Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182555 February 8, 2011
LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 185123
CESAR FORTUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
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G.R. No. 187745
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SPO2 CESAR FORTUNA y ABUDO, RAMESES DE JESUS y CALMA, LENIDO LUMANOG y LUISTRO, JOEL DE JESUS y VALDEZ and AUGUSTO SANTOS y GALANG, Accused,
RAMESES DE JESUS y CALMA and JOEL DE JESUS y VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.
R E S O L U T I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This resolves the motions for reconsideration separately filed by Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos, Cesar Fortuna and Rameses de Jesus assailing our Decision dated September 7, 2010 convicting them of the crime of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions and appeal are hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated April 1, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00667 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the civil indemnity for the death of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla is hereby increased to ₱75,000.00, and the amounts of moral and exemplary damages awarded to his heirs are reduced to ₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.1
Lumanog and Augusto Santos seek the reversal of their conviction on the following grounds:
The Honorable Supreme Court erred in:
I. Setting out in the facts of the case and the contents of inadmissible extrajudicial confessions;
II. Not including the extrajudicial confession of Lorenzo delos Santos as excluded evidence;
III. Applying the ruling in People v. Rivera "that the testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court";
IV. According finality to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimony of Freddie Alejo;
V. Ruling that there was positive identification;
VI. Finding "none of the danger signals enumerated by Patrick M. Wall" when 3, 7, 10, 11, 12 in said enumeration are present;
VII. Dismissing the mismatch between the prior description given by the witness and the actual appearances of the accused;
VIII. Relying on the ocular inspection conducted at a time when a material condition is significantly altered;
IX. Ruling that the inconsistencies in Alejo’s earlier statement and his in-court testimony have been explained;
X. Not discrediting Alejo’s testimony despite acceptance of benefits from the Abadilla family;
XI. Holding that the acquittal of Lorenzo delos Santos does not necessarily benefit the appellants;
XII. Ruling that the ballistic and fingerprint examination results are inconclusive and not indispensable;
XIII. Not considering the totality of evidence presented by the defense as against the alleged "positive identification" of the accused.
XIV. Allowing Justice Jose Catral Mendoza to take part in the deliberation and the voting;
XV. Dismissing the evidence presented by Augusto Santos;
XVI. Ruling that the silence of accused Lumanog amounts to a quasi-confession;
XVII. Holding that the delay of (4) four years during which the case remained pending with the CA and this Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.2
Rameses de Jesus raised the following grounds in his motion:
I.
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HEAVILY RELYING ON THE LONE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS SECURITY GUARD (SG) FREDDIE ALEJO’S TESTIMONY, WHICH WAS CHARACTERIZED BY MATERIAL OMISSIONS, PATENT INCREDIBILITY, CONTRADICTIONS AND DISCREPANCIES.
II.
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FIRST SWORN STATEMENT GIVEN BY SG FREDDIE ALEJO, WHEREIN HE STATED THAT THERE WERE FOUR (4) SUSPECTS WHO PERPETRATED THE CRIME CONTRARY TO HIS SUBSEQUENT TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT.
III.
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS, WHICH WOULD SHOW AS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THEIR ALLEGED COLLECTIVE GUILT AND CONSPIRACY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO GIVE WEIGHT TO PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, PARTICULARLY THE EXCULPATORY BALLISTICS AND DACTYLOSCOPY EVIDENCE, AND EXPERT TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE.3
On his part, Cesar Fortuna argues that:
THE LONE, CONTRADICTED AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF S/G ALEJO IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT4
At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our Decision being questioned.5 In particular, the Court need not dwell again on the extrajudicial confessions of Joel de Jesus and Lorenzo delos Santos which we have held inadmissible, the delay in the resolution of the appeals before the CA and this Court which under the circumstances cannot be deemed unreasonable or arbitrary, the inconclusive ballistic and fingerprint examination results, and the effect of Lorenzo delos Santos’ acquittal to the rest of appellants. These matters have been passed upon and adequately discussed in our Decision.
In fine, the accused-movants strongly assail the weight and credence accorded to the identification of the accused by the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard Freddie Alejo. It was pointed out, among others, that: (1) in his statement given to the police investigators immediately after the incident, Alejo mentioned only four suspects, contrary to his subsequent testimony in court; it was impossible for him not to mention the two men he had seen walking back and forth before the shooting; (2) Alejo accepted financial support and benefits from the Abadilla family which could have colored his testimony against the accused; (3) his in-court identification of the six accused is questionable and unreliable considering that it referred to them only by numbers and he had given prior description of only two suspects; and (4) the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court to confirm Alejo’s observations was likewise unreliable because it was made at a time when a material condition is significantly altered, i.e., it was held from 10:00 a.m. onwards whereas the incident occurred between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. when the glare of the morning sun directly hits the guard post where Alejo was stationed.
Fortuna submitted an Affidavit dated November 12, 2009 executed by a certain Orencio G. Jurado, Jr. who claims to be one of the police officers initially assigned to investigate the case. Fortuna contends that said belated statement would certainly cast doubt on the procedures undertaken by the police authorities in the apprehension of the likely perpetrators.
We find the motions bereft of merit.
While it is true that Alejo mentioned only four and not six suspects in his June 13, 1996 sworn statement, this did not impair his testimony as an eyewitness. Alejo was simply responding to specific questions as to what he had witnessed during the shooting incident. Herein quoted is an excerpt from the questioning by SPO1 Edilberto S. Nicanor of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) at Camp Karingal (PNP-NCR) and Alejo’s answers thereto:
08. T - Habang ikaw ay naka-duty bilang guwardiya sa 211 Katipunan Road, Quezon City, itong araw na ito, may napansin ka bang hindi pangkaraniwang pangyayari?
S - Mayroon, Sir.
09. T – Ano iyon?
S - May binaril na sakay ng kotse sa harap ng puwesto ko sir.
10. T - Anong oras ito nangyari?
S - 8:40 ng umaga kanina sir, more or less (13 June 1996)
11. Tanong : Sino ba itong binaril na tinutukoy mo, kung kilala mo?
Sagot : Isang hindi ko kilala na lalaki sir.
12. T - Sino naman ang bumaril sa biktima na ito, kung kilala mo?
S - Apat na hindi kilalang lalaki sir na armado ng baril.
x x x x6 (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing shows that Alejo merely gave the responsive answer to the question as to those persons whom he saw actually shoot the victim who was in his car. As the question was phrased, Alejo was not being asked about the persons who had participation or involvement in the crime, but only those who actually fired at the victim. Hence, he replied that there were four (4) armed men who suddenly fired shots at the victim. What followed was Alejo’s narration of what the gunmen further did to the already wounded victim, to those people within the vicinity -- including himself who was ordered at gunpoint to lie down and not interfere -- and until the firing stopped as the suspects ran away. Clearly, it was not a fatal omission on the part of Alejo not to include in his first affidavit the two other suspects who were acting as lookouts. During his testimony in court, Alejo was able to fully recount the details and state that there were two men walking back and forth before the shooting. It is settled that contradictions between the contents of an affiant’s affidavit and his testimony in the witness stand do not always militate against the witness’ credibility. This is so because affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate.7
There is likewise nothing irregular in Alejo’s manner of testifying in court, initially referring to the accused by numbers, to indicate their relative positions as he remembered them, and the individual participation of each in the violent ambush of Abadilla. As already explained in our decision, Alejo’s elevated position from the guardhouse gave him such a clear and unobstructed view of the incident that he was able to recognize the faces and physical features of the accused at the time. When two of the accused actually poked a gun at him, it gave him more opportunity to see the faces of the accused who had briefly turned their eyes on him. Furthermore, experience dictates, precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before witnesses’ eyes, that they remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals.8 Indeed, Alejos’ recollection is not of "superhuman" level as accused now make it appear, considering that he was a trained security guard, whose job demands extra perceptiveness and vigilance at all times especially during emergency or critical situations. Keen scrutiny of the physical appearance and behavior of persons is a routine part of a security guard’s work duties.
Movants likewise fault this Court for giving considerable weight to the observations made by the trial judge during the ocular inspection, arguing that the timing of said ocular inspection did not coincide with the precise hour in the morning when the shooting incident happened. Because the shooting took place between 8:30 to 9:00 when the glare of the morning sun directly hits the guard post of Alejo, the latter supposedly cannot be said to have had such clear vantage point as found by the trial judge when he positioned himself at the said guard post at a later time, which is already past 10:00 in the morning.
We are not persuaded.
Movants are raising the issue for the first time before this Court and long after trial and rendition of judgment. We have perused the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court on September 26, 1996, and found no objection or comment made by the defense counsel regarding the timing of the inspection and its relevance to the evaluation of Alejo’s testimony. Neither did the accused complain of any irregularity in the conduct of the said ocular inspection before the appellate court. If indeed, the accused found the timing of the ocular inspection crucial to their defense that Alejo was not really an eyewitness as he could not have clearly seen the faces of all the accused from his guard post, they could have made a proper manifestation or objection before the trial judge. They could have even staged a reenactment to demonstrate to the trial court the alleged glare of the morning sun at the time of the commission of the crime, which could have affected Alejo’s perception of the incident. But they did not. It is now too late in the day for the accused to assail as irregular the ocular inspection which was done with the conformity and in the presence of their counsel.
It is an admitted fact that Alejo and his family were sheltered and given financial support by the victim’s family, presumably out of gratitude and sympathy considering that Alejo lost his job after the incident. Such benevolence of the Abadilla family, however, is not sufficient basis for the conclusion that Alejo would falsely accuse movants as the perpetrators of the crime. As we have stressed, Alejo did not waver in his identification of the accused despite a grueling cross-examination by the defense lawyers. Both the trial and appellate courts found Alejo’s testimony as credible, categorical and straightforward. After a painstaking review of the records, we find no cogent reason to deviate from their findings on the issue of credibility of the prosecution’s lone eyewitness.
As to the affidavit of Orencio G. Jurado, Jr. submitted by Fortuna, the said affiant claimed that he had a heated argument with Inspector Roger Castillo during one of the hearings before the trial court because Inspector Castillo was urging him (Jurado) "to confirm that those arrested by the joint team of CID and PARAK-DILG were exactly the same people/suspects described by the guards to which [he] firmly declined". Jurado alleged that he was surprised to see the faces of the suspects flashed on TV several days after Herbas and Alejo gave their statements at Camp Karingal because they did not fit the description given by witnesses Herbas and Alejo. Jurado was also allegedly prevented earlier by an unidentified policeman -- as per instruction of then DILG Secretary Robert Barbers -- from interviewing the suspects arrested by the operatives of the CID and PARAK-DILG.9
Evidently, Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense argument that there was no positive identification of Abadilla’s killers. To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was "newly discovered" pursuant to Section 2,10 Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.1avvphi1
Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below.11 Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the same was cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.
Finally, we must make it clear that Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, who, as then presiding judge at the trial court, heard the prosecution and defense witnesses, never took part in the deliberations and voting by the Court in this case. The absence of notation in the ponencia that Justice Mendoza had "no part" in the deliberations and voting in this case was purely an oversight and inadvertent omission. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, had already rectified such error in the Revised Page 75 of our Decision dated September 7, 2010.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motions for reconsideration filed by Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos, Rameses de Jesus and Cesar Fortuna are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
(No Part)
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA*
Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice |
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice |
(No Part)
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*
Associate Justice |
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* No part.
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 182555), pp. 870-871.
2 Id. at 979-980.
3 Id. at 937.
4 Id. at 1023.
5 People v. Larrañaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA 652, 659, citing Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 109645 and 112564, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.
6 Folder of Exhibits, pp. 26-27.
7 Resayo v. People, G.R. No. 154502, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 391, 402-403, citing People v. Quillosa, 382 Phil. 638, 647 (2000), People v. Bermudez, G.R. No. 129033, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 124, 136, People v. Tanilon, 354 Phil. 1015, 1026 (1998).
8 Vidar v. People, G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010, 611 SCRA 216, 228, citing People v. Foncardas, 466 Phil. 992, 1006 (2004).
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 182555), p. 1035.
10 SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial. -- The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
11 United States v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 269, 271 (1905).
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