Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 184966 May 30, 2011
HEIRS OF FELICIDAD VDA. DE DELA CRUZ namely: VIOLETA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIANA GARCIA SECRETARIO, and GRACE FERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF PEDRO T. FAJARDO, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 29 August 2008 Decision2 and 16 October 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95554. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 1 March 2006 Decision4 and 28 June 2006 Resolution5 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 10659. The DARAB affirmed the 29 December 2000 Decision6 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. 05261 ‘SNE’ 00.
The Facts
Joaquin Garces (Garces) owned two parcels of land in Barangay Pambuan, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The properties were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. NT-22566 and NT-7737-A and tenanted by Cervando Garcia (Garcia), Pedro Fajardo (Fajardo), and Felicidad Vda. de Dela Cruz (Vda. de Dela Cruz).
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, the Department of Agrarian Reform identified Garcia, Fajardo and Vda. de Dela Cruz as qualified tenant-farmers. On 5 April 1999, the heirs of Garces filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 3, Branch 23, Cabanatuan City, acting as special agrarian court, a petition for judicial determination of just compensation and payment of lease against Garcia, Fajardo and Vda. de Dela Cruz.
On 28 March 2000, during the pre-trial, the heirs of Garces entered into a compromise agreement with Garcia, Fajardo and Vda. de Dela Cruz. In its 28 August 2000 Decision,7 the RTC approved the compromise agreement. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding these "Transfers under PD No. 27" not contrary to law, morals, public order or policy and, further, the same having the approval of the defendant Land Bank and the defendant DAR, the foregoing compromise agreement, otherwise called "Deed of Transfer under P.D. No. 27," are hereby APPROVED, and judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the terms and conditions thereof.
The parties are hereby enjoined to comply strictly and in good faith with all the terms set forth in the aforesaid "Compromise Agreement."
SO ORDERED.8
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Garcia, Fajardo and Vda. de Dela Cruz were issued their corresponding certificates of land transfer and emancipation patents. The 28 August 2000 Decision became final and executory.
Vda. de Dela Cruz filed with the PARAD a petition for cancellation of Emancipation Patent No. A-051521-H issued to Fajardo. Vda. de Dela Cruz alleged that she, not Fajardo, was the actual tenant and possessor of the 619-square meter parcel of land covered by the emancipation patent.
The PARAD’s Ruling
In his 29 December 2000 Decision, the PARAD dismissed the petition for cancellation of emancipation patent because Vda. de Dela Cruz failed to adduce substantial evidence. The PARAD held that:
In view of these, the questioned emancipation patent was regularly been [sic] issued under the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed by the employees/officials of the Department of Agrarian Reform as the same was made an integral part of the Deed of Transfer under PD 27 dated March 28, 2000 in favor of private respondent. The claim of the petitioner that the questioned emancipation patent has been erroneously issued in the name of the private respondent miserably failed to impress this Board. The burden of proof to show that the questioned emancipation patent was erroneously issued in the private respondent [sic] is on the petitioner. Absent convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions has to be upheld. (People vs. Lapura, 255 SCRA 85) Although it is admitted that the questioned emancipation patent is covered by the homelot [sic] of the petitioner where her house is erected, the same was not meant that [sic] the said EP was erroneously issued in the name of the private respondent. This Board sees no errors whatsoever in the issuance of the said patent for the subject lot is indeed meant for the private respondent as the same was transferred by the former landowner, Joaquin Garces in his favor with the intervention of the DAR and LBP, which transfer was duly approved by a regular court. While it is true that private respondent has other lands (in the minimum ceiling required by law) including a homelot covered under OLT, herein petitioner also has other lands, which should also include her homelot. Hence, what should be enforced was the one that was given or allocated by the landowner to the petitioner, which is the area containing 2.100 has., as the 0.619 ha. is excluded from the said area. The 0.619 ha. is within the coverage of 2.0964 has., which is therefore indeed part and parcel of the land of the private respondent. Petitioner is estopped to state that she is entitled for an additional area of 0.619 ha. as the same was excluded or was never stated in her Deed of Transfer under PD 27.9
Vda. de Dela Cruz appealed to the DARAB.
The DARAB’s Ruling
In its 1 March 2006 Decision, the DARAB affirmed the PARAD’s 29 December 2000 Decision. The DARAB held that:
At the outset, it must be stressed that before an Emancipation Patent is issued to a farmer-beneficiary, procedures such as surveys, inspection, investigation, evaluation and endorsements are conducted (15 September 1976 Memorandum). Only after this rigorous and exhaustive procedure will the Department of Agrarian Reform issue Emancipation Patents. Strong evidence is necessary in order to claim that these procedures have not been complied with. As held in the case of Tatad vs. Garcia, government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. Petitioner did not present strong evidence to rebut such presumption, the EP issued in favor of respondent Fajardo is presumed to have been issued validly and with regularity.
Moreover, an Emancipation Patent holder acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Thus, respondent Fajardo, being an emancipation patent holder, has absolute ownership over the subject landholding.
