Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 2009-23-SC February 26, 2010
RE: SMOKING AT THE FIRE EXIT AREA AT THE BACK OF THE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Resolution the administrative case involving Atty. Brandon C. Domingo, Atty. Leo Felix S. Domingo, and Atty. Emiliana Helen R. Ubongen (respondents) for alleged violation of (1) Section 6,1 in connection with Section 1,2 of Office Order No. 06-2009 entitled "Reiterating the Ban on Smoking as Provided for in Administrative Circular No. 09-99 and Reiterated and Clarified in Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A," and (2) Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 2009, entitled "Smoking Prohibition Based on a 100% Smoke-Free Environment Policy."3
By 1st Indorsement dated October 29, 2009,4 Eduardo V. Escala (Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Security Division of this Court) forwarded to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria (Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer) for her information and appropriate action, the Incident Report5 dated October 29, 2009 of Gregorio Alvarez (Alvarez), Security Officer II.
Alvarez related that on October 27, 2009 at about 2:50 p.m., Roel Suyo (Watchman II) instructed him to proceed to the Public Information Office (PIO) because some staff members of that Office wanted to report violations of the Court’s smoking ban. At the PIO, Atty. Dominadoranne Lim reported to him that she found one female and two male Supreme Court employees smoking in the fire exit at the back of the PIO. She further claimed that she recognized them as court attorneys from the Office of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, but was prevented from ascertaining their identities when one of the lawyers parried her hands as she tried to take a look at his Supreme Court identification card.
In a Memorandum dated November 13, 2009, the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) requested Atty. Lim to name and identify the employees she saw smoking inside the Court premises and to give additional details on the incident, so that the Office may act accordingly on the report.6 Atty. Lim responded with a letter dated November 18, 20097 where she narrated that:
On 28 October 2009, at around noon time, upon inhaling second hand smoke in the PIO coming from the fire exit, my officemates and I discreetly went to the fire exit, and upon opening the door, were met with a strong smell of cigarette smoke. I heard people conversing upstairs. I proceeded up a flight of stairs, and immediately saw outside the 4th floor door, three (3) people smoking, who were identified later as Brandon Carlos Domingo, Leo Felix S. Domingo, and Emiliana Belen R. Ubongen. Incidentally, they were in an area surrounded by stacks and piles of paper documents.
I also called my office mate, Erika Dy, who immediately showed up at the flight of stairs and saw the smokers. Moments after, office mates Dennis Balason and Jay Rempillo also arrived and also saw them.
Later in the day, the three smokers, accompanied by Atty. Josephine C. Yap, came to our office for a meeting attended by, [sic] all three, Brandon Carlos Domingo, Leo Felix S. Domingo, and Emiliana Belen R. Ubongen, and DCA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Atty. Yap and Erika Dy, and myself. During the meeting the three categorically admitted that they were indeed all smoking in the fire exit that afternoon.
On November 19, 2009, the OAS individually directed the respondents to submit their respective comments/explanations on why they should not be subjected to appropriate administrative disciplinary actions and sanctions for violating the ban on smoking within the Court premises.8 The respondents collectively filed their Comment dated November 27, 2009.9 They contended that Alvarez’s report was not based on his personal knowledge of the incident; he completely relied on the account given by Atty. Lim. They also claimed that Atty. Lim uttered untruthful statements against them to retaliate for the administrative complaint lodged against her. They pointed out that while Alvarez reported that the incident occurred on October 27, 2009, Atty. Lim inconsistently maintained that it occurred on October 28, 2009.
The respondents further alleged that they were not informed of the particular memorandum or circular they were supposed to have violated. Nevertheless, they questioned the validity of the existing regulations on smoking within Court premises. They averred that the salient provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A,10 particularly the implementation of smoking cessation programs within the Court and the designation of smoking areas within the premises, had not yet been implemented. Similarly, they noted that Republic Act No. 9211 (otherwise known as "The Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003") likewise requires that the appropriate places for cigarette smoking be designated. Moreover, the respondents consider an absolute ban on smoking within the Court premises to be unreasonable.11
In the Memorandum12 dated December 21, 2009, Atty. Candelaria reviewed the respondents’ assertions regarding the inaccuracies in the reports of Alvarez and Atty. Lim, but considered it more significant that the respondents did not deny that they were the persons found smoking in the fire exit. She also clarified that the facts contained in the reports consisted of violations of reasonable office rules and regulations, particularly Office Order No. 06-2009, and Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 2009. She likewise cited a Memorandum dated October 6, 2009, issued by the OAS through Atty. Ma. Carina M. Cunanan, declaring that smoking is now strictly prohibited inside the Supreme Court’s premises.
