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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 167284               July 6, 2011

THE ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANINANG AND THE LAW FIRM OF QUISUMBING TORRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES SALVACION SERRANO LADANGA* and AGUSTIN LADANGA,** AND BERNARDO ASENETA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

An act will be struck down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion only when the abuse of discretion is patent and gross.¹

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus² under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 1, 2004³ and December 29, 2004⁴ Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 51242, entitled Bernardo Aseneta v. Spouses Salvacion Serrano Ladanga and Agustin Ladanga where the CA refused to act on petitioners’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the November 7, 2000 Decision⁵ in the said case. The dispositive portion of the assailed June 1, 2004 Resolution reads:

ACCORDINGLY, on account of the pendency before the Supreme Court of a petition for review filed by defendant-appellant Agustin Ladanga from the decision of the Court, the Court will again refrain from acting on the aforesaid Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.⁶

The assailed December 29, 2004 Resolution,⁷ on the other hand, denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the June 1, 2004 Resolution.

Petitioners seek (1) to annul and set aside the aforesaid Resolutions for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) to require the CA to act on their earlier Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties, as well as their Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

Factual antecedents

In 1975, during her lifetime, Clemencia Aseneta (Clemencia), through her adopted son and judicially-appointed guardian,⁸ respondent Bernardo Aseneta (Bernardo), filed a reconveyance case⁹ (Reconveyance Case) against respondent-spouses Salvacion and Agustin Ladanga (spouses Ladanga) before Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint sought to annul the Deeds of Sale allegedly executed by Clemencia in favor of the spouses Ladanga over a Diliman property¹⁰ and a Cubao property¹¹ on grounds of lack of intent to convey and lack of consideration. In 1977, Clemencia died during the pendency of the reconveyance case and was substituted as plaintiff by her known putative heir, Bernardo.¹²

Meanwhile, Clemencia’s death also brought about estate settlement proceedings (Probate Case) between Soledad Maninang (Maninang), represented by petitioner Law Firm of Quisumbing Torres (QT), and Bernardo. Maninang claimed that Clemencia bequeathed to her the entire estate in her last will and testament. Bernardo countered that the will is void on the ground of preterition.

This Probate Case was eventually decided based on a compromise agreement executed by Bernardo, Maninang, and their respective counsels. The compromise agreement identified certain properties of the estate and provided for their distribution among the parties. It further provided that as to "any other properties, known or unknown," Maninang would get 35% interest while QT would get 15% interest. The following are the relevant excerpts from the November 5, 1992 Decision Based on Compromise Agreement in the Probate Case:

BERNARDO ASENETA and the ESTATE OF SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, assisted by their respective counsels, respectfully state:

1. On 6 October 1992, they have reached and concluded a mutually satisfactory settlement of their claims in the above-referenced cases. Consequently, they freely entered into and executed a Compromise Agreement to effect a prompt distribution of the Estate of Clemencia A. Aseneta, as follows:

WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the sole claimants to the estate of Clemencia A. Aseneta x x x presently the subject of consolidated Special Proceeding Nos. Q-23304 and 8569 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 161, and Special Proceeding No. M-2176 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145;

WHEREAS, the deceased Clemencia A. Aseneta left no other heirs;

x x x x

WHEREAS, MANINANG is indebted to the law firms of N.J. Quisumbing & Associates and Quisumbing Torres & Evangelista (QTE) for professional services rendered in the aforesaid estate proceedings in an amount equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of MANINANG’s recovery of inheritance, and therefore MANINANG has assigned directly to QTE, a thirty percent (30%) share of her distributions under this Compromise Agreement;

x x x x

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:

1. The aforesaid real properties of the Estate shall belong and be distributed to the parties hereto and to ALGR [Bernardo’s counsel] and QTE, as follows:

x x x x

(h) Any other real properties, known or unknown, to ASENETA (37.5% undivided interest), to ALGR (12.5% undivided interest), to MANINANG (35% undivided interest), and to QTE (15% undivided interest)

x x x x

6. The Estate shall be distributed, as soon as possible after approval of this Compromise Agreement, in accordance with the terms hereof, and the parties hereto shall voluntarily hand over whatever titles, cases, papers, documents, exhibits and personal properties appertaining to the other as per the distribution above.

