Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1706 April 16, 2009
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-1984-MTJ)
MUTYA B. VICTORIO, Complainant,
vs.
Judge MAXWELL S. ROSETE, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL Trial Court IN CITIES, BRANCH 2, SANTIAGO CITY, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant administrative complaint1 was filed before this Court by Mutya B. Victorio (Victorio) charging Judge Maxwell S. Rosete (Judge Rosete) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Santiago City, with Conduct Unbecoming a Judge, in relation to Civil Cases No. 11-551 and No. 556-557, entitled, Mutya Victorio v. Leonardo Chua, et al.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the instant administrative case, as judicially determined in Chua v. Victorio,2 are recounted below:
Sometime in September of 1994, [Victorio] (through her attorney-in-fact) made a rental survey of other commercial establishments along Panganiban Street. On the basis of the survey, a 25% rental increase was demanded from [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian].
[Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] refused to pay the increased rentals which compelled [Victorio] to file unlawful detainer cases against both lessees, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. II-370 and II-371. However, both complaints were dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch II, Santiago City. The dismissal was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), but reversed by the Court of Appeals, which ordered [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] to vacate the leased premises.
The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory, and, upon motion filed by [Victorio], the MTCC issued writs of execution ordering the ejectment of [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] from respondent’s property.
[Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] filed motions to quash the writs of execution, contending that there were supervening events which rendered the execution unjust or impossible. Specifically, [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] claimed that they had acceded to the request for an increase in rentals, and had paid [Victorio] the amount demanded.
The MTCC found that [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] had indeed paid to [Victorio] the increased monthly rental even before the Court of Appeals decision attained finality. In fact, [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] offered to pay the increased rentals as early as January 1996, while the cases were still pending with the RTC. The increased monthly rentals were accepted by [Victorio] without reservation, and monthly payment of the rentals at the increased rate continued throughout the pendency of the suits. Accordingly, the MTCC quashed the writs of execution that it earlier issued.1awphi1
[Victorio] assailed the quashal of the writ of execution directly to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari. This petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on procedural grounds. [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] thus remained in possession of [Victorio’s] properties.
Subsequently, on October 10, 1998, [Victorio] wrote a letter to [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] informing them of her intention to increase the monthly rentals effective November 1, 1998, from ₱6,551.25 per unit to a sum more than double that, namely, ₱15,000.00 per unit. [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] refused to pay this amount, contending that it was beyond the allowable rental increase embodied in the compromise agreement.
[Victorio] thus instituted Civil Cases Nos. [II-556 and 557] seeking the ejectment of [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian]. In a joint decision dated May 10, 1999, the MTCC, Branch II, Santiago City dismissed these complaints for lack of merit. On appeal [in Civil Cases Nos. 21-2761 and 21-2762], the RTC initially reversed the MTCC, but later reversed its earlier decision. On March 9, 2000, the RTC issued an order affirming the MTCC’s dismissal of the complaints.
[Victorio] filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. [59482]. On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals reversed the March 9, 2000 Order of the RTC affirming the MTCC’s dismissal of the complaints. The Court of Appeals ruled that the compromise agreement, which set a definite period of four years for the lease contract, had been abrogated by [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian’s] refusal to pay the increased rentals in 1994. Accordingly, in 1994, the juridical relation between the parties severed. When [Victorio] accepted payment of the increased monthly amount, an entirely new contract of lease was entered into between the parties. Since payment of rent was made on a monthly basis, and pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code, the period of this lease contract was monthly. Upon expiration of every month, the lessor could increase the rents and demand that the lessee vacate the premises upon noncompliance with increased terms. In exercise of equity, however, the Court of Appeals granted [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] an extension of one year from finality of the decision within which to vacate the premises. A motion for reconsideration [was filed but the same was denied] on 11 March 2003.3
Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59482, Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 157568, bearing the complete title Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian v. Mutya B. Victorio.
The Court rendered a Decision4 in Chua v. Victorio on 18 May 2004, with the following fallo:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59482, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] are ordered to vacate the leased premises one month after the finality of this decision. Petitioner Leonardo Chua is also ORDERED to pay [Victorio] the sum of ₱15,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises from November 1, 1998 until he finally vacates the premises. Petitioners, Heirs of Yong Tian, are ORDERED to pay [Victorio] the monthly sum of ₱15,000.00 per unit, or ₱30,000.00 per month from November 1, 1998 until they finally vacate the premises.
