Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179150 June 17, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DELIA BAYANI y BOTANES, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Appellant Delia Bayani y Botanes assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00310, affirming the Decision2 dated 16 July 2004 of Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-115598. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of drug pushing, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,3 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and sentenced her to suffer life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos.
On 7 March 2003, an Information4 was filed before the RTC charging appellant with Violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, which reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of March 2003, in the Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, six point forty one (6.41) grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On 9 September 2003, appellant, with the assistance of counsel , was arraigned and she pleaded "Not guilty." Thereafter, a pre-trial conference was held, and trial ensued accordingly.5
Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of PO3 Virgilio Bernardo, who testified that on 3 March 2003, a confidential informant arrived at Police Station 3, Quirino Highway, Barangay Talipapa, Quezon City, where he was on duty, and reported to the Drug Enforcement Unit that appellant was illegally trading drugs along Trinidad Street, Barangay Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City. Chief Superintendent Gerardo Ratuita formed a team composed of PO3 Bernardo, SPO4 Brigido An, SPO2 Levi Sevilla, PO2 Manny Panlilio, and PO2 Cecil Collado to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team took with them "boodle" money with two (2) pieces of genuine one-hundred-peso bills on top as buy-bust money.6
At around 10:30 in the morning of the same day, PO3 Bernardo and the informant went in front of the appellant’s house located at No. 22 Barangay Gulod, Trinidad Street, Novaliches, Quezon City, while the other police officers positioned themselves within viewing distance. The appellant was standing in front of her house. As they approached her, the informant introduced Bernardo to her as a buyer. Witness testified that he told appellant that he wanted to buy ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) worth of shabu, and the appellant nodded her head. Thereafter, she handed him two sachets containing a crystalline substance which was suspected to be shabu. Witness, in turn, gave the boodle money, after which he grabbed the appellant’s right hand, apprehended her, and identified himself as a police officer.7
After the apprehension of the appellant, the team brought her before the Police Station investigator, while the drugs and the buy-bust money were turned over to the crime laboratory. Appellant was apprised of her constitutional rights.8
During his testimony, PO3 Bernardo identified the accused, the boodle money with his initials "VB," as well as two (2) sachets of crystalline substance (also with the same initials) which was positive of methylamphetamine hydrochloride after laboratory examination.9
Denying the charge filed against her, appellant testified that at around 7:00 in the morning of 3 March 2003, she was inside her house with her children and her sister-in-law. While changing her clothes inside her room at the third floor, seven men barged inside her house. When she asked them what they were doing inside her house, they refused to answer. Although they continued to search her house, they did not find drugs therein. Thereafter, they introduced themselves as police officers and commanded her to show them the shabu. When she denied possession of any shabu, the police officers got angry and forced her to go with them to the Police Station. She also testified that she could not cry to her neighbors for help because she was locked inside her room while her sister-in-law and her five children were all afraid of the police.10
When they arrived at the Police Station, she was asked if she knew a certain "Allan." She answered in the negative. After a day of detention, she was brought to the office of the inquest fiscal where she was informed that she was being charged with drug pushing.11
Appellant’s seventeen-year-old son, Dan Jefferson, corroborated his mother’s testimony. He recounted that he was about to leave their house when five men barged into their house and went straight to his mother’s room at the third floor. He testified that he did not know what happened on the third floor since, at that time, he stayed in their sala at the second floor of the house. Thereafter, the rest of the police officers and his mother left the house, while he stayed put.12
In a Decision dated 16 July 2004, the RTC decreed that the accused was guilty without reasonable doubt since the fact of the illegal sale of a dangerous drug, methylamphetamine hydrochloride, was sufficiently and indisputably established by the prosecution. PO3 Bernardo, as the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as the person who handed him two sachets containing 6.41 grams of shabu in exchange for P10,000.00. The boodle money was marked as Exhibit "B" for the prosecution.13 The two sachets of shabu were likewise presented and marked in court as Exhibits "G" and "H."14 The RTC gave full credence to PO3 Bernardo’s testimony, given the presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions as a police officer, especially since no ill motive was attributed to him for the appellant’s apprehension. On the other hand, the RTC found the testimony of appellant’s son, Dan, on what transpired on the third floor to be unreliable, since at that time he was supposedly staying in the sala, which was located at another floor.15
According to the dispositive part of the Decision dated 16 July 2004:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 for drug pushing of six point forty one (6.41) grams of crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos.