x x x x

8. x x x Any claims, causes of action or liabilities arising as a result of a breach of this Compromise Agreement are specifically reserved and excluded from this release and discharge.

x x x x¹³

Back in 1987, while the Probate Case was still pending, a development allegedly took place in the Reconveyance Case. According to Bernardo,¹⁴ the parties to the Reconveyance Case – Bernardo and respondent spouses Ladanga – allegedly entered into a Compromise Agreement with respect to the Cubao property. (The records of this case does not include a copy of such alleged Compromise Agreement.) This Compromise Agreement, which was allegedly approved by the trial court, stated that Bernardo and the spouses Ladanga have agreed to sell the Cubao property to an unmentioned third party.¹⁵ The parties did not disclose to whom payment was made for such alleged sale.

The Reconveyance Case then proceeded and, after 20 years in the trial court, was finally decided in favor of Clemencia’s estate. The trial court’s February 24, 1995 Decision ordered the reconveyance of both the Diliman property (TCT No. 197624) and the Cubao property (TCT No. 204090) to "[Bernardo Aseneta] for and in behalf of Miss Clemencia Aseneta." The dispositive portion reads thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the Court finds in favor of [Bernardo Aseneta] and against the [Spouses Ladanga], and hereby orders as follows:

A. For x x x spouses Ladanga to reconvey the titles and possession to the property now covered [by] TCT Nos. 197624 and 204090 to [Bernardo Aseneta] for and in behalf of Miss Clemencia Aseneta;

B. For the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT Nos. 197624 and 204090 and to issue new transfer certificates of title in lieu of those cancelled, upon payment of the required fees by [Bernardo Aseneta], in the name of Miss Clemencia Aseneta;

C. For the x x x spouses Ladanga to render within fifteen (15) days an accounting of rentals received from the properties covered by TCT No. 197624 from April, 1974 up to the present and so with the property under TCT No. 204090 from November 1974 up to the present and to remit said rentals to [Bernardo Aseneta] minus any amount paid by the x x x [spouses] Ladanga as realty taxes for the period mentioned;

D. For x x x [spouses] Ladanga to pay [Bernardo Aseneta] ₱10,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees; and

E. Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.¹⁶

The spouses Ladanga appealed the adverse decision in the Reconveyance Case to the CA. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51242.

It was at this stage that petitioners Estate of Soledad Maninang (Estate of Maninang) and QT attempted to join Bernardo as appellees in the Reconveyance Case by filing a Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties on September 2, 1996.¹⁷ Petitioners claimed that under the Decision in the Probate Case, they had a 50% undivided interest in the Cubao property, which the trial court in the Reconveyance Case adjudicated in favor of the estate of Clemencia. They posited that while the Cubao property was not specifically identified in the compromise agreement in the Probate Case, it falls under the clause "any other property, known or unknown."

Bernardo opposed petitioners’ motion on the ground that the spouses Ladanga’s appeal in the Reconveyance Case does not involve the Cubao property, but only the Diliman property.¹⁸ The spouses Ladanga did not controvert Bernardo’s contention that the appeal only involves the Diliman property. Instead they opposed petitioners’ motion on the ground that petitioners’ right to a share in Clemencia’s estate is dubitable and should be threshed out in the appropriate proceedings.¹⁹

Without acting on petitioners’ Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties, the CA affirmed in toto in its November 7, 2000 Decision the trial court’s decision with respect to the Diliman property. The dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision, insofar as it relates to the property presently covered by TCT No. 197624, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.²⁰

On November 24, 2000, respondent spouses Ladanga appealed²¹ the CA Decision to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 145874). This Court affirmed the CA Decision over the Diliman property in its September 30, 2005 Decision,²² which attained finality on November 11, 2005.²³

Meanwhile, the petitioners learned in 2001 of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51242, which affirmed the trial court’s Decision with respect to the Diliman property. Petitioners filed before the CA a Motion for Partial Reconsideration²⁴ of the CA Decision. They prayed for the nullification of the compromise agreement executed by Bernardo and spouses Ladanga over the Cubao property on the basis that Bernardo had no authority from the probate court to enter into such agreement;²⁵ or, in the alternative, petitioners sought a declaration that no such compromise agreement actually existed between Bernardo and spouses Ladanga.²⁶

