Taking all this into consideration, the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its jurisdiction are public officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations directed against them.²¹ Its function is critical because public interest (in the accountability of public officers and employees) is at stake.

The Ombudsman concept originated in Sweden and other

Scandinavian countries.²² Its original and classic notion was that of an independent and politically neutral office which merely received and processed the people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel.²³ The Philippine Ombudsman deviated from the classic model. It retained the characteristic independence and political neutrality but the range of its functions and powers was enlarged.

Given the foregoing premises, we cannot limit the powers of the Ombudsman if its acts are not contrary to law or the Constitution.

Intervention by the Ombudsman in

Cases In Which its Decision is Assailed

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the disposition of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court be allowed to intervene in the action. xxx

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceeding.²⁴ Its purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment the whole controversy (among) the persons involved.²⁵

Intervention is not an absolute right²⁶ as it can be secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable statute or rule. In claiming the right to intervene, the intervenor must comply with the requirements laid down by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court which provides that the intervenor must have a legal interest in any of the following:

(a) the matter in controversy;

(b) the success of either of the parties;

(c) against both parties or

(d) be so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the disposition of the court or of an officer thereof.²⁷

Intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of the original parties.²⁸ Moreover, it must be shown that the intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding.²⁹

The legal interest must be actual and material, direct and immediate.³⁰ In Magsaysay-Labrador v. CA,³¹ the interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit:

[m]ust be on the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. The words "an interest in the subject" mean a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded and which would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint, without the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.

The CA denied petitioner’s motion for intervention for lack of basis, reasoning that:

In the instant case, the Ombudsman’s intervention is not proper considering that, other than its objection to the issuance of the injunctive writ, no legal interest in the matter subject of litigation has been alleged by the Ombudsman in the motion for intervention. xxx

We disagree.

The Office of the Ombudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest in the subject matter of litigation. Paragraph 2 of its motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall writ of preliminary injunction averred:

2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to seek redress on the apparently erroneous issuance by this Honorable Court of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman’s Joint Decision imposing upon petitioner the penalty of suspension for one (1) year, consistent with the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in PNB [vs]. Garcia, xxx and CSC [vs]. Dacoycoy, xxx; (citations omitted; emphasis in the original)

In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of the Ombudsman correctly summed up its legal interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim, it invoked its role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of the people," a disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative disciplinary cases against public officials.³² To hold otherwise would have been tantamount to abdicating its salutary functions as the guardian of public trust and accountability.³³

Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the inquiry into whether respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct,³⁴ an offense punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.³⁵ It was in keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of public service³⁶ that petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its authority.

It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court³⁷ after a consideration of the appropriate circumstances.³⁸ However, such discretion is not without limitations.³⁹ One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the Ombudsman’s powers as provided in the Constitution and RA 6770.

Moreover, the rule on intervention is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice, not to hinder or delay it.⁴⁰

Both the CA⁴¹ and respondent likened the Office of the Ombudsman to a judge whose decision was in question.⁴² This was a tad too simplistic (or perhaps even rather disdainful) of the power, duties and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially when defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against government personnel, the offense is committed against the government and public interest. What further proof of a direct constitutional and legal interest in the accountability of public officers is necessary?

Propriety and Necessity of Injunction

In Appeals of the Decisions of the Ombudsman

The CA anchored its denial of the motion to recall the writ of preliminary injunction on its lack of authority over the case. (The Office of the Ombudsman’s motion for intervention was allegedly improper). But the Office of the Ombudsman could properly intervene in the appeal filed by respondent and therefore, the CA could determine whether a recall of the injunctive writ was proper.

In the interest of justice and practicality, we will rule on the propriety of the issuance of the injunctive writ.

The applicable provision of law is Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, as amended:⁴³

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – xxx where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals xxx.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. xxx.

A literal reading of this rule shows that the mere filing of an appeal does not prevent the decision of the Ombudsman from becoming executory. However, we clarified this rule in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja:⁴⁴

[O]nly orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. (emphasis in the original).

The penalty meted out to respondent was suspension for one year without pay. He filed an appeal of the Ombudsman’s joint decision on time. In his appeal, he included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in order to stay the execution of the decision against him. Following Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, we hold that the mere filing by respondent of an appeal sufficed to stay the execution of the joint decision against him. Respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (for purposes of staying the execution of the decision against him) was therefore a superfluity. The execution of petitioner’s joint decision against respondent should be stayed during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 11, 2006 and November 21, 2006 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals is ordered to allow the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No. 89999. The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby LIFTED as the execution of the decision in OMB-L-A-03-1060-K was (and still is) stayed by the filing and pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* On Official Leave.

¹ The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals was impleaded as a respondent but the Court excluded it pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

² Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. of the Former Twenty-Third Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, p. pp. 41-42 and 44.

³ Regional Legal and Adjudication Office of the Commission on Audit.

⁴ Filed on October 7, 2003.

⁵ Filed on October 8, 2003.

⁶ OMB-L-A-03-1060-K was for the period of November 28, 2001 to June 19, 2002. OMB-L-A-03

1061-K was for the period of June 19, 2002 to October 7, 2002.

⁷ Joint Decision dated April 11, 2005. Rollo, p. 223.

⁸ Rollo, p. 222.

⁹ As will be discussed later, the Office of the Ombudsman had the right to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 89999 and we fully agree with its position on this matter. With regard to the recall of the writ of preliminary injunction, the Office of the Ombudsman claims that respondent was not entitled to the injunctive writ as his appeal did not stay the execution of the decision of the Ombudsman. While we do not agree with the reasoning of the Office of the Ombudsman on this issue, we lift the writ of preliminary injunction nonetheless following our ruling in Ombudsman v. Laja (G.R. No. 169241, 2 May 2006, 488 SCRA 574).

¹⁰ Coquia, Jorge A., ANNOTATION ON THE EXCESSIVE POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE OMBUDSMAN, 288 SCRA 676, 682.

¹¹ Ledesma v. CA, G.R. No. 161629, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 437, 446.

¹² Bernas, Joaquin J., S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 1996 Edition, Rex Book Store, Inc., p. 999.

¹³ Ombudsman Act of 1989.

¹⁴ Estarija v. Ranada, G.R. No. 159314, 26 June 2006, 492 SCRA 652.

¹⁵ Section 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

¹⁶ G.R. No. 167844, 22 November 2006, 507 SCRA 593, 608-611.

¹⁷ Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v.Vasquez,

310 Phil. 549, 572.

¹⁸ Office of the Ombudsman v. Lucero, G.R. No. 168718, 24 November 2006, 508 SCRA 107, 115

citing Office of the Ombudsman v. CA, G.R. No. 160675, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 92.

¹⁹ Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, 21 September 1993, 226 SCRA 645, 653, citing, Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 SW (2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 [1934]).

²⁰ G.R. No. 106719, 21 September 1993, 226 SCRA 645, 653.

²¹ Almonte v. Vasquez, 314 Phil. 150, 179 (1995).

²² Coquia, Jorge A., ANNOTATION ON THE EXCESSIVE POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE OMBUDSMAN, 288 SCRA 676, 679-680, 683.

²³ Office of the Ombudsman v. CA, G.R. No. 167844, 22 November 2006, 507 SCRA 593, 611.

²⁴ Manalo v. CA, G.R. No. 141297, 8 October 2001, 419 SCRA 215, 233.

²⁵ First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 88345, 1 February 1996, 253

SCRA 30, 38.

²⁶ Big Country Ranch Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 102927, 12 October 1993, 227 SCRA 161, 165.

²⁷ Feria, Jose Y., Justice (Ret.) and Noche, Maria Concepcion S., CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED vol. 1, 2001 Edition, Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc., p. 480.

²⁸ Id.

²⁹ Id.

³⁰ Batama Farmers’Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et. al. v. Hon. Rosal, et. al.,149 Phil.

514, 519 (1971).

³¹ Magsaysay-Labrador v. CA, G.R. No. 58168, 19 December 1989, 180 SCRA 266, 271.

³² Rollo, p. 23

³³ Id., p. 24.

³⁴ Grave misconduct is characterized by the existence of the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of others. Salazar v. Barriga, A.M. No. P-05-2016, 19 April 2007, 521 SCRA 449. Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 578.

³⁵ Grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19 (series of 1999), Section 52 (A)(2).

³⁶ The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans and Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Ombudsman Desierto, G.R. No. 138142, 19 September 2007, 533 SCRA 571.

³⁷ Big Country Ranch Corp. v. CA, Supra note 26.

³⁸ Mago v. CA, 363 Phil. 225, 233 (1999).

³⁹ Batama Farmers’Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et. al. v. Hon. Rosal, et. al. , Supra

note 30.

⁴⁰ Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, G.R. Nos. 165416, 165584 and 165731, 22 January 2008.

⁴¹ "While we are of the view that there is nothing under Section 6, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure which prevents the courts or agencies in which decisions are the subject of the appeal from impleading themselves, at their own volition, in the action xxx." Rollo, p. 41-42.

⁴² Paragraph 11, Comment of respondent Joel S. Samaniego. Rollo, p. 298.

⁴³ Administrative Order No. 7 (series of 1990), as amended.

⁴⁴ Supra note 9, citing Lopez v. CA, 438 Phil. 351 (2002).