Costs against [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian].5
The aforementioned Decision in Chua v. Victorio became final and executory on 6 August 2004, per Entry of Judgment6 issued by this Court.
A Motion for Execution was filed on 28 December 2004 by Victorio before the MTCC in Civil Cases No. 11-551 and No. 556-557, but Judge Rosete denied the same.
On 25 January 2005, Victorio filed another Motion7 for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the MTCC, but her Motion was again denied by Judge Rosete in a Resolution8 dated 28 March 2006, which decreed:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court resolves and so holds that [Victorio] may no longer be entitled to a writ of execution. Accordingly, the motion for issuance of a writ of execution should be as it is hereby DENIED.9
Victorio appealed the 28 March 2006 Resolution of the MTCC, but the appeal was withdrawn10 upon verbal instruction of Victorio’s Attorney-in-Fact. Thereafter, Judge Rosete issued an Order on 3 August 2006, which declared that the case was considered "Finally Closed and Terminated."11
On 13 November 2006, Victorio file a third Motion12 for Execution to have Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian vacate the leased premises. However, in a Resolution dated 6 December 2006, Judge Rosete only granted the issuance of a partial Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the rental obligations of Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light pf the foregoing, and finding [Victorio’s] motion dated November 13, 2006 partially meritorious, let a writ of execution issue but only for the payment of rental arrearages by the [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian].13
Consequently, Victorio filed on 28 March 2007 the present administrative complaint14 against Judge Rosete for Conduct Unbecoming a Judge. Victorio pointed out that Judge Rosete, in his Resolutions dated 28 March 2006 and 6 December 2006, in Civil Cases No. 11-551 and No. 556-557, refused to execute the judgment ordering Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian to vacate the leased premises. Victorio argued that Judge Rosete erred in ruling that Victorio’s continuous acceptance of rental payment from Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian gave birth to new contracts of lease, since:
a. All the receipts issued by [Victorio] to [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] contained a reservation which reads "It is understood that the deposit and endorsement of the above check(s) will not prejudice the cases now in court, Municipal Trial Court Branch II," among others.
b. It is clearly stated on page 7 of the Supreme Court Decision the dispositive portion of which read "No amount of subsequent payment by the lessees could automatically restore the parties to what they once were "and" the lessor’s acceptance of the increased rentals did not have the effect of reviving the earlier contract of lease.
Victorio also informed the Court that on 14 December 2006, Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Santiago City, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction, against Victorio and Judge Rosete challenging the issuance of the partial Writ of Execution in Civil Cases No. 11-551 and No. 556-557. The RTC issued a TRO and the Petition therein is now submitted for resolution.
In his Comment15 on Victorio’s administrative complaint against him, Judge Rosete explained that he considered the collection and acceptance by Victorio’s representative from Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian of advance monthly rentals as having created a new lease contract between said parties. For this reason, Victorio may no longer press for the ejectment of Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian from the leased premises. Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian, however, remained bound and obligated to pay Victorio whatever balance they may have had on the monthly rentals as decreed by this Court in its Decision of 18 May 2004 in Chua v. Victorio. So Judge Rosete averred that it was not true that he denied the execution of the judgment in Chua v. Victorio, for he issued a Writ of Execution on 8 December 2006 for the same, particularly with regard to the payment by Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian of their rental obligations.
On 3 March 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its Report,16 recommending that –
We respectfully submit for the consideration of the Honorable Court our recommendation:
1. That the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2. That respondent Judge Maxwell S. Rosete be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and accordingly be meted with a penalty of FINE in the amount of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from his accrued leave credits;
3. That the Fiscal Management Office be DIRECTED to compute the monetary value of Judge Rosete’s leave credits to be applied in satisfaction of the penalty to be imposed.17
On 2 June 2008, the Court required18 the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed. Both parties failed to file any manifestation despite notice sent to and received by them. Resultantly, the Court deemed the parties to have waived their right to submit such manifestations and considered the case submitted for decision based on the pleadings filed.
The Court agrees in the recommendation of the OCA except for the penalty imposed.