The appellate court, in its assailed June 1, 2004 Resolution,²⁷ refused to act on petitioners’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration because of the then pending appeal of CA-G.R. CV No. 51242 in the Supreme Court. To recall, the Resolution disposes as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, on account of the pendency before the Supreme Court of a petition for review filed by defendant-appellant Agustin Ladanga from the decision of the Court, the Court will again refrain from acting on the aforesaid Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed before the CA a Motion for Reconsideration,²⁸ which was

denied by the CA in its assailed December 29, 2004 Resolution.²⁹ This assailed Resolution pertinently reads:

The Estate of Soledad Maninang and the Quisumbing Torres Law Firm (movants for partial reconsideration) are back with a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 1, 2004 Resolution, contending that their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the November 7, 2000 Decision may yet be resolved notwithstanding the pendency of the Petition for Review in the Supreme Court. Herein movants submit that ‘considering that the subject matter of movants’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration is not the same as the subject matter of defendant-appellants’ Supreme Court petition, there is absolutely no risk that the Honorable Court’s Resolution of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration may conflict with the Supreme Court’s future decision in G.R. No. 145[8]74. The Court is not persuaded. Prudence, let alone proper judicial decorum, commends that action on the aforesaid incident by the Court should be deferred until such time that the High Court will have finally resolved G.R. No. 145[8]74.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.³⁰

Petitioners come to this Court seeking the annulment of the assailed Resolutions and a writ of mandamus to compel the CA to act on their various motions.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners contest the ground which the CA relied upon in refraining from acting on their motions. They argue that the pending appeal of CA-G.R. CV No. 51242 in the Supreme Court has nothing to do with their pending motions. They point out that the spouses Ladanga’s appeal to the Supreme Court only involved the Diliman property, while petitioners’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration before the CA sought a ruling on the compromise agreement over the Cubao property. The difference in the subject matter of the two appeals prevents the possibility of issuing conflicting rulings on the case. ³¹

As authority for their theory that the CA can still rule on their motions,

petitioners cite Section 8 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court which states that the lower court "loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties." Basing their theory on the said provision, petitioners maintain that the CA still has jurisdiction to act on their motions because petitioners were still well within their period to appeal when they filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration.³²

As regards their Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties,which was not acted upon by the CA, petitioners are adamant that the CA had the ministerial duty to act on their motions, as allegedly enshrined in no less than the Constitution.³³ Petitioners insist that, as pro indiviso co-owners of the Cubao property, they have a right to join Bernardo as party-plaintiff in the reconveyance case.³⁴

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondent Bernardo waived his right to file a comment and submitted the petition for resolution;³⁵ hence, the Court resolved in its Resolution dated December 12, 2007 to dispense with the filing of Bernardo’s memorandum.

On the other hand, respondent spouses Ladanga filed their Comment dated June 28, 2005.³⁶ They assert that the CA was correct in declining to act on petitioners’ motions because the CA already lost jurisdiction over CA-G.R. CV No. 51242 after the spouses Ladangas’ appeal to this Court was given due course. As to the filing of a Memorandum, the same was waived³⁷ by the respondent spouses’ lawyer, Atty. Gregorio T. Fabros, who manifested that the respondent spouses had already died.

Issue

Whether petitioners have a right to adjudicate their claims to the Cubao property in the appeal in the Reconveyance Case, such that the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in denying them the opportunity to participate therein.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners claim that they have an interest in the properties of Clemencia’s estate by virtue of the decision in the Probate Case which gave them a certain share in those properties. They thus seek to join the appeal in the Reconveyance Case so that the Cubao property would be adjudicated to Clemencia’s estate. But the said motion is moot because the Cubao property had already been adjudicated in favor of Clemencia’s estate with finality by the trial court in the Reconveyance Case. The trial court’s February 24, 1995 Decision ordered the spouses Ladanga to reconvey the Cubao property to Clemencia’s estate, and this was not appealed. What was appealed to the CA (in CA-G.R. CV No. 51242) was the order to reconvey the Diliman property. That the appeal in the Reconveyance Case (CA-G.R. CV No. 51242) only involved the Diliman property was finally determined by this Court in G.R. No. 145874.

In short, there is no need for petitioners to join the appeal in the Reconveyance Case because: first, such appeal covered the Diliman property and not the Cubao property; and second, as to the Cubao property, it has already been settled with finality that such property must be reconveyed by the spouses Ladanga to Clemencia’s estate.

