry is simply providing the Anti-Money Laundering Council or the appropriate law enforcement agency with access to knowledge of the content of these accounts. The limits of its storage, how it is exchanged, and making public disclosures are another matter. Nothing in this decision should be used to imply the nature of the right to privacy or the factors to be considered to establish "legitimate expectation of privacy" as it applies to storage, exchange, and public disclosures of information. The truth is that most of today's digital data is vulnerable to one who is curious enough, exceedingly determined, skillful, and willing to deploy the necessary time and resources to make discovery of our most private information. Ubiquitous surveillance systems that ensure the integrity as well as increase confidence in the security of the data kept in a system are ever present. Copying or transferring digital data occurs likewise with phenomenal speed. Data shared in cyberspace also tends to be resilient and difficult to completely delete. Users of various digital platforms, including bank accounts, are not necessarily aware of these vulnerabilities. Therefore, the concept of "legitimate expectation of privacy" as the framework for assessing whether personal information fall within the constitutionally protected penumbra need to be carefully reconsidered. In my view, the protected spheres of privacy will make better sense when our jurisprudence in the appropriate cases make clear how specific types of information relate to personal identity and why this is valuable to assure human dignity and a robust democracy in the context of a constitutional order. II A bank inquiry order is a provisional relief available to the Anti-Money Laundering Council in aid of its investigative powers. It partakes of the character of a search warrant. United Laboratories Inc. v. Isip14 discussed the nature of a search warrant: On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner's contention that a search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings. While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action. A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines. A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution.15 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) In a search warrant proceeding, there is already a crime that has been committed and law enforcers apply for a search warrant to find evidence to support a case or to retrieve and preserve evidence already known to them. In the same way, a bank inquiry order is "a means for the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain an intended prosecution of the account holder for violation of the [Anti-Money Laundering Act]."16 It is a preparatory tool for the discovery and procurement, and preservation — through the subsequent issuance of a freeze order — of relevant evidence of a money laundering transaction or activity. Considering its implications on the depositor's right to privacy, Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act explicitly mandates that "[t]he authority to inquire into or examine the main account and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution[.]" Article III, Section II of the Constitution states: SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. "The phrase 'upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce' allows a determination of probable cause by the judge [or the Court of Appeals in Anti-Money Laundering Act cases] ex parte." 17 In People v. Delos Reyes,18 the Court held that due to the ex parte and non-adversarial nature of the proceedings, "the [j]udge acting on an application for a search warrant is not bound to apply strictly the rules of evidence."19 The ordinary rules of evidence are generally not applied in ex parte proceedings, partly because there is no opponent to invoke them, partly because the Judge's determination is usually discretionary, partly because it is seldom that, but mainly because the system of evidence rules was devised for the special control of trials by jury.20(Emphasis supplied) "The existence [of probable cause] depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge [or magistrate] conducting the examination."21 "However, the findings of the judge [or magistrate] should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason."22 Search warrant proceedings are ex parte because of the necessities of the investigation. La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Hon. Fernandez, etc. et al.,23 states: ... an application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is neither a trial nor a part of the trial. Action on these applications must be expedited for time is of the essence. Great reliance has to be accorded by the judge to the testimonies under oath of the complainant and the witnesses.24 (Emphasis supplied) Similarly, it is essential that investigations for Anti-Money Laundering Act offenses, including the proceedings for the issuance of bank inquiry orders, be kept ex parte, in order not to frustrate the State's effort in building its case and eventually prosecuting money laundering offenses. III The absence of notice to the owner of a bank account that an ex parte application as well as an order to inquire has been granted by the Court of Appeals is not unreasonable nor arbitrary. The lack of notice does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution. It is reasonable for the State, through its law enforcers, to inquire ex parte and without notice because of the nature of a bank account at present. A bank deposit is an obligation. It is a debt owed by a bank to its client-depositor. It is understood that the bank will make use of the value of the money deposited to further create credit. This means that it may use the value to create loans with interest to another. Whoever takes out a loan likewise