As the OCA found, Judge Rosete is indeed guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing the Resolutions dated 28 March 2006 and 8 December 2006, denying Victorio’s motions for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Cases No. 11-551 and No. 556-557. There is no dispute that judgment in said cases, appealed to this Court in Chua v. Victorio, has already become final and executory, an entry of judgment having been made in Chua v. Victorio on 6 August 2004. With a final and executory decision, rendered by no less than this Court, execution should issue as a matter of right on motion by Victorio, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
Judge Rosete's excuses for his refusal to enforce the Decision dated 18 May 2004 of this Court in Chua v. Victorio, which categorically ordered Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian to vacate the leased premises, are unsatisfactory for the following reasons:
First, the 18 May 2004 Decision of this Court in Chua v. Victorio was already final and executory, having been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment on 6 August 2004. Hence, Judge Rosete’s insistence to the contrary constituted a contumacious disregard of a final and executory judgment of this Court.
Second, Judge Rosete’s exposition – that he deemed the collection and acceptance of advance monthly rentals by Victorio’s representative from Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian as acts that had created new lease contracts between said parties and prevented the ejectment of the lessees from the leased premises – unacceptable.
The Court, in Chua v. Victorio, clearly ordered (1) Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian to vacate the leased premises one month after the finality of the said Deicsion; (2) Leonardo Chua to pay Victorio ₱15,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the use of the leased premises from 1 November 1998 until he finally vacates the same; (2) Heirs of Yong Tian to pay Victorio ₱15,000.00 per month per unit, or a total of ₱30,000.00 per month, as reasonable compensation for the leased premises from 1 November 1998 until they finally vacate the same; and (4) Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian to pay the costs of the suit.
By refusing to issue the necessary writ for the ejectment of Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian from the leased premises, and considering the establishment of alleged new lease contracts arising from Victorio’s acceptance of advance rental payments from Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian, Judge Rosete effectively altered or modified the final and executory Decision dated 18 May 2004 of this Court in Chua v. Victorio, which ordered Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian to already vacate the leased premises.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.19 A decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. The writ of execution must therefore conform to the judgment to be executed and adhere strictly to the very essential particulars.20
A final judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be altered or modified, except for clerical errors, misprisions or omissions. No "inferior" court has authority to revoke a resolution of a superior court, much less a final and executory resolution of the Supreme Court, the latter itself having no power to revoke the same after it has become final. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. An order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.21
In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence, Judge Rosete showed gross ignorance of the law, amounting to bad faith.
Judges, being the visible representations of law and justice22 are expected to be circumspect in the performance of their tasks,23 for it is their duty to administer justice in a way that inspires confidence in the integrity of the justice system.
For this reason, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires high standards of competence, integrity and independence.24 It mandates judges to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence.25 Indeed, it has been held that the failure to consider and apply a basic and elementary rule, law or principle is not only inexcusable, but also renders magistrates susceptible to administrative sanctions for incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.26
In this case, it is very clear that Judge Rosete disregarded a basic, unequivocal rule that execution shall issue as a matter of right when the order becomes final and executory.27 It is moreover hornbook doctrine that when this point is reached, the trial court has the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution to enforce the order.28 The rule admits of exceptions,29 but none obtains in this case. Hence, it is mandatory for Judge Rosete to issue the writ prayed for.
As can be seen, the law involved is simple and elementary; lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less.30
A judge owes it to himself and to his office to know by heart basic legal principles and to harness his legal know-how correctly and justly. When a judge displays utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one – most especially judges. Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire tenetur non excusat.31 As the Court held in Spouses Monterola v. Judge Caoibes, Jr.32 :
Observance of the law, which respondent ought to know, is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that is either deliberate disregard thereof or gross ignorance of the law. It is a continuing pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one — not even judges — from compliance therewith. x x x. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be studious in the principles of law. Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Indeed, it has been said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider a basic and elementary rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.33
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts.34 It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.35 Basic legal procedures must be at the palm of a judge's hands.36
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC; and penalized under Section 11 of the same Rule as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
Guided by the previous rulings of this Court in Gamas v. Oco37 and Sule v. Biteng,38 a fine of ₱20,000.00 is justified in the case at bar.
However, the Court notes that Judge Rosete filed a Certificate of Candidacy as mayor of Cordon, Isabela, on 29 March 2007. Pursuant to Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, Judge Rosete is considered ipso facto resigned from his office. Moreover, on 15 April 2008, this Court en banc, in A.M. MTJ-08-1702,39 dismissed Judge Rosete from service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, for Dishonesty and Gross Misconduct. Thus, the ₱20,000.00 fine imposed against Judge Rosete shall be deducted from his accrued leave credits, if sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Judge Maxwell Rosette is found LIABLE for Gross Ignorance of the Law in issuing the Resolutions dated 28 March 2006 and 8 December 2006, denying complainant Mutya B. Victorio’s motions for issuance of a writ of execution, and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand (₱20,000.00) PESOS, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. But since he was already dismissed from office with forfeiture of all benefits, the fine shall be deducted from his accrued leave credits, if sufficient; if not, then he should pay the said amount directly to this Court. The Fiscal Management and Budget Office is DIRECTED to compute the monetary value of Judge Rosete’s leave credits to be applied in satisfaction of the fine imposed.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 5-7.
2 G.R. No. 157568, 18 May 2004, 428 SCRA 447.
3 Rollo, pp. 13-16.
4 Id. at 12-24.
5 Id. at 22.
6 Id. at 30.
7 Id. at 36-37.
8 Id. at 37-38.
9 Id. at 39.
10 Id. at 43.
11 Id. at 44.
12 Id. at 45-48.
13 Id. at 50.
14 Id. at 5-7.
15 Id. at 59-60.
16 Id. at 1-4.
17 The OCA reported that Judge Rosete filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Cordon, Isabela, on 29 March 2007; and pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), Judge Rosete was considered ipso facto resigned from his office. As per records of the Leave Division of the OCA, Judge Rosete had 115 days vacation leave and 126 days sick leave.
18 Id. at 75.
19 Rubio v. MTCC, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City, 322 Phil. 193-194 (1996); Soco v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 753, 760 (1996).
20 Buaya v. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., 396 Phil. 738, 748 (2000); Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., 387 Phil. 885, 895 (2000).
21 Torres v. Hon. Sison, 416 Phil. 394, 401 (2001).
22 Spouses Dizon v. Hon. Calimag, 417 Phil. 778, 785 (2001).
23 Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC, Branch 54, Manila, of an Accused in a Non-Bailable Offense, 419 Phil. 567, 591 (2001).
24 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Rule 1.01.
25 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Rule 3.01 and Canon 1, Rule 1.01.
26 Spouses Monterola v. Judge Caoibes, Jr., 429 Phil. 59, 67 (2002); citing De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, 407 Phil. 351, 368-369 (2001).
27 §1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
28 Mayuga v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 1078, 1088 (1996); Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 483, 493 (1998).
29 Execution of a final judgment or order may be stayed or precluded under any of the following conditions:
1) Equitable grounds render its execution impossible or unjust due to facts and events transpiring after the judgment has become executory (Soco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19).
2) There has been a change in the situation of the parties, which makes execution inequitable (Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., 431 Phil. 324, 333-334 [2002], citing Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28).
3) The judgment has been novated by the parties (Dormitorio v. Fernandez, 164 Phil. 381, 386 [1976]).
4) Injunctive relief is prayed for and granted (Rule 38, Sec. 5).
5) The five-year period to enforce the judgment has expired (Cunanan v. Court of Appeals, 134 Phil. 338 [1968]).
6) The judgment is incomplete or is conditional (Ignacio v. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605 [1946]; Cu Unjieng v. Mabalacat Sugar Co., 70 Phil. 380 [1940]).
30 Rubio v. MTCC, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City, supra note 19; Soco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19; Villanueva v. Almazan, 384 Phil. 776, 786 (2000).
31 Español v. Mupas, 485 Phil. 636, 664 (2004); Lu v. Siapno, 390 Phil. 489, 496-497 (2000).
32 Supra note 26.
33 Spouses Monterola v. Judge Caoibes, Jr., supra note 26 at 66-67.
34 Fr. Guillen v. Judge Cañon, 424 Phil. 81, 88 (2002).
35 Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, 406 Phil. 434, 439-440 (2001).
36 Pesayco v. Layague, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, 22 December 2004, 447 SCRA 450, 459.
37 469 Phil. 633 (2004). In this case, respondent Judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for failure to comply with the requirements of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, by failing to furnish complainants therein a copy of the information with the list of the witnesses and was meted a fine of ₱20,000.00.
38 313 Phil. 398 (1995). In this case, respondent Judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he granted bail solely on account of the voluntary surrender of the accused and was meted a fine of ₱20,000.00.
39 Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1702, 8 April 2008, 550 SCRA 542.
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