The drug involved in this case is hereby ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) through the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.16
The appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00310. Raising only one assignment of error, appellant faulted the RTC’s finding of guilt for being based on a buy-bust transaction instigated by the arresting officers. In affirming the RTC Decision, the appellate court declared that the police officers did not induce the appellant to sell the prohibited drugs. By pointing out the fact that appellant had the shabu in her possession, ready for selling, before the police officer approached her, it adjudged that the appellant’s criminal resolve was evident; no inducement to sell the prohibited drugs had led to the commission of the offense. It maintained that the fact that the police officers did not conduct a prior surveillance does not affect the validity of an entrapment operation. It further held that presentation by the prosecution of the informant and other police officers who had witnessed the buy-bust operations was not required to prove the appellant’s guilt, where their testimonies would merely repeat the testimony of the poseur-buyer.17 In the Decision dated 20 December 2005, the fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in toto. Without pronouncement as to costs.18
Hence, the present petition in which the appellant reiterates the sole assignment of error, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE POLICE INSTIGATED THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST TRANSACTION.
This petition must fail, since the argument raised by appellant is specious. Appellant argues that PO3 Bernardo’s act of approaching the appellant to buy shabu during a buy-bust operation amounted to instigation. Such contention lacks basis and is contrary to jurisprudence.
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker.19 Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent," while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary criminal."20
As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a valid means of arresting violators of Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.
A police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operations. The sale of contraband is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the criminal’s course of conduct.21 In People v. Sta. Maria, the Court clarified that a "decoy solicitation" is not tantamount to inducement or instigation:
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the office is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.22
Conversely, the law deplores instigation or inducement, which occurs when the police or its agent devises the idea of committing the crime and lures the accused into executing the offense. Instigation absolves the accused of any guilt, given the spontaneous moral revulsion from using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist.23
People v. Doria enumerated the instances when this Court recognized instigation as a valid defense, and an instance when it was not applicable:
In United Sates v. Phelps, we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in order to persecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps’ apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he like smoking opium on some occasions. Smith’s testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug. The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible." In People v. Abella, we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, x x x a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found there was inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused. In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, [W]e convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hong Kong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.24
In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders, which is made difficult by the secrecy with which drug-related offenses are conducted and the many devices and subterfuges employed by offenders to avoid detection. On the other hand, the Court has taken judicial notice of the ugly reality that in cases involving illegal drugs, corrupt law enforcers have been known to prey upon weak, hapless and innocent persons.25 The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be crucial. The balance needs to be struck between the individual rights and the presumption of innocence on one hand, and ensuring the arrest of those engaged in the illegal traffic of narcotics on the other.
In the present case, PO3 Bernardo testified that appellant stood in front of her house and was in possession of drugs readily available for anyone who would buy them. PO3 Bernardo did not even have to employ any act of instigation or inducement, such as repeated requests for the sale of prohibited drugs or offers of exorbitant prices.
In addition, PO3 Bernardo was able to identify the accused, the boodle money, and the two packets of crystalline substance, which tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.26 The essential elements for the prosecution for illegal sale of shabu were established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. In short, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money, as relayed by PO3 Bernardo, successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.27
In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, together with the dangerous drug taken from the appellant, more than sufficient to prove the crime charged. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.28
The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.29 Finding no compelling reason to depart from the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this Court affirms the same.