Finally, well-entrenched is the rule that an EP is a title that has the force and effect of a Torrens Title, and as such it is irrevocable and indefeasible, and the duty of the DAR and its instrumentalities like the court, is to see to it that this title is maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding. Needless to state, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible.10
Vda. de Dela Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 28 June 2006 Resolution, the DARAB denied the motion. Vda. de Dela Cruz appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
In its 29 August 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DARAB’s 1 March 2006 Decision. The Court of Appeals held that:
The Court notes that the subject matter of the Compromise Agreement between Joaquin Garces and private respondent set forth in the Decision in said Agrarian Case No. 132 (AF) specifically mentions 0.619 has. as one of the parcels of land transferred to private respondent. This was relied upon by PARAD when he ruled that —
"After a careful perusal of the aforementioned Decision particularly the Deeds of Transfer under PD 27 enetered into and executed by the petitioner and private respondent, it revealed that the lots allocated to the private respondent consist of 0.4163 ha. and 0.619 or 2.0964 has. While to the petitioner, 2.0354 ha. and 0.0646 ha. or 2.100 has. So the area of 0.619 ha., which is the lot in question is a part and parcel of the lands of the private respondent, being awarded by the DAR thru Operation Land Transfer, which consequently been [sic] covered by TCT EP No. 1879."
Petitioners never raised an issue as to the identity of the land acquired by private respondent. Further, the Court noted that in the cited Decision in Agrarian Case No. 132 (AF), Felicidad vda. de De la Cruz and Joaquin Garces likewise executed a Compromise Agreement and the subject matter were parcels of land with total area of 2.180 has. No evidence was presented by petitioners that the subject landholding is embraced within the area covered by the Compromise Agreement of petitioner vda. de Dela Cruz with Joaquin Garces.
The Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, was relied in turn by DARAB in ruling that the subject landholding was acquired by private respondent.
When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment.
The bare allegation of petitioner Felicidad vda. Dela Cruz that she occupied a portion of the disputed subject landholding does not prove that she is the rightful and legal farmer-beneficiary of the subject landholding under P.D. No. 27 as supplemented by Letter of Instructions No. 705. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules.lawphi1
Moreover, it appears that the certification issued by the BARC Chairman Roberto Ramos of Pambuan, Gapan City, dated March 29, 2000, presented by petitioner Felicidad vda. Dela Cruz to prove that she is the tenant of the subject landholding was obtained through fraud and deceit as evidenced by the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by BARC Chairman Roberto Ramos of Pambuan, Gapan City, dated June 29, 2000.11
Vda. de Dela Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 16 October 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Petitioners heirs of Vda. de Dela Cruz raise as issue that Emancipation Patent No. A-051521-H was erroneously issued to Fajardo because Vda. de Dela Cruz, not Fajardo, was the actual tenant and possessor of the 619-square meter parcel of land covered by the emancipation patent.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
First, questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People,12 the Court held that:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.13
Whether Vda. de Dela Cruz, not Fajardo, was the actual tenant and possessor of the 619-square meter parcel of land covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-051521-H is a question of fact. Thus, it is not reviewable.
The factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Court. In Gandara Mill Supply v. NLRC,14 the Court held that, "In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that findings of fact by quasi-judicial agencies x x x are conclusive upon the court in the absence of proof of grave error in the appreciation of facts."15
The exceptions to this rule are (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculation; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.16 The heirs of Vda. de Dela Cruz fail to convince the Court that any of these circumstances is present.
Second, the RTC’s 28 August 2000 Decision has long become final and executory, thus, it can no longer be disturbed. Vda. de Dela Cruz entered into a compromise agreement with the heirs of Garces. There is no question that under the compromise agreement, the 619-square meter parcel of land covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-051521-H was given to Fajardo. The RTC approved the compromise agreement. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding these "Transfers under PD No. 27" not contrary to law, morals, public order or policy and, further, the same having the approval of the defendant Land Bank and the defendant DAR, the foregoing compromise agreement, otherwise called "Deed of Transfer under P.D. No. 27," are hereby APPROVED, and judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the terms and conditions thereof.
The parties are hereby enjoined to comply strictly and in good faith with all the terms set forth in the aforesaid "Compromise Agreement."
SO ORDERED.17
In Inaldo v. Balagot,18 the Court held that:
A compromise agreement is final and executory. Such a final and executory judgment cannot be modified or amended. If an amendment is to be made, it may consist only of supplying an omission, or striking out a superfluity or interpreting an ambiguous phrase therein in relation to the body of the decision which gives it life.19
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 29 August 2008 Decision and 16 October 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95554.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice |
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 27-92.
2 Id. at 11-21. Penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr., with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Japar B. Dimaampao concurring.
3 Id. at 23-24.
4 Id. at 141-145. Penned by Assistant Secretary Edgar A. Igano, with Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman, Assistant Secretary Augusto P. Quijano, Undersecretary Nestor R. Acosta, Acting Assistant Secretary Ma. Patricia Rualo-Bello and Assistant Secretary Delfin B. Samson concurring.
5 Id. at 149-150.
6 Id. at 135-138. Penned by Provincial Adjudicator Eulogio M. Mariano.
7 Id. at 128-134. Penned by Presiding Judge Andres R. Amante, Jr.
8 Id. at 133-134.
9 Id. at 138.
10 Id. at 143-144.
11 Id. at 18-19.
12 G.R. No. 163868, 4 June 2009, 588 SCRA 249.
13 Id. at 256.
14 360 Phil. 871 (1998).
15 Id. at 877.
16 Supra note 12 at 257.
17 Rollo, pp. 133-134.
18 G.R. No. 57256, 18 November 1991, 203 SCRA 650.
19 Id. at 654.
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