Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182010 August 25, 2010
SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via petition erroneously captioned as one for Certiorari, Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) challenges the November 27, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27894 which affirmed the July 28, 2003 Decision of Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 convicting Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) – possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The accusatory portion of the Information dated December 12, 2002 indicting petitioner reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2002 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, custody and control 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).2 (underscoring supplied)
At the trial, petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary evidence of the prosecution, particularly the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports issued by National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen (de Belen),3 subject to her defenses, to thus dispense with the testimony of de Belen.
De Belen recorded the results of the laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet in Dangerous Drugs Report No. DD-02-613,4 viz:
x x x x
SPECIMEN:
White crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked "SRE" and further placed in bigger marked transparent plastic sachet.
x x x x
F I N D I N G S:
Net Weight of specimen = 0.1224 gram
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug. x x x
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
With respect to the examination of the urine of petitioner, de Belen recorded the results thereof in Toxicology Report No. TDD-02-41285 reading:
x x x x
SPECIMEN:
Urine of one SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES. 37 y/o, married, jobless, of no. 1159 Bo. Bayanihan, Maricaban, Pasay City.
x x x x
F I N D I N G S:
Volume of urine = 60 mL.
pH of urine = 5.0
Appearance = yellow orange, turbid
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for the presence of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, and its metabolite AMPHETAMINE. x x x
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on its documentary evidence and the testimony of PO1 Alvin Cruzin (PO1 Cruzin),6 a member of the Pasay City Police Station Special Operations Group (SOG), the prosecution established its version as follows:
On the basis of an informant’s tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as "Ryan."
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case.
After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic sachet7 on which he marked her initials "SRE." With the seized item, petitioner was brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police Station where P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a memorandum8 dated December 10, 2002 addressed to the Chief Forensic Chemist of the NBI in Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory examination of the substance contained in the plastic sachet to determine the presence of shabu, and 2) the conduct of a drug test on the person of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas soon executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension9 recounting the details of their intended surveillance and the circumstances leading to petitioner’s arrest.
Repudiating the charges, petitioner10 gave the following tale:
At around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question, while she was sick and resting at home, several policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists barged in and asked her whether she knew one named "Ryan" who they claimed was a notorious snatcher operating in the area, to which she replied in the negative. The police officers then forced her to go with them to the Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where she was detained.
While she was under detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which they claimed contained shabu and recovered from her.
In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was "planted," stemming from an all too obvious attempt by the police officers to extort money from her and her family.
Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioner’s daughter Josan Lee11 and family friend Ma. Stella Tolentino,12 corroborated petitioner’s account. They went on to relate that the police officers never informed them of the reason why they were taking custody of petitioner.
By Decision13 of July 28, 2003, the trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal possession of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused Susan Esquillo y Romines GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of par. 3 of Section 11, Article II of R. A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and absent any modifying circumstance to either aggravate or mitigate the criminal liability of the same accused, and furthermore, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P350,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus costs.
The 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or "Shabu" involved in this case is declared forfeited in favor of the Government and ordered to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper and appropriate disposition in accordance with the provisions of the law.14 (underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant to thus render any evidence obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible.
In its challenged Decision affirming petitioner’s conviction, the appellate court, citing People v. Chua,15 held that the police officers had probable cause to search petitioner under the "stop-and-frisk" concept, a recognized exception to the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches.16
Brushing aside petitioner’s defense of frame-up, the appellate court noted that petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the arresting officers were impelled by any evil motive to falsely charge her, and that she was even found positive for substance abuse.1âwphi1
In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate court’s application of the "stop-and-frisk" principle in light of PO1 Cruzin’s failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having merely noticed her placing something inside a cigarette case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the suspicion.17
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision but seeks a modification of the penalty to conform to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9165.
Appellant’s conviction stands.
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest – before her arraignment. Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest – as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof– for the first time only on appeal before the appellate court.18 By such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.19
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.20 (emphasis underscoring supplied)
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account, among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.21
Elucidating on what includes "stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua22 held:
. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In said case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk." In People v. Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons w[h]ere roaming the vicinity. (emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)1âwphi1
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.23
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner’s possession - later voluntarily exhibited24 to the police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.
It bears recalling that petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports, subject, however, to whatever available defenses she would raise. While such admissions do not necessarily control in determining the validity of a warrantless search or seizure, they nevertheless provide a reasonable gauge by which petitioner’s credibility as a witness can be measured, or her defense tested.
It has not escaped the Court’s attention that petitioner seeks exculpation by adopting two completely inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one hand, she argues that the "stop-and-frisk" search upon her person and personal effects was unjustified as it constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Constitution. In the same breadth, however, she denies culpability by holding fast to her version that she was at home resting on the date in question and had been forcibly dragged out of the house by the police operatives and brought to the police station, for no apparent reason than to try and extort money from her. That her two witnesses – a daughter and a friend – who were allegedly present at the time of her arrest did not do anything to report it despite their claim that they were not informed why she was being arrested, should dent the credibility of their testimony.
Courts have tended to look with disfavor on claims of accused, such as those of petitioner’s, that they are victims of a frame-up. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been held as a shop-worn defense of the accused in drug-related cases, the allegation being easily concocted or contrived. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts of government officials. This it failed to do.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of petitioner.25
A word on the penalty.
While the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, it overlooked the error in the penalty imposed by the trial court. The trial court, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentenced petitioner to "suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum."
Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 provides, however:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
x x x x
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
x x x x
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, metamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to MDMA or "ecstacy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possesses is far behind therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when the offense is punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, "the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same."
The prayer of the Office of the Solicitor General for a modification of the penalty is thus in order.
The Court, therefore, imposes on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum. In all other respects, the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice |
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Magdangal M. De Leon; CA rollo, pp. 108-116.
2 Records, p. 5.
3 TSN. May 5, 2003, pp. 2-8.
4 Vide Exhibit "C," records, p. 116.
5 Vide Exhibit "D," id. at 117.
6 TSN, May 29, 2003, pp. 2-19.
7 Exhibit "A-1-a."
8 Exhibits "A" and "B," records, pp. 114-115.
9 Exhibits "E" to "E-2," id. at 118.
10 TSN, June 24, 2003, pp. 19-29.
11 TSN, June 19, 2003, pp. 2-10.
12 TSN, June 24, 2003, pp. 2-18.
13 Rendered by Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero; records, pp. 143-150.
14 Id. at 150.
15 G.R. No. 136066-67, February 4, 2003, 396 SCRA 657.
16 CA rollo, pp. 114-115.
17 Rollo, pp. 18-22.
18 CA rollo, pp. 54-59.
19 People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004, 428 SCRA 51, 61 citing People v. Lagarto, 326 SCRA 693, 749 (2000); People v. Timon, 281 SCRA 579, 597 (1997).
20 People v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571, 594.
21 People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 476.
22 Supra, note 15.
23 Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997, 283 SCRA 159, 177.
24 TSN, May 29, 2003, pp. 7-8.
25 People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 185164, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 494, 507-508.
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