Atty. Candelaria found that the respondents’ acts constituted a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations—a light offense under Section 52(C)(3) of Rule IV on Penalties of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,13 for which the penalty is Reprimand.14 Nevertheless, she recommended that a WARNING be issued to the respondents, as well as a reminder that a repetition of the same or similar acts be dealt with more strictly in the future. In merely admonishing the respondents instead of issuing a reprimand, Atty. Candelaria considered that the respondents had never been charged with any offense prior to this incident.15
We agree with Atty. Candelaria’s recommendation that a WARNING issued to the respondents is sufficient. We appreciate Atty. Candelaria’s submitted reason that this is the respondents’ first offense, and is in fact the first case in this Court involving smoking. Separately from these reasons, we take into account compelling considerations that dissuade us from imposing the full sanctions on the respondents.
The statute that actually penalizes smoking is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9211 or the Tobacco Regulation Act of 200316 which, in order to foster a healthful environment, absolutely prohibits smoking in specified public places17 and designates smoking and non-smoking areas in places where the absolute ban on smoking does not apply.18 Under this law, the Court is generally considered a place where smoking is restricted, rather than absolutely banned. Exceptions to this characterization are the Court’s elevators and stairwells; the Court’s medical and dental clinics; and the Court’s cafeteria and other dining areas (including the Justices’ Lounge), together with their food preparation areas, where an absolute ban applies. In the areas where smoking restriction applies, the law requires that the Court designate smoking and non-smoking areas. Significantly, the law carries specific penalties for violations, ranging from a low of a ₱500.00 fine for the first offense, to a high of not more than ₱10,000.00 fine for the third offense.19
In the present case, the respondents were caught smoking (as Atty. Candelaria found and we have no reason to dispute this finding) at the Court’s stairwell – an area subject to an absolute ban on smoking. Thus, technically, a smoking violation under R.A. No. 9211 exists.
We note, however, that the respondents were never held to account for violation of R.A. No. 9211 and, in fact, had raised the question of under which law or regulation they were being held accountable. In response, the OAS pointed to Section 6, in connection with Section 1, of Office Order No. 06-2009; and Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 2009.20 Thus, the respondents never defended themselves against any charged violation of R.A. No. 9211 and cannot be held liable under this law pursuant to the present charge against them.
Office Order No. 06-2009, under which the respondents are charged, covers absolute smoking prohibition areas greater than those covered by R.A. 921, which include all interior areas of the buildings of the courts and the areas immediately adjacent to these buildings. The Office Order still allows smoking within court premises (apparently referring to exterior areas), but such smoking has to be done in designated places. Sections 2 and 3 of Office Order No. 06-2009 provides for the designation of smoking areas:
Sec. 2. Smoking Areas.-Court personnel who choose to smoke shall do so in open locations at reasonable distance (five or more meters) from any building, enclosed area, or vehicle where smoking is prohibited to ensure that environmental tobacco smoke does not enter the building, enclosed area, or vehicle through entrances, windows, ventilation or exhaust systems or any other means.
Sec. 3. Designation of smoking areas. – (a) In the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals, their respective Chief Administrative Officers shall designate the smoking areas in their compounds.
Compliance with the Office Order is enforced under its Section 6 on Administrative Sanction.21
Implicit, to our mind, in these provisions is that appropriate smoking areas should be designated to give full effect to the Office Order. The smokers within the courts must know not only where they cannot smoke, but also where they can legitimately smoke.
Unfortunately, no designation of the smoking areas was immediately made. In fact, a clarificatory Memorandum dated October 6, 2009 states that "smoking is now strictly prohibited inside the Supreme Court’s premises," since there are no open areas that are five or more meters away from any building, enclosed area or vehicle where smoking is absolutely prohibited.
