Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165993 September 30, 2008
MERIDA WATER DISTRICT; ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NAMELY: SUSANO TOREJAS JR., LOURDES QUINTE, ROMULO PALES, CARMELITA DE LOS ANGELES, VILLAFRANCA ROSAL; AND MWD GENERAL MANAGER NILO C. LUCERO, Petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO BACARRO, VICTORINO DOMANILLO, PATRICK BACOL, CARLITO BARRERA, RUSTICA MENDOLA, JOSE DELIO HERMOSO, CHARITO TOLORIO, MA. VICTORIA MAINGqUE, ELMER GO, and GERARDO BIOCO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated January 30, 2004 and September 16, 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.77141, which affirmed the Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in favor of respondents.
Petitioners are Merida Water District, a government-owned and controlled corporation4 that operates the water utility services in the municipality of Merida, Leyte; its Chairman, Susano Torejas, Jr.; other members of the Board of Directors, Lourdes Quinte, Romulo Pales, Carmelita De Los Angeles, and Villafranca Rosal; and General Manager, Nilo C. Lucero. On October 10, 2001, Merida Water District conducted a public hearing for the purpose of increasing the water rate.5
On March 7, 2002, Merida Water District received a letter from the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).6 The letter stated that on March 5, 2002, the LWUA Board of Trustees, per Board Resolution No. 63, series of 2002, confirmed Merida Water District’s proposed water rates.7 Attached to the letter was the Rate Schedule of Approved Water Rates containing a progressive increase of water rates over a certain period.8
On September 3, 2002, Merida Water District approved Resolution No. 006-02, implementing a water rate increase of P90 for the first ten cubic meters of water consumption.9 Thereafter, petitioners issued notices of disconnection to concessionaires who refused to pay the water rate increase and did not render service to those who opted to pay the increased rate on installment basis.10
On February 13, 2003, respondents, consumers of Merida Water District, filed a Petition for Injunction, etc.11 against petitioners before the RTC. Respondents sought to enjoin the petitioners from collecting payment of P90 for the first ten cubic meters of water consumption. Respondents alleged that this imposed rate was contrary to the rate increase agreed upon during the public hearing. Respondents claimed that petitioners violated Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 700 by: (1) implementing a water rate increase exceeding 60% of the current rate; and (2) failing to conduct a public hearing for the imposed rate of P90.12
On February 24, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,13 alleging that respondents’ petition lacked a cause of action as they failed to exhaust administrative remedies under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended by P.D. Nos. 768 and 1479.
On February 26, 2003, one of the respondents questioned the legality of the water rate increase before the National Water Resources Board (NWRB).14
In its Order15 dated March 3, 2003, the RTC denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss. The RTC held that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies due to the following circumstances, that by imposing and collecting P90 for the first ten cubic meters of water consumption from its concessionaires, petitioners: (1) failed to comply with the legal requisites of hearing and notice; and (2) violated LOI No. 700 for prescribing a water rate increase of almost 100% from the previous rate. On March 8, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 which the RTC denied in its Order17 dated March 31, 2003.
On April 15, 2003, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari18 with the CA, assailing the RTC’s orders for lack of jurisdiction. The CA affirmed the RTC’s orders, upholding its jurisdiction and the propriety of respondents’ recourse to the trial court notwithstanding the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies. On March 1, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 which the CA denied in a Resolution.
Petitioners raise the same arguments before this Court, alleging the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition and the impropriety of the respondents’ recourse to the RTC considering their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Solicitor General supports the petitioners’ arguments.20
The following issues require resolution:
1. whether the RTC has jurisdiction over respondents’ petition; and
2. in the event of an affirmative answer of the first issue, whether respondents’ recourse to the trial court is proper despite their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Petitioners argue that the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case brought by the respondents before the RTC, and for this reason, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the same. Petitioners cite P.D. No. 1067, the Water Code of the Philippines, to support this argument:
Art. 88. The [NWRB] shall have original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters within the meaning and context of the provisions of this Code.21
At the outset, it must be clarified that P.D. No. 1067 vests the NWRB with original jurisdiction over disputes relating to the utilization of waters within the context of the Water Code. However, it must be noted that respondents’ allegations all point to the legality in Merida Water District’s implementation of the water rate increase. P.D. No. 1479 provides for the administrative remedies regarding a review of water rates, to determine whether a local water district had complied with the legal requirements in establishing such rates:
SEC. 11. The last paragraph of Section 63 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:
The rates or charges established by such local district, after hearing shall have been conducted for the purpose, shall be subject to review by the Administration to establish compliance with the abovestated provisions. Said review of rates or charges shall be executory and enforceable after the lapse of seven calendar days from posting thereof in a public place in the locality of the water district, without prejudice to an appeal being taken therefrom by a water concessionaire to the [NWRB] whose decision thereon shall be appealable to the Office of the President. An appeal to the [NWRB] shall be perfected within thirty days after the expiration of the seven-day period of posting. The [NWRB] shall decide on appeal within thirty days from perfection.22
After review by the LWUA, a water concessionaire may appeal the same to the NWRB, and the NWRB’s decision may then be appealed to the Office of the President.
