Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176566 October 2, 2009
ELISEO EDUARTE y COSCOLLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Resolution is accused-appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration, Compassion and Reduction of Penalty dated 26 May 2009.
On 16 April 2009, this Court affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 August 2004 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Robbery. The dispositive portion of Our decision reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 12 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26716 affirming the conviction of Eliseo Eduarte y Coscolla for the crime of Robbery and sentencing him to suffer the prison term ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years [of] prision mayor as maximum, is hereby affirmed in toto. He is ordered to pay private complainant Catherine Navarra the amount of ₱8,875.00 by way of restitution.1
In this instant motion, accused-appellant, being aware that it is no longer practicable to change the Court’s verdict guilty against him or to shake the Court’s faith in the credibility of his accuser, instead pleads, out of compassion for him and his family, that we reduce the maximum period of his sentence from eight years to six years in order that he may apply for probation and continue to work as a messenger at Unilever Philippines, where he has been employed since 1994 or for more than 15 years.
Accused-appellant discloses that he is the sole breadwinner of his family. If he is imprisoned, there will be no one to support his wife and two children. If his wife, who is a plain housewife, works as a domestic helper or nanny for other people’s children, no one will be left at home to care for their children.
Accused-appellant stresses that, except for this case, he has no previous criminal record. He appends several Certifications,2 in addition to those he already attached during trial, issued by his immediate superiors at Unilever Philippines, the parish priest in his parish and the Barangay Chairperson of his barangay at Cristobal Street, Paco Manila, to attest that he is a person of good moral character with a good reputation in his community.
Accused-appellant further emphasizes that since the imposable penalty on him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law ranges from a minimum of arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months) to a maximum of prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 8 years), his prayer for the reduction of his maximum penalty to six (6) years, so that he may be eligible for probation, is not too much to ask considering that only one (1) day separates 6 years from the minimum of the maximum penalty (6 years and 1 day to 8 years) imposable by law for the offense charged.
Counsel for accused-appellant believes that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public and that of accused-appellant and his family will be served by allowing accused-appellant to avail himself of the benefits of probation. Counsel for accused-appellant, who personally knows the latter, asserts that accused-appellant is not a vagrant or a good-for-nothing bum in need of correctional treatment that can be provided by putting him in a penal institution. In fact, he has, for the past fifteen years, been steadily and gainfully employed in a reputable corporation where his immediate superiors have vouched for his good character and conduct.
The penalty for simple robbery, the felony committed by accused-appellant, is provided for in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Said article reads:
ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
x x x x
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases.
The penalty prescribed under Article 294(5) is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, that is, four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,3 the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, and whose maximum term should be the proper period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, or four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, taking into account the proven modifying circumstance.
In our decision dated 16 April 2009, we inadvertently declared that the medium period of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence is prision mayor in its minimum period which has a range of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years. This has to be rectified. The medium period of the maximum term is six (6) years, one month (1) month and eleven (11) days to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days.
After taking a second hard look at the records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN), as well as the state of affairs of accused-appellant’s life, we opt to modify the penalty imposed on him.
We first determine the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed on accused-appellant. The minimum term is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court may impose a minimum term which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. In determining the minimum penalty, the law confers upon the courts in fixing the penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had. The determination of the minimum term is left entirely within the discretion of the court to fix it anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without reference to the periods into which it may be subdivided.4 In the exercise of Our discretion, and considering the circumstances (i.e., gainfully employed for the past 15 years in a reputable company and involvement in civic activities) that have arisen after the commission of the felony, we lower the minimum of the indeterminate sentence to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.1avvphi1
We now go to the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. As mentioned in Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code. In the instant case, the maximum term has a range of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, or four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. The maximum term of the indeterminate penalty is broken down as follows:
Minimum: 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years, 1 month and 10 days
Medium: 6 years, 1 month and 11 days to 8 years and 20 days
Maximum: 8 years and 21 days to 10 years
In our decision, we affirmed the maximum term of eight (8) years imposed by the Court of Appeals, which is in the medium period (6 years, 1 month and 11 days to 8 years and 20 days) of the maximum term, considering that we did not find any modifying circumstance.
In the case before us, accused-appellant was arrested by the police without resistance. Even before accused-appellant was arrested, he suggested to private complainant that they go to the police station.5 In addition, when private complainant and her friend left accused-appellant to seek the assistance of the police, accused-appellant, despite having the opportunity to flee, did not leave.6 The confluence of these circumstances justifies the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance of similar nature and analogous to that of number 7 of Article 13 (voluntary surrender) in favor of accused-appellant. If accused-appellant really wanted to abscond, he could have readily done so. This, he did not do. We therefore pronounce that accused-appellant is entitled to a mitigating circumstance under number 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
With the attendance of one mitigating circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence must be imposed in its minimum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years, 1 month and 10 days).
We, therefore, modify the penalty imposed on accused-appellant to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, Motion for Reconsideration, Compassion and Reduction of Penalty is GRANTED and our Decision promulgated on 16 April 2009 is hereby MODIFIED by reducing the indeterminate sentence imposed on accused-appellant to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA C. CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Associate Justice Conchita C. Carpio Morales was designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Raffle dated 29 June 2009.
1 Rollo, p. 149.
2 Annexes "A" to "D."
3 SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
4 People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, 116 (1933).
5 TSN, 3 February 1997, pp. 7 & 10.
6 TSN, 2 August 1995, pp. 12-13, 16 November 2001, p. 5.
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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
I concur with the Resolution but it is with respect to the appreciation of supposed analogous mitigating circumstances therein that I register my dissent. The circumstances mentioned therein are, to me, not analogous to voluntary surrender.
The Resolution declares that yielding to arrest without any attempt to resist is analogous to voluntary surrender. People v. Rabuya (182 Phil. 490, 504) dictates otherwise, however.
Even if accused-appellant suggested to the private complainant that they go to the police station, this is not akin to voluntary surrender. For, material in the appreciation of accused-appellant’s claim in this regard is the testimony that he introduced himself as a police station commander, to deter or scare the private complainant from pointing to him as the robber. Further, accused-appellant’s suggestion to go to the police station was apparently meant to "clear his name" against the private complainant’s accusation (Vide: People v. Abella, 393 Phil. 513, 538 [2000]) and not to acknowledge his guilt.
In the same vein, accused-appellant’s "non-flight" is not analogous to voluntary surrender. His supposed actuation of staying put is consistent with the bravado he had initially displayed when he casually walked inside a food chain store as if nothing happened and thereafter flaunted a police badge and introduced himself as a policeman to the private complainant and her friend.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
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