After the smoking incident involving the respondents on October 27, 2009, the Court clarified the interpretation of the issuances on smoking to reflect the interpretation the Court believes to be correct. On December 15, 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Resolution directing the OAS to recommend smoking areas within the Court pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A.22 In compliance with this December 15, 2009 Resolution, the OAS addressed a Memorandum to the Chief Justice recommending two areas in the Court that may be designated as smoking areas: (1) a portion of the Taft side parking area in the Old Compound; and (2) a space between the DOJ building and the front exit gate in the New Compound. In effect, the Court invalidated the October 6, 2009 Memorandum declaring a total smoking prohibition within court premises, but it was not until February 9, 2010 that the matter was clarified when the Court En Banc approved the OAS Memorandum to the Chief Justice on the designated smoking areas.
To be sure, the stairwell where the respondents smoked is considered a completely banned area under the Office Order and does not need the issuance of any clarificatory smoking area designation. The lack of designation, however, raises questions about the status of the Office Order and the issuances it seeks to implement (specifically, Administrative Circular No. 09-99, Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A, as well as the related Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 2009). One of the questions is whether there can be a valid partial enforcement of the Office Order.1avvphi1
Effectively, partial enforcement upholds that part of the Office Order that prohibits smoking in certain areas, but nullifies equally critical parts of the rule that clearly allow smoking in designated areas. Stated differently, partial enforcement gives effect to the part of the Office Order absolutely prohibiting smoking in certain areas, without implementing the parts that call for the designation of smoking areas. An arguable objection to this manner of implementation is the badge of inequity that it carries, as it places a greater burden upon smokers than that which the Office Order intended; without any designated smoking area, they are always at risk of running afoul of the Office Order.
When the interpretation of a statute or a rule according to the exact and literal import of its words would contravene the clear purposes of the law (in the case of the Office Order, to safeguard health and environmental concerns, while respecting the rights of the individual), such interpretation should be disregarded in favor of a construction of the law made according to its spirit and reason.23 A law’s raison d’etre must be ascertained from a consideration of the rule as a whole, not of an isolated part of a particular provision alone. A word or phrase taken in isolation from its context might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended.24
Another point to consider is the reality that the Office Order imposes an administrative sanction on violating court officials and employees. Thus, strictly speaking, the Office Order is a penal measure because of the punishment it imposes. The penal provisions of a law or regulation are to be construed strictly – a rule of construction that emphatically forbids any attempt to hold that when the commission of an act on certain specific occasions is penalized, it should be penalized on all other occasions.25 It is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to increase the restrictions provided by law.26 When Section 6 of Office Order No. 06-2009 sets out to penalize only the act of smoking outside the designated smoking areas, but ends up penalizing the act in all the areas within the Court because no proper smoking area has been designated, the rule is thereby expanded beyond its intended parameters.
The rule, being penal, must also be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the respondents and at the same time preserve its obvious intention. If the language is plain, it will be construed as it is read, with the words of the rule given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the respondents than it would if the statute were remedial.27 The strict construction of penal statutes against the state and their liberal construction in favor of an accused, defendant, or respondent are not intended to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality, but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.28
It must likewise be considered, still with respect to the penal nature of the Office Order, that not only smoking violators but even the Chief of our OAS may have technically been in violation of the Office Order when she failed to comply with the duty to designate the smoking areas within Court premises.29 As worded, Section 3 of the Office Order imposes this duty on the Chief Administrative Officer. Thus, the Office Order casts a net wider than that which caught the respondents. In the absence of any Court action for the omission under Section 3, so also should we not act at this point on other violations of our rule.
An aspect obviously absent from this discussion is CSC Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 2009, that was also allegedly violated. The absence is intentional to avoid repetition, as this Memorandum is no different in its terms and effects from Office Order No. 06-2009; thus, what applies to the latter – with due adjustments owing to circumstances peculiar to the development of Office Order No. 06-2009 within the Court – similarly applies to the former.
Under the circumstances, in addition to those pointed out by Atty. Eden Candelaria and out of considerations of fairness that the Court should exemplify, we believe and so hold that we should not impose on the respondents the strict sanction the Office Order carries. The health and safety concerns that our smoking policy embodies, however, should not be lost on the respondents and on everyone within the Court, smokers and non-smokers alike. Hence, we have to give the respondents the firm warning that the chief enforcer of the Office Order – the OAS, through Atty. Eden Candelaria – recommended, while at the same time also warning everyone that this initial lenient consideration is not apt to be repeated in future violations now that our smoke-free policy is complete.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Brandon C. Domingo, Atty. Leo Felix S. Domingo, and Atty. Emiliana Helen R. Ubongen are firmly WARNED and PUT ON NOTICE that a repetition of any prohibited smoking under the law and against our internal Court policies shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice |
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Section 6 of Office Order No.06-2009 reads:
Sec. 6. Administrative sanction. Non-compliance by court officials and employees with the provisions of this Memorandum Circular restricting smoking in prohibited smoking areas shall be subject to the appropriate administrative disciplinary action and sanction.
