Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162411 June 30, 2008
NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI), represented by RAMON M. CALO, petitioner,
vs.
NASIPIT EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (NELU)-ALU-TUCP, represented by DONELL P. DAGANI, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This petition for review1 under Rule 45 seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision2 dated September 30, 2003 and Resolution3 dated January 9, 2004, both issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70435 which dismissed petitioner Nasipit Integrated Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc.’s (NIASSI’s) petition for review of the Decision4 dated February 22, 2002 rendered by Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus G. Chavez in VA Case No. 0925-XIII-08-003-01A.
The records yield the following facts:
NIASSI is a domestic corporation with office at Talisay, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. Respondent Nasipit Employees Labor Union (Union) was––and may still be––the collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of NIASSI and is a local chapter of the Associated Labor Union.
The dispute started when, in October 1999, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (Wage Board) of Caraga Region in Northeastern Mindanao issued Wage Order No. (WO) RXIII-02 which granted an additional PhP 12 per day cost of living allowance to the minimum wage earners in that region. Owing allegedly to NIASSI’s failure to implement the wage order, the Union filed a complaint before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Caraga Regional Office for the inspection of NIASSI’s records and the enforcement of WO RXIII-02. A DOLE inspection team was accordingly dispatched to NIASSI. In its reports dated May 30, 2000 and November 28, 2000, the inspection team stated that WO RXIII-02 was not applicable to NIASSI’s employees since they were already receiving a wage rate higher than the prescribed minimum wage.
Upon motion by the Union, the DOLE Regional Director indorsed the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch for further hearing. On May 18, 2001, Executive Labor Arbiter Rogelio P. Legaspi, in turn, referred the case to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for voluntary arbitration.
The case was, accordingly, referred to the NCMB which docketed the same as VA Case No. 0925-XIII-08-003-01A.
On February 22, 2002, Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus G. Chavez rendered a decision granting the Union’s prayer for the implementation of WO RXIII-02 on the rationale that WO RXIII-02 did not specifically prohibit the grant of wage increase to employees earning above the minimum wage. On the contrary, Chavez said, the wage order specifically enumerated those who are outside its coverage, but did not include in the enumeration those earning above the minimum wage. He also held that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between NIASSI and the Union provides that wage increases granted by the company within one year from CBA signing shall not be creditable to future legally mandated wage increases. The voluntary arbitrator further held that NIASSI would not incur any damage from the implementation of WO RXIII-02 since NIASSI’s petition to increase the tariff rates for all cargoes––to counter the financial burden of implementing WO RXIII-02––had been granted and had been in effect since February 16, 2000.
Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NIASSI filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to nullify the February 22, 2002 Decision of Chavez. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 70435.
By a decision dated September 30, 2003, the CA found the decision of the voluntary arbitrator and the premises holding it together to be in order and, accordingly, dismissed NIASSI’s petition for review.
NIASSI is now before the Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari, ascribing to the CA the commission of several errors all which resolve themselves into the question of whether or not WO RXIII-02 applies or covers NIASSI’s employees.
The Court’s Ruling
In gist, NIASSI argues that its employees enjoy a daily wage level higher than the minimum wage mandated by the subject wage order; thus, the wage order is not applicable. Corollary to this argument, NIASSI contends that the Wage Board did not envision a wage order with an "across-the-board" wage increase effect; thus, it could be made to apply only to minimum wage earners. As a final point, NIASSI states that, since WO RXIII-02 is not applicable, the issue respecting the interpretation of the NIASSI-Union CBA provision on wage crediting finds no application either.
As a counterpoint, the Union maintains that Section 2, Article XIX of the CBA clearly mandates the implementation of WO RXIII-02 to cover all NIASSI’s employees. While admitting that the new wage rates specifically finds application only to minimum wage earners, the Union would nonetheless argue that WO RXIII-02, as couched, does not specifically prohibit the grant of wage increase to employees already receiving wages over the prescribed minimum wage.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The main issue in this case is whether WO RXIII-02 may be made to apply and cover Nasipit’s employees who, at the time of the issuance and effectivity of the wage order, were already receiving a wage rate higher than the prevailing minimum wage.
The pertinent portion of WO RXIII-02 provides, as follows:
Section 1. COVERAGE. The rates prescribed under this Wage Order shall apply to minimum wage earners in the private sector regardless of their position designation or status and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid.
Not covered by the provisions of this Order are household or domestic helpers and persons employed in the personal service of another, including family drivers. (Emphasis supplied.)
The provision of the wage order’s Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)5 pertinent to the instant issue reads, as follows:
RULE II
NEW MINIMUM WAGE RATES
Section 1. COVERAGE
a. The minimum wage rates prescribed under the Order shall apply to the minimum wage earners in the private sector regardless of their position, designation or status and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid.
b. Not covered by the provision of the Order are household or domestic helpers or persons employed in the personal service of another including family drivers.
c. Workers and employees who, prior to the effectivity of the Order were receiving a basic wage rate per day or its monthly equivalent of more than those prescribed under the Order, may receive wage increases through the correction of wage distortions in accordance with Section 1, Rule IV of this Rules. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is abundantly clear from the above quoted provisions of WO RXIII-02 and its IRR that only minimum wage earners are entitled to the prescribed wage increase. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.6 The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. The beneficent, operative provision of WO RXIII-02 is specific enough to cover only minimum wage earners. Necessarily excluded are those receiving rates above the prescribed minimum wage. The only situation when employees receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed by the WO RXIII-02 may still benefit from the order is, as indicated in Sec. 1 (c) of the IRRs, through the correction of wage distortions.