The self-serving denial of the appellant deserves scant credence, since it is unsupported by any evidence other than the testimony of her son, Dan Jefferson. This Court finds her son’s testimony even more suspect, considering that his statement that five men barged into their house was belied by appellant’s allegation that seven men forcibly entered their home. An allegation of frame-up and extortion by police officers is a common and standard defense in most dangerous drug cases. To substantiate such defense, which can be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear and convincing.30
In this case, there was no allegation of any attempt at extortion on the part of police officers or any reason for the police officers to falsify a serious criminal charge against appellant. Appellant admitted that she had never even seen any of the police officers until she was arrested. This negates any vengeful motive for her arrest. In the absence of proof of any ill motive or intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute a serious crime to the appellants, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties must prevail over the latter’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim. This presumption is placed on an even more firm foothold when supported by the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the witness, PO3 Bernardo.31
Contrary to the appellant’s claim, the prevailing doctrine is that additional corroborating testimony of the confidential informant is not essential to a successful prosecution. Intelligence agents are not often called to testify in court in order to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable service to the police. Once known, they may even be the object of revenge by criminals they implicate. 32
Lastly, the testimonies of other arresting officers are not required in obtaining a conviction. The testimony of PO3 Bernardo, being candid and straightforward, is complete and sufficient for a finding of guilt. Section 6, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court allows the court to stop introduction of further testimony upon a particular point when more witnesses to the same point cannot be expected to be additionally persuasive. Furthermore, appellant cannot allude to or suggest the possibility of any irregularity that could have been revealed by the presentation of additional witnesses, when she herself failed to exert any effort to summon these witnesses when she had the chance to do so.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2005 in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 00310 is AFFIRMED. Appellant Delia Bayani y Botanes is found GUILTY of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No 9165. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice |
*ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 507, dated 28 May 2008, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, designating Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion to replace Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, who is on official leave under the Court’s Wellness Program.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga with Associate Justices Eliezer R. de los Santos and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring; Rollo, pp. 2-10.
2 Penned by Presiding Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 36-38.
3 Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
4 CA rollo, p. 11.
5 Id. at 12.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 13.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Records, p. 24.
14 Id. at 28.
15 CA rollo, pp. 13-14.
16 Id. at 14.
17 Rollo, pp. 2-10.
18 Id. at 10.
19 People v. Gatong-o, G.R. No.L-78698, 29 December 1988, 168 SCRA 716, 717.
20 Cabrera v. Pajares, A.M. Nos. R-278-RTJ & R-309-RTJ, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 127, 134; Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46638, 9 July 1986, 142 SCRA 534, 539; People v. Lapatha, G.R. No. L-63074, 9 November 1988, 167 SCRA 159, 172-173; and People v. Patog, G.R. No. L-69620, 24 September 1986, 144 SCRA 429, 437.
21 People v. Gonzales, 430 Phil. 504, 513 (2002).
22 People v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 171019, 23 February 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 628.
23 People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, 22 January 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 686; People v. Boco, G.R. No. 129676, 23 June 1999, 309 SCRA 42, 65.
24 People v. Doria, id. at 692-693.
25 Id. at 697; People v. Ale, G.R. No. L-70998, 14 October 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58-59; People v. Fernando, G.R. No. L-66947, 24 October 1986, 145 SCRA 151, 159; People v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. 97427, 24 May 1993, 222 SCRA 511,514; People v. Salcedo, G.R. No. 86975, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 345, 352; and People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 102880; 25 April 1994, 231 SCRA 759, 764-765.
26 Chemistry Report No. D-236-2003, 4 March 2003; Records, p. 8.
27 People v. Gonzales, supra note 21 at 513; and People v. Jocson, G.R. No. 169875, 18 December 2007.
28 People v. Julian-Fernandez, 423 Phil. 895, 910 (2001).
29 People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, 12 February 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547.
30 People v. Boco, supra note 23 at 65.
31 People v. Pacis, 434 Phil. 148, 158-159 (2001); People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555, 563.
32 People v. Doria, supra note 23 at 699; People v. Pacis, id. at 159; People v. Boco, supra note 23 at 62.
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