Neither P.D. No. 1067, as cited by petitioners, nor P.D. No. 1479, which governs the procedure for the review of water rates, expressly states that the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the increase of water rates.23 Moreover, petitioners failed to cite any law which impliedly grants the NWRB original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve a dispute regarding the increase of water rates. A grant of exclusive jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of a statute in the absence of a clear legislative intent to that effect.24 An administrative agency with quasi-judicial power is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, and "[i]ts jurisdiction should be interpreted in strictissimi juris."25
Petitioners’ reliance on Abe-Abe v. Manta[26] to support their allegation that the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute concerning a local water district’s water rate increase is misplaced. First, the abovementioned case involved a dispute over water rights for irrigation purposes,27 a dispute clearly governed by P.D. No. 1067. The case at bar concerns a local water district’s increase of water rates, and P.D. No. 1479 provides for the administrative procedure regarding a review of the said rates. Second, the Court discussed the NWRB’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies.28 The doctrine of exhaustion does not apply when jurisdiction is exclusive. An administrative agency’s exclusive jurisdiction over a certain dispute renders the courts without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same at that stage.29 The doctrine of exhaustion applies "where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial intervention is withheld until the administrative process has run its course."30 To cite Abe-Abe v. Manta as the authority to support the allegation that the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a water rate increase is a strained construction of this Court’s pronouncements. Thus, petitioners’ contention that the RTC has no jurisdiction because the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the increase of water rates is clearly without merit.
Respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies by stopping their pursuit of the administrative process before the NWRB. Their failure to exhaust administrative remedies, however, does not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC.31 Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies only renders the action premature, that the "claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination."32
It is incumbent upon the party who has an administrative remedy to pursue the same to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The Court has consistently reiterated the rationale behind the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies:
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so… It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.33
Although the doctrine of exhaustion does not preclude in all cases a party from seeking judicial relief, cases where its observance has been disregarded require a strong showing of the inadequacy of the prescribed procedure and of impending harm.
Respondents justify their failure to observe the administrative process on the following exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: (1) patent illegality; and (2) a denial of due process. However, respondents fail to show that the instant case merits the application of these exceptions.
First, respondents claim that Merida Water District’s increase of the water rate is patently illegal for violating LOI No. 700, which provides that the LWUA shall:
(f) Ensure that the water rates are not abruptly increased beyond the water users’ ability to pay, seeing to it that each increase if warranted, does not exceed 60% of the current rate.34
The cases where this Court has upheld the non-observance of exhaustion of administrative remedies because of patently illegal actions35 do not involve issues that require the consideration of the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other. In these cases, the question of patent illegality arose from a set of undisputed facts. Here, certain facts need to be resolved first, in order to arrive at a conclusion of patent illegality. The LWUA confirmed the Rate Schedule of Approved Water Rates for Merida Water District, a schedule that outlines different rates due to the progressive increase of water rates. Thus, the determination of the current rate from which to measure the allowable increase prescribed by LOI No. 700 is a factual matter best left to the expertise of the NWRB.
Second, respondents claim that Merida Water District violated due process by failing to conduct a hearing for the purpose of establishing a water rate increase. Section 11 of P.D. No. 1479 provides that hearing is a requirement in establishing water rates:
The rates or charges established by such local district, after hearing shall have been conducted for the purpose, shall be subject to review by the Administration to establish compliance with the abovestated provisions. (Emphasis supplied)36
Jurisprudence affirming the failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion due to a denial of due process involves instances when the party seeking outright judicial intervention was denied the opportunity to be heard.37 Here, respondents admit that Merida Water District conducted a public hearing on October 10, 2001 regarding the increase of water rates. The existence of a hearing for this purpose renders the allegation of a denial of due process without merit.
The failure of the respondents to show that the instant case falls within the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion necessitates in the due observance of exhausting the proper administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.77141 dated January 30, 2004 and September 16, 2004, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 26-36.
2 Id. at 55.
3 Id. at 156-157, 174-175.
4 Id. at 6.
5 Id. at 9.
6 Id. at 10.
7 Id. at 124.
8 Id. at 124-125.
9 Id. at 126.
10 Id. at 32.
11 Id. at 127-132.
12 Id. at 128-130.
13 Id. at 146-150.
14 Records, p. 127.
15 Rollo, pp. 156-157.
16 Id. at 158-161.
17 Id. at 174-175.
18 CA rollo, pp. 3-13.
19 Id. at 163-169.
20 Rollo, pp. 234-247.
21 Executive Order No. 124-A, dated July 22, 1987, renamed the National Water Resources Council to the NWRB.
22 Executive Order No. 124-A, dated July 22, 1987, renamed the National Water Resources Council to the NWRB.
23 P.D. No. 902-A is an example of an express grant of exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative agency.
24 Dimagiba v. Geraldez, et al., 102 Phil. 1016, 1019 (1958).
25 Ching v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 73123, September 2, 1991, 201 SCRA 190, 198.
26 G.R. No. L-4827, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 524.
27 Id. at 527.
28 Id. at 531.
29 Sandoval v. Caneba, G.R. No. 90503, September 27, 1990, 190 SCRA 77, 80-81.
30 U.S. v. Western P.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
31 Rosario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89554, July 10, 1992, 211 SCRA 384, 387.
32 Carale v. Abarintos, G.R. No. 120704, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 132, 141.
33 Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad, G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA 482, 486-487.
34 Letter of Instructions No. 700 (1978), Par. 1(f).
35 Celestial v. Cachopero, 459 Phil. 903 (2003); China Banking Corporation v. Members of the Board of Trustees, Home Development Mutual Fund, G.R. No. 131787, May 19, 1999, 307 SCRA 443.
36 Presidential Decree No. 1479 (1978), Sec. 11.
37 Pagara v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 66 (1996); Samahang Magbubukid ng Kapdula, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103953, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 147.
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