In any case, it would be highly irregular for the Wage Board to issue an across-the-board wage increase, its mandate being limited to determining and fixing the minimum wage rates within its area of concern, in this case the Caraga Region, and to issue the corresponding wage orders and implementing rules. In Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc., v. National Wages and Productivity Commission, the Court elucidated on the authority of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, thus:
R.A. No. 6727 declared it a policy of the State to rationalize the fixing of minimum wages and to promote productivity improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of living for the workers and their families; to guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of production; to enhance employment generation in the countryside through industrial dispersal; and to allow business and industry reasonable returns on investment, expansion and growth.
In line with its declared policy, R.A. No. 6727 created the NWPC, vested with the power to prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of appropriate minimum wage and productivity measures at the regional, provincial or industry levels; and authorized the RTWPB to determine and fix the minimum wage rates applicable in their respective regions, provinces, or industries therein and issue the corresponding wage orders, subject to the guidelines issued by the NWPC. Pursuant to its wage fixing authority, the RTWPB may issue wage orders which set the daily minimum wage rates, based on the standards or criteria set by Article 124 of the Labor Code.7
In the same case, the Court held that a RTWPB commits ultra vires and unreasonable act when, instead of setting a minimum wage rate, it prescribes a wage increase cutting across all levels of employment and wage brackets:
In the present case, the RTWPB did not determine or fix the minimum wage rate by the "floor-wage method" or the "salary-ceiling method" in issuing the Wage Order. The RTWPB did not set a wage level nor a range to which a wage adjustment or increase shall be added. Instead, it granted an across-the-board wage increase of P15.00 to all employees and workers of Region 2. In doing so, the RTWPB exceeded its authority by extending the coverage of the Wage Orders to wage earners receiving more than the prevailing minimum wage rate, without a denominated salary ceiling. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the Wage Order granted additional benefits not contemplated by R.A. No. 6727.8
Clearly then, only employees receiving salaries below the prescribed minimum wage are entitled to the wage increase set forth under WO RXIII-02, without prejudice, of course, to the grant of increase to correct wage distortions consequent to the implementation of such wage order. Considering that NIASSI’s employees are undisputedly already receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed by the wage order, NIASSI is not legally obliged to grant them wage increase.9
The Union, in a bid to bolster its case for wage increase for its members under NIASSI’s employ, invokes its CBA with the company and invites attention to Chavez’s favorable ruling. The pertinent CBA provision reads:
Article XIX, Section 2.
All general wage increases granted by the company after one (1) year from the signing of this CBA shall not be creditable to any future wage increases mandated by any wage legislation and/or issuance of the Regional Wage Board.
Chavez’s decision, on the other hand, pertinently states:
It is likewise undisputed that complainant members are receiving more than the minimum wage. Although, as mentioned earlier, the Notice of Inspection Report was not attached to respondent’s Position Paper, complainant did not rebut respondent’s contention that the complainant members receive more than the minimum wage. However, there is no evidence that the overage results from wage increases granted by the company within one (1) year from the signing of the CBA. Doubt is resolved in favor of labor. Therefore, the overage could not be credited to the P12.00 COLA mandated by Wage Order No. 2 pursuant to the aforequoted CBA provision.
x x x x
Moreover, Wage Order No. 2 does not expressly prohibit the granting of P12.00 COLA to those receiving more than the minimum wage. It only says under Section 2 thereof that all "minimum wage earners in the private sector in Caraga Region shall receive a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) in the amount of TWELVE PESOS (P12.00) per day upon the effectivity of this Wage Order." On the other hand, Section 1 of the same Wage Order positively enumerates those not covered: "household or domestic helpers and persons employed in the personal service of another, including family drivers. If Wage Order No. 2, therefore, meant to exclude those receiving more than the minimum wage, then it would have specifically provided so.10
Petitioner’s reliance on the above quoted CBA provision and on the flawed arbitrator’s case disposition is really misplaced. Consider that in his decision, Chavez, after admitting that NIASSI’s employees were receiving a wage rate higher than the prescribed minimum wage, proceeded to fault NIASSI for not presenting evidence to show that the overage or excess resulted from general wage increases granted by the company itself within one year from the effectivity of the CBA in 1997. By simplistically utilizing the adage "doubt is resolved in labor," instead of relying on the case records and the evidence adduced, the voluntary arbitrator extended the coverage of WO RXIII-02 to include those who, by the terms of the order, are not supposed to receive the benefit. If only the voluntary arbitrator was circumspect enough to consider the facts on hand, he would have seen that the CBA provision on non-creditability finds no application in the present case, because creditability is not the real issue in this case. And neither is the interpretation of the CBA provision. The real issue in this case, as discussed above, is the coverage and application of WO RXIII-02.
While it behooves the Court to accord protection to the working class, tilting the balance of justice in its favor whenever appropriate, it is not possible to resolve every dispute to further the cause of labor. In every case, justice is to be granted to the deserving and dispensed in the light of established facts and the applicable law and doctrine,11 as here.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the CA dated September 30, 2003 and its Resolution of January 9, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70435, affirming the Decision dated February 22, 2002 of Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus G. Chavez in VA Case No. 0925-XIII-08-003-01A, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Union’s complaint for the enforcement of Wage Order No. RXIII-02 is, accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson |
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice |
*MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Additional member as per April 28, 2008 raffle.
1 Rollo, pp. 7-28.
2 Id. at 32-41. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
3 Id. at 57-58.
4 Id at 69-72.
5 Id. at 94-104.
6 Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 48886-88, July 21, 1993, 224 SCRA 665, 669-670.
7 G.R. No. 144322, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 346, 361-363.
8 Id. at 364.
9 See Pag-Asa Steel Works, Inc., G.R. No. 166647, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 475.
10 Rollo, pp. 70-71.
11 Norkis Free and Independent Workers Union v. Norkis Trading Company, Inc., G.R. No. 157098, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 485, 497.
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