creates a deposit with another bank creating another obligation and empowering that other bank to create credit once mere through providing other loans. Bank deposits are not isolated information similar to personal sets of preferences. Rather, bank deposits exist as economically essential social constructs. The inherent constitutionally protected private rights in bank deposits and other similar instruments are not absolute. These rights should, in proper cases, be weighed against the need to maintaining the integrity of our financial system. The integrity of our financial system on the other hand contributes to the viability of banks and financial intermediaries, and therefore the viability of keeping bank deposits. Furthermore, we are at an age of instantaneous financial transactions. It would be practically impossible to locate, preserve, and later on present evidence of crimes covered by the Anti-Money Laundering Act if the theory of the petitioner is correct. After all, as correctly pointed out by the majority opinion, the right to information accrues only after a freeze order is issued. It is then that limitations on the ability to transact the value of the bank account will truly affect the depositor. Accordingly, with these clarifications, I vote to DENY the Petition. Footnotes 1 CONST., art III, sec. I provides: ARTICLE III. Bill of Rights SECTION I. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 2 CONST., art. III, sec. 2 provides: ARTICLE III. Bill of Rights .... SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 3 CONST., art. III, sec. 2 4 Ponencia, p. II. 5 CONST., art III, sec. 1. 6 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). See also Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren & Brandeis, 39 Cath. U.L. Rev. 703 (1990). 7 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193-195 (1890). 8 Secretary of National Defense, et at. v. Manalo, et al., 589 Phil. 1, 50 (2008) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc], explained the concept of right to life: While the right to life under Article III, Section I guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned- the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz.: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property ... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." (Citations omitted) See also J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. No. 209271, December 8, 2015, 776 SCRA 434, 644 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc]. 9 CIVIL CODE, arts. 415(10), 417, 519, 520, 521, 613, 721, and 722 provide: Article 415. The following are immovable property: .... (10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property. .... Article 417. The following are also considered as personal property: (1) Obligations and actions which have for their object movables or demandable sums; and (2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial entities, although they may have real estate. .... Article 519. Mining claims and rights and other matters concerning minerals and mineral lands are governed by special laws. Article 520. A trade mark or trade-name duly registered in the proper government bureau or office is owned by and pertains to the person, corporation, or firm registering the same, subject to the provisions of special laws. Article 521. The goodwill of a business is property, and may be transferred together with the right to use the name under which the business is conducted. Article 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate. Article 721. By intellectual creation, the following persons acquire ownership: (1) The author with regard to his literary, dramatic, historical, legal, philosophical, scientific or other work; (2) The composer, as to his musical composition; (3) The painter, sculptor, or other artist, with respect to the product of his art; (4) The scientist or technologist or any other person with regard to his discovery or invention. Article 722. The author and the composer, mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article, shall have the ownership of their creations even before the publication of the same. Once their works are published, their rights are governed by the Copyright laws. The painter, sculptor or other artist shall have dominion over the product of his art even before it is copyrighted. The scientist or technologist has the ownership of his discovery or invention even before it is patented. INTELLECTUAL PROP. CODE, secs. 28, 71, 103, 147.1, 165.1, 165.2, and 177 provide: SECTION 28. Right to a Patent. The right to a patent belongs to the inventor, his heirs, or assigns. When two (2) or more persons have jointly made an invention, the right to a patent shall belong to them jointly. .... SECTION 71. Rights Conferred by Patent.- 71.1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: a. Where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to restrain, prohibit and prevent any unauthorized person or entity from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing that product; b. Where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to restrain, prevent or prohibit any unauthorized person or entity from using the process, and from manufacturing, dealing in, using, selling or offering for sale, or importing any product obtained directly or indirectly from such process. 71.2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession the patent, and to conclude licensing contracts for the same. .... SECTION 103. Transmission of Rights.- 103.1. Patents or applications for patents and invention to which they relate, shall be protected in the same way as the rights of other property under the Civil Code. 103.2. Inventions and any right, title or interest in and to patents and inventions covered thereby, may be assigned or transmitted by inheritance or bequest or may be the subject of a license contract. .... SECTION 147. Rights Conferred.- 147.1. The owner of a registered mark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner's consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs or containers for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. .... SECTION 165. Trade Names or Business Names.- 165.1. A name or designation may not be used as a trade name if by its nature or the use to which such name or designation may be put, it is contrary to public order or morals and if, in particular, it is liable to deceive trade circles or the public as to the nature of the enterprise identified by that name. 165.2. a. Notwithstanding any laws or regulations providing for any obligation to register trade names, such names shall be protected, even prior to or without registration, against any unlawful act committed by third parties. b. In particular, any subsequent use of the trade name by a third party, whether as a trade name or a mark or collective mark, or any such use of a similar trade name or mark, likely to mislead the public, shall be deemed unlawful. .... SECTION 177. Copyright or Economic Rights. - Subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, copyright or economic rights shall consist of the exclusive right to 'carry out, authorize or prevent the following acts: 177.1. Reproduction of the work or substantial portion of the work; 177.2. Dramatization, translation, adaptation, abridgment, arrangement or other transformation of the work; 177.3. The first public distribution of the original and each copy of the work by sale or other forms of transfer of ownership; 177.4. Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or cinematographic work, a work embodied in a sound recording, a computer program, a compilation of data and other materials or a musical work in graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the original or the copy which is the subject of the rental; 177.5. Public display of the original or a copy of the work; 177.6. Public performance of the work; and 177.7. Other communication to the public of the work. 10 City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 311-312 [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], states, "[s]ubstantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient justification for the government's action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose." Further, in Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016 < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/august2016/189185.pdf > 28 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc], the Court referred to three levels of scrutiny in analysing the validity of governmental intrusion: the rational basis test, which inquires into the reasonable relation between the means and purpose of the law; the intermediate or heightened review where "the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest, but ... the classification ... must not depend on broad generalizations[;]" (Id.) and the strict scrutiny review, where the Government must prove the necessity "to achieve a compelling state interest, and that [the law or ordinance] is the least restrictive means to protect such interest." (Id.) In Mosqueda, The Court declared unconstitutional Davao City Ordinance No. 0309-07, (Id. at 46) which imposed a ban in aerial spraying as an agricultural practice, for being "broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted[;]" (Id. at 34) and for being unreasonable and oppressive, "in light of the existence and availability of more permissible and practical alternatives that will not overburden ... those who stand to be affected." (Id. at 36). See also Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 601 Phil. 245 (2009) [Per J. Austria Martinez, En Banc], White Light Corporation, et al. v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 461-464 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]; Blo Umpar Adiong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc]. 11 Gutierrez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 200628, January 13, 2015, 745 SCRA 435, 452-453 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc); Montinola v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 198656, September 8, 2014, 734 SCRA 439, 459-460 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division); Department of Agrarian Reform v. Samson, et al., 577 Phil. 370, 380 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division]; F/O Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 731, 740 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; Air Philippines Corporation v. International Business Aviation Services Philippines, Inc., 481 Phil. 366, 386 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Macayayong v. Hon. Ople, 281 Phil. 419, 423-424 (1991) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division]; Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 641-642 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. 12 Ponencia, p. 11. 13 569 Phil. 98 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 14 500 Phil. 342 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]. 15 Id. at 357-358. 16 Republic v. Hon. Judge Eugenio, Jr., et al., 569 Phil. 98, 120 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 17 Mendoza v. People, et al., 733 Phil. 603, 613 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]. 18 People v. Delos Reyes, 484 Phil. 271 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]. 19 Id. at 285. 20 Id., citing Brinegar v. United States, 93 L.ed. 1879 (1949). 21 Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., 563 Phil. 781, 793 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 22 Id. 23 214 Phil. 332 (1984) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division]. 24 Id. at 350. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation