Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 148123 June 30, 2008
RENE SORIANO @ "RENATO," petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For review before the Court are the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated November 21, 2000 and May 3, 2001, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR No. 21084 which affirmed the Decision3 dated April 17, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan, finding petitioner Rene Soriano @ "Renato" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of homicide with frustrated homicide, and sentencing him accordingly.
The Facts
For the death of Ernesto Amarillo and the serious wounding of Soledad Ferrer, petitioner was charged with homicide and frustrated homicide under the following Information, docketed as Crim. Case No. SCC-2348:
That on or about the 29th day of December, 1994, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, in San Carlos City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Ernesto Amarillo and Soledad Ferrer, thereby inflicting upon Ernesto Amarillo serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim x x x; and that as a consequence of the shooting of Soledad Ferrer by said accused, the crime of Homicide would have been produced by reasons of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the timely and able medical attendance rendered to Soledad Ferrer, which prevented her death.
Contrary to Article 249 in relation to Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code.4
When arraigned on March 28, 1995, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. During trial, the prosecution presented Benjamin Cabansag, a tricycle driver and resident of Pagal, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, who allegedly witnessed the shootings. Benjamin testified that on December 29, 1994, between 9:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m., he was conversing with Federico Castro and Alfredo Paragas in front of the house of Kagawad Cancino in Brgy. Pagal, San Carlos City. At about that time, petitioner, a neighbor of Cancino, arrived and, upon alighting from a tricycle, kicked the gate as he entered his own house. Not long after, petitioner came out with an armalite rifle in hand, proceeded towards the middle of the road, fired shots upwards for about 15 minutes, and then started harassing passing tricycles. A single motorbike later passed by with the unsuspecting Amarillo and Ferrer on board. According to Benjamin, petitioner fired at and hit the passing duo. Amarillo died on the spot. Also hit and killed was petitioner’s brother, Loreto Soriano. Ferrer, on the other hand, survived, but suffered serious injuries which eventually prevented her from testifying at the trial.5 As the CA would later conclude, the injuries Ferrer sustained, consisting of lacerations, contusion, ecchymose, and cerebral laceration, definitely could not have been caused by bullets but must have been logically due to Ferrer’s violent fall to the ground.
Roger Doldol, a police investigator, testified seeing, when he arrived at the crime scene, two lifeless bodies sprawled on the side of the road. They were later identified to be those of Amarillo and Loreto. He also testified that Ferrer was one of the victims shot and rushed to the hospital.6 Doldol presented a photograph of Loreto’s body behind the gate and testified that, based on the interview he conducted, Loreto was hit while on the side of the street, then pulled by his brother and sister behind the gate and into the family compound.7
Dr. Rachel Leyva-Uy, who conducted the autopsy on Amarillo’s cadaver, declared the gunshot wound on Amarillo’s neck to be the most fatal. She explained that, based on the location of the wound and the bullet’s points of entry and exit, the fatal bullet came from behind the victim.
Dr. Manuel Austria, testifying on Ferrer’s condition, stated that she suffered cerebral ostentation which impaired her learning capabilities and rendered her incapable of testifying at the trial. Lastly, Onofre Ferrer testified shouldering the hospital expenses incurred as a result of his sister Soledad’s month long confinement.
Petitioner denied the accusations and presented an alibi. He stated that as 1st Lieutenant of the Philippine Army’s 48th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, he was at his base station in Camp Boloan, Kalinga, Apayao on the date and time the crime happened. He claimed that he learned of the criminal case against him only on February 2, 1995 when he received a subpoena relative thereto while in the camp. His fellow army officers corroborated his alibi as follows: (1) S/Sgt. Mario Salmos testified being with the petitioner on December 29 and 30, 1994, a fact he distinctly remembered because he was then the Sergeant of the Guard while petitioner was then the officer of the day (OD); (2) Lt. Dominador Tamo testified that he prepared the Guard Detail for December 29, 1994 and petitioner reported for duty on that date; and (3) 1st Lt. Prudencio Dimas stated that he personally turned over to petitioner the responsibility as OD on December 29, 1994. The defense adduced in evidence the Guard Detail and the Disposition and Location of Troops––documents in which the name of petitioner appeared as one of those assigned on duty from December 28 to 31, 1994.8
Petitioner testified that he learned of his brother’s demise only on January 3, 1995. He immediately secured a travel order from his commanding officer so he could attend his brother’s wake and funeral.9
Carmen Soriano, a kagawad of Brgy. Pagal and the wife of petitioner’s uncle, also took the witness stand for the defense. She testified that the prosecution witness, Benjamin, could not have possibly been at the situs of the crime inasmuch as she saw him at the wake of a certain Iling Cabansag in Brgy. Cacaritan, San Carlos City from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on December 29, 1994. In fact, she related that she, Benjamin, and one Ernesto Resuello, Jr., upon learning of the shooting incident, immediately repaired to the scene. And while there, she did not notice, so she claimed, any police officer investigating the incident, albeit investigator Doldol would later testify, on rebuttal, seeing Carmen during the investigation.
Another defense witness, Luciano Soriano, corroborated Carmen’s account regarding the presence of Benjamin at the wake of Iling. According to Luciano, Benjamin was at the wake before the 8:00 p.m. gambling.10
In a bid to further discredit Benjamin, the defense parlayed the existence of bad blood between the Soriano and Cabansag families. In this regard, petitioner testified that Benjamin’s brother, Florante, once stoned his house and later challenged him to a gun duel. Petitioner presented the police reports on the twin incidents.11
On April 17, 1997, the RTC, finding the prosecution’s witnesses against petitioner, as accused below, more credible and their accounts more tenable, rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the complex crime of homicide with frustrated homicide. The fallo of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused, Rene Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt with crime charged, and Homicide being the graver offense, the accused is hereby sentenced to an Indeterminate prison terms of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Ernesto Amarillo and Soledad Ferrer in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) respectively as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.12
Ruling of the CA
Even as he reiterated his main defense and invited attention to the testimonies of his fellow army officers supporting his alibi, petitioner, on appeal, impugned Benjamin’s credibility as witness, tagging the latter’s stated reaction during and shortly after the alleged shooting rampage as incredible and unnatural. Benjamin’s reaction referred to consisted of his not hiding for safety during the shooting incident or telling anyone later in the wake about it. Petitioner further dismissed Benjamin’s testimony as inconsistent with the physical evidence because the entry and exit points of the bullet found in Amarillo’s body show that the firing position is not angular, contrary to Benjamin’s testimony.13 Petitioner also scored the prosecution for not calling to testify witnesses who were in a position to corroborate Benjamin’s purported eyewitness account, specifically the persons Benjamin was allegedly conversing with shortly before the shooting.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision dated November 21, 2000, as reiterated in a Resolution of May 3, 2001, dismissed petitioner’s appeal and effectively affirmed his conviction of the complex crime of homicide with frustrated homicide.14 Thus, we have this petition.
Petitioner’s Sole Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT CONVICTING HEREIN PETITIONER DESPITE THE MISERABLE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Essentially, petitioner faults the appellate court for making much, as did the trial court, of Benjamin’s testimony as basis of its judgment of conviction, petitioner’s well-founded alibi notwithstanding.
The Court’s Ruling
The conviction is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner relies on (1) his alibi and (2) the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence as bases for his acquittal.
We are not persuaded.
As a rule, alibi is considered with suspicion and is always received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can easily be fabricated.15 For alibi to prosper, the accused must satisfactorily prove (1) that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and (2) that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.16 In this case, petitioner alleged being in Camp Boloan, Kalinga, Apayao on the fateful night in question. Assuming the veracity of this allegation, it would still be not impossible for petitioner to leave the base camp and travel to and arrive in San Carlos City at about 9:30 p.m. of December 29, 1994.
Petitioner’s reliance on the presumptive regularity of official functions to support his alibi, pointing to the official documents and testimony of his fellow officers regarding his presence in Camp Boloan on the night of the shooting, is misplaced. The presumption leaned on is disputable and can be overcome, as it had been overcome, by evidence to the contrary, which, in this case, is Benjamin’s testimony that he saw petitioner in San Carlos City alight from a tricycle on the night of December 29, 1994. While petitioner’s fellow officers also testified on his presence in Camp Boloan at about the same time, the Court is more inclined to accept the trial court’s appreciation of the testimony of Benjamin and the weight it gave to such testimony as against those of the defense witnesses. We quote the pertinent portions of the trial court’s sound holding:
As to the documents presented by the accused supporting his theory that he was in Kalinga Apayao, the Court cannot accord its reliance on the same because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of prosecution eyewitness. The facility which the accused can secure documents to bolster his claim that he was not present at the scene of the crime cannot be denied considering that the sources of such documents are his fellow soldiers many of whom are his subordinates. Even assuming arguendo that the said documents are real, in the face of the clear and positive testimony of the prosecution witness regarding the participation of the accused in the crime, the accused’s alibi dwindles into [nothing]. x x x However, in the case at bar, the eyewitness pointing to the herein accused as the author of the crime has positively and in a straightforward manner identified the accused as the one who committed the crime charged.17
Citing the RTC’s Decision, the CA rejected the soldiers’ testimony to prop up petitioner’s defense of alibi, thus:
While it may be true that the witnesses who testified on the whereabouts of the accused are not related to him by blood, they belong to a group of men where loyalty and obedience are the first order. How many battles have been fought with a man in uniform sacrificing his own dear life just to save a brother in arms? Sadly to say, the seeming formidable defense of alibi is [dwarfed] by the positive identification of the accused by an eyewitness whose candid and straightforward account on what transpired on December 29, 1994 the defense failed to shatter.18
Against positive evidence, alibi becomes most unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible witness. In this case, Benjamin testified that he saw Soriano on a shooting spree on December 29, 1994, as follows:
Atty. M. Ramos (Q). Sometimes on December 29, 1994 about 9:00 to 9:30 o’clock in the evening do you remember where you were?
[Benjamin] Cabansag (A). Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q. Kindly inform this Honorable Court?
A. I was in front of the house of Kagawad Cancino, sir.
Q. Did [you] have any companion at that time when you were in front of the house of Kagawad Cancino?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who were your companion[s] at that time?
A. I was with Federico Castro, Alfredo Paragas and no more, sir.
Q. And what were you doing there at that time in the company of Alfredo Paragas and the other person you have just mentioned?
A. We were just stand by, sir.
x x x x
Q. While you were there together with Mr. Paragas and Mr. Castro, do you remember if there was any unusual thing that happened at that date and time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that incident about?
A. When Rene Soriano alighted from the tricycle and kicked their gate, sir.
x x x x
Q. Now after kicking the gate of their house, what did Rene Soriano do after that?
A. He got a gun, sir.
Q. From where did Rene Soriano get the gun?
A. Inside their house, sir.
Q. Do you know what kind of gun did Rene Soriano take out from their house?
x x x x
A. Armalite, sir.
x x x x
Q. What did Rene Soriano do after he got that armalite from their house?
A. He went outside and went to the middle of the road, [and fired shots] sir.
x x x x
Q. In what direction where he fired shots while he was in the middle of the road?
A. At the town proper, he [accosted] tricycles, sir.
Q. While you saw Rene Soriano went in the middle of the road and you said you saw him fire shots towards town proper, where were you at that time?
A. I was in front of the house of Kagawad Cancino, sir.
x x x x
Q. How far were you when Rene Soriano shot those 2 persons riding tandem on a motor bike, from where Rene Soriano was?
A. About 7 meters, sir.
x x x x
Q. Before this incident, do you know this Rene Soriano whom you are referring to?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long have you known this Rene Soriano?
A. I was ahead in the Elementary grades sir and he follows me, and we are neighbors.
x x x x
Q. Now this person you have just pointed before this Honorable Court, is he the same Rene Soriano whom you saw on the night of December 29, 1994 at around 9:00 to 9:30 o’clock in the evening that shot 2 persons riding on a motor bike?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, that was evening Mr. Witness or it was a night time how were you able to identify that that person whom you saw on December 29, 1994 at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening is the same person that you have just pointed to inside this courtroom?
A. There is a fluorescent lamp in front of Kagawad Cancino, and also a light in front the house of Rene Soriano, sir.19
Like the CA, the Court cannot accord cogency to the defense’s characterization of Benjamin’s behavior, i.e., "incredible and unnatural," during and right after the shooting incident. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
To Our mind, there is nothing incredible in [Benjamin] Cabansag’s reaction of not running away or seeking cover immediately upon seeing appellant came out from house with an armalite and firing the same at random to the extent of hitting and killing his very own brother, Loreto Soriano. x x x
In People vs. Roncal, 272 SCRA 242 [1997], and again in People vs. Palma, 308 SCRA 466 [1999], the Supreme Court, citing Its earlier pronouncements, made it clear "that different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience", adding that "[O]ne person’s spontaneous or unthinking, or even instinctive, response to a horrid and repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while another person’s reaction may be cold indifference".20
The ensuing parallel observation of the Solicitor General also deserves mention:
x x x Diversities in reaction are to be expected from different persons due to their psychological conditions and make-up. In this case, [Benjamin] Cabansag opted to stay put during the incident in question, thus seeing with his own eyes the minutest detail of petitioner’s criminal act. This reaction on the part of Cabansag cannot be said to be unnatural. The incident that he saw was a violent stimulus that impelled him not to move where he was, though it may not have been the reaction of another person under the same circumstances. The same is true when he opted to keep silent about the incident immediately thereafter. Delay in reporting a criminal incident as long as it was fully explained is not an indication of fabricated charges [People vs. Rafanan, 182 SCRA 811 (1990)].21
What perhaps might be viewed as unnatural and certainly inconsistent to human experience was petitioner’s reaction to the death of his own brother, Loreto. Benjamin, police investigator Doldol, and petitioner’s own aunt, Carmen,22 all testified that Loreto was among the victims on that fateful night of December 29, 1994. The defense neither contradicted the witnesses’ account of Loreto’s death nor offered any explanation as to why petitioner and his family did not initiate a thorough probe into their kin’s death. Petitioner merely testified that he learned of his brother’s death while in camp on January 3, 1995.23 He admitted that after the burial of his brother, he immediately went back to camp to resume his duties without as much as bothering to inquire from the police about how his brother died.24 Itself puzzled by this odd behavior of the petitioner, the trial court wrote:
x x x The credibility of the accused is made suspect because the defense from their own evidence, his brother was also among the fatalities of the incident that occurred in the evening of December 29, 1994. His silence on the matter of death of his own brother is not one normally the outrage of which is to be suffered in silence, and yet, no complaint was ever filed against anybody responsible for the death of Loreto Soriano. This must be one for the books considering that the killing was perpetuated almost in front of the house of the accused.25
The Court, like the trial court, finds petitioner’s behavior indeed strange. Based on investigation reports and testimonies given below, the death of Loreto was inevitably linked to the shooting of Amarillo and Ferrer. Petitioner’s silence regarding his brother’s death raises some questions as to his credibility and even his alibi. Is it possible that a formal investigation of Loreto’s death will place petitioner at the scene of the crime, making his liability for the fate of Amarillo and Ferrer very much easier to establish? Is it possible that petitioner’s unusual silence on the death of his brother is avoidance of being implicated in the crimes charged herein, as well as an additional and more serious charge for Loreto’s death? Petitioner’s unexplainable reaction to his brother’s death casts a doubt on his credibility and the tenability of his alibi. Silence regarding the circumstances surrounding the unjustified death of a family member is contrary to human experience.
Petitioner would next maintain that Benjamin could not plausibly have witnessed the shooting since, at about 8:00 p.m. of December 29, 1994, he was at a nearby town attending a wake. The contention may be extended plausibility had the testimony as to the whereabouts of Benjamin during the time material came from an unbiased source whose credibility is not under a cloud. As it were, however, Carmen, petitioner’s own aunt, and Luciano, doubtless a relative, had by reason of kinship a strong motive to concoct a story to free petitioner from criminal liability. Not lost on the Court, furthermore, is the fact that under the information, the crime was committed around 9:30 p.m. which makes it possible for Benjamin to be present in the wake and in the crime scene on the same night.
Petitioner’s imputation of ill motives to Benjamin in view of the purported bad blood between him and Benjamin’s brother, Florante, cannot be given credence for lack of adequate substantiation. In this regard, suffice it to reproduce what the CA said on this point:
We may add that no convincing evidence has been adduced by appellant to establish his imputation of ill-motive on the part of [Benjamin] Cabansag. [Absent] such a convincing proof, the presumption arises that Cabansag was not so ill-motivated, and therefore, his testimony deserves full faith and credit.26 x x x
Lastly, petitioner assails the prosecution’s failure to present other witnesses who could have had corroborated Benjamin’s testimony. The assault is untenable for "[t]he testimony of a single witness, if credible, positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. After all, witnesses are weighed, not numbered."27 The Court notes with approval the CA’s reasons for making short shrift of petitioner’s above posture. Wrote the CA:
If at all, therefore, whatever [Benjamin] Cabansag’s companions could have mouthed in court could at best be merely corroborative or cumulative, reason for which their non-presentation could not have given rise to the disputable presumption that there was an attempt to suppress evidence (People vs. Pagal, 272 SCRA 443). In any event, considering that the same companions are likewise available to the defense, it puzzles Us why appellant, despite his perception that they would give an account derogatory to the prosecution’s cause, did not bother to utilize them as his own witnesses.
Besides, it is not for appellant to dictate on the prosecution the choice of its witnesses, as it is the prerogative of each party to determine what evidence should be presented.28
Well-settled is the principle that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter particularly falling within the authority of the trial court, as it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.29 A trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight—even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.30
The trial court observed that Benjamin "has positively and in a straightforward manner identified the accused as the one who committed the crime charged."31 Upon review of the records, we concur with the appellate and trial courts in their appreciation of Benjamin’s testimony. Pertinently, the CA explained:
For one, [Benjamin] Cabansag could not have been mistaken in positively identifying appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As testified to by this witness, there was light at the scene, and he was at a distance of only about seven (7) meters from appellant (TSN, August 7, 1995, p. 8). Cabansag, therefore, could very well see appellant when the latter fired his armalite. For sure, Cabansag could not have been mistaken appellant for somebody else, what with the undisputed fact that the two (2) were former neighbors and schoolmates (Ibid, p. 7).32
It may be stated at this juncture that Benjamin’s testimony regarding the weapon the petitioner used, an armalite rifle, is consistent with the physical evidence obtained at the scene of the crime, as SPO2 Marciano de los Santos described in his testimony.33 This circumstance, to be sure, adds another convincing dimension to the credibility of Benjamin as witness.
A final note. While moral suffering may perhaps not have been testified to or proven, the Court hereby awards moral damages to the heirs of Amarillo even granting that there is no allegation and proof of emotional suffering. As we said in People v. Panado:
Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only when the heirs of the victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, x x x but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional suffering.34 x x x
In accordance with jurisprudence,35 the amount of moral damages is pegged at PhP 50,000.
Moral damages in the same amount should also be awarded to Ferrer. She suffered, as a result of petitioner’s criminal act, cerebral lacerations which impaired her learning capabilities, among other serious injuries. The fact that she sustained near fatal wounds for which she was confined for one month in a hospital constituted what we considered in People v. Caraig "the trauma of physical, psychological and moral sufferings on which the award of moral damages x x x could be based." 36 Moral damages can be awarded without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof, her physical suffering being quite obvious.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision and Resolution dated November 21, 2000 and May 3, 2001, respectively, of the CA, which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the RTC of the complex crime of homicide with frustrated homicide, are AFFIRMED in all respects, with the MODICATION that he is hereby ordered to pay Soledad Ferrer the amount of PhP 50,000 and the same amount of PhP 50,000 to the heirs of Ernesto Amarillo as moral damages. The instant petition is accordingly DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 66-77. Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now a retired member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
2 Id. at 93.
3 Id. at 29-37. Penned by Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada.
4 Id. at 29-30.
5 Id. at 31, 67-69.
6 Id. at 31.
7 TSN, October 12, 1995, Vol. 3, pp. 61-63.
8 Rollo, pp. 69-70.
9 Id. at 145.
10 Id. at 32-33.
11 Id.
12 Supra note 3, at 36-37.
13 Rollo, p. 72.
14 Id. at 76.
15 People v. Paraiso, G.R. No. 131823, January 17, 2001, 349 SCRA 335, 350.
16 People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 128105, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 189, 195.
17 Supra note 3, at 36.
18 Supra note 1, at 75-76; supra note 3, at 35.
19 TSN, August 7, 1995, pp. 19-29.
20 Supra note 1, at 72.
21 Rollo, pp. 127-128.
22 TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 196.
23 Rollo, p. 14.
24 TSN, April 17, 1996, pp. 42-43.
25 Supra note 3, at 35.
26 Supra note 1, at 75.
27 Panahon v. People, G.R. No. 134342, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 456, 461.
28 Supra note 1, at 74.
29 People v. Cabareño, G.R. No. 138645, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 297, 304.
30 People v. Toyco, Sr., G.R. No. 138609, January 17, 2001, 349 SCRA 385, 393-394; citations omitted.
31 Supra note 3, at 36.
32 Supra note 1, at 75.
33 TSN, November 9, 1995, p. 26.
34 G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 690-691.
35 People v. Abella, G.R. No. 127803, August 28, 2000, 339 SCRA 129 and other cases.
36 G.R. Nos. 116224-27, March 28, 2003, 400 SCRA 67, 85.
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