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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 182161               December 3, 2009

Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS, secretary DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 4, 2008 Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011 which dismissed the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, as amended. It also assails the CA’s Resolution dated March 25, 2008, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid February 4, 2008 Decision.

The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:

Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.

On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.

On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.

On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge.

On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other accused-civilians conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the government; that petitioner and other accused-civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing one’s sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete evidence that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law penalizes must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.

On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.

On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioner’s letter stating that the DOJ could not act on petitioner’s request until Atty. Chavez’s right to represent petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.

On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioner’s counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is illegal.

On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed the Return of the Writ raising the following affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998² and No. 18 Series of 2007³ pursuant to his mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the principal law agency of the government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case against herein petitioner upon the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondent’s pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by the respondents of the Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not be attacked collaterally in an amparo proceeding.

During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the Court of Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing HDO; that the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and that petitioner did not file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would be tantamount to recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.

For respondents’ part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that the Secretary of the DOJ’s power to issue HDO springs from its mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as the principal law agency of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 has not been challenged except now; and that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Dismissal of the trial court.

On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the Order dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent DOJ’s Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also observed that the said Motion should be dismissed outright for being filed out of time. ⁴

The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.

On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration⁵ thereon was also denied in the assailed Resolution⁶ dated March 25, 2008.

Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:

I.

THE DOJ SECRETARY’S ARROGATION OF POWER AND USURPATION OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY BEEN "REGULARLY EXERCISED IN THE PAST" OR HAS "NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).

II.

THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO INDEPENDENT OF THAT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, HENCE, PETITIONER CANNOT MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF THE RTC MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-3126 TO ASSAIL SUCH CLAIMED POWER.

III.

THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CONTINUING ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO TRAVEL THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO LIST AND DOES NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A RESTRAINT.

IV.

DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE DOJ SECRETARY’S CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR IT IS NOT A STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT BE ATTACKED IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING.⁷

Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that "[liberty] includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways." Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person to travel.

In their Comment,⁸ both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,⁹ and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007,¹⁰ which were issued pursuant to said Secretary’s mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government, to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretary’s authority to issue hold departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a writ of amparo.

The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

The petition must fail.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,¹¹ made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof, thus:

x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."¹²

In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,¹³ the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on the writ of amparo as follows:

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."¹⁴

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.

In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,¹⁵ the Court explained the concept of right to life in this wise:

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property… pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."¹⁶

The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,¹⁷ in this manner:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." x x x

Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.¹⁸ thoroughly expounded on the import of the right to security, thus:

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

x x x

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.

x x x

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis supplied) ¹⁹

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.²⁰ As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,²¹ "xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion." ²²

Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I – XIII, Inc. et al.,²³ this Court ruled that:

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.

We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:

Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. – When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.1avvphi1

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJ’s HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO.²⁴ We quote with approval the CA’s ruling on this matter:

The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul²⁵ that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondent’s MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).²⁶

Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del Rosario,²⁷ thus:

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or securitythe personal concern that the writ is intended to protectis immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.²⁸ Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice	RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice	MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice	ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice	DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice	MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice	MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alino-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Angelita R. Lontok and Marlene Gonzales-Sison concurring; rollo, pp. 33-45.

² Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders.

³ Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for other purposes.

⁴ Rollo, pp. 34-38.

⁵ Id. at 53-68.

⁶ Id. at 48-52.

⁷ Id. at 10-11.

⁸ Rollo, pp. 235-254.

⁹ Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders.

¹⁰ Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for other purposes.

¹¹ G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1, 38-39.

¹² Citing the Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 48. This is the definition used in the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.

¹³ G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 768, 784-785.

¹⁴ Citing Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

¹⁵ Supra note 11 at 52.

¹⁶ Id.

¹⁷ G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308, 336.

¹⁸ Supra note 11 at 52-57.

¹⁹ Id. at 50-59.

²⁰ Mirasol, et al. v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 318, 353.

²¹ G.R. Nos. 115132-34, August 9, 1995, 247 SCRA 127.

²² Id. at 141-142.

²³ G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008, 554 SCRA 208, 211-212.

²⁴ CA Decision, rollo, pp. 9-10.

²⁵ G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 462.

²⁶ Rollo, pp. 39-40.

²⁷ Supra note 13 at 789.

²⁸ Rollo, p. 43.

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