2 Section 1 of Office Order No. 06-2009 states that:
Sec. 1. Prohibited smoking areas. Smoking will be prohibited absolutely in the following areas:
a. All interior areas (including conference rooms, utility rooms, comfort rooms, cafeterias, elevators, fire exit staircases and other stairwells) of the buildings mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
b. All areas immediately adjacent to the said buildings; and
c. All garage/parking areas within the compound of such buildings and all motor vehicles parked therein.
3 Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 2009, provides that:
x x x x
2. Smoking Prohibition. Smoking shall be prohibited in areas anywhere in or on the government premises, buildings, and grounds, except for open spaces designated as "smoking area," as herein defined.
4 Rollo, p. 24.
5 Id., at 25.
6 Id., at 23.
7 Id., at 19-20.
8 Id., at 16-18.
9 Id., at 6-14.
10 Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A, entitled "Enjoining All Officials and Employees of the Judiciary to Strictly Observe the Prohibition Against Smoking in the Buildings of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and in All Halls of Justice," was issued by Chief Justice Reynato Puno on January 22, 2008.
11 Rollo, pp.12-13.
12 Id., at 1-4.
13 Resolution No. 99-1936, otherwise known as the "Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service," issued by the Civil Service Commission on August 31, 1999, took effect on September 27, 1999.
14 Section 53 (C) (3) of Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service reads:
C. The following are Light Offenses with corresponding penalties:
x x x x
3. Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations:
1st Offense – Reprimand
2nd Offense – Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense - Dismissal
15 Rollo, p. 4.
16 Effective date – June 28, 2003.
17 Section 5, R.A. No. 9211. Smoking Ban in Public Places. — Smoking shall be absolutely prohibited in the following public places:
a. Centers of youth activity such as playschools, preparatory schools, elementary schools, high schools, colleges and universities, youth hostels and recreational facilities for persons under eighteen (18) years old;
b. Elevators and stairwells;
c. Locations in which fire hazards are present, including gas stations and storage areas for flammable liquids, gas, explosives or combustible materials;
d. Within the buildings and premises of public and private hospitals, medical, dental, and optical clinics, health centers, nursing homes, dispensaries and laboratories;
e. Public conveyances and public facilities including airport and ship terminals and train and bus stations, restaurants and conference halls, except for separate smoking areas; and
f. Food preparation areas.
18 Section 6, R.A. No. 9211. Designated Smoking and Non-smoking Areas. — In all enclosed places that are open to the general public, private workplaces and other places not covered under the preceding section, where smoking may expose a person other than the smoker to tobacco smoke, the owner, proprietor, operator, possessor, manager or administrator of such places shall establish smoking and non-smoking areas. Such areas may include a designated smoking area within the building, which may be in an open space or separate area with proper ventilation, but shall not be located within the same room that has been designated as a non-smoking area.
All designated smoking areas shall have at least one (1) legible and visible sign posted, namely "SMOKING AREA" for the information and guidance of all concerned. In addition, the sign or notice posted shall include a warning about the health effects of direct or secondhand exposure to tobacco smoke. Non-Smoking areas shall likewise have at least one (1) legible and visible sign, namely: "NON-SMOKING AREA" or "NO SMOKING."
19 R.A. No. 9211, Section 32(a).
20 Supra note 3.
21 Supra note 1.
22 The Court issued this Resolution pursuant to a Letter-Petition dated November 5, 2009, signed by Court employees seeking the recall of the October 6, 2009 Memorandum strictly prohibiting smoking within the Court premises.
23 Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil 850, 856 (1957).
24 People v. Judge Purisima, 176 Phil 186, 204 (1978).
25 United States v. Estapia, 37 Phil 17, 21 (1917).
26 Go Chioco v. Martinez, 45 Phil 256, 281 (1923).
27 United v. Go Chico, 14 Phil 128, 140-141 (1909).
28 People v. Judge Purisima, 176 Phil 186, 208 (1978).
29 See: Section 3(a), Office Order No. 06-2009.
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