Based on the foregoing, the respondent court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it did not allow petitioners to join and participate in the appeal in the Reconveyance Case. Grave abuse of discretion "implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law."³⁸ In the case at bar, while the CA’s actions may not have been ideal (it should have simply denied petitioners’ motions instead of refraining from acting on them), the same did not amount to a grave abuse of discretion considering that the issues raised by petitioners were not related to the subject matter before the CA. The petitioners’ interest is in the Cubao property, while the subject of the appeal before the CA was the Diliman property.1avvphi1

As to petitioners’ ultimate objective of getting their alleged share in the Cubao property, this cannot be litigated in the appeal of the Reconveyance Case but must be the subject of a separate suit or proceeding. Petitioners’ cause of action is independent of the cause of action in the Reconveyance Case and cannot possibly be litigated without causing undue delay and prejudice to the respondents, who have already endured more than two decades only to resolve the issues in the Reconveyance Case. Moreover, petitioners’ cause of action presents contentious issues (i.e., scope of the Compromise Agreement in the Probate Case, authority of Bernardo to compromise an estate property in the Reconveyance Case, defenses of other interested parties, etc.) which may still need to be threshed out in a proper trial and may require impleading other interested parties. To allow petitioners to litigate these matters for the first time in the appellate stage of the Reconveyance Case will not serve the ends of justice – not to respondents and not even to petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Died on August 2, 1996 (rollo, p. 55).

** Deceased per Manifestation of his counsel, Atty. Gregorio T. Fabros (rollo of G.R. No. 167284, p. 221).

¹ Fajardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157707, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 156, 163.

² Rollo of G.R. No. 167284, pp. 3-37.

³ Id. at 50; penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto and concurred in by Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Aurora S. Lagman.

⁴ Id. at 51-52; penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Aurora S. Lagman.

⁵ Id. at 39-49; penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto and concurred in by Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Alicia L. Santos.

⁶ Id. at 50.

⁷ Id. at 52.

⁸ CA Decision, pp. 1, 3; id. at 39-41.

⁹ Civil Case No. Q-20128 (id. at 56-62).

¹⁰ The property in Diliman, Quezon City was registered in Clemencia Aseneta’s name and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 5813. After the purported sale, title was transferred to Salvacion Ladanga, who obtained TCT No. 197624 in her name (CA Decision, p. 2; id. at 40).

¹¹ The property located in Cubao, Quezon City was registered in Clemencia Aseneta’s name and covered by TCT No. 177619. Due to the purported sale, title was transferred to Salvacion Ladanga, who then obtained TCT No. 204090 in her name (Id.; id.).

¹² Id. at 1; id. at 39.

¹³ Rollo of G.R. No. 167284, pp. 67-72; penned by Judge Job B. Madayag. Emphasis supplied.

¹⁴ CA rollo, pp. 91-92.

¹⁵ Bernardo’s Clarification and Opposition, pp. 1-2 (rollo of G.R. No. 167284, pp. 76-77) and Spouses Ladanga’s Petition in G.R. No. 145874, p. 5 (id. at 108).

¹⁶ RTC Decision, p. 7; id. at 62; decided by Judge Elpidio M. Catungal, Sr.

¹⁷ Id. at 63-66.

¹⁸ Id. at 76-78.

¹⁹ Id. at 74-75.

²⁰ CA Decision, p. 11; id. at 49.

²¹ Id. at 104-117.

²² Spouses Ladanga v. Aseneta, 508 Phil. 376 (2005).

²³ Rollo of G.R. No. 145874, (unpaged).

²⁴ Rollo of G.R. No. 167284, pp. 88-101.

²⁵ Id. at 92-93.

²⁶ Id. at 90-92.

²⁷ Id. at 50.

²⁸ Id. at 118-130.

²⁹ Id. at 51-52.

³⁰ Id. at 52.

³¹ Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 17-19; id. at 204-206.

³² Id. at 13-16; id. at 200-203.

³³ Id. at 25-27; id. at 212-214.

³⁴ Id. at 19-25; id. at 206-212.

³⁵ Rollo of G.R. No. 167284, p. 156.

³⁶ Id. at 154-155.

³⁷ Id. at 221.

³⁸ Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samut, 491 Phil. 458, 474 (2005).

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