Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164682 September 14, 2011
JOEL GALZOTE y SORIAGA, Petitioner,
vs.
JONATHAN BRIONES and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the twin resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 30, 2004 and July 23, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. The assailed April 30, 2004 resolution dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Joel S. Galzote (petitioner), while the challenged July 23, 2004 resolution denied his motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On January 23, 1997, the prosecution filed an Information for robbery in an uninhabited place against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 1, Manila. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
The undersigned accuses JOEL GALZOTE Y SORIAGA of the crime of Robbery in an Uninhabited Place, committed as follows:
That on or about July 22, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one ROSENDO OQUINA Y ESMALI who is already charged with the same offense with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 304765, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain, by means of force upon things, break into and enter the Administration Office of the Prince Town Inn Corporation located at Valenzuela Street, Sta. Mesa, this City, which is an uninhabited place, by then and there destroying the Jipson board ceiling of the said establishment with the use of a fan knife and passing through the same, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, and once inside, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, took, stole and carried away cash money in the amount of ₱109,000.00 belonging to said Prince Town Inn Corporation, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of ₱109,000.00, Philippine Currency [sic].
Contrary to law.2
The petitioner moved to quash the above information by alleging that it was patently irregular and fatally flawed in form and in substance. The MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion to quash in its order of September 15, 1997.3 Likewise, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order of denial.4
Via a petition for certiorari,5 the petitioner elevated the unfavorable ruling of the MeTC to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila. The petitioner argued that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not granting his motion to quash. Respondent Jonathan Briones (respondent) moved to dismiss the petition for certiorari, arguing that: (a) the petitioner failed to prosecute the petition for an unreasonably long period of time; (b) a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to address the denial of a motion to quash; and (c) the MeTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion to quash.6
In its order7 of March 22, 2002, the RTC granted the respondent’s motion and dismissed the petition for certiorari. The RTC also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.8
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. The CA dismissed the petition in its resolution of April 30, 2004.9
The CA held that the petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA explained that the petitioner should have filed an appeal, instead of a special civil action for certiorari, upon receipt of the RTC’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. The CA also noted that the petitioner failed to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in his petition.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the lower courts erred in denying his motion to quash. It explained that the allegation of conspiracy in his case need not be alleged with particularity since it was not charged as an offense in itself, but only as a manner of incurring criminal liability. The fact that the petitioner’s alleged co-conspirator had been convicted of the lesser offense of malicious mischief in another case is not a bar to the petitioner’s prosecution for the crime of robbery.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this resolution, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution10 dated July 23, 2004.
THE PETITION
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner claims that his recourse to a petition for certiorari before the CA was proper. He argues that both the MeTC and the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when they denied his motion to quash. He alleges that the trial courts failed to see that the information filed against him was flawed both in form and in substance.
The petitioner additionally claims that his failure to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent was not fatal to his petition.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Remedy from the Denial of a Motion to Quash
A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed of by the petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter’s ruling.
In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy.11 The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.
Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice";12 the promotion of public welfare and public policy;13 cases that "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof";14 or judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.15
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.
At the RTC
We find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition for certiorari against the orders of the MeTC as the petitioner failed to show that the factual circumstances of his case fall under any of the above exceptional circumstances. The MeTC in fact did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its denial of the motion to quash was consistent with the existing rules and applicable jurisprudence. The ground used by the petitioner in his motion to quash (i.e., that his co-conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser than the crime of robbery) is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated under Section 3, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that warrant the quashal of a criminal information.16
This ground, too, is an extraneous matter that has no bearing and is irrelevant to the validity of the criminal information filed against the accused; the designated purpose of a motion to quash is to assail the validity of the criminal information (or criminal complaint) for defects or defenses apparent on the face of the information.17 A facial examination of the criminal information against the petitioner shows it to be valid and regular on its face considering its conformity with the guidelines under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
Under the circumstances, the criminal information is sufficient in form and substance for it states: (a) the name of the petitioner as the accused; (b) the offense of robbery as the designated offense committed; (c) the manner on how the offense of robbery was committed and the petitioner’s participation were alleged with particularity; and (d) the date and the place of the commission of the robbery were also stated therein. Thus, as the RTC correctly ruled, the petitioner can be properly tried under the allegations of the information.
The CA Resolution
To proceed to the merits of the CA resolution that is the main subject of this review, we find no reversible error in the CA’s dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s order; the petition was both procedurally and substantively infirm.
We find that the petition for certiorari filed with the CA was a wrong legal remedy to question the RTC order. The petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner before the RTC was an original action whose resulting decision is a final order that completely disposed of the petition;18 the assailed CA resolution was in all respect a ruling on the propriety of the petition for certiorari filed with the RTC. Hence, the petitioner’s remedy was to appeal the RTC order to the CA pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
Given the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of appeal, the petitioner cannot avail of the remedy of certiorari.19 1avvphi1
Even on the substantive aspect, the petition for certiorari filed with the CA must fail considering the petitioner’s failure to show any justifiable reason for his chosen mode of review. In addition, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC since it was merely affirming a correct ruling of denial by the MeTC of the petitioner’s motion to quash.
As a final word, we cannot allow a party to delay litigation by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of grave abuse of discretion.20 We repeat that it is only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances where a resort to a petition for certiorari is proper.21 Under the circumstances, the petitioner’s recourses cannot but be dilatory moves that deserve sanction from this Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the challenged resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2004 and July 23, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. Treble costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice |
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice |
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes per Special Order No. 1077 dated September 12, 2011.
1 Rollo, pp. 22-31; penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, and concurred in by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador.
2 Records, p. 27.
3 Rollo, pp. 74-75.
4 Id. at 76-78.
5 Records, pp. 16-23.
6 Id. at 35-42.
7 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
8 Order of March 19, 2003; id. at 81-82.
9 Id. at 22-28.
10 Id. at 31.
11 Santos v. People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 341.
12 Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214, 313.
13 Ibid.
14 Supra note 11, at 361.
15 Ibid., citing Mead v. Hon. Argel, etc., et al., 200 Phil. 650, 656 (1982); Yap v. Lutero, 105 Phil. 1307, 1308 (1959); and Pineda and Ampil Manufacturing Co. v. Bartolome, et al., 95 Phil. 930, 937 (1954) which cited People v. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 752, 756 (1951).
16 Section 3, Rule 117 enumerates the grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
17 Los Baños v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, April 22, 2009, 586 SCRA 303.
18 See Vios v. Pantangco, Jr., G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009, 578 SCRA 129, 139.
19 Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 211.
20 Santos v. People, supra note 11.